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Abstract  
The objectives of the thesis are: (1) to contribute to the literature on the issue 
of accountability in public sector organisations in a developing country; and (2) to 
explore  the  relationship  between  accountability  theory  and  accountability  aspects 
implemented and reflected in a developing country. There are three general research 
questions: How is accountability as defined in a western context reflected by public 
sector organisations in a developing country?; How do government departments in a 
developing  country  implement  accountability?;  and  How  does  the  experience  of 
implementation  in  a  developing  country  help  us  think  about  theories  of 
accountability? 
In order to achieve these objectives, this thesis explores accountability in the 
Thai public sector with a particular focus on  Thai government departments.  It is 
motivated  by  the  implementation  of  public  sector  reform  in  Thailand  and  the 
promulgation of the Royal Decree on Criteria and Procedures for Good Governance 
B.E. 2546 (2003) following the Asian Economic Crisis in 1997 in order to recover 
Thailand from the crisis and to enhance accountability in operations.  
From the literature review, a practical guideline, based on four concepts of 
accountability in practice, is developed for conducting interviews, and an analytical 
framework of coding schemes is developed for analysing the interview data. There 
are two main empirical parts. The first part is an interview-based case study, where 
semi-structured  interviews  were  conducted,  while  the  second  examines 
communications in the public domain, where the content analysis was conducted.  
The  implementation  of  the  aspects  of  accountability  from  western  society 
does not lead to the creation of an entirely new system. It helps people in society to 
realise  what  they  had  in  the  past  and  clarifies  the  aspects  of  accountability  that 
should be implemented. To enhance accountability in government departments, some 
improvement  is  needed.    There  are  some  factors  such  as  cultural  perspectives, 
incentives, motivations, pressures, systems, and organisational culture that influence 
the accountability relationship. 
The contribution is (1) to discuss the literature on accountability issues in a 
developing country  and (2) to link the  findings with accountability theory in the 
public sector in a developing country.  The findings show that the understanding of 
the aspects of accountability, the focus on types of accountability, qualification and 
educational training, and cultural perspectives, including motivations and incentives   iii 
of  accountors  and  accountees,  affect  the  accountability  relationship  and  how  a 
developing country implements accountability.    
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Glossary of Terms 
Accountability (1) 
Term  Definition  Location 
Accountability  Obligation, or responsibility of a person or 
organisations or entities to explain, answer, 
justify, and defend their actions or what they 
have done to another party who will observe, 
evaluate, and scrutinise that performance and 
they can give feedback, including reward and 
punishment. 
Section 
2.2 
Accountability 
relationship  
The relationship between two groups of people 
or organizations (Power 1991; Behn 2001). One 
group is held accountable while the other one 
holds others to account. 
Sections 
2.1 and 
2.4 
Accountability 
components  
Six main features of the accountability 
relationship, namely:  accountors, accountees, 
accountability for what, processes, standards, 
and effects (from Mashaw 2006). 
Sections 
2.1 and 
2.5 
Types of accountability   Different layers of the accountability 
relationship, involving different forms of 
accountors, accountees, responsibilities, 
processes, standards and effects. In this 
research, three types of accountability, namely 
public, administrative and organisational 
accountability, are the main focus. 
Section 
2.3 
Administrative 
accountability  
The focus of this type of accountability is on 
departmental effectiveness and efficiency; on 
outcomes on input / output ratios, and 
processes. Typically such accountability is 
relatively formal and will involve external 
scrutiny by agencies such as the Office of the 
Auditor General (Sinclair 1995; Bovens 2005). 
Section 
2.3 
Public accountability   Public accountability involves the process of 
answering public concerns about organisational 
actions and performance (Sinclair 1995). 
Typically it is more informal than 
‘administrative accountability’ and invoves a 
more ‘direct accountability to the public, 
interested community groups and individuals’ 
(Sinclair 1995, p. 225).  
Section 
2.3 
Organisational 
accountability 
This is essentially bureaucratic accountability, 
normally based on the relationship between role 
superiors and subordinates in organisations or 
hierarchical relationships (Bovens 2005; 
Mashaw 2006). 
Section 
2.3 
Concepts of 
accountability (in 
practice) 
Four broad concepts, generated from an 
extensive literature review, are used to facilitate 
and guide interviews in Thailand, namely 
responsibility, transparency, scrutiny and 
answerability: These concepts are used as a 
practical framework.  
Section 
2.6   xviii 
Accountability (2) 
Term  Definition  Location 
Responsibility   Deals with duties, obligations and expectations 
of accountors, including duties in relation to 
action and inaction, and obligations to answer 
questions such as ‘why did you do it?’ or ‘why 
did you not do it?’, or ‘how and why the person 
or organisation has acted in the manner it has?’ 
(Lucas 1993; Unerman and O’Dwyer 2006). 
Section 
2.6 
Transparency   Relates to the availability to accountees of 
reliable, relevant and timely information about 
responsibilities and activities  (Kondo 2002, p. 
7). 
Section 
2.6 
Scrutiny   The activity of subjecting actions, operations 
and performance to examination and evaluation 
in accordance with certain standards. Accountee 
participation and awareness is important for 
scrutiny (Bertók et al. 2002). 
Section 
2.6 
Answerability   Answer to questions, and respond to 
accusations (Hart 1968 and Leiserson 1964, 
mentioned in Pyper 1996) 
Section 
2.6 
Accountor  The entity which is held accountable, or ‘who is 
accountable’. 
Sections 
2.1, 2.5.1 
Accountee  The entity who holds others to account, or ‘to 
whom they are accountable’. 
Sections 
2.1, 2.5.2  
 
Thai words (in sections 3.3 and 3.4) (1) 
Term  Definition 
Dharmarath  Good governance  
Dharmaphibal  Good governance  
Karn borihan kijakarn 
banmuang thidi 
Good governance (in the Thai public sector context) 
Karn borihan kijkarn 
banmuang lae 
sangkhom thidi 
Good governance (in the Thai public sector context) 
Rabob kham phrom rub 
pid  
This phrase is defined as ‘accountability’ by the Office of 
the Civil Service Commission (in the Thai public sector 
context). The translation of this phrase is ‘the system that 
one person is ready to be responsible for actions and ready 
to receive effects arising from actions’ 
Kham phrom rub pid  This phrase is defined as ‘accountability’ by the Office of 
the Civil Service Commission. The translation of this 
phrase is ‘readiness to be responsible for one’s actions and 
to receive effects arising’.  
Kham rub pid chob  Accountability. This phrase is used by a large group of 
people, including scholars, journalists and public officials. 
The translation of this phrase is ‘responsibility’   
 
 
   xix 
Thai words (in sections 3.3 and 3.4) (2) 
Term  Definition 
Kham rub pid chob tor 
nhaa ti 
Accountability. This phrase is mentioned by  
a large group of people, including scholars, and public 
officials. The translation of this phrase is ‘responsibility for 
one’s duties’. 
Karma  The sum of a person’s actions in previous phases of 
existence, viewed as influencing one’s fate in future 
existences 
Kod hang khum  The rules of karma 
Tum dee dai dee, tum 
chua dai chua 
If people do something well, they will receive happiness or 
good results but if they do something badly, the results will 
also be bad 
Mai pen rai  It does not matter 
Kraeng jai  To be considerate, to feel reluctant to impose upon another 
person, to take another person’s feelings (and ego) into 
account, or to respect deeply 
Bunkhun relationship  ‘The psychological bond between two persons, which are 
one who renders the needy help and favours out of 
kindness and the other’s remembering of the goodness 
done and his ever-readiness to reciprocate the kindness, not 
bound by time nor distance’ (Komin 1990, p. 691) 
Saang bunkhun  The process of creating gratitude 
Phak phuak  People who are in the same group or clan or clientage 
Phu yai  People who are older, higher status or more powerful than 
phu noi 
Phu noi  People who are younger, lower status or less powerful than 
phu yai 
Sakdina  Feudalism, which indicated the status and power in the 
society 
Kin muang  ‘Eating the state’ (Phongpaichit and Baker 1995, p. 238) or 
corruption 
Personalism  Stressing and focusing on uniqueness of each person, and 
paying attention to person rather than other issues such as 
the system   
Personal relationship   Using personal connections in working place, acquaintance   
Farang  Foreigners, particularly Caucasian  
Other terms  
Term  Definition 
Public official  Both elected and non-elected official 
Civil servant  Non-elected official 
Executives of 
departments  
The director and deputy directors of departments  
Staff  Staff mean either civil servants or public officials 
depending on the context.  
Ministerial level    A ministry under the direction of a minister, who is a 
politician. 
Departmental level   A government department is led by the director of a 
department and is under the control of a permanent 
secretary of a ministry, who reports directly to a minister.     xx 
  
 
1 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction  
Accountability  is  claimed  as  a complex  and  elusive  subject (Mulgan  2000b). 
Sinclair  (1995)  argues  that  accountability  is  chameleon-like,  and  that  researchers  in 
different areas focus on different types of accountability. For example, human resource 
management and social psychology usually explain accountability via organisational and 
human  behaviour  (see  Ammeter  et  al.  2004;  Frink  and  Klimoski  1998).  Some 
researchers focus on accountability and ethical issues (see Dubnick 2003; Zadek 1998). 
Some accounting researchers focus on accountability in financial reports and accounting 
information, including information disclosure (see such as Bird 1973; Dixon et al. 1991; 
Hyndman and Anderson 1995). For public management, accountability is important to 
enhance  good  governance  (World  Bank  1992).  However,  the  problem  of 
‘incommensurability’  in  the  aspects  of  accountability  is  encountered  in  non-English 
speaking  countries  (Dubnick  2002).  Different  countries  translate  accountability 
differently.  Thailand,  particularly  in  the  public  sector,  translates  ‘accountability’  as 
‘liable responsibility for one’s own actions’ (OCSC 2007d, in Thai). 
Due to the fact that accountability is discussed in many areas, there are several 
theories  relating  to  accountability,  for  example,  agency  theory,  which  regards  the 
principal-agent relationship as an accountability relationship. Cultural perspectives also 
have  a  link  to  accountability.  Hofstede’s  cultural  idea  is  applied  in  certain  areas  of 
research. For example, cultural perspectives and values in some Asian countries do not 
support  accountability  (Velayutham  and  Perera  2004).  Asian  countries,  which  are 
classified as large power distance, collectivist, and having strong uncertainty avoidance 
societies, tend to hide or prevent the disclosure of information, as they prefer to keep 
certain  information  secret  (Gray  1988;  Velayutham  and  Perera  2004).  Such 
characteristics  can  affect  accountability,  particularly  the  accountability  relationship 
between accountors and accountees.  
In 1997,  a  lack  of  accountability  was  claimed  to  be  a  principal  cause of  the 
economic  crisis  that  affected  some  East  Asian  and  South  East  Asian  countries 
(Velayutham and Perera 2004). To recover from this, some Asian countries, such as 
Thailand,  received  support  programmes  from  various  international  organisations  and 
some developed countries (World Bank 2000). They had to change and revise particular  
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systems. Some of these countries, including Thailand were given help to improve and 
enhance accountability in both public and private sector organisations (Thailand Letter 
of Intent 1997). For Thailand, some ideas and techniques were implemented in both 
public and private sector organisations. In the public sector, some techniques, such as 
accruals accounting and key performance indicators, were introduced (OPDC 2006, in 
Thai). In the private sector, business had to pay attention to some new ideas, such as 
corporate governance and international accounting standards.   
This research focuses on accountability in a developing country because it is 
interesting to  study  how such  a  country  implements  accountability,  and  whether  the 
activities a country has undertaken reflect accountability. This chapter is organised as 
follows.  Section  1.2  describes  the  motivation  of  this  research.  The  objectives  are 
outlined in section 1.3. Section 1.4 presents research questions, including general and 
specific research questions. Section 1.5 is the summary of research methods to be used 
in this study. The contribution is outlined in section 1.6 and section 1.7 contains the 
structure of this thesis.    
1.2 Motivation  
This  section  explains  the  motivation  of  this  research  in  choosing  to  study 
accountability in the public sector in Thailand. In 1997, an  economic crisis affected 
some  Asian  countries,  including  Thailand,  Indonesia  and  South  Korea  (World  Bank 
2000). They received support programmes from international organisations and had to 
implement a number of projects in order to recover from the crisis (World Bank 1998). 
To improve corporate governance and accountability, some international organisations 
proposed and launched codes of good governance and codes of accountability (ADB 
2000; World Bank 2000). For example, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) proposed a 
set of corporate governance principles for companies and the World Bank supported the 
implementation of the concept of good governance in a developing country.  
Thailand  was  the  first  country  that  was  affected  by  the  economic  turbulence 
(Soontornpipit 2002). One of the main causes of the crisis was a lack of accountability in 
operations.  The  Thai  government  and  the  bureaucratic  system  were  required  to  be 
transparent, efficient and effective (Soontornpipit 2002) especially in fiscal transparency 
because  a  lack  of  transparency  among  government,  public  sector  and  private  sector 
organisations was seen as one of the causes of the financial crisis (Fischer 1998). To  
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recover  from  the  crisis,  both  private  sector  and  public  sector  organisations  had  to 
implement the new techniques and ideas proposed by the international  organisations 
(World Bank 2000).  
Just after the crisis, the idea of good governance was widely discussed in Thai 
society. This idea was first mentioned in 1997 (Satsanguan 2001). Researchers, scholars, 
public sector and private sector paid attention to this topic (Satsanguan 2001). Various 
projects were implemented and research was conducted. For example, in 2002, the Code 
of Good Corporate Governance for listed companies was launched, in order to improve 
accountability in business. The Stock Exchange of Thailand also revised its accounting 
principles and practices and applied international standards to Thai business in order to 
improve  the  transparency  and  quality  of  information  disclosure  (Thailand  Letter  of 
Intent 1998).  
For public sector organisations, the Thai government implemented public sector 
reform  in  a  number  of  ways,  for  example  accruals  accounting  and  performance 
assessment  focusing  on  key  performance  indicators  (OPDC  2006,  in  Thai).  These 
techniques were aimed at improving operational systems and enhancing accountability 
in the public sector. In addition, the Royal Decree on Criteria and Procedures for Good 
Governance B.E. 2546 (2003)
1
 was promulgated as a framework to improve governance 
and enhance accountability in government departments, and there were many projects, 
which arose from this. It is, therefore, interesting to study accountability in the Thai 
public sector following the economic crisis and the implementation of these projects. It 
is also interesting to study whether techniques used in a western context are workable in 
a developing country like Thailand because there are some obvious cultural and system 
differences.  
1.2.1 Scope of study  
This research focuses on the particular case of the Thai public sector. In 1997, 
the concept of good governance was quite new in Thailand, and moreover before the 
economic crisis, accountability was not mentioned much. The Good Governance Royal 
Decree (2003) is regarded as the main instrument for helping to enhance accountability 
in Thai government departments and is, therefore, chosen as a focus of this research.  
                                                 
1
Later in this research, the phrase ‘the Good Governance Royal Decree’ and ‘the Decree’ will be used.   
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The  contents  of  the  Decree  are  mainly  related  to  public  sector  organisations 
rather than the rights of citizens or other stakeholders, and emphasise the importance of 
operational  processes  in  government  departments.  The  Decree  provides  guidance, 
mainly  about  what  the  public  sector  should  do  in  order  to  improve  governance  in 
operations, and to enhance accountability. The contents of the Decree will be further 
analysed in Chapter 3 Accountability and Governance in Thailand. Therefore, in this 
research,  government  departments  and  the operational  processes  are  the  main  focus. 
Civil servants are interviewed in order to understand the attitudes and behaviours of civil 
servants.  
Departmental websites are the main communication medium of Thai government 
departments,  and  provide  information  about  both  services  and  the  departments 
themselves.  In  this  research,  these  are  studied  in  order  to  understand  the  sorts  of 
information  departments  are  communicating  to  the  public, and  how this information 
links to the aspects of accountability. In addition, annual reports, which mainly present 
departmental information, are also studied. Although there is less information in annual 
reports  than  on  websites,  the  annual  reports  do  contain  information  about  annual 
performance, which is important for the objective of accountability. Thus, studying the 
annual reports is an extension of the analysis of departmental websites.  
1.3 Objectives  
There are two main areas of research objectives, as follows. 
1.3.1 General objectives 
The objectives are: 
1)  To  contribute  to  the  literature  on  the  issue  of  accountability  in  public  sector 
organisations in a developing country 
In this thesis, the main focus is to study accountability, as defined in a western 
context,  when  implemented  by  a  non-western,  developing  country.  Differences  in 
culture can affect the way the countries implement and understand accountability, as 
well as the behaviour of accountors and accountees in the accountability relationship. A 
developing country may have some different perspectives from those of western society. 
From  previous  research,  some  Asian  countries  are  likely  to  have  difficulties  in 
enhancing accountability (Velayutham and Perera 2004).   
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Some  international  organisations,  such  as  the  World  Bank,  the  International 
Monetary  Fund,  and  the  Asian  Development  Bank,  introduced  the  concept  of  good 
governance and accountability. Since these organisations are the important donors for 
developing countries, this research also focuses on how the reflection of accountability 
in  a  developing  country  is  similar  or  different  from  the  aspects  raised  by  these 
organisations.  The  process  and  obstacles  arising  from  the  implementation  of  good 
governance are included in this research.   
2) To explore the relationship between accountability theory and accountability aspects 
implemented and reflected in a developing country  
With  the  first  general  objective,  cultural  perspectives  may  cause  some 
differences in the reflection of accountability in a developing country. The reflection, the 
evidence and the implementation of accountability will help the researcher to consider 
and decide what part cultural perspectives play in the accountability relationship. In this 
research, cultural perspectives are used to analyse results and key findings, in order to 
study  the  impact  of  culture  on  accountability.  The  literature  review  compares  and 
contrasts Hofstede’s cultural perspectives (1991) with specific research into Thai values, 
including the historical background and religion, to form a framework for the analysis. 
From the findings of the analysis, the relevance of Hofstede’s work is discussed.  
The accountability relationship, used in this research to study the relationship 
between accountor and accountee, is developed from Power’s agency model (1991) and 
Mashaw’s accountability components (2006). The results from this research can increase 
and expand the knowledge and perspectives of accountability of the public sector in a 
developing country.  
1.3.2 Specific objectives – Thailand 
The  specific  objectives  focus  on  accountability  in  Thai  public  sector 
organisations. Some projects, such as the promulgation of the Good Governance Royal 
Decree, the implementation of accruals accounting into the accounting system and the 
implementation of the new performance assessment system, are also important for this 
study. Additionally, since civil servants play an important part in the process of reform, 
their perceptions and understanding of the issues arising from public sector reform and 
the introduction of the Good Governance Royal Decree are one of the focal points of this 
research.  The  results  can  explain  the  behaviour  of  accountors  and  accountees  and  
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provide  reasons  for  the  results  of  the  implementation.  Two  main  methods  of 
communication used by departments to communicate with internal and external users are 
also examined.  
Thus, the specific objectives are:  
1)  to study the implementation of accountability in government departments, and  
the  understanding  of  aspects  of  accountability,  particularly  after  the 
implementation of public sector reform and the Good Governance Royal Decree, 
in order to explore factors that affect accountability directly; 
2)  to explore constraints and obstacles arising from public sector reform and the 
implementation  of  the  Good  Governance  Royal  Decree,  and  investigate  the 
reasons for these; 
3)  to  explore  the  importance  and  usefulness  of  departmental  media,  particularly 
departmental websites and annual reports and to explore how effectively these 
are used; 
4)  to  explore  the  role  of  financial  information  used  by  executives  and  staff  in 
government departments   
The results from this study can be used to improve accountability in the Thai 
public sector and help answer the research questions. 
1.4 Research questions  
From the general objectives, three general research questions are employed as 
follows.  
GQ1: How is accountability as defined in a western context reflected by public sector 
organisations in a developing country?  
GQ2:  How  do  government  departments  in  a  developing  country  implement 
accountability?  
GQ3: How does the experience of implementation in a developing country help us think 
about theories of accountability? 
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The specific research questions are as follows.  
SQ1: How is accountability  evidenced following public sector reform  and the Good 
Governance Royal Decree, in the particular case of government departments? 
SQ1.1: How do departmental communications, including reports, show evidence 
of accountability? 
SQ2: What are the constraints on departments from the implementation of public sector 
reform and the Good Governance Royal Decree?  
1.5 Research methodology and methods  
1.5.1 Research methodology 
With  regard  to  the  ontological  approach,  this  research  is  mainly  based  on 
objective  and  subjective  information.  Factual  data,  such  as  information  on  websites, 
annual reports, laws and regulations, and standards, is the primary source of information 
used in the analysis. However, this research also focuses on subjective data, i.e. attitudes 
and opinions of civil servants, culture and behaviour. 
The first part of the research starts with a deductive approach while the second 
part  applies  an  inductive  approach.  The  start  of  the  thesis  is  based  on  theories  and 
previous work by other researchers, used to establish the framework. The accountability 
relationship  in  this  research  is  developed  from  Power’s  agency  model  (1991)  and 
Mashaw’s accountability components (2006). Previous research papers and theoretical 
papers are also used to develop the analytical and practical framework for this thesis. 
Because  culture  is  an  important  factor  that  can  affect  the  implementation  of 
accountability, Hofstede’s cultural perspectives, discussed in relation to Thai values and 
the  historical  background,  provide  a  framework  to  explore  the  accountability 
relationship. The results and findings can expand some ideas about accountability theory 
in the public sector in a developing country.   
The process of this thesis is not either purely positivism or interpretivism but a 
combination of these two paradigms. This is a normal occurrence in research (Easterby-
Smith et al. 2002). This research starts with the theories and ideas of previous research 
papers,  which  is  a  characteristic  of  positivist  research  (Easterby-Smith  et  al.  2002). 
However, this study does not test hypothesis and does not try to be value free. Moreover, 
it is difficult to generalise the results to any other cases because this research is focused  
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on  the  particular  case  of  Thailand.  Other  countries,  with  different  cultures,  would 
produce different results. However, the results of this study can add some perspectives to 
the implementation of accountability in a developing country. Some of the findings may 
also help future researchers in their studies of public sector accountability in a non-
western developing country.  
With regard to methods, this research takes a mainly qualitative approach, as 
most  interpretivist  research  does  (Neuman  2000).  However,  this  thesis  does  not 
contribute to any new theory, which should be the outcome of interpretivist research.  
Instead, this research provides further understanding of existing theories, by applying 
these to different countries and cultures. The implication of the results is used to discuss 
accountability theory when applied to different cultures. The results can support and 
increase the knowledge of accountability theory in a developing country. 
The  process  of  this  study  begins  with  the  literature.  A  literature  review  is 
employed  to  create  a  practical  framework,  and  this  is  then  used  to  develop  coding 
schemes  for  analysing  information  obtained  from  interviews.  Another  set  of  coding 
schemes  is  also  developed  from  the  literature  review  to  be  used  for  the  analysis  of 
websites and annual reports.   
1.5.2 Research methods 
To  answer  the  research  questions,  there  are  two  main  empirical  parts,  an 
interview-based case study, and website and annual report analysis.  
1. Interview-based case study 
One Thai ministry is chosen for the case study. Senior accountants, accountants, 
internal auditors, IT staff and PR staff are interviewed. Semi-structured interviews are 
conducted. The main methods used to develop themes and codes are theory-driven and 
prior-research driven.  
2. Primary data analysis  
Two main methods of communication, departmental websites and annual reports, 
are analysed using a checklist developed from the literature review. This checklist is 
used  to  analyse  selective  departmental  websites.  Departmental  websites  and  annual 
reports are then analysed in order to study what information is provided.   
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The analysis from both research methods, along with data from interviews, can 
help the researcher interpret and explain accountability in Thai government departments. 
Further details about the research methods can be found in Chapter 4.  
1.6 Contributions 
There are two main contributions arising from this thesis.  
1. This research discusses the literature on accountability issues in the public sector in a 
developing country. It helps to explore the implementation of accountability, including 
the  attitudes  of  civil  servants,  and  how  departments  present  accountability  in  their 
operations.  Although  specific  to  Thailand,  this  research  provides  findings  and 
conclusion that may be relevant to other developing countries. The results may be useful 
for  other  developing  countries  that  want  to  implement  accountability  and  for 
international organisations that give support to developing countries and encourage them 
to  implement  accountability,  in  order  to  know  the  situation  and  obstacles  arising. 
Researchers  can  use  results  from  this  thesis  as  a  guideline  for  public  sector 
accountability in a developing country. 
2. The findings of this research may provide an understanding of accountability theory 
applied to the public sector in a developing country. The implication of the results can 
help in expanding ideas and knowledge of accountability theory.  
Previous research argues that cultural perspectives can influence accountability. 
Regarding the economic crisis in 1997, Asian culture is argued as one of the factors that 
does not support the enhancement of accountability (Velayutham and Perera 2004). This 
study contributes to explaining how culture and historical background can impact on the 
implementation of accountability. It helps people to understand and use the results to 
improve  and  enhance  accountability  and  good  governance,  particularly  in  the public 
sector in a developing country.  
1.7 Structure of the thesis  
This thesis consists of 8 chapters. Table 1.1 shows the relationship between the 
research  objectives,  research  questions  and  chapters  in  this  thesis.  General  research 
objectives help in creating specific research objectives.  
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Table 1.1 Research objectives, research questions and chapters in the thesis 
Research objectives  Research questions  Chapters 
G1  GQ1, GQ2  5, 6, 7, 8 
G2  GQ3  5, 6, 7, 8 
S1  SQ1, SQ1.1  5,6, 7 
S2  SQ2  5, 7 
S3  SQ1, SQ1.1  5, 6, 7 
S4  SQ1, SQ1.1, SQ2  5, 6, 7 
Brief details of the remaining chapters of the thesis are given below. 
Chapter 2 introduces the aspects of accountability and defines terms that will be 
used  throughout  the  thesis,  such  as  the  meaning  of  accountability,  the  types  of 
accountability, the accountability relationship and the accountability components. Four 
concepts of accountability in practice are developed from prior literature as a basis for 
the empirical analysis.   
Chapter  3  presents  details  about  accountability  and  governance  in  Thailand. 
Governance in Thailand and public sector reform are explained and discussed in this 
chapter. The Good Governance Royal Decree, which is an important act for the Thai 
public  sector  organisations,  is  also  explained  and  analysed.  In  addition,  some 
background information about Thailand, including the Thai culture and political system, 
is provided.  
Chapter 4 describes research methods employed in this thesis. A discussion of 
the methods of data collection and data analysis is also provided in this chapter.   
Chapter  5  presents  the  results  of  the  interview-based  case  study.  Five 
departments,  under  one  Thai  ministry,  are  chosen  as  the  case  study.  The  interview 
questions  and  analysis  are  based  on  the  components  of  accountability,  discussed  in 
Chapters 2 and 4.   
Chapter 6 presents the results of the analysis of websites and annual reports, 
which are the two main tools by departments to communicate with the public. This 
chapter analyses whether departments use websites and annual reports to present their 
accountability and which information they present.   
Chapter 7 discusses all the results, along with the literature review and theories. 
This chapter is classified by following the components of the accountability relationship.   
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Chapter  8  summarises  key  findings,  provides  contributions  to  theory, 
recommendations, limitations, and suggestions for further research.   
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Chapter 2 Accountability 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the aspects of accountability in terms of the meaning 
of  accountability,  types  of  accountability,  the  accountability  relationship,  and 
accountability components. The chapter includes a discussion of the four concepts, 
which, based upon an analysis of the literature, were assessed as key to thinking 
about the practice of accountability and which were used to guide the conduct of 
interviews in Thailand. The main purpose of the chapter is to explain the frameworks 
that have been developed to provide support for answering the following specific 
research questions:   
SQ1: How is accountability evidenced following public sector reform and the 
Good Governance Royal Decree, in the particular case of government departments? 
SQ1.1:  How  do  departmental  communications,  including  reports, 
show evidence of accountability? 
Accountability is discussed by many researchers in various fields (Sinclair 
1995). They focus on different issues and disagree about many things. The word 
‘accountability’  is  often  used  when  considering  fair  and  equitable  governance 
(Bovens  2005).  The  accountability  relationship  is  the  relationship  between  two 
parties, groups of people or organisations (Power 1991; Behn 2001). One group is 
held  accountable  while  the  other  one  holds  others  to  account.  The  first  group  is 
normally called the ‘accountor’ and the second group is called the ‘accountee’. The 
relationship  between  these  two  groups  is  indicated  by  types  of  accountability 
(Bovens  2005;  Mashaw  2006),  as  different  types  can  lead  to  different  types  of 
accountor and accountee, and can affect the types of activities that they perform. 
Researchers and scholars give some ideas about the types of accountability. 
With  regard  to  the  public  sector,  various  types  are  normally  mentioned  by 
researchers (Stewart 1984; Day and Klein 1987; Romzek and Dubnick 1987; Sinclair 
1995;  Bovens  2005),  such  as  public,  political,  managerial  or  administrative, 
organisational, professional and personal accountability. Moreover, some types can 
be classified into sub-types. For example, managerial accountability can be classified 
as  fiscal/regularity  accountability,  process/efficiency  accountability,  and 
programme/effectiveness accountability (Day and Klein 1987).    
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In addition to the accountor and accountee, the relationship of accountability 
has been said to include four other components. These are: what the accountor is 
accountable for; how accountability is discharged or through what process; by what 
standards;  and  with  what  effect  (UN  2004;  Mashaw  2006).  These  are  said  by 
Mashaw to be features of the actions between the accountor and the accountee.  The 
six components of the accountability relationship are discussed in section 2.5.  
This chapter is classified into 8 sections, including the introduction. Section 
2.2 discusses the meaning of accountability and the relationship of accountability. 
Section 2.3 describes types of accountability, focusing on the public sector. Section 
2.4  describes  and  discusses  the  accountability  relationship.  Section  2.5  discusses 
accountability  components,  and  focuses  on  the  accountor,  the  accountee, 
accountability for what, processes, standards, and effects of accountability.    
Section 2.6 discusses the four concepts of the practice of accountability that 
are  used  in  this  thesis  to  explore  accountability  in  Thailand.  In  this  section,  the 
meanings of accountability given by researchers are used to develop the four main 
concepts  emerging:  responsibility,  transparency,  answerability  and  scrutiny. 
Responsibility is related to ‘accountability for what’. The other three concepts are 
features  of  ‘the  processes  of  accountability’.  Section  2.7  discusses  how  the  four 
concepts link with the accountability relationship. Section 2.8 is the conclusion. 
2.2 The meaning of accountability  
The root of the word ‘accountability’ comes from the word ‘account’. In the 
past,  the  aspects  of  accountability  have  been  specifically  related  to  accounting, 
particularly bookkeeping (Bovens 2005). Nowadays, accountability is a feature of 
almost every area, including politics and social science (Mulgan 2002). For meanings 
of accountability, the Oxford Dictionary of English defines the word ‘accountable’ as 
(a) ‘required or expected to justify actions or decisions; responsible’ and (b) ‘able to 
be explained or understood’ (p. 11). Webster’s dictionary defines ‘accountability’ as 
‘the state of being accountable; liability to be called on to render an account; the 
obligation  to  bear  the  consequences  for  failure  to  perform  as  expected’.  It  also 
mentions that the synonym of accountability is answerability. 
There are various definitions of accountability given by scholars, as shown in 
Appendix 1. Different  authors focus on different types of  accountability (Sinclair 
1995). For example, some auditors focus on accountability in terms of financial and  
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numerical matters while some philosophers think that accountability is a subset of 
ethics (Sinclair 1995).   
In  addition  to  the  general  elusiveness  of  the  meaning  of  ‘accountability’, 
there  is  for  non-English  speaking  countries  a  special  problem  of 
‘incommensurability’ (Dubnick 2002). In some countries, ‘accountability’ is all the 
more difficult to comprehend, or ‘pin down’ because the native language contains no 
direct equivalent of English word ‘accountability’. Some countries, such as France, 
Spain,  Italy  and  Portugal,  use  various  forms  of  ‘responsibility’  to  represent 
‘accountability’  (Dubnick  2002).  In  Brazil,  ‘accountability’  is  translated  as  a 
combination  of  ‘transparency’  and  ‘responsibility’  (Litovsky  and  MacGillivray 
2007).  In  Indonesia,  the  word  ‘accountability’  can  be  translated  as  either 
‘compliance’  or  ‘the  rendering  of  accounts’,  while  the  Russians  use  the  word 
‘transparency’  (Litovsky  and  MacGillivray  2007,  p.  23).  Some  languages,  e.g. 
Korean, Romanian, Spanish and Thai do not actually have a word for accountability, 
but it is sometimes translated as ‘responsibility’ (Osborne 2004, p. 292). Thailand, 
particularly in public sector organisations equates the word ‘accountability’ with the 
phrase ‘Rabob kham phrom rub pid or Kham phrom rub pid’ OCSC 2007d, in Thai). 
A literal translation is ‘responsibility in the performance of their duties and actions’.      
As shown in Appendix 1, there are some definitions of accountability given 
by scholars and international organisations. Those meanings are used to define a 
word ‘accountability’ as:  
…obligation,  or  responsibility  of  a  person  or  organisations  or  entities  to 
explain, answer, justify, and defend their actions or what they have done to another 
party who will observe, evaluate, and scrutinise that performance and they can give 
feedback, including reward and punishment.  
In any accountability relationship, there are two main parties. Researchers 
may refer to the first in a variety of ways, including  ‘actor’, ‘accountor’, ‘agent’, 
‘steward’,  or  ‘accountability  holdee’.    The  other  party  may  be  referred  to  as 
‘accountee’,  ‘principal’,  ‘forum’,  ‘audience’  or  ‘accountability  holder’.  However, 
Ijiri (1983) argues that there is often another party included in the accountability 
relationship,  specifically  in  an  accounting  framework.  An  accountant  plays  an 
important role, as the medium between an accountor and an accountee being the 
supplier and the user of information respectively.   
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2.2.1 Theories  
With regard to theories, agency theory, and the relationship between principal 
and agent are normally mentioned in the discussion of accountability (Power 1991). 
Agency theory is based on an agency relationship, ‘a contract under which one or 
more person (the principal(s)) engages another person (the agent) to perform some 
service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to 
the agent’ (Jensen and Meckling 1976, p. 308). Thus, this relationship involves two 
parties, the principal and the agent (Levinthal 1988). Principal-agent theory is usually 
used to explain the accountability relationship, particularly in business, because the 
origin of agency theory comes from the problem of risk sharing between individuals 
or groups of people (Eisenhardt 1989) and the problem of uncertainty, incomplete 
information or information asymmetries (Levinthal 1988). This theory is also utilised 
in  psychology  and  human  resource  management  research  when  discussing  the 
accountability relationship and decision making processes.   
Regarding stewardship theory, according to Davis et al. (1997), ‘… the model 
of  man  is  based  on  a  steward  whose  behaviour  is  ordered  such  that  pro-
organisational, collectivistic behaviours have higher utility than individualistic, self-
serving behaviour’ (p. 24). The way a steward performs may affect the accountability 
relationship.  Caers  et  al.  (2006)  argue  that  ‘stewardship  theory  differs  from 
traditional agency theory in that it questions the assumption that a principal-agent 
relationship will always be characterised by agency conflicts’ (p. 28). Dicke and Ott 
(2002) state that stewardship theory is ‘the possible basis for the reform of roles and 
responsibilities of principals and agents in government contracted service relations, 
and  for  the  design  and  development  of  more  effective  methods  for  ensuring 
accountability (and quality) in contracted human services’ (p. 463). 
The next theory, usually addressed in human resource management and social 
psychology research, is that of role theory. This was originally seen as ‘a way to 
describe  how  organisations,  as  contrived  social  systems,  manage  to  inculcate  or 
produce reliable behaviour on the part of their members’ (Frink and Klimoski 1998, 
p. 20) and is used to explain organisational behaviour. Role theory also emphasises 
interpersonal  relationships.  Frink  and  Klimoski  (1998)  explain  that  ‘role  theory 
postulates a central role for interpersonal expectations, emphasises the importance of 
the consequence of compliance, and links tasks and activities to individuals’ (p. 20).  
There  are  some  research  studies  that  use  this  theory  to  explain  the  aspects  of  
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accountability. For example, Ammeter et al. (2004) focus on the integration of trust 
and accountability by applying the accountability role theory model in their research.   
As  well  as  these  theories,  there  are  cultural  perspectives  relating  to 
accountability  which  need  to  be  highlighted.  Hofstede’s  cultural  idea  is  usually 
applied  in  the  research.  For  example,  Gelfand  et  al.  (2004)  use  the  concept  of 
Hofstede’s perspectives in their research, by focusing on the relationship between 
cultural  perspectives,  individualism-collectivism,  cultural  tightness-looseness, 
hierarchy-egalitarianism and accountability webs (or relationships) in organisations. 
They  argue  that  cultural  perspectives  are  directly  related  to  the  accountability 
relationship. The nature of the accountability mechanisms can vary across cultures 
(p. 157).  
This is confirmed by Velayutham and Perera (2004), who study the influence 
of emotional and cultural perspectives, e.g. shame-prone and guilt-prone cultures, on 
accountability. In their research, they focus on people’s feelings that possibly affect 
the level of accountability and governance in different societies. The mechanisms of 
responsibility  in  Asian  countries  are  typically  different  from  those  dominant  in 
western societies (Velayutham and Perera 2004). The collectivist and shame-based 
cultural values typical of certain Asian countries can militate against the effective 
discharge of responsibility. In such cultural settings people may prefer to hide or 
resist the disclosure of information, and thereby impede accountability. These ideas 
will be used to discuss the results of this research.  
The previous research can help to explain similarities and differences in the 
accountability in different places.  It can help people understand  accountability in 
different societies because different countries and societies give different meanings 
to and have different understandings of the aspects of accountability. As mentioned 
previously,  non  English-speaking  countries  differ  in  their  translation  of  the  word 
‘accountability’.  
The  aspects  of  accountability  are  raised  by  developed  countries.  From 
previous  research,  culture  can  affect  the  implementation  of  accountability 
(Velayutham and Perera 2004). This research studies public sector accountability in a 
developing country, and cultural perspectives are the main focus in order to study the 
impact of culture on the implementation of accountability.   
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2.2.2 Accountability components  
There are six main components of accountability (Mashaw 2006). The first 
two components are the people or organisations in the accountability relationship, i.e. 
accountor and accountee. This relationship is usually based on the principal-agent 
relationship (Power 1991), whereby there is a contract between the accountor and 
accountee, which clarifies what the accountor should be accountable to the accountee 
for.  ‘Accountability  for  what’,  ‘processes’,  ‘standards’  and  ‘effects’  are  also 
significant components of accountability (Mashaw 2006). 
There are some research papers focusing on the accountability relationship 
between  accountors  and  accountees.  Ebrahim’s  (2005)  study  relates  to  the 
relationship of the NGOs and funders. He points out that if non-profit organisations 
rely on upward accountability or on donors, and they know what the donors want, 
they aim to please their donors rather than focusing on broader objectives. Sinclair 
(1995) focuses on Chief Executive Officers of Australian public sector organisations 
and their understanding of the aspects of accountability. Roberts (1991) focuses on 
how the influences of different forms of accountability can vary depending on the 
type of relationship, in particular the actions of individuals, or individual actions 
towards others.  
Different  types  of  organisations  have  different  focal  parties.  For  example, 
public sector organisations have a variety of the accountability relationship because 
they have more stakeholders, compared with the private sector and NGOs. In the 
public sector, one of the important  accountability  relationships is between public 
entities and citizens. On the other hand, for business, one important relationship is 
the  one  which  exists  between  managers  and  shareholders.  Therefore,  as  well  as 
having different objectives and requirements, different parties will require different 
types of information.  
Some researchers in both the public and private sector focus especially on the 
processes of accountability. Some of them, particularly in the field of accounting, 
focus on information disclosure in annual reports and external reporting in order to 
judge how much information organisations provide to the public (see Dixon et al. 
1991;  Pablos  et  al.  2002;  Nelson  et  al.  2003;  Steccolini  2004).  Others  study  the 
importance  of  accounting  information  in  accountability  systems  (see  Roberts  and 
Scapens 1985; Stewart 1984; Torres and Pina 2003), particularly for the decision-
based concept (Ijiri 1983).   
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2.2.3 Other accountability issues  
As Sinclair (1995) mentions, researchers in different fields focus on different 
themes of accountability or, even though in the same field, they can be interested in 
different perspectives. Sinclair also argues that ‘accountability exists in many forms 
and is sustained and given extra dimensions of meaning by its context’ (p. 219). 
There are a number of examples given to support this argument. Accounting scholars 
typically focus on financial information disclosure, researchers in the fields of human 
resource management and psychology are more interested in accountability relations, 
the effect of decision-based frameworks, and organisational behaviour (see Erdogan 
et al. 2004; Ammeter et al. 2004). In the fields of politics and public administration, 
some scholars underscore the relationship between accountability mechanisms and 
organisational policies.  
Ethics is an important issue for the researchers to study. Zadek (1998) focuses 
on the mechanisms of performance, ethics and accountability, especially the context 
of  social  and  ethical  accounting,  auditing  and  reporting  provision.  In  the  area  of 
public  administration,  Dubnick  (2003)  addresses  the  relationship  between 
accountability and ethical policies in response to four main forms of accountability, 
i.e. answerability, blameworthiness, liability and attributability. 
Romzek  and  Dubnick  (1987)  studied  accountability  mismatch  in  the 
particular  case  of  NASA  and  the  ill-fated  Challenger  mission.  It  was  found  that 
NASA had changed its aspect of accountability to one more reliant on bureaucratic 
and  political  accountability,  instead  of  professional  accountability.  This  diversion 
from what NASA had done well was one of the causes of the Challenger tragedy.  
For business, one of the main concerns is a lack of effective accountability of 
executives (Cadbury 1992, p. 14).  The main objective of the private sector is to 
maximise  profit  for  shareholders  (Barton  2005).  Therefore,  financial  information 
disclosure  and  the  bottom  line  are  important  for  them.  In  addition,  accounting 
information is a main tool for providing useful information to stakeholders. From 
this, it is not surprising that researchers usually link accountability arrangements and 
accounting  systems  together,  and  that  they  also  study  information  disclosure  and 
accountability reports. Corporate accountability or organisational accountability is an 
important area of interest for the researchers to study.  
One of the leading developments in the business field is the Cadbury report 
(1992). This report focuses on corporate governance and was the first code of best  
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practice
1
 for the UK companies. Within this report, accountability is underscored, 
especially in the shareholder’s section, and recommended duties and responsibilities 
are  also  mentioned.  Moreover,  the  report  mentions  accountability  of  boards  of 
directors to shareholders:  
Boards of directors are accountable to their shareholders and both have to 
play their part in making that accountability effective. Boards of directors need to do 
so through the quality of the information which they provide to shareholders, and 
shareholders through their willingness to exercise their responsibilities as owners. 
(p. 16)  
  In terms of the accountability relationship within the private sector, boards of 
directors have to be responsible to their companies and to the shareholders, who are 
the owners of the companies (Cadbury 1992). In addition, in order to examine and 
verify  organisational  performance,  external  auditors  are  appointed  by  the 
shareholders (Cadbury 1992).  
Likewise,  the  OECD  mentions  that  auditors  are  held  accountable  by  the 
shareholders who are their clients, and that auditors also owe ‘a duty to the company 
to exercise due professional care in the conduct of the audit’ (OECD 2004b, p. 22). 
Thus, shareholders have the right to access certain data and information, and should 
have the opportunity to ask questions of the board (OECD 2004b).  
   Due to ineffective management and administration, some governments had 
to implement public sector reform and start New Public Management (NPM) (Parker 
and Gould 1999). In such situations, the aspects of public accountability are broader 
than  before.  For  example,  Mulgan  (2000b)  argues  that  the  aspects  now  expand 
beyond the core sense of ‘being called to account for one’s actions’, to include some 
important  features,  e.g.  external,  social  interaction  and  exchange,  and  rights  of 
authority. He points out that the aspects extend beyond the internal aspects of official 
behaviour, focusing instead on institutions that control official behaviour, the process 
of making officials responsive to public wishes, and dialogue between citizens in 
cases where there is a lack of people able to be called to account. 
2.2.4 Differences between public sector and private sector  
There are some differences between public sector accountability and private 
sector accountability. First of all, private companies are more accountable in terms of 
their bottom line (Mulgan 2002) because the main aim is to maximise profit for the 
shareholders  (Barton  2005).  The  primary  method  by  which  accountability  is 
                                                 
1
 The latest version is the Combined Code of Corporate Governance (2008).   
 
20 
presented  to  shareholders  is  via  the  annual  report  (Midgley  1982;  Ormrod  and 
Cleaver 1993). The main themes for assessing financial reporting are ‘whether profit-
reporting  is  reliable  and  accurate,  and  whether  it  is  useful  for  the  purpose  of 
investor’s dealing decisions so that resources are allocated to the most deserving 
companies’ (Dev 1982, p. 129). On the other hand, public sector organisations focus 
on process and general policy (Mulgan 2002). Types of public sector accountability 
will be discussed later on in this chapter.     
For decision making, businesses pay attention to both private and individual 
decisions  but  government  agencies  mainly  focus  on  collective  decisions  (Barton 
2005). Moreover, the scope of accountability for these two types of organisation is 
not  similar.  The  public  sector  is  more  focused  on  the  public  interest  and  its 
responsibilities are more extensive than those of the private sector (Barton 2005). 
Also,  public  sector  organisations  have  more  accountees  than  the  private  sector. 
Regarding privacy, private sector  companies are less open with their information 
than the public sector in order to keep their information private (Ijiri 1987; Mulgan 
2002). They also have more rights entitling them to a certain amount of privacy. 
Public sector entities however are obliged to provide more information to the public 
in general.  
2.3 Types of accountability  
Public  governance,  market  and  social  accountability  are  the  three  main 
regimes (Mashaw 2006). Public governance focuses on the accountability of public 
sector organisations and the officials they employ. Market is related to accountability 
in  the  private  sector.  For  social  accountability,  accountability  among  families, 
professions or teams are the main considerations. Public sector organisations are the 
main  focus  of  this  research.  Therefore,  in  this  section,  the  regime  of  public 
governance is described and discussed.   
For public sector accountability, scholars cite a variety of ideas about the 
types of accountability. For example, Day and Klein (1987) mention two main types 
of accountability, political and managerial accountability. Sinclair (1995) focuses on 
five types, political, public, managerial, professional and personal accountability. In 
this section, types of public sector accountability are discussed.  
The first type is that of public accountability. Sinclair (1995) defines this type 
as ‘a more informal but direct accountability to the public, interested community 
groups and individuals’ (p. 225). This type of accountability is more informal than  
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political  accountability.  A  citizens’  right  to  know  is  at  the  root  of  this  type  of 
accountability  (Pablos  et  al.  2002).  Public  accountability  involves  the  process  of 
answering  public  concerns  about  organisational  actions  and  performance  through 
various mechanisms, such as the media and public hearings (Sinclair 1995). Public 
officials should treat the public fairly (Behn 2001; Axworthy 2005). The strength of 
public audit can support public accountability (Stewart 1984). 
The  next  type  is  political  accountability  that  has  been  applied  since  the 
Athenian era, when it meant holding officials accountable for their actions (Newell 
and  Bellour  2002,  p.  7).  It  was  then  extended  to  include  ministerial  and 
parliamentary accountability. The meaning of political accountability, as given by 
Day and Klein (1987), is as follows:  
Political  accountability  is  about  those  with  delegated  authority  being 
answerable  for  their  actions  to  people,  whether  directly  in  simple  societies  or 
indirectly in complex societies (p. 26) 
From  this  meaning,  accountors  mainly  include  civil  servants,  politicians, 
cabinet  members,  legislators,  and  political  parties,  all  of  whom  should  be 
accountable  to  their  constituents.  The  chain  of  political  accountability  in  the 
parliamentary system links public officials to the directors of particular departments, 
who are accountable to ministers, then to the cabinet, to the parliament, and finally to 
the  electors  (Sinclair  1995).  For  some  countries,  the  chain  directly  links  public 
managers to representatives and political parties (Bovens 1998). The basis of this 
accountability relationship is based on responsiveness to constituents (Romzek and 
Dubnick 1987; Brinkerhoff 2001).    
Another type of accountability is organisational accountability, though some 
researchers use the term ‘administrative accountability’ instead (Mashaw 2006). This 
is  normally  based  on  the  relationship  between  superiors  and  subordinates  in 
organisations or hierarchical relationships (Bovens 2005; Mashaw 2006).   
Managerial  accountability  is  defined  as  ‘making  those  with  delegated 
authority answerable for carrying out agreed tasks according to agreed criteria of 
performance’ (Day and Klein 1987, p. 27). Day and Klein (1987) argue that this 
accountability  can  be  classified  into  three  sub-types,  namely  fiscal/regularity 
accountability,  process/efficiency  accountability,  and  programme/effectiveness 
accountability.  These  three  sub-types  focus  on  input,  output,  and  outcome 
respectively,  and  are  a  means  of  checking  on  the  appropriate  use  of  resources,  
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accomplishment, efficiency of output, and effectiveness of outcome (Day and Klein 
1987; Sinclair 1995).  
Stewart  (1984)  argues  that  managerial  accountability  involves  programme 
and performance accountability, which focus on goals and results, and standards and 
performance. This means managerial accountability  focuses on input, output, and 
outcome.  Accounting  information  and  financial  reports  are  important  tools  for 
showing how organisations use resources and how effective they are (Behn 2001). 
More  importantly,  they  can  confirm  that  government  agencies  are  using  public 
money wisely.  
Some  researchers  use  the  word  ‘administrative’  instead  of  managerial 
accountability. However, others believe that managerial accountability focuses on 
monitoring  inputs  and  outputs,  or  outcomes,  while  administrative  accountability 
focuses  on  only  monitoring  processes  of  the  use  of  inputs  (Sinclair  1995). 
Additionally,  some  researchers  (see  Brinkerhoff  2001)  refer  to  financial 
accountability  and  performance  accountability  instead.  Financial  accountability 
relates to controlling and monitoring the use of public resources or inputs. Laws and 
regulations,  and  procedures  on  resource  allocation  and  reporting,  should  be 
transparent.   
The phrase ‘performance accountability’ is defined as scrutinising the process 
of achievement through the use of public resources (Brinkerhoff 2001). This focuses 
on ‘what government does – what it actually accomplishes’, as opposed to ‘… how 
government does what it does’, which focuses on accountability for finances and 
fairness (Behn 2001, p. 9-10). This type is related to outputs and outcomes, and the 
relationship between managerial accountability and public accountability. In the case 
of accountability of the government for activities carried out in the public sector, 
public accountability depends on the existence of managerial accountability (Stewart 
1984, p. 18).  
Another type of accountability is that of professional accountability. Public 
officials  should  be  accountable  to  an  expert  group  of  which  they  are  a  member 
(Sinclair  1995).  Normally,  subordinates  should  be  accountable  to  their  superiors. 
However, the difference between bureaucratic or organisational accountability and 
professional accountability is the degree of control (Romzek and Dubnick 1987). The 
degree of control is high in the case of bureaucratic accountability while it is low for  
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professional accountability. In addition, professional bodies usually have their own 
code of conduct or standards for all their members to follow (Bovens 1998).  
This type of accountability is necessary when a government is dealing with 
difficult or complex problems and need to use skilled or expert officials (Romzek 
and Dubnick 1987). These officials have to be accountable to professional peers. 
Although outside professional bodies may directly influence the decision or actions 
of the expert, either through standards or education, the main authority belongs to the 
agency  for  controlling  or  monitoring  the  operational  process.  This  type  of 
accountability  is characterised by  a deference to expertise (Romzek and Dubnick 
1987).  
Personal accountability is defined as ‘fidelity to personal conscience in basic 
values  such  as  respect  for  human  dignity  and  acting  in  a  manner  that  accepts 
responsibility for affecting the lives of others’ (Harmon and Mayer 1986 mentioned 
in Sinclair 1995, p. 230).  Individuals should be responsible for actions that may 
affect other people (Bovens 1998). This type of accountability focuses on a personal 
ethic of responsibility (Axworthy 2005).  
Accountability can be classified as either internal or external accountability 
(Mulgan  2000b).  Internal  accountability  relates  to  individual  behaviours,  such  as 
professional accountability and personal accountability (Mulgan 2000b). For these 
kinds  of  accountability,  individuals  have  to  be  accountable  for  their  actions. 
Regarding external accountability, types of accountability consist of political, public 
and managerial accountability, and relate to investigating and assessing actions taken 
by organisations or subordinates and imposing sanctions (Mulgan 2000b, p. 561). 
Reflection  
From the above ideas, although researchers use different words to describe 
types  of  accountability  in  terms  of  public  sector  context,  the  main  themes  of 
accountability are almost the same. For public sector accountability, subordinates 
have to be accountable to their superiors and the final group in the chain is that of the 
constituents or citizens. Also in some cases, skilled officials are accountable to their 
professional  bodies.  For  governmental  and  departmental  performance,  researchers 
usually focus on the use of resources and accomplishments. In other words, they 
focus on inputs, outputs or outcomes, including the processes, in order to assess 
whether public sector organisations are using public resources wisely.   
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In  this  research,  public  accountability,  administrative  accountability,  and 
organisational  accountability  including  bureaucratic  accountability,  are  the  main 
types  of  accountability  to  be  studied.  For  public  accountability,  the  relationship 
between government departments and the public is the main focus, though, in this 
research  only  the  departmental  point  of  view  is  studied.  For  administrative 
accountability, the relationship between departments and controllers and auditors is 
studied.  For  organisational  accountability,  the  emphasis  of  this  study  is  on  the 
relationship between subordinates and superiors in organisations, particularly within 
bureaucratic systems. These types provide the ideas for analysing the results and 
findings in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.  
2.4 The accountability relationship   
Accountability  refers  to  a  relationship  between  two  groups  of  people  or 
organisations, i.e. the  accountor  and accountee. This relationship can be between 
superiors  and  subordinates,  or  principals  and  agents,  or  citizens  and  their 
representatives, and can consist of a number of types of accountability.  
Figure 2.1 illustrates the relationship between accountor and accountee and 
activities between these two groups. The accountee gives power or authority to the 
accountor  to  work  on  his/her  behalf  (stage  1)  (Ijiri  1983;  Behn  2001).  This 
relationship  involves  the  account  and  the  holding  to  account  (Stewart  1984). 
Between accountor and accountee, the relationship is related to the nature of the 
contract  or  agreement,  which  the  accountor  acts  upon  as  part  of  his/her  duty  of 
accountability  (stage  2)  (Power  1991).  The  accountor  then  has  to  inform  the 
accountee  about  his/her  actions  and  performance,  including  answering  questions 
(stage  3)  (Bovens  2005).  This  is  the  process  of  information  flow  between  the 
accountor and accountee, used to provide evidence of the accountor’s actions to the 
accountee (Power 1991).  
The  accountee  can  observe  and  evaluate  performance  (stage  4)  (Mulgan 
2002). Standards of appraisal are applied. The accountee has the right to ask the 
accountor questions and/or to request any other information deemed necessary (stage 
5).  However,  in  some  cases,  the  accountor  has  a  right  to  protect  privacy,  and  is 
entitled to withhold some information from the accountee (Ijiri 1983). The accountee 
then can apply sanctions to the accountor (stage 6) (Mulgan 2002). These sanctions, 
including rewards or penalties, could be either formal or informal (Bovens 2005).   
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Figure 2.1 The accountability relationship
2
                                                 
2
 This model is developed by using a model from Power (1991) and previous research papers such as Ijiri (1983), Sinclair (1995), Bovens (1998, 2005), Day and Klein (1987) and 
Barberis (1998).   
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Figure 2.1 shows the accountability relationship and the six accountability 
components, namely accountor, accountee, accountability for what, process, standard 
and effect (Mashaw 2006). All these components will be discussed later in section 
2.5.  
Power is an important concept for the accountability relationship. Roberts and 
Scapens (1985) refer to Giddens’ idea that there are two senses of power, i.e. broad 
and narrow. A broad sense is ‘the power to do’, which is ‘the power of human action 
to transform the social and material world’ (Roberts and Scapens 1985, p. 449). This 
power directly affects the relationship between accountors and accountees and it can 
indicate what, why and how these two parties have performed actions. Another sense 
of  power  is  the  sense  of  ‘power  over’,  i.e.  ‘power  as  the  domination  of  some 
individuals by others’ (Roberts and Scapens 1985, p. 449). This sense of power is 
related to an unequal relationship, such as superior-subordinate relationship.  
With  regard  to  public  sector  organisations,  a  hierarchical  system  is  the 
traditional idea of accountability (Bovens 2005). The relationship between superiors 
and subordinates is normally unequal (Mulgan 2000b). Superiors or people in higher-
power  positions  set  standards  that  people  in  subordinate  positions  have  to  obey 
(Gelfand  et  al.  2004).  Subordinates  follow  what  superiors  want  them  to  do  and 
receive sanctions for unsatisfactory performance (Mulgan 2000b). There are several 
motives for subordinates to follow what their superiors want. The fear of being called 
to account, of facing scrutiny and possible penalty are among the motives (Mulgan 
2000b,  p.  567).  Some  public  officials  want  to  please  their  superiors  in  order  to 
enhance  their  personal  advancement,  i.e.  they  focus  on  their  career  opportunity 
(Mulgan 2000b). This case is different from fear of being called to account.  
Figure 2.2 is modelled on the accountability relationship in a parliamentary 
system. In a bureaucratic system, accountability takes place over several levels. The 
relationship between accountor and accountee is usually between subordinates and 
superiors, whereby subordinates are accountable to superiors. In Figure 2.2, public 
officials are accountable to the heads of departments or executive staff. Executive 
officers then have to be accountable to the ministers and then the cabinet, which is 
accountable to the parliament. Finally, heads of departments, ministers and members 
of the parliament should be accountable to the public. 
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Figure 2.2 The relationship of accountability in the public sector
3
   
Regarding the relationship between the public and government agencies and 
ministers, in addition to receiving services from the government and public sector 
organisations,  the  public  have  a  responsibility  to  give  feedback  or  comments  on 
public  sector  actions  or  performance.  For  example,  the  public  should  report 
information about fraudulent or corrupt activities to the relevant authorities. Citizens 
also have a responsibility to participate in parliamentary activities (Axworthy 2005). 
They  should  vote  in  order  to  recruit  their  parliamentary  representatives  and  give 
feedback on the various policies or organisations (Axworthy 2005). The media also 
plays an important role in investigating organisational performance (McMahon 1995; 
Mulgan 2000a). For example, it can uncover corruption and report this to a number 
of organisations. Organisations should then use these comments and/or feedback to 
improve their actions and decision making.    
In addition to the above relationship, there are certain organisations, such as 
an  ombudsman,  national  audit  office,  professional  bodies,  or  other  independent 
agencies, which are also involved in the accountability relationship. They monitor 
and control departmental actions and performance (Brinkerhoff 2001; Bovens 2005), 
thus the relationship between these organisations and government departments is that 
of  horizontal  accountability.  For  the  processes  of  monitoring  and  controlling, 
                                                 
3
 This model is developed by using ideas and models from Axworthy (2005); Bovens (2005); Parker 
and Gould (1999); and Day and Klein (1987).   
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auditing  reports  are  sent  directly  to  either  the  parliament,  or  indirectly  through 
ministers.  
2.5 Accountability components   
  As discussed in section 2.4, the accountability  relationship consists of  six 
main components, namely accountor, accountee, accountability for what, processes, 
standards  and  effects  (Mashaw  2006).  In  this  section,  these  six  components  of 
accountability are discussed.  
2.5.1 Accountor  
   Many scholars give ideas on who should be held accountable. The concise 
answer to the question, ‘who is accountable’, is that ‘… every person who is in a 
position of power on trust is accountable for the use of that power’ (UN 2004, p. 4). 
An accountor has an obligation to inform the accountee about his conduct which can 
vary  ‘from  budgetary  scrutiny  in  the  case  of  financial  accountability,  to 
administrative fairness in the case of legal accountability, or even sexual propriety 
when it comes to the political accountability of Anglo-American public officials’ 
(Bovens 2005, p. 185). 
According  to  Gelfand  et  al.  (2004),  accountors  can  take  the  form  of 
individuals  or  groups  of  people.  Individuals  are  directly  accountable  to  their 
supervisor, organisation, work group, and colleagues. The accountor can sometimes 
be a representative of the group and is answerable to the organisation as a whole. In 
such  cases,  the  relationship  of  accountability  can  be  either  unidirectional  or 
bidirectional.  
With regard to public sector accountability, the largest group of accountors 
are  public  officials  working  in  ministries,  departments  and  agencies  (Brinkerhoff 
2001). According to Bovens (2005), public officials can play many roles, which can 
be classified into four types of accountability.  The first type is that of corporate 
accountability,  whereby  the  accountor  is  an  entire  organisation.  An  essential 
component  of  this  type  is  the  unity  of  the  organisation.  The  second  type  of 
accountability is hierarchical accountability, with a clear chain of command as the 
main  focus.  Subordinates  have  to  be  accountable  to  their  superior  (Brinkerhoff 
2001), while officials in the middle level can be both accountor and accountee.  
The third type is that of collective accountability. Bovens (2005) explains that 
‘public organisations are collectives of individual officials’ (p. 191). The accountee 
can choose one official to be a representative of the organisation. Finally, there is  
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individual  accountability.  Each  official  has  to  be  accountable  for  their  own 
performance. In addition to the above types, public officials should be accountable to 
citizens during policy implementation and service delivery (Brinkerhoff 2001). By 
contrast, some scholars such as Axworthy (2005) argue that civil servants are not 
required to be directly accountable to citizens.   
2.5.2 Accountee   
The second component of the accountability relationship is the accountee, 
who has certain rights to hold others to account (Buhr 2001 referred in Unerman and 
O’Dwyer 2006). The scope of the accountee within a particular relationship can be 
classified  as  either  a  broad  concept,  intermediate  concept  or  narrow  concept 
(Unerman  and  O’Dwyer  2006).  Taking  a  broader  perspective,  organisations  are 
accountable to all parties affected by their actions. Regarding NGOs, organisations 
might  be  accountable  to  those  for  whom  they  provide  services  and  to  people, 
communities  and  organisations  who  receive  indirect  impact  from  those  actions 
(Unerman and O’Dwyer 2006). Many public sector organisations also fall within this 
scope. At an intermediate level, stakeholders who influence an organisation have 
rights  to  hold  organisations  to  account.  This  links  into  corporate  accountability, 
which is normally developed in business. Private sector organisations are usually 
accountable  to  the  stakeholders,  who  have  the  greatest  economic  power  over  the 
business (Unerman and O’Dwyer 2006).  
A narrow perspective might be when organisations are only accountable to 
the group of people who manage or give money to organisations, the legal owners, or 
the  shareholders.  This  is  usually  applicable  in  businesses,  accountable  only  to 
shareholders.  The  accountability  relationship  can  exist  both  inside  and  outside 
organisations (Ijiri 1983). Within organisations, staff should be accountable to their 
superiors.  Outwith  organisations,  there  are  also  some  forms  of  the  accountability 
relationship,  between,  for  example,  officials  and  the  general  public,  officials  and 
professional peers, and officials and other public sector organisations, dependent on 
the types of accountability.  
Regarding public sector accountability, Bovens (2005) proposes five different 
kinds  of  accountees  based  on  the  following  five  types  of  accountability: 
organisational  accountability,  political  accountability,  legal  accountability, 
administrative  accountability  and  professional  accountability.  First  of  all, 
organisational  accountability  occurs  inside  public  sector  organisations,  where  the  
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accountee is superior. It is based on hierarchical relations, whereby subordinates are 
required to be accountable to their superiors (Brinkerhoff 2001). It is also possible 
that at some levels the relationship will be bidirectional.  
The  second  accountability  type  is  that  of  political  accountability.  The 
important accountees are those elected representatives and political parties. However, 
for  countries  using  a  parliamentary  system,  the  chain  of  accountability  is  via 
government  ministers.  The  third  type  of  accountability  is  legal  accountability, 
whereby the accountee is the courts.  
Fourthly, there is administrative accountability, where the accountees should 
be auditors, inspectors and controllers. At the present time, independent agencies, 
such  as  ombudsman  and  anti-fraud  offices,  monitor  and  verify  performance  and 
administration  (Brinkerhoff  2001),  and  organisations  and  officials  are  already 
accountable to these organisations.  
The fifth type is professional accountability via professional peers acting as 
the accountee. Professional boards have set standards and they monitor performance 
and  conduct.  Moreover,  skilled  officials  should  comply  with  these  standards.  In 
addition to these five types of accountees, funders and recipients of the services are 
also  important  groups  of  people  to  which  public  sector  organisations  have  to  be 
accountable (Wynn-Williams 2005). 
Effective  accountability  depends  on  public  access  to  parliamentary  or 
governmental reports and freedom of information (Barata and Cain 2001; UN 2004). 
Access to information is important for accountability (Kondo 2002; Bertók et al. 
2002), and in an open democracy, the media play an important role in providing 
information  to  the  public  through  newspapers,  magazines,  radio,  and  television. 
Moreover, the media sometimes investigate performance and reveal the truth to the 
public.  However,  in  some  countries,  the  media  do  not  have  much  freedom.  For 
example,  in  Thailand,  some  forms  of  the  media  are  owned  by  politicians 
(Phongpaichit  and  Baker  1995).  Many  Thai  citizens  believe  that  the  government 
intervenes in the media operational process and they think they would not know the 
truth about political matters (Suan Dusit Poll 2002a, in Thai). Therefore, it is not 
always  easy  to  apply  public  accountability  through  the  media.  Also,  some 
governments do not want to provide information to their citizens (UN 2004) and they 
do not have to tell everything to citizens (Birkinshaw 2006). Many countries classify  
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and rank certain information as Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential and Restricted in 
order to decide which information should be kept back from the public (UN 2004).   
2.5.3 Accountable for what?   
This section discusses what accountors should be accountable to accountees 
for.  Organisations  have  an  obligation  to  be  accountable  for  their  performance 
(Mulgan  2000a).  Regarding  types  of  organisations,  there  are  some  differences 
between public sector and private sector organisations. Private sector organisations 
are more accountable in terms of bottom line and profit but public sector agencies 
focus on the operational process and general policy (Mulgan 2000a, p. 87). Both the 
public and private sector have an obligation to provide information to citizens or 
shareholders. However, private sector companies do not have to provide any other 
information than that which they are required to do so by law. Although public sector 
organisations  provide  more  information,  they  do  not  actually  have  to  present  all 
information, particularly information relating to national security (Birkinshaw 2006).     
For  the  public  sector,  one  of  the  most  important  reasons  to  be  held 
accountable to the public is because the money spent by governments is actually 
public money. Thus, they are expected to be responsible when using the money (Ball 
2005). Governments are accountable for their performance and administration (UN 
2004). They should pay attention to the use of public resources, and the results from 
their  operations.  Elected  officials  are  responsible  for  their  choices  of  policies 
(Mashaw  2006).  For  non-electoral  accountability,  top-level  bureaucrats  are 
responsible to elected officials in following through the plans and policies of elected 
officials (Mashaw 2006).  
For  organisational  and  bureaucratic  accountability,  subordinates  are 
responsible for carrying out their superior’s orders or commands (Mashaw 2006). 
This relationship is based on hierarchy instead of coordination (Mashaw 2006). For 
legal public accountability, public officials should be responsible to individuals and 
firms by following justiciable legal requirements (Mashaw 2006).  
In  some  cases,  it  is  possible  that  accountability  may  become  biased  or 
distorted.  For  example,  accountors  and  accountees  may  prefer  one  type  of 
accountability over others (Behn 2001). For example, Behn (2001) mentions that, if 
accountees set aggressive strategies, accountors may focus on money and equity, and 
possibly ignore performance. Another common type of distortion of accountability is 
that of excessive caution. It is possible that accountees may create their own strict  
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rules by not having enough knowledge about organisational culture or information 
inside organisations. This may not be appropriate for organisation performance for 
the long term.   
This situation can occur, for example, with NGOs. If NGOs or non-profit-
organisations depend on funds from a limited number of donors, organisations may 
pay  attention  to  donors  or  external  demand  instead  of  organisational  missions 
(Ebrahim 2005). In addition, short term plans and rule-following behaviour are paid 
attention  rather  than  long-term  social  change.  This  component  will  be  further 
discussed in section 2.6. The concept of ‘responsibility’ is related to this component. 
2.5.4 Processes of accountability  
Different  types  of  accountability  focus  on  different  processes.  Mashaw 
(2006) argues that for public accountability, as mentioned in section 2.3.3, public 
officials are responsible to the public by virtue of legal requirements, which they 
have  to  follow,  so  the  processes  of  accountability  should  therefore  follow 
administrative and judicial consideration. For the relationship between superiors and 
subordinates  within  organisations,  the  processes  of  accountability  are  managerial 
rather than legal (p. 121). Executives monitor the activities of subordinates. Political 
accountability, or the relationship between politicians and constituents, is based on 
the political process. Voting oversight is an important process of this accountability 
(Mashaw 2006).    
Many scholars give some ideas about factors that can increase the level of 
accountability. Controlling and monitoring from both internal and external parties are 
important for accountability, and the amount of information that controlling agencies 
can obtain can affect the level of accountability (UN 2004). Thus, a strong system of 
checks and balances is important for accountability (Brinkerhoff 2001). The ability 
to analyse information and the response from the users of funds are also essential for 
accountability (UN 2004).  
The  establishment  of  independent  agencies  is  one  method  used  by 
governments in order to increase answerability and transparency (Brinkerhoff 2001). 
Another method is to improve the quality  and skill of staff, both officials in the 
public sector and officials in the independent agencies, e.g. auditors. In other words, 
the government should improve operational systems in order to support its work.    
Group  norms,  corporate  cultural  norms,  and  loyalty  to  superiors  and 
colleagues are important for enhancing accountability (Frink and Klimoski 2004).  
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One of the main accountability tools required for accountability mechanisms is that 
of records (McMahon 1995), but different types of accountability require different 
tools. For example, for policy accountability, the main tool is public policy while the 
main  tool  for  financial  accountability  is  financial  reporting.  (Pablos  et  al.  2002). 
Different users require different types and scope of information. General users such 
as citizens, the media or other organisations do not require detailed information while 
professional  groups  such  as  representatives,  creditors,  or  legislative  bodies  prefer 
complete, precise and detailed information (Pablos et al. 2002).  
Since the government and public sector use public resources, they should be 
prepared to explain how they use public money and whether they have used this 
wisely  or  not.  The  government  and  public  sector  organisations  should  report 
information  back  to  resource  owners  in  order  to  evaluate  and  question  their 
performance. There are some tools used to present governmental information. For 
example,  an  annual  report  is  one  of  the  most  important  tools  for  accountability 
(Dixon et al. 1991; Pablos et al. 2002; Sharman of Redlynch 2001). Reports should 
include audited financial statements and auditor’s report, a statement of the aims and 
objectives of the entity, a statement on how the board or committee are appointed, 
the term of appointment and remuneration, reasons for their performance, and any 
commitments and liabilities (IFAC 2001).  
Effective  disclosure  of  financial  information  is  a  basic  requirement  for 
accountability (Ebrahim 2003; Pablos et al. 2002). Financial reporting and audit are 
also essential components (Brinkerhoff 2001; Ormrod and Cleaver 1993; Spira 2001; 
Velayutham and Perera 2004). In addition, financial statements should be prepared 
on an accruals basis (Pendlebury et al. 1994; Barrett 2004; UN 2004). Accruals based 
accounting can provide useful information when assessing government decisions and 
measurement  of  fiscal  policies  and  governmental  policies  in  particular.  It  helps 
governments to enhance accountability and transparency (Carnegie and West 2003; 
Torres 2004).  
The  information  on  assets  and  resources,  financial  performance  and  non-
financial aspects of performance are also important for accountability (IFAC 2001). 
The  significance  of  measures,  results  and  trends  should  also  be  explained  to  the 
public,  along  with  explanations  of  why  objectives  are  not  being  met  (Steinberg 
1999).  For  public  sector  organisations,  other  information,  such  as  budgeted  and 
actual  revenues  and  expenditures,  service  efforts  and  accomplishments,  and  
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performance  assessment,  can  help  to  promote  accountability  (Halachmi  2002; 
Ebrahim 2003; Ives 1987; Premchand 1999; UN 2004).  
However, more accountability means more reports, which sometimes are not 
used effectively, or at all, and may cause unnecessary work (Osborne 2004). Too 
much procedural concentration on accountability and transparency can reduce the 
quality of decision making process (Adelberg and Batson 1978, McLaughlin and 
Riesman 1986 and Jackall 1988 referred in Bovens 2005). Moreover, extremely strict 
democratic control can cause rule-obsession in government agencies (Bovens 2005). 
Paying too much attention to integrity can cause proceduralism in organisations. This 
can obstruct efficiency and effectiveness in the public sector (Anechiarico and Jacobs 
1996 referred in Bovens 2005).   
In this research, three main features of the processes of accountability are 
used as the practical framework, namely transparency, answerability and scrutiny. 
These three features are discussed in section 2.6. 
2.5.5 Standards of accountability  
With regard to the standards of accountability, different standards are applied 
to different types of accountability. The standards are used to analyse the actions and 
performance  of  the  accountor.  According  to  Mashaw  (2006),  for  political 
accountability,  the  standards  of  appraisal  are  ideology  or  political  preference 
aggregation  (p.  128).  For  the  relationship  between  superior  and  subordinate,  the 
standard  is  based  on  instrumental  rationality  (Mashaw  2006).  The  connection 
between executives and subordinates is strong if the standards are clear and there are 
a  number  of  rules  (Gelfand  et  al.  2004).  Legal  accountability  is  the  relationship 
between public officials and affected persons or organisations (Mashaw 2006). This 
relationship is based on legal requirements; therefore, the standards used are the legal 
rules.     
Standards  of  accountability  are  either  formally  codified  in  laws  and 
regulations  or  subjective  standards  or  expectations  of  accountees  (Kearns  2003). 
Clarity  of  the  standards  and  number  of  rules  and  regulations  also  affects  the 
accountability relationship (Gelfand et al. 2004).  Appropriate laws and regulations 
including code of conducts, codes of ethics and standards are also important elements 
for increasing the level of accountability (Brinkerhoff 2001; Osbone 2004).   
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2.5.6 Effects  
After the accountor reports information about his/her action to the accountee, 
the  accountee  assesses  this  performance  by  using  standards  as  a  guideline  for 
appraisal.  Dependent  on  the  type  of  the  accountability  relationship,  reward  or 
sanctions  are  then  given  to  the  accountor.  Rewards  and  sanctions  can  be  either 
formal  or  informal  (Bovens  2005).  With  regard  to  political  accountability,  this 
relationship  can  lead  to  either  re-election  or  the  dismissal  of  elected  officials 
(Mashaw 2006, p. 121). For non-electoral accountability, the range of sanction varies 
from removal to simple displeasure, or ostracism from the governing body (Mashaw 
2006, p. 121). Within public sector organisations, rewards and sanctions can include 
approval,  substitution  or  action  (p.  128).  For  example,  reaffirming  decisions, 
removing errant officials or redesigning decision structure are all possible effects (p. 
121).  For  legal  accountability,  the  results  of  the  actions  could  include  either 
validation or nullification of official acts (p. 121). In addition, affirmation, remand, 
injunction, penalties or compensation are also possible effects (p. 128).    
Effects,  such  as  sanctions  and  penalties,  are  important  for  accountability 
mechanisms. Scrutiny and freedom of information, without sanctions, can possibly 
devalue  accountability  (Brinkerhoff  2001).  In  some  societies,  accountability  is 
defined as a punishment (Behn 2001). This represents the importance of the effects 
of accountability.  
2.6 Four concepts of accountability in practice  
In order to facilitate the conduct of interviews and data collection in Thailand, 
a  set  of  working  concepts  covering  the  conceptual  space  of  the  practice  of 
accountability were drawn out of an analysis (as shown in Appendix 1) of  the prior 
literature of accountability. Colour coding is used in Appendix 1 to show how the 
differences have been extracted from the sources reviewed. Considerable diversity of 
language and terminology was encountered in the analysis of the prior literature, and 
some  diversity  of  views  on  the  conceptual  level.  Nevertheless  the  analysis  did 
ultimately yield a core of the four distinct ideas or concepts about accountability that 
clearly commanded strong support; a broad consensus. 
The  four  concepts,  namely  responsibility,  transparency,  scrutiny  and 
answerability,  were  identified  as  substantially  covering  the  conceptual  space  of 
interest.  These practical concepts or themes of accountability in action were used as  
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a  foundation  for  the  planning  and  conduct  of  interviews  and  data  collection  in 
Thailand.  
These four concepts relate directly to the components of accountability as 
they have been discussed above. The concept of responsibility relates most directly 
to the question of what accountors are accountable for. The concepts of transparency, 
scrutiny  and  answerability  can  be  conceived  of  as  aspects  of  processes  of 
accountability. These concepts are independent concepts that can link to each other.  
Responsibility  deals  with  duties  and  obligations,  the  things  which  the 
accountor  is,  and/or  feels  responsible  for,  and  in  respect  of  which  accounting 
information may be required. Transparency involves openness to examination, and 
the availability of reliable, timely, relevant information is crucial to transparency. 
Scrutiny  cannot  happen  unless  there  is  a  measure  of  transparency,  but  it  further 
entails  the  active  operations  of  examination  and  evaluation  of  performance  and 
actions. Answerability relates to the accountor’s capacity and  willingness to give 
meaningful answers to questions, and respond to accusations, raised by accountees. 
These  brief  indications  of  the  meanings  of  the  four  concepts  will  be  developed, 
explained and discussed later in this section.  
As shown in Appendix 1, the four working concepts derived here have been 
loosely drawn so as to subsume certain words or phrases and ideas, which whilst not 
precisely  and  directly  equivalent  to  responsibility,  transparency,  answerability  or 
scrutiny, are linked to them. For example, the phrase ‘rendering an account’ relates to 
both  responsibility  and  answerability  but  relates  to  the  two  concepts  in  different 
ways. Responsibility can be seen as implying an obligation to render an account of 
that  for  which  one  has  a  responsibility,  while  answerability,  and  the  action  of 
answering, may be thought of in terms of the action of rendering an account; giving 
an answer.   
In  addition,  there  are  some  concepts  which  are  significant  in  context  of 
accountability  that  do  not  directly  equate  on  an  individual  basis  with  the  four 
working concepts but do have important links to them. Control, for example, is not 
equivalent  to  scrutiny  but  these  two  concepts  have  some  relationship.  To  apply 
scrutiny can be vital to controlling an accountor’s actions and operations. Moreover, 
after  scrutinising  performance,  rewards  or  sanctions  are  given  to  accountors. 
Although  rewards  and  sanctions  are  effects  of  accountability,  these  relate  to  the 
concept  of  scrutiny.  Finally  there  are  some  concepts,  e.g.  justification  and  
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responsiveness, that relate to more than one concept. In the colour coding used in 
Appendix 1, these issues are highlighted separately. They cannot be classified into 
any  certain  concepts.  The  comments  on  justification  and  responsiveness  are 
discussed  later  in  section  2.7.  The  main  aim  of  this  part  is  to  create  practical 
guidelines suitable for data collection in Thailand, so every idea relating to the four 
concepts is emphasised. 
Responsibility, transparency, scrutiny and answerability are discussed in the 
sections which follow.   
2.6.1 Responsibility  
From the meanings of accountability in Appendix 1 and the components of 
accountability discussed earlier in section 2.5, responsibility relates to ‘accountability 
for what’. As shown in Table 2.1, these words and phrases are derived from the 
meaning of accountability given by various scholars and researchers. Words listed in 
Table 2.1 are taken together to imply ‘responsibility’.  
Table 2.1 Responsibility  
Code  Sources 
Responsibility   Bovens 2005; Behn (2001); Day and Klein (1987); Nelson 
et al. (2003); Kluvers (2003); Dunsire (1978) quoted in 
Stewart (1984); Jones (1977) quoted in Stewart (1984); 
Mulgan (2000a); Sinclair (1995);  Cadbury (1992); Gray et 
al. (1987); Erdogan et al. (2004); Ebrahim (2003); Edwards 
and Hulme (1996) quoted in Ebrahim (2003); Fox and 
Brown (1998) quoted in Ebrahim (2003); Cornwall, Lucas 
and Pasteur (2000) quoted in Ebrahim (2003); Malena et 
al. (2004); Unerman and O’Dwyer (2006); Bank for 
International Settlements (1998); Grant and Keohane 
(2005); IFAC (2001); IMF quoted in UN (2004) 
Hold to account  Aucoin and Heintzman (2000); Conrad (2005); Roberts 
and Scapens (1985); Steccolini (2004) 
Discharge of a duty  Day and Klein (1987) 
Duty   Mulgan (2000a) 
Call for account  Day and Klein (1987); Mulgan (2000a) 
Rendering an 
account  
Kluvers (2003); Dunsire (1978) quoted in Stewart (1984); 
Bird (1973)  
Liability  Jones (1977) quoted in Stewart (1984); Dubnick (2003) 
Give an account  Jackson (1982) quoted in Hyndman and Anderson (1995); 
Osborne (2004); Dunsire (1978) quoted in Stewart (1984); 
Jones (1977) quoted in Stewart (1984); Mulgan (2000b); 
Kaler (2002); Roberts and Scapens (1985); Gray et al. 
(1987) 
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Table 2.1 Responsibility (con.) 
Code  Sources 
Obligation   Pollitt (2003) quoted in Bovens (2006); Kluvers (2003); 
Normanton quoted in Stewart (1984); Mulgan (2000a); 
Steccolini (2004); Bird (1973); Frink and Klimosky 
(2004); Erdogan et al. (2004); Ebrahim (2003); Malena et 
al. (2004); Grant and Keohane (2005) 
Compliance  AccountAbility (2005) 
Onus, requirement 
and responsibility 
Gray et al. (1987) 
Run business on 
one’s behalf 
Cadbury (1992)  
Rights of authority   Mulgan (2000b) 
Rights and 
obligation  
Conrad (2005); Roberts and Scapens (1985) 
The Oxford Dictionary of English defines ‘responsibility’ as (1) ‘the state or 
fact of having a duty to deal with something or of having control over someone’; (2) 
‘the  state  or  fact  of  being  accountable  or  to  blame  for  something’;  (3)  ‘the 
opportunity or ability to act independently and take decisions without authorisation’ 
(p. 1501). According to Black’s Law Dictionary mentioned in Corlett (2004, p. 11), 
‘responsibility’ is defined as ‘the state of being answerable for an obligation, and 
includes  judgment,  skill,  ability  and  capacity’  while  ‘responsible’  is  defined  as 
‘liable, legally accountable, or answerable’ (p. 11).  
To be responsible is to be answerable (Lucas 1993, p. 5). Therefore, when 
someone is responsible for something, he/she is obliged to answer questions such as 
‘why did do you it?’ or ‘why did you not do it?’, or ‘how and why the person or 
organisation has acted in the manner it has?’ (Lucas 1993; Unerman and O’Dwyer 
2006).  These  questions  are  the  main  questions  for  responsibility  in  the  sense  of 
accountability  (Bovens  1998;  Corlett  2004).  Answering  such  questions  may 
sometimes involve answering accusations (Bovens 1998).  
If responsibility is considered a virtue, then to prevent unwanted outcomes, 
the question ‘what is to be done?’ is the primary question to be answered (Bovens 
1998). When someone is responsible for doing something, he/she has the power or 
authority  to  carry  out  that  action  (Lucas  1993).  Some  actions  involve  being 
responsible, whereby failure to act results in punishment (Corlett 2004). Regarding 
legal responsibility, someone can be responsible for something by virtue of the rules 
and  regulations  of  a  particular  legal  system  (Corlett  2004).  Moral  responsibility 
relates to human reason that can affect how people act, ‘the balance of human reason 
entails or implies that one is accountable for an outcome’ (Corlett 2004, p. 14).   
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With regard to the chain of responsibility, Lucas (1993) argues that, within 
organisations, upwards responsibility occurs, i.e. ‘if I am responsible to you, you are 
responsible  for  what  I  do’  (p.  184).  In  other  words,  it  is  the  superior  who  is 
responsible for the actions of his subordinate because the superior can correct actions 
or reasons (Lucas 1993). However, it is not possible for a superior to supervise and 
observe all the actions being carried out by his subordinate (Lucas 1993).  
Some researchers mention that accountability and responsibility are closely 
related: ‘a reminder that one cannot be accountable to anyone, unless one also has 
responsibility for doing something’ (Day and Klein 1987, p. 5). Others argue that 
responsibility  is  a  component  or  factor  within  a  broader  aspect  of  accountability 
(Schlenker et al. 1994 mentioned in Frink and Klimoski 1998, p. 8). Accountability 
has both internal and external dimensions (Ebrahim 2003). For an internal one, it is 
motivated  by  a  feeling  of  responsibility  and  expressed  through  individual  or 
organisational  actions.  Externally,  it  is  an  obligation  which  individuals  or 
organisations ought to fulfil (Ebrahim 2003). Accountability should go together with 
responsibility.  
Uhr (1999) mentions that there is ‘no responsibility without accountability: 
the  person  appointed  to  a  position  of  responsibility  also  takes  on  obligations  of 
accountability’ (p. 99). Accountability may not occur if organisations do not feel 
responsible for their actions.  
“…whoever is ‘responsible for’ a policy or program is also ‘accountable to’ 
some  authority  for  their  performance  within  their  sphere  of  responsibility”  (Uhr 
1999)    
Some researchers argue that while accountability is close to responsibility, 
they are not similar (Licht 2002; Mulgan 2002; Midgley 1982). For example, Mulgan 
(2002)  mentions  that  responsibility  may  include  accountability  in  its  meaning. 
However,  accountability  usually  involves  two  groups  of  people  or  organisations, 
unlike  responsibility  where  it  is  not  necessary  to  have  another  person  involved. 
Midgley (1982) mentions that ‘responsibility involves an obligation and a possibility 
of being called to account’ while ‘accountability suggests a binding requirement to 
account for an obligation’ (p. 63). In other words, ‘to be responsible does not always 
mean that an account should be rendered’ (p. 63). Midgley (1982) gives an example 
about how a chemist is responsible to his customers for ensuring the correct mix of 
ingredients, and if an error is made, he may be called to account. However, this does 
not mean that he is accountable to his customers for his general affairs.   
 
40 
Public sector organisations and public officials should be responsible for their 
decisions and actions (IFAC 2001). Accountability is more than a requirement to 
provide answers to the public, rather it includes ‘how responsibility will be exercised 
and  resources  deployed’  (Sharman  of  Redlynch  2001,  p.  16).  However,  being 
responsible does not mean that responsible people have to answer every question 
(Lucas 1993).  
For public sector organisations, there is an obligation to be responsible to the 
public  by  providing  explanations  about  their  performance  and  reasons  for  their 
actions. One of the most important reasons for providing information to the public is 
because the money spent by governments is public money, so governments have to 
be  responsible  when  using  these  funds  (Ball  2005).  With  regard  to  being  a 
responsible  and  responsive  government,  openness  and  access  to  information  are 
acknowledged as being important components for a government (Birkinshaw 2006).  
In order to enhance accountability, organisations should clarify their roles and 
responsibilities, including staff roles and responsibilities, in order to help the public 
understand  their  duties  and  actions  (Gosling  2005).  Plans  are  also  important  for 
accountability.  The  explanation  or  justification  for  ‘what  has  been  planned?’  and 
future plans involves a system of accountability (Jackson 1982, p. 220 quoted in 
Hyndman and Anderson 1995, p. 1; Roberts and Scapens 1985).  
Reflection   
With  regard  to  general  definitions  from  the  English  Dictionary, 
‘responsibility’ means duty, accountability and capability. Where responsibility is 
used to imply accountability, some scholars mention that accountability is almost the 
same  as  responsibility  whereas  others  argue  that  each  is  different.  However, 
responsibility can help to enhance accountability. A responsible person should be 
prepared  to  answer  the  questions  ‘how  and  why  he/she  did  certain  actions’.  For 
public  sector  organisations,  officials  should  provide  reasons  and  explanations  for 
their performance to the public, and be ready to receive examination and comments 
from  the  public.  Organisations  should  produce  documents,  such  as  statements  of 
functions and responsibilities, organisation strategies, and a code of conduct, which 
describes their responsibilities and acts as a framework for their staff to follow.  
2.6.2 Transparency 
From  Appendix  1  and  the  sections  of  the  accountability  relationship  and 
accountability components (sections 2.4 and 2.5 respectively), it can be seen that  
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transparency is one of the features of the processes of accountability. The words and 
phrases  in  Table  2.2  are  derived  from  the  meanings  of  accountability  stated  in 
previous research papers and are taken to imply ‘transparency’.   
Table 2.2 Transparency 
Code  Sources 
Explanation  Bovens (2005); Pollitt (2003) quoted in Bovens (2006); 
Jackson (1982) quoted in Hyndman and Anderson 
(1995); Barberis (1998); Behn (2001); Day and Klein 
(1987); Jones (1977) quoted in Stewart; Parker and 
Gould (1999); Sinclair (1995); Steccolini (2004); 
Ammeter et al. (2004); Unerman and O’Dwyer (2006) 
Providing/giving 
information  
Barberis (1998); Normanton quoted in Stewart (1984); 
Steccolini (2004); Ijiri (1982) 
Open to inspection  Day and Klein (1987) 
Open themselves to 
the public 
Unerman and O’Dwyer (2006) 
Present  Kluvers (2003) 
Transparency  AccountAbility (2005) 
Report   Osborne (2004); Normanton quoted in Stewart (1984); 
Cadbury (1992); Kaler (2002); Edwards and Hulme 
(1996) quoted in Ebrahim (2003) 
Inform  Aucoin and Heintzman (2000) 
Disclosure statements 
and reports 
Ebrahim (2003) 
Availability of 
information  
Normanton quoted in Stewart (1984); IMF quoted in UN 
(2004) 
 
There  are  several  meanings  for  transparency  given  by  scholars  and 
organisations. For example, the Asian Development Bank cited in Hood (2006, p. 4) 
defines ‘transparency’ as referring to ‘the availability of information to the general 
public and clarity about government rules, regulations and decisions’. The Oxford 
Dictionary of Economics gives a further definition of ‘transparent policy measures’ 
as follows: 
Policy measures whose operation is open to public scrutiny. Transparency 
includes making it clear who is taking the decisions, what the measures are, who is 
gaining  from  them,  and  who  is  paying  for  them.  This  is  contrasted  with  opaque 
policy measures, where it is hard to discover who takes the decision, what they are, 
and who gains and who loses. Economists believe that policies are more likely to be 
rational if they are transparent than if they are opaque (Black 1997, p. 476 cited in 
Hood 2006, p. 4).   
Transparency is also defined as: ‘reliable, relevant and timely information 
about the activities of government is available to the public’ (Kondo 2002, p. 7). 
Bertók  et  al.  (2002)  define  transparency  as  ‘openness  about  policy  intention, 
formulation and implementation’. However, for the word ‘openness’, there are two  
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groups of thought about this word. Some scholars argue that this word is close to 
transparency,  while  others  think  the  two  words  are  different  (Heald  2006a).  The 
meaning  of  transparency  in  the  context  of  corporate  governance  is  likely  to  be 
understood as ‘disclosure in the language of accounting’ (Hood 2006, p. 17).  
The  concept  of  transparency  is  important  for  government  as  Birkinshaw 
(2006) states: 
‘Transparency’, ‘openness’, and access to government-held information are 
widely  applauded  as  remedies  for  the  deficiencies  and  operations  of  government 
where government claims to be democratic but where it falls short of its rhetoric (p. 
48).  
Audit  and  accounting,  including  reassurance,  is  important  because  the 
obligations on organisations are extended. The concept of transparency varies among 
different fields and sometimes depends on to whom this concept is applied (Hood 
2006). Different groups usually require different information.  
Heald  (2006a)  proposes  four  directions  of  transparency,  namely  upwards, 
downwards, outwards and inwards. Upwards transparency is based on a hierarchical 
or  principal-agent  relationship,  whereby  a  superior  or  principal  can  examine  the 
results,  performance,  conduct  and  actions  of  a  subordinate  or  agent.  Downwards 
transparency relates to the relationship between the ruled and the rulers, in which 
those being ruled can examine the behaviour, actions, performance and results of the 
rulers. It is argued that this relationship relates to accountability and is usually found 
in  democratic  societies.  Outwards  transparency  happens  when  the  subordinate  or 
agent  can  observe  a  situation  happening  outside  the  organisation  while  inwards 
transparency is the opposite. Outside organisations, such as society, can observe a 
situation happening inside. 
Both accountability and transparency are key elements of good governance 
(Bertók  et  al.  2002).  Transparency  between  the  accountor  and  accountee  is  also 
important  for  accountability.  Transparency,  in  the  form  of,  for  example,  a  clear 
performance  report  and  publication  of  results,  is  essential  to  ensure  that  public 
entities  are  accountable  and  practice  good  governance  (Barrett  2001).  Thus, 
transparency and accountability relate to each other, and people tend to use these two 
words together. In fact, Barrett (2004) mentions that ‘openness and transparency are 
essential  elements  of  accountability’.  Reliable  information  is  necessary  for 
accountability,  which  can  help  to  assess  the  efficiency  and  effectiveness  of 
governmental  policies  and  programmes  (Birkinshaw  2006).  Due  to  the  fact  that  
 
43 
accountability relates to the principal-agent relationship, more information about the 
agent’s behaviour can make the agent more accountable and the agent is likely to 
behave better (Holmström 1979 mentioned in Prat 2006, p. 91).  
In order to increase the level of transparency, information on performance 
and annual reports should be easily accessed by the stakeholders (McTigue et al. 
2005). In the public sector, information that is likely to enhance accountability and 
transparency would include reliable information on the fiscal policy intentions and 
forecasts,  information  on  governmental  performance,  information  on  official 
remuneration  and  methods  of  appointment  (UN  2004).  Freedom  of  information 
requirements, codes of conduct, a transparent framework and regulations are also 
important factors for effective accountability (UN 2004).  
Although improving transparency  and  accountability  can  result in a better 
financial  system,  it  cannot  guarantee  the  removal  of  all  risks  in  the  event  of  a 
financial crisis (Bank for International Settlements 1998). In addition, even though 
transparency can improve accountability, there are still some drawbacks, such as the 
violation  of  privacy,  the  direct  cost  of  disclosure,  or  the  revelation  of  sensitive 
information (Prat 2006).  
There is some information to which access should not be permitted and which 
needs  to  be  kept  private  (Birkinshaw  2006).  Such  information  would  include 
information that can affect national security, personal privacy, commercial secrecy, 
defence,  international  relations,  interference  with  a  criminal  investigation  and 
prosecution of law enforcement (Birkinshaw 2006). Thus, confidentiality must be 
balanced  against  transparency.  In  some  instances,  withholding  information  can 
prevent  jealousy  or  dissatisfaction  (Heald  2006b).  In  addition,  access  to  more 
information does not necessarily guarantee that the accountor works and behaves 
better (Prat 2006). Regarding the direct cost of disclosure, organisations currently 
provide most of their information on the internet, which has less direct cost to them 
than that of publications (Prat 2006).   
Reflection  
From the above ideas, it can be seen how the concept of transparency can link 
into accountability. Increased transparency can enhance the level of accountability in 
government  agencies,  while  a  lack  of  transparency  can  cause  many  problems, 
particularly  a  lack  of  trust  by  stakeholders,  and  an  economic  crisis.  However, 
precisely  because  of  this,  public  scrutiny  may  not  be  welcome.  Although  
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transparency  is  important  for  the  government,  some  developing  countries  do  not 
want  to  present  certain  information  to  the  public.  A  good  example  is  the  Asian 
economic crisis of the 1990s, when a lack of transparency was deemed to be one of 
the most important causes of the crisis (Phasukavanich 2003). However, after the 
crisis,  the  governments  improved  many  of  their  systems  in  order  to  enhance 
accountability  and  transparency.  Thailand  is  one  of  the  countries  that  undertook 
some projects to improve governance and transparency. This will be discussed later 
in Chapter 3 (see section 3.4).  
2.6.3 Scrutiny 
The concept of scrutiny is a feature of the processes of accountability (see the 
meanings of accountability in Appendix 1, the accountability relationship in section 
2.4 and the components of accountability discussed earlier in section 2.5). The words 
and phrases in Table 2.3 are derived from the meanings of accountability given in 
previous  research  papers.  These  words  and  phrases  are  taken  together  to  imply 
‘scrutiny’.  
In  order  to  enhance  accountability,  ‘strong  public  scrutiny  based  on  solid 
legal provisions for access to information and public participation and awareness 
raising among citizens and public officials’ (Bertók et al. 2002, p. 47) are essential. 
Public  sector  entities  or  individuals  should  provide  information  for  appropriate 
external scrutiny (IFAC 2001). Barrett (2002) mentions that ‘…external independent 
audit is a critical element of accountability chain….’ (p. 2). 
Scrutiny  and  freedom  of  information  are  important  concepts  relating  to 
accountability, but which should be accompanied by sanctions (Brinkerhoff 2001). 
Some researchers argue that accountability is different from regulation or control 
(Mulgan  2002).  Regulation  and  control  are  ‘forward-looking  mechanisms  of 
influencing behaviour’ while accountability is ‘retrospective, inquiring into actions 
that  have  already  take  place’  (Mulgan  2002,  p.  3).  However,  controlling  and 
preventing misconduct is still important for accountability (Kaler 2002).  
  There are some factors that can obstruct the process of scrutiny. For example 
in public sector accountability, some ministers and officials try to avoid scrutiny of 
and sanctions related to their performance (Mulgan 2002). This situation can damage 
the level of accountability in public agencies. 
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Table 2.3 Scrutiny 
Code  Sources 
Sanctions  Barberis (1998);  Dunsire (1978) quoted in Stewart 
(1984); Mulgan (2000a); Mulgan (2000b); Frink and 
Klimosky (1998); Grant and Keohane (2005) 
Open to inspection  Day and Klein (1987) 
Observation   Frink and Klimosky (2004) 
Evaluation  Dunsire (1978) quoted in Stewart (1984);  Steccolini 
(2004); Frink and Klimosky (1998, 2004); Ebrahim 
(2003) 
Participation   Ebrahim (2003) 
Control and assurance  Aucoin and Heintzman (2000) 
Control   Bovens (2005); Haque (2000); Unerman and O’Dwyer 
(2006)  
Review and revise   Barberis (1998) 
Grant redress  Barberis (1998)  
Measure  Dunsire (1978) quoted in Stewart (1984) 
Scrutiny  Aucoin and Heintzman (2000); Haque (2000); Parker and 
Gould (1999); Ebrahim (2003); Unerman and O’Dwyer 
(2006); IFAC (2001) 
Audit  Aucoin and Heintzman (2000); Bird (1973); Kaler 
(2002); Ebrahim (2003) 
Examination  Bird (1973) 
Assess action  Roberts and Scapens (1985); Jones (1977) quoted in 
Stewart (1984); Ebrahim (2003); Unerman and O’Dwyer 
(2006) 
Power to make open 
criticism  
Normanton quoted in Stewart (1984) 
Praise or blame  Dunsire (1978) quoted in Stewart (1984) 
Praise and censure  Jones (1977) quoted in Stewart (1984) 
Performance 
assessment 
Ebrahim (2003); Unerman and O’Dwyer (2006) 
Blameworthiness   Dubnick (2003) 
Feedback and control  Dubnick (2003) 
Reward, sanctions 
and punishment 
Frink and Klimosky (1998, 2004) 
Provide public 
oversight 
Hüpkes et al. (2005) 
External check  Cadbury (1992) 
Attributability   Dubnick (2003) 
Audit scrutiny   IMF quoted in UN (2004) 
 
Reflection  
Scrutiny is an essential part of accountability mechanisms because it allows 
the public to verify and investigate governmental performance, in order to ascertain 
whether governments use and make decisions about resources wisely and properly.  
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From the above ideas, it can be seen that scrutiny directly relates to transparency. 
Access to information and public participation and awareness can aid the process of 
scrutiny. However, it is hard for people in some developing countries to obtain data. 
As referred to by the UN (2004), many Arab countries classify their information as 
Top  Secret,  Secret,  Confidential  and  Restricted  and  launch  acts  to  prohibit 
unauthorised disclosure. Moreover, the characteristic of people in some developing 
countries, particularly those in Asia, does not support external scrutiny because they 
are  more  likely  to  hide  information  and  keep  it  secret,  particularly  accounting 
information (Gray 1988; Velayutham and Perera 2004). Cultural issues are discussed 
further in Chapter 3 (see section 3.2).     
2.6.4 Answerability 
Answerability is one of the features of the processes of accountability (see 
Appendix  1  and  the  accountability  relationship  and  accountability  components 
discussed in section 2.4 and 2.5 respectively). The words and phrases in Table 2.4 
are  derived  from  the  meanings  of  accountability  mentioned  in  previous  research 
papers.    
Answerability is one of the ideas included in accountability (Dubnick 2002). 
Hart (1968) and Leiserson (1964), mentioned in Pyper (1996), argue that the word 
‘answer’ means both the answering of questions and the rebutting of accusations. It 
is important that public sector organisations provide explanations and reasons as to 
why they failed to meet performance objectives (Armstrong 2005). The important 
themes for answerability are how stakeholders get answers from organisations and 
whether the answers are available (Dubnick 2006). 
There are two types of questions that should be asked in connection with 
accountability (Brinkerhoff 2001). The first type of question asks about facts and 
figures or reporting on what they have done, the second type is about reporting of 
facts,  figures,  explanations  and  reasons  about  their  actions  and  performances 
(Brinkerhoff 2001). Increased answerability can improve accountability (Brinkerhoff 
2001), and there is a close link between accountability and answerability, e.g. ‘the 
information  can  prompt  the  forum  to  interrogate  the  actor  and  to  question  the 
adequacy of the information or the legitimacy of the conduct’ (Bovens 2005, p. 185). 
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Table 2.4 Answerability  
Code  Sources 
Explanation  Bovens (2005); Pollitt (2003) quoted in Bovens (2006); 
Jackson (1982) quoted in Hyndman and Anderson (1995); 
Barberis (1998); Behn (2001); Day and Klein (1987); 
Jones (1977) quoted in Stewart; Parker and Gould (1999); 
Sinclair (1995); Steccolini (2004); Ammeter et al. (2004); 
Unerman and O’Dwyer (2006) 
Answer   Behn (2001); Day and Klein (1987); Kluvers (2003); 
Dunsire (1978) quoted in Stewart (1984); Mulgan (2000b); 
Ahrens (1996); Frink and Klimoski (2004)  
Answerable   Unerman and O’Dwyer (2006); Bank for International 
Settlements (1998) 
Answerability   Dunsire (1978) quoted in Stewart (1984); Dubnick (2003) 
Defending one’s 
conduct  
Day and Klein (1987); Frink and Klimoski (1998, 2004) 
Give reason  Day and Klein (1987); Roberts and Scapens (1985); 
Unerman and O’Dwyer (2006) 
Providing answers  Kaler (2002) 
Hold to account  Aucoin and Heintzman (2000); Conrad (2005); Roberts 
and Scapens (1985); Steccolini (2004) 
Rendering an 
account  
Kluvers (2003); Dunsire (1978) quoted in Stewart (1984); 
Bird (1973)  
Give an account  Jackson (1982) quoted in Hyndman and Anderson (1995); 
Osborne (2004); Dunsire (1978) quoted in Stewart (1984); 
Jones (1977) quoted in Stewart (1984); Mulgan (2000b); 
Kaler (2002); Roberts and Scapens (1985); Gray et al. 
(1987) 
 
However,  some  scholars  argue  that  answerability  is  not  related  to 
accountability. Butler (1973) mentioned in Pyper (1996), argues that answerability 
involves  nothing  else  apart  from  answering  questions.  He  argues  that  while 
politicians and civil servants have to answer questions that relate to their duties, but 
they do not have to admit any liability relating to matters that have gone wrong. 
From his point of view, answerability is different from accountability.  
Reflection  
From  the  above  ideas,  answerability  relates  to  answering  questions  and 
rebutting  accusations,  including  explaining  why  organisations  fail  to  meet  their 
objectives. These answers should be readily available for the accountee. It can also 
be assumed from the above that the issue of answerability relates to responsibility 
and transparency. Organisations are responsible for answering questions. If public 
sector  organisations  can  answer  questions  about  their  actions,  decisions  and 
performance, and can respond to enquiries from the public, then the problem of a  
 
48 
lack of transparency in government agencies can be reduced. In addition, the level of 
public participation, an essential feature for scrutiny, can be enhanced.      
2.7 The accountability relationship and the four concepts 
As  discussed  in  section  2.5,  there  are  six  main  components  of  the 
accountability relationship. The relationship between the accountor and accountee 
can  be  explained  using  the  four  concepts,  namely  responsibility,  transparency, 
scrutiny,  and  answerability.  Figure  2.3  describes  the  relationship  between  the 
accountability relationship and the four concepts. First of all, the accountor gains the 
authority to work on behalf of the accountee (Behn 2001; Bovens 2005; Ijiri 1983; 
UN 2004). The accountor has to work and use resources properly (Bovens 2005; 
Mulgan 2000a). At this stage, the accountor’s responsibility begins (stage 1). The 
accountor should know what he is accountable for, be responsible for his actions and 
for reporting the reliable and timely results of his/her actions, performance and other 
information to the accountee (Mulgan 2000a). This process relates to the concept of 
transparency, which is one of the features of the processes of accountability (stage 
3). Transparency links to ‘the ability of the principal to observe what the agent does’ 
(Prat  2006).  In  order  to  evaluate  departmental  performance,  standards  of 
accountability are used as the framework for the evaluation.       
If  the  accountee  has  questions  or  desires  more  information  (stage  5),  the 
accountor should try to answer or provide this information (stage 3) (although there 
is no requirement to provide all that the accountee requests). This stage relates to the 
concept of answerability. The accountor is responsible for providing the reasons for 
their actions (stage 3). When the accountee receives information, he observes and 
assesses the accountor’s performance and gives feedback to the accountor (stage 4). 
In some cases, the accountee may apply penalties to the accountor (stage 4) (Mulgan 
2002). These processes relate to the concept of scrutiny. Accounting and auditing 
information  is  important  at  this  stage  (Power  1991).  The  actions  between  the 
accountor and the accountee are related to the four concepts used as the practical 
framework of this research. Regarding the other two components of accountability, 
standards  and  effects,  standards  play  an  important  part  in  the  relationship, 
particularly at the fourth stage. The accountee uses standards as a framework for 
analysing the accountor’s performance. Effects are what happen in stage 6.   
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Figure 2.3 The accountability relationship and the four concepts 
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It can be noted that there might seem to be various other important elements 
included in certain conceptions of the practice of accountability. They are, however, 
in  my  view  related  to  and  encompassed  by  the  four  elements  discussed  above. 
Therefore,  they  are  not  chosen  to  be  a  framework  of  this  study.  For  example, 
‘justification’ is defined as ‘an admission of full responsibility for the act in question, 
coupled with a denial that it was wrongful’ (Velayutham and Perera 2004, p. 54). 
From this meaning, the concept of justification can be included in responsibility, 
answerability and scrutiny. Birkinshaw (2006, p. 51) mentions that justification is a 
part of transparency. Organisations should justify whether they will provide access to 
information or keep it private. Some researchers such as Uhr (1999) mention the idea 
of responsiveness is related to the concept of being client focused and the focus of 
public  comment  (Uhr  1999).  Responsiveness  also  links  with  the  concept  that 
governments or public sector entities pursue the wishes or needs of their citizens 
(Mulgan 2000b, p. 556). Therefore, this concept links to the ideas of responsibility, 
answerability, and transparency.  
Regarding  the  four  concepts,  each  concept  is  necessary  to  enhance 
accountability in the public sector. If the public sector lacks one of the components, 
the remainder will be devalued because each has a relationship with the others. First 
of  all,  if  public  sector  organisations  and  officials  realise  that  they  have  a 
responsibility and obligation to the public, and are clear on what their roles  and 
responsibilities are, then the other concepts will occur. Responsibility directly relates 
to answerability, because effective accountability will generally require that there be 
an  onus  on  public  sector  organisations  to  answer  questions  about  the  issues  and 
actions  that  fall  within  the  remit  of  their  responsibilities.  Behn  (2001)  defines 
accountability  as  ‘the  responsibility  to  answer,  to  explain  and  to  justify  specific 
actions…’  (p.  4).  In  terms  of  accountability,  Kaler  (2002)  mentions  that  people 
should  answer  questions  about  how  well  or  badly  they  have  carried  out  their 
responsibilities (p. 328). Responsibility also has a direct relationship with scrutiny. 
With regard to the definition of accountability by IFAC (2001), public sector entities 
are  responsible  for  their  actions  and  decisions  and  have  to  be  ready  for  external 
scrutiny.  
Answerability  directly  links  with  transparency  because  if  public  sector 
organisations can provide answers for every question posed to them by the public, 
this means they show transparency. If the public have access to reliable information, 
they can then observe the accountor’s actions and performance and if necessary ask  
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relevant questions. This shows how these two concepts link to each other. If the 
organisation can meet the conditions of answerability that means they also can fulfil 
the  conditions  of  transparency.  Transparency  also  has  a  close  relationship  with 
scrutiny, as Crick (1972) mentioned in Velayutham and Perera (2004, p. 55), argued 
that ‘effective scrutiny implies access to information and any body cannot be made 
accountable  without  publicity’.  If  public  sector  organisations  do  not  provide 
explanations or information about their decisions and actions, then it will be difficult 
to scrutinise their performance. Transparency and freedom of information is needed 
to make scrutiny effective. As Barberis (1998) mentions, accountability relates to the 
ability to give an explanation, provide further information, review, revise and impose 
sanctions.  Answerability  also  relates  to  scrutiny,  because  answerability  without 
scrutiny is less effective than both together. 
2.8 Conclusion 
As mentioned in section 2.1, the purpose of this chapter is to discuss the 
aspects of accountability in order to develop a practical and analytical framework, 
which will then be used to facilitate interviews and to analyse the findings in order to 
answer  the  specific  research  questions.  This  chapter  discusses  the  meaning  of 
accountability,  types  of  accountability,  the  accountability  relationship,  the 
components of accountability, the four concepts of accountability in practice, and the 
accountability relationship and the four concepts.   
Accountability is the relationship of two groups of people or organisations 
(see section 2.2). In this thesis, the words ‘accountor’ and ‘accountee’ are used to 
represent ‘who is accountable’ and ‘accountable to whom’ respectively (see details in 
sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2). The types of accountability indicate who should be the 
accountor and accountee. This thesis focuses on three main types of accountability: 
public, administrative and organisational accountability (section 2.3). These represent 
the  relationships  which  exist  between  government  departments  and  the  public; 
government departments and auditors or controllers; and subordinates and superiors. 
This  part  is  important  for  development  of  the  research  process.  The  ideas  of 
accountor  and  accountee  and  the  types  of  accountability  are  used  to  decide  who 
should be the interviewees of this research (see Chapter 4).  
With regard to the meanings of accountability, from section 2.2 and from the 
meanings given by scholars and some organisations, accountability is summarised as 
follows:   
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…obligation,  or  responsibility  of  a  person  or  organisations  or  entities  to 
explain, answer, justify, and defend their actions or what they have done to another 
party  who  will  observe,  evaluate,  and  scrutinise  that  performance  and  can  give 
feedback, including reward and punishment. 
Additional to the accountor and accountee, there are further components of 
accountability  (see  details  in  section  2.5).  Some  researchers  argue  that  the 
components  of  the  relationship  should  include  what  the  accountor  should  be 
accountable for, processes, standards and effects (UN 2004; Mashaw 2006). These 
components can also be derived from the meanings. First of all, the accountor has an 
obligation or takes responsibility for their actions. This represents what the accountor 
should  be  accountable  for.  The  processes  of  explaining,  answering,  justifying, 
defending, observing, evaluating  and scrutinising  are features of the processes of 
accountability. In order to evaluate actions or performance, standards or framework 
or objectives should be set as a benchmark for judgement. This relates to standards. 
Feedback, rewards, or punishments are the effects. These components vary between 
the different types of accountability. These components will be used to develop a 
practical and analytical framework (see Chapter 4).  
This thesis considers the particular case of Thailand. In order to facilitate 
interviews  in  Thailand,  the  meanings  of  accountability  given  by  researchers  are 
analysed and the four concepts, namely responsibility, transparency, answerability 
and scrutiny, are derived from the analysis.    
With regard to the accountability relationship, first of all, the accountor has 
an  obligation  to  work  on  behalf  of  the  accountee.  At  this  stage,  the  accountor’s 
responsibility begins. The accountor should be responsible for his/her actions and for 
reporting  reliable  and  timely  results,  performance  and  other  information  to  the 
accountee. In addition, information should be available for the public. This process 
relates to the concept of transparency.  
The accountee has the right to access information and ask questions. The 
accountor should respond and answer the questions.  However, it does not mean that 
he/she  has  to  provide  all  the  information  that  the  accountee  requests.  This  stage 
relates  to  the  concept  of  answerability.  The  accountor  is  also  responsible  for 
explaining why they have carried out certain actions. When the accountee receives 
information, he/she should observe and assess the accountor’s performance and give 
feedback to the accountor. In some cases, the accountee may reward or punish the 
accountor. These processes relate to the concept of scrutiny (see Figure 2.3).   
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The  concept  of  responsibility  is  related  to  what  the  accountor  should  be 
accountable  for.  The  other  three  concepts  are  features  of  the  processes  of 
accountability. Together, these four concepts are used as a practical framework and 
will be used to analyse the Good Governance Royal Decree. The Decree is used as 
the  framework  for  Thai  government  departments,  who  follow  this  in  order  to 
improve governance and enhance accountability (see Chapter 3). The four concepts 
will also be used to develop questions for the interviews, and for the coding schemes, 
used to analyse the findings (see Chapter 4).   
Accountability can be represented through many forms of medium and types 
of documents (see section 2.5.4). One of the  most important forms is that of an 
annual  report,  because  the  report  includes  useful  information  describing 
organisational actions and performance and decision making during the past year 
(section 2.5.4). Other documents and information, such as legal documents, budget, 
auditing  reports,  codes  of  conduct,  and  codes  of  ethics  are  also  important  for 
accountability  (section  2.5.4).  The  internet  is  an  important  medium  by  which 
organisations  can  communicate  with  their  stakeholders,  and  which  can  directly 
reduce  the  costs  of  disclosure  to  the  organisation  (Prat  2006).  In  this  thesis, 
departmental websites and annual reports are chosen to be studied (see Chapter 6). 
The processes of accountability, in terms of types of information and documents, will 
be used to develop checklists, which are then used to analyse websites and annual 
reports (see Chapter 4). The next chapter discusses the aspects relevant to Thailand.  
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Chapter 3 Accountability and Governance in Thailand 
 
3.1 Introduction  
  The  purpose  of  this  chapter  is  to  discuss  culture  and  values,  including 
background information on Thailand, the political system and corruption problems. 
In  addition,  this  chapter  aims  to  discuss  public  sector  reform  and  governance  in 
Thailand, linked to the context of accountability. The information discussed in this 
chapter  can  help  with  analysing  findings  and  answering  the  specific  research 
questions: 
SQ1: How is accountability evidenced following public sector reform and the 
Good Governance Royal Decree, in the particular case of government departments? 
SQ1.1:  How  do  departmental  communications,  including  reports, 
show accountability? 
SQ2: What are the constraints on departments from the implementation of the 
public sector reform and Good Governance Royal Decree? 
As discussed in Chapter 2, an accountability  relationship is a relationship 
between two groups of people or organisations. Within such a relationship, there are 
certain  actions  taking  place  between  the  two  groups  and  several  factors  that  can 
influence the accountability relationship. Culture and values are among the factors 
affecting  accountability  and  can  be  used  to  explain  why  Asian  countries  have 
historically lacked accountability (Velayutham and Perera 2004). Thus, Thai culture, 
values and characteristics will be used to explain the accountability relationship. 
   The political system is one aspect of governance (World Bank 1994), and 
can affect both the processes of accountability and the behaviour of accountors and 
accountees. In this chapter, the political system in Thailand is explained. Corruption 
is one of the main problems in the Thai bureaucratic system, and is discussed in this 
chapter in order to give background information about accountability problems in 
Thailand. 
In  1997,  after  the  economic  crisis,  Thailand  called  on  the  International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) for a package of rescue programmes (Bullard et al. 1998). 
Public  sector  reform  was  one  of  the  projects  put  in  place  by  the  government  to 
recover from the crisis and improve operational processes. One of the main aims of 
public sector reform in Thailand was to enhance accountability in its public sector 
and this resulted in the implementation of several other new projects and techniques 
(OPDC 2006, in Thai).   55 
With  regard  to  accountors  and  accountees,  because  the  Constitution  of 
Thailand  B.E.  2540  (1997)  focused  on  rights  of  citizens  and  aimed  to  improve 
governance,  the  government  paid  attention  to  a  citizen-centred  approach.  In  fact, 
public accountability is one of the main focuses of the government and there were 
several projects implemented which supported this. Consequently, this emphasis on 
public  accountability  links  to  the  concept  of  ‘accountability  for  what’.  Since 
departments should be responsible for the use of public money, there were some 
projects  implemented  with  the  aim  of  enhancing  this  objective.  For  example,  to 
improve  governmental  accounting  systems,  accruals  accounting  replaced  cash 
accounting  (MoF  2002).  This  provides  correct  financial  status  that  is  useful  for 
decision making and evaluating performance.  
The Thai government also implemented projects relating to the processes of 
accountability.  For  example,  the  government  introduced  the  Government  Fiscal 
Management Information System (GFMIS) to record departmental transactions, both 
in central and provincial offices. This project helps staff to obtain correct and timely 
information,  by  reducing  operational  time  and  increasing  transparency 
(Trakarnsirinont  2005,  in  Thai).  In  addition,  the  Monitoring  and  Performance 
Evaluation Committee was established in order to improve the system of monitoring 
and controlling of government agencies, including performance evaluation.  
As  a  result  of  reform,  one  of  the  most  important  projects  has  been  the 
introduction  of  the  concept  of  good  governance  and  accountability  to  Thai 
government  departments,  through  the Good  Governance  Royal  Decree  B.E.  2546 
(2003). This has played an important part in improving and enhancing governance 
and  accountability  in  Thai  government  departments  (OPDC  2006,  in  Thai).  The 
Decree  provides  a  framework  for  departments  to  follow  and,  with  regard  to 
accountability, the Decree acts as ‘the standard of accountability’. It is used by the 
accountor as a guide and by the accountee to evaluate performance. The effects of 
accountability, i.e. either rewards or penalties, come after the evaluation process. In 
this chapter, the Decree is analysed in order to judge how it relates to four concepts: 
responsibility,  transparency,  scrutiny  and  answerability,  and  how  it  links  to 
corruption problems. 
  Section 3.2 discusses culture and values. This section also consists of general 
information, including Hofstede’s cultural dimensions along with criticisms of his 
research. Thai culture and values, and corruption are also discussed in this section, 
while section 3.3 explains the Thai political system. Section 3.4 discusses recent   56 
reforms,  including  recovery  from  the  economic  crisis  and  public  sector  reform. 
Section  3.5  describes  governance  in  Thailand  and  the  Good  Governance  Royal 
Decree. The similarities and differences between the Thai Decree and some selected 
codes  of  good  governance  are  also  discussed  in  this  section.  Section  3.6  is  the 
conclusion.  
3.2 Culture and values 
Asian culture affects accountability and responsibility, and the purpose of this 
section is to discuss Thai culture, values  and corruption. There are many  factors 
influencing the accountability relationship, among which may be included culture 
and values. Velayutham and Perera (2004) use cultural perspectives to explain how a 
lack  of  accountability  caused  the  Asian  economic  crisis  of  1997.  Cultural 
perspectives of some Asian countries are based on collectivism, large power distance 
and  strong  uncertainty  avoidance,  associated  with  the  emotional  state  of  shame 
(Velayutham and Perera 2004). This kind of emotional system is not appropriate for 
supporting the discharge of responsibility (Velayutham and Perera 2004). A situation 
where people engage in hiding information or are reluctant to disclose information 
can cause weak accountability.  
This part starts with general information about Thailand. Westernisation and 
Americanisation  is  then  described  in  order  to  provide  background  information 
regarding western influences on Thai society. Hofstede’s cultural dimensions are also 
discussed in this section as well as criticisms of these. Thai culture and values, and 
corruption in Thailand are then discussed.  
3.2.1 General information about Thailand   
Thailand is a country located in South-East Asia with borders with Lao PDR, 
Myanmar,  Cambodia  and  Malaysia.  Thailand  was  formerly  known  as  ‘Siam’.  In 
1939, the country was renamed ‘Thailand’
1
 (NESDB 2006). According to statistics 
issued by the National Economic and Social Development Board (2006), the total 
population of Thailand is around 62.38 million people. Its main ethnic group, which 
is about 75% of the population, is Thai. The second major ethnic group is Chinese. 
The official language is Thai and 90% of the total population is Buddhist. Thailand 
was the only country in South-east Asia that was not colonised. The demography of 
Thailand is not particularly diverse. Its citizens are almost all of the same religion 
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and ethnicity. Apart from three provinces in the far south, there are no problems 
caused by ethnic or religious differences. All its citizens call themselves ‘Thai’.  
3.2.2 Westernisation and Americanisation  
Thailand or Siam has had links with other countries since the Ayutthaya Era 
in the sixteenth century. Although Siam was never colonised, during the colonial 
period after the mid-nineteenth century, its economy was affected by the colonists 
(Vandergeest  1993).  For  example,  Siam  was  forced  to  open  its  economy,  give 
exemptions for some taxes to Britain, its rights over Indochina to France and some 
parts of Malaya to Britain (Bell 1978). 
Thai modern society started in the fifth reign of the Chakri dynasty (1868-
1910). Beginning with King Chulalongkorn’s era, it was traditional for the royal clan 
and  great  households  to  send  their  sons  to  study  overseas,  especially  to  Europe 
(Baker and Phongpaichit 2005). The revolution in 1932 was down to a group of 
middle class youths educated in Europe. This was the first step towards a change in 
Thai politics and Thai culture.  
There were, of course, particular countries influencing Thailand. During the 
colonial period, there were various nationalities e.g. French, British, and Dutch living 
in Thailand (Baker and Phongpaichit 2005). However, after the Second World War, 
most of Bangkok’s farang
2
 population were American. The US had regularly sent 
advisers  to  Siam  since  the  early  part  of  the  20
th  century  (Bell  1978).  American 
missionaries and educators also played an important part in Siam’s development. 
Political and legal concepts, particularly the anti-colonial posture, also happened at 
that time (Bell 1978).  
Concerning  Thai  trade,  during  the  late  nineteenth  century  until  1960s, 
America dominated the world economy (Zeitlin 1999). However, between 1932 and 
1947, and then during the 1970s and 1980s, it was Japan who influenced Thailand 
prominently (Bell 1978). The US dominated once again in the 1990s. During the era 
of Americanisation after the Second World War, there were a number of techniques 
the Americans introduced to the world such as hierarchically managed cooperation 
and mass production (Zeitlin 1999). The US encouraged Thailand to open up its 
economy (Phongpaichit and Baker 1995). This not only affected the pace of life in 
Thailand, but also the class structure.  
                                                 
2
 The Thai word used to refer to foreigners, particularly Caucasians.   58 
During the Cold War era, the US government used Thailand as a troop base 
in  order  to  oppose  communism  in  East  Asia  (Baker  and  Phongpaichit  2005). 
Consequently, the US supported Thailand in various aspects, particularly military. 
The Thai economy was also influenced by the US during this period, which wanted 
to  develop  a  free-market  economy  in  Thailand.  However,  only  a  few  American 
investors came to Thailand because it was considered to be too far away, unknown 
and risky (Baker and Phongpaichit 2005). Instead, Chinese businessman dominated 
the  Thai  economy  (Callahan  2003).  Indeed,  Chinese  businessman  changed  from 
being considered pariah entrepreneurs to being leaders within Thai economy (Baker 
and  Phongpaichit  2005).  Opening  up  the  economy  saw  the  number  of  slums, 
unemployed street vendors, and street workers increase (Bell 1978). Thais in rural 
areas migrated to urban areas frequently and regularly.   
Thai beliefs and values have changed. Moreover, a social class in Thailand 
has altered dramatically. Some lower-class Thai were able to upgrade their status. 
Thais pay respect to the rich and powerful members of society. The status of Chinese 
businessmen changed being from lower to higher in Thai society. Since the 1970s, 
students from small towns and the lower classes have gained more education and are 
able to enter higher education (Phongpaichit and Baker 1995). Education can raise 
their social status and position in society.  
The  US  influenced  Bangkokians’  shape,  styles  and  tastes  (Baker  and 
Phongpaichit 2005). Most of Thai middle classes were westernised. Wealthy families 
sent their children to study in the US, and the US government supported the Thai 
educational  system  (Bell  1978).  Tertiary  education  began  to  expand  during  this 
period. Thai people had the opportunity to gain more education, and they became 
exposed  to  westernised  perspectives  and  lifestyles.  Thus,  they  became  more 
independent and individualistic than their ancestors (Klausner 1997).  
There were both advantages and disadvantages from receiving the influences 
of Americanisation (Baker and Phongpaichit 2005). On the plus side, the pace of life 
and the lifestyles of urbanised Thais became more comfortable and convenient. Thais 
gained more education. They were able to improve their quality of life. Also, Thai 
people  are  now  more  egalitarian  than  in  the  past.  However,  some  Thais  express 
concern  that  Americanisation  may  damage  some  traditional  Thai  culture 
(Thongprayoon and Hill 1996). American values and attitudes are different and may 
not be congruent with Thai values and attitudes. There were also some drawbacks. 
Westernisation  and  the  concept  of  capitalism  have  affected  the  country’s  natural   59 
resources. It has changed Thailand from a country of abundant natural resources to 
one with scarce resources in only one generation (Baker and Phongpaichit 2005). 
Thais used a lot of natural resources, such as forest and mineral, in order to become a 
new industrialised country.  
3.2.3 Relevance of Hofstede to a study of Thailand  
This  section  focuses  on  Hofstede’s  cultural  dimensions  with  particular 
reference to studies of Thai society. The relationship between Hofstede’s national 
cultural dimensions and corruption, with reference to Thailand, is also discussed.  
Hofstede (1999) defines culture as ‘the collective programming of the mind 
that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another’ (p. 
35). Komin
3
 (1990) researches culture and Thai work-related values, and defines 
culture as ‘the total patterns which make society distinct’ (p. 683). Regarding values, 
Hofstede (1999) defines values as ‘broad tendencies to prefer certain states of affairs 
over others’ (p. 35) and perceives them to be the main element of culture. According 
to  Komin  (1990),  values  act  as  a  guide  for  individual  behaviour.  They  directly 
influence  people’s  judgement,  choice,  attitude,  evaluation,  argument,  exhortation, 
rationalisation, and attribution of causality (Komin 1990, p. 684). Therefore, it is 
important  to  study  culture  and  values  in  order  to  understand  the  behaviour  of 
individuals.  
Hofstede proposes five cultural dimensions. Within these dimensions, certain 
values  are  apparent,  including  motivational  values  that  influence  how  individuals 
make choices. Within institutions, for normative systems, both norms  and values 
influence how individuals make choices as well as their individual behaviour (Scott 
1995).  However,  it  is  not  only  norms  and  values  that  can  explain  individual 
behaviour. Rules and incentives are also explanatory factors (Peters 2000).   
Komin (1999) mentions nine value clusters, which are used for explaining the 
Thai  national  character.  These  consist  of  ego  orientation,  grateful  relationship 
orientation, smooth interpersonal relationship orientation, flexibility and adjustment 
orientation,  religio-psychical  orientation,  education  and  competence  orientation, 
interdependence  orientation,  fun-pleasure  orientation,  and  achievement-task 
orientation. Komin (1990) argues that although the value may change, it is stable 
enough to constitute a national character.  Hofstede, meanwhile, argues that national 
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values change slowly. From these points of view, culture and values would last long 
and be difficult to change. 
3.2.3.1 Power distance 
Hofstede  (1991)  argues  that  Thai  society  is  classified  as  a  large  power 
distance country, in which inequality in society is normal. His Power Distance Index 
for Thailand is 64 and ranks between 34th and 36th out of 74 countries (Hofstede and 
Hofstede 2005, p. 43). Some characteristics classified as representing large power 
distance can be compared with the situation in Thailand. For example, centralisation 
is popular in a large power distance society. In Thailand, this situation was normal, 
particularly  before  the  beginning  of  public  sector  reform.  Executives  and  high-
ranking officials are familiar with authoritarian styles (Soralump
4
 2004, in Thai). 
This  situation  causes  problems  in  the  bureaucratic  system,  e.g.  abuses  of  power. 
Centralisation in Thailand occurs not only in the public sector, but also the private 
sector (Holmes and Tangtongtavy 1995). One characteristic of large power distance 
is  a  wide  salary  range  between  higher-ranking  and  lower-ranking  officials.  This 
situation can be found in Thailand. 
Supporting Hofstede’s concept of large power distance, inequality has existed 
in Thai bureaucracy for many years. Inequality includes differences in social status, 
economics, education, genders, and opportunities. Although the following research 
papers do not mention Hofstede directly, ideas in these articles support his concept. 
For example, in the nineteenth century, the salary of senior officers was about 200 
times more than that of junior officers (Phongpaichit and Baker 1995). Vandergreest 
(1993) did research in the district of Satingpra in Songkha, a province in the southern 
part of Thailand, and found that even until the 1980s the police took advantage of 
their positions by ‘appropriating’ items from the village and citizens. Apart from this, 
officials also took advantage of their citizens. However, after this time, people were 
more aware of the laws and of their rights, so were less likely to let officials take 
advantage of them, though now there are still some inequalities in Thai society (see 
the Suan Dusit Poll
5
 2002c, in Thai).  
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Inequality in Thai society is related to other values, such as hierarchy and 
bunkhun
6
. Changes in the political system or the social system have sometimes come 
about through the influences of the middle class, as opposed to any other class of 
citizen (Maisrikod 1999). After the period of Americanisation and Westernisation, 
Thais are more westernised in their beliefs and thinking. Forty years ago, egalitarian 
and  individualism  were  not  yet  characteristics  of  Thai  society  (Klausner  1997). 
However,  now  Thai  people  have  been  characterised  by  more  equality  and 
individualism (Klausner 1997; Webster 2004).   
However, there are some differences between Thai society and what Hofstede 
mentions. For example, Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) argue that, for large power 
distance, power is based on traditional or family, charisma, and the ability to use 
force, while for small power distance society power is based on formal position, 
expertise,  and  ability  to  give  rewards  (Hofstede  and  Hofstede  2005,  p.  67).  In 
Thailand, power, particularly in the work place, is based on formal position and the 
ability to give rewards (Soralump 2004, in Thai).  
3.2.3.2 Collectivism and Individualism  
Hofstede  (1991)  classifies  Thailand  as  a  collectivist  society.  This  cultural 
dimension focuses on the social group over the individual. For Thai individualism, 
the index is 20 and the rank is between 56th and 61st. Hofstede argues that wealthier 
countries  and  small  power  distance  societies  are  likely  to  be  classified  as 
demonstrating individualism. This research was first done in the 1980s. Since then 
there have been some changes in Thai society, which Hofstede himself realises. For 
example,  he  mentions  that  Thais  are  now  more  individualistic,  though  Thai 
individualism is different from that found in western countries (Hofstede 1999). This 
difference may be due to differences in society, culture and values. 
Some  researchers  have  discussed  Thai  culture  as  demonstrating 
individualism. Although these groups of researchers do not mention Hofstede, their 
research  papers  give  a  wider  picture  of  Thai  cultural  perspectives.  For  example, 
Klausner (1997), when writing about Thailand, did not mention Hofstede but argues 
that Thai people are more individualistic and egalitarian. Some researchers argue that 
Thai society can be classified as a loose structure, which means that Thais can accept 
behavioural  deviation  from  traditional  behaviour  in  society  (Embree  1950; 
Thongprayoon and Hill 1996). In cases, where laws and customs converge, Thais 
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may  choose  to  ignore  the  laws  (Klausner  1997).  Thais  are  also  believed  to  lack 
regularity, discipline and regimentation (Embree 1950). They pay attention to their 
own wishes, rather than following any laws or regulations (Virushaniphawan
7
 2004, 
in  Thai).  The  research  by  Embree  (1950)  and  Phillips  (1965)  argues  that 
individualism is a Thai characteristic. Podhisita (1998) argues that ‘strong adherence 
to the social groups seems to be lacking or weak in Thai society’ (p. 49). A popular 
saying in Thai society is ‘to do as one wishes is to be a genuine Thai’ (Podhisita 
1998, p. 51). 
On the other hand, Komin (1998) argues that Thailand’s social system is not 
loosely  structured.  Social  interaction  in  Thai  society  can  be  explained  by  the 
behaviour  of  individuals  who  are  motivated  by  ‘I’  and  ‘me
8
’  (Komin  1998).  If 
individuals are motivated by ‘I’ and the bunkhun relationship, this will manifest itself 
in honest, sincere, stable, reliable, and predictable behaviour. However, if individuals 
are motivated by ‘me’, then their behaviour will be classified as without discipline, 
irresponsible,  non-committal,  unreliable,  opportunistic,  selfish,  and  unpredictable 
(Komin 1998, pp. 222-223). This shows that interaction between individuals will 
normally depend on the circumstances of the case.   
One of the reasons to support ideas of individualism is Buddhism (Podhisita 
1998). Buddhism is claimed as ‘the religion of individualism’, which focuses on ‘the 
individual’s effort as the only means to any desirable achievement, be it a better life 
here and now or the ultimate nirvana hereafter’ (Podhisita 1998, p. 52). In addition, 
ideas of karma and tham bun (merit-making) depend on the individual (Holmes and 
Tangtongtavy 1995; Podhisita 1998).   
3.2.3.3 Masculinity  
Hofstede classifies Thailand as showing characteristics of femininity, which 
means that people in society are likely to be modest, tender, and concerned with the 
quality of life (Hofstede and Hofstede 2005, p. 120).  Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) 
argue that this type of culture is unrelated to the degree of economic development, 
i.e.  both  poor  and  rich  countries  can  be  classified  as  having  either  masculine  or 
feminine characteristics. This dimension is related to unequal relationships, starting 
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from  within  the  family,  i.e.  parent-child,  husband-wife  etc.  This  then  leads  to 
inequality  among  individuals.  From  the  result  by  Hofstede,  Thailand  is  the  most 
feminine Asian country (with a score of 34 and ranked 64th). Thais are more skilful 
at  avoiding  confrontation  than  at  defending  themselves  against  aggression.  In 
addition, with regard to femininity, compromise and negotiation are used to resolve 
conflict. This links to Thai values, criticism avoidance and kraeng jai, which are 
discussed later in section 3.2.4. 
3.2.3.4 Uncertainty avoidance  
The  dimension  of  strong  uncertainty  avoidance  relates  to  how  people  in 
society feel about unknown situations. This cultural perspective is linked to a need 
for written and unwritten rules (Hofstede and Hofstede 2005, p. 167). For uncertain 
avoidance, the index for Thailand is 64 and the rank is 44th, so it is likely to be 
medium. Thailand is not extremely strong uncertainty avoidance. One characteristic 
for strong uncertainty avoidance is an emotional need for rules, even if these will not 
work  (Hofstede  and  Hofstede  2005,  p.  189).  This  links  to  the  Thai  bureaucratic 
system where plenty of rules exist already.  
Hofstede argues that citizens from strong uncertainty avoidance countries do 
not participate much in the decisions being made by the authorities, and that the 
possibilities  for  influencing  such  decisions  are  lower  than  in  weak  uncertainty 
avoidance countries. In addition, where there is strong uncertainty avoidance, certain 
characteristics  will  prevail.  For  example,  citizens  are  incompetent  towards 
authorities; civil servants are negative towards the political process; citizen protest 
should  be  repressed;  citizens  are  not  interested  in  politics;  citizens  are  negative 
towards politicians, civil servants and the legal system (Hofstede and Hofstede 2005, 
p. 194). While these values do occur in Thailand, some values have been changed. 
Now, for example, protest in Thailand, particularly peaceful protest, is quite normal 
for  Thai  politics,  especially  after  the  political  incidents  of  2006.  Thus,  it  can  be 
implied that there have been some changes among values over time, even though 
these have happened slowly.   
3.2.3.5 Long-term and short-term orientation  
The fifth cultural perspective by Hofstede links to the teachings of Confucius. 
Thailand is classified as long-term orientation, which means ‘the fostering of virtues 
oriented towards future rewards’ (Hofstede and Hofstede 2005, p. 212). With regard 
to economic growth and politics, societies that are classified long-term orientation 
normally focus on long-term results. For example, organisations are likely to focus   64 
on the importance of profits ten years from now and will focus on market positions. 
With  regard  to  the  Thai  bureaucratic  system,  in  the  past,  the  government  and 
departments  rarely  had  any  long-term  plans.  However,  this  changed  after  the 
economic crisis, when they started to work on more strategic and long-term projects. 
Although it is not mentioned directly in Hofstede’s research, Buddhism, particularly 
law of karma, relates to ideas of long-term orientation. Believing in next life and 
believing in the results of activities are influenced by long-term desire. 
3.2.3.6 Hofstede’s cultural dimensions and corruption   
Some  of  the  cultural  dimensions  mentioned  by  Hofstede  may  be  linked 
directly to incidences of corruption cases. In some cases, people spend the amount of 
money to authorities or power wielders in order to earn private benefits (Hofstede 
and Hofstede 2005).  In some countries, the  giving of  gifts is an important ritual 
(Hofstede and Hofstede 2005, p. 63) and it is difficult to distinguish between bribing 
and gifting. This is the case in Thailand. For example, when civil servants receive a 
petty  amount  of  money  from  citizens,  they  do  not  think  of  this  as  corruption 
(Phongpaichit et al. 2000). Indeed, they think that it is acceptable. 
Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) argue that power distance relates directly to 
corruption. Large power distance supports corruption because there are fewer checks 
and  balances  against  power  abuse  (Hofstede  and  Hofstede  2005,  p.  63).  Where 
subordinates  have  to  follow  superiors,  people  can  accept  inequality.  Regarding 
collectivism,  a  relationship  that  involves  this  value  is  that  of  patron-client.  This 
relationship  possibly  discourages  calls  for  the  implementation  of  anti-corruption 
projects (Poocharoen and Tangsupvattana 2006). 
Some researchers use Hofstede’s cultural dimensions to discuss and analyse 
corruption  cases.  For  example,  Getz  and  Volkema  (2001)  use  Hofstede’s  four 
primary dimensions, i.e. power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism and 
masculinity,  in  order  to  study  the  relationship  between  corruption  and  economic 
development.  They  found  that  strong  uncertainty  avoidance  moderates  the 
relationship between economic adversity and corruption. One possible reason given 
by them for this is that an increase in the level of rule enforcement can lead to a 
decrease in corruption. Both uncertainty avoidance and power distance have positive 
relationships with corruption.  
  Husted  (1999),  mentioned  in  Connelly  and  Ones  (2008),  studied  the 
relationship  between  Hofstede’s  cultural  dimensions  and  national  corruption.  The   65 
results of this indicated that power distance was the strongest predictor of corruption, 
while  masculinity  and  uncertainty  avoidance  had  a  modest  correlation  with 
corruption. Collectivism had a strong correlation with corruption but after controlling 
wealth the relationship disappeared (Connelly and Ones 2008, p. 355).  
  Davis and Ruhe (2003) study the relationship between Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions and how country corruption is perceived. They found that large power 
distance countries have higher corruption; high masculinity countries have higher 
perceived  national  corruption;  and  high  individualistic  countries  have  lower 
perceived national corruption. The results did not support one hypothesis, i.e. high 
uncertainty avoidance, higher perceived national corruption. Uncertainty avoidance 
failed to explain national corruption.  
From Transparency International 2008, the ranking of Corruption Perceptions 
Index for Thailand is 80th from 180 countries. Thai society is classified into the 
following  four  dimensions:  large  power  distance,  strong  uncertainty  avoidance, 
collectivism  and  femininity.  From  previous  research,  it  is  large  power  distance, 
collectivism  and  masculinity,  which  have  significant  relationships  with  national 
corruption.  Thus  for  Thailand,  as  proposed  by  Hofstede,  only  two  dimensions 
support corruption, with the other one unlikely to support corruption.  
Although  some  previous  research  papers  argue  that  uncertainty  avoidance 
does not have strong relationship with corruption, it should, in fact, have an indirect 
link.  The  characteristics  of  strong  uncertainty  avoidance  mean  citizens  in  such 
countries tend not to focus on politics (Hofstede and Hofstede 2005). However, in 
order  to  solve  corruption  problems,  public  will  and  public  participation  are 
important. Therefore, if the public do not want to participate in resolving corruption, 
the problem will continue. Certainly one of the problems in Thailand is a lack of 
political  and  public  will  in  resolving  corruption  cases  (Poocharoen  and 
Tangsupvattana 2006). In addition to cultural dimensions, some organisational and 
personal  factors,  such  as  opportunism  and  personal  motivations,  can  support 
corruption (Davis and Ruhe 2003, p. 286). Corruption in Thailand is discussed later 
in this chapter. 
3.2.3.7 Discussion  
There are some criticisms of the validity of Hofstede’s research. For example, 
Baskerville (2003) criticises Hofstede’s methodology, including the assumption of 
equating  nation  states  with  culture,  and  the  quantification  of  culture  based  on   66 
numeric  dimensions  and  matrices.  In  addition,  some  of  the  terminology  used  by 
Hofstede,  particularly  ‘masculinity’  and  ‘femininity’,  is  also  criticised  (Roberts, 
Weetman and Gordon 2008). Authors and researchers subsequently use other words 
to represent this idea. Hofstede himself is concerned about the use of his work in 
further study. He mentions that his work focuses on national cultural dimensions that 
are different from individuals (Hofstede 1991). In addition, his work does not make 
suitable  sub-cultural  distinctions,  such  as  gender,  generation,  social  class  or 
organisation. Another limitation of his research is the bias towards the western way 
of thinking because his team consisted only of staff from western countries. 
There are some criticisms from McSweeney (2002). He criticises Hofstede’s 
survey  and  that  using  questionnaires  with  results  from  the  surveys  may  not  be 
appropriate.  Some  countries  have  more  respondents  than  others.  In  addition,  the 
available data may not be enough to generalise national culture. He also criticises 
about national uniformity. Also subsidiaries of one company may not represent an 
entire nation.   
Hofstede (2002) has responded to some of the criticisms received. The first 
criticism is about his survey research and that this may not be a suitable method for 
measuring cultural differences. He replies by mentioning that a survey is not the only 
way to study cultural differences. For the second criticism, although nations may not 
be a suitable unit for studying culture, Hofstede argues that it is better to have at least 
one unit to be studied. In addition, regarding the criticism that one company may not 
be suitable to represent an entire nation, Hofstede argues that the results are valid 
enough  to  be  applied  generally  to  entire  nations.  The  data  from  the  IBM  was 
criticised as obsolete, but Hofstede argues that culture and values change slowly. In 
addition, where it is argued that four or five dimensions are not enough, Hofstede 
responds  that  any  additional  dimensions  are  welcome  and  they  should  be 
independent from the five dimensions.  
Some  of  these  criticisms  are  raised  in  this  discussion.  First  of  all,  the 
information  may  be  obsolete.  With  regard  to  Thailand,  as  discussed  in  section 
3.2.3.2, Thai people are more individualistic but Thailand is classified as collectivism 
by  Hofstede.  This  shows  that  there  have  been  some  changes  in  values,  which 
Hofstede himself realises. He mentions that values change slowly. In addition, as 
mentioned in section 3.2.3.4, there are some characteristics or situations of strong 
uncertainty avoidance that contradict what is happening in Thailand. It is possible 
that these differences come from differences between the public and private sectors.   67 
Hofstede studied a private company, so it is possible that the situation in the public 
sector may be different. This links to one of Hofstede’s research papers in which he 
studied organisational culture.    
Hofstede  does  explain  about  values  and  practices.  For  practices,  ideas  or 
concepts under the term ‘practices’ are ‘visible to an observer’. On the other hand, 
Hofstede et al. (1990) argue that  
The core of culture is formed by values, in the sense of broad, nonspecific 
feelings of good and evil, beautiful and ugly, normal and abnormal, rational and 
irrational – feelings that are often unconscious and rarely discussable, that cannot 
be observed as such but are manifested in alternatives of behaviour (p. 291). 
Hofstede (2002) also claims that values … are hardly changeable … whereas 
practices can be modified – given sufficient management attention (p. 1360).  
From the study about organisational culture, different organisations in the 
same country have different practices (Hofstede et al. 1990). It is possible that the 
private sector and public sector are different because of differences in practice.   
Regarding research about Thailand, there are a number of researchers who 
think  Hofstede’s  cultural  dimensions  are  relevant.  For  example,  Marta  and 
Singhapakdi (2005) study differences in the ethical decision making processes of 
Thai and American businessmen. They use Hofstede’s four cultural dimensions to 
explain  differences  between  the  two  countries.  Holmes  and  Tangtongtavy  (1995) 
focus  on  two  of  Hofstede’s  dimensions,  power  distance  and  collectivism-
individualism. They argue that ‘Thais work hard to build and maintain relationships 
among a wide and complex network of people’ and ‘Thais’ interactions are more or 
less  controlled  within  the  context  of  a  strong  hierarchical  system’  (p.  17).  Both 
collectivism  and  large  power  distance  can  be  used  to  explain  Thai  society. 
Roongrerngsuke and Cheosakul (2002) use Hofstede’s national culture to explain 
differences between Thailand and the USA.  
These research papers demonstrate trust in Hofstede’s cultural perspectives. 
The evidence shows that there are both similarities and conflicts between Hofstede’s 
ideas and Thai culture and values, including practices. However, the majority of his 
cultural dimensions are still valid in Thailand. In addition, culture and values are not 
the only factors able to explain the accountability relationship or other issues. As 
Hofstede mentions:   68 
I never claim that culture is the only thing we should pay attention to. In 
many practical cases it is redundant, and economic, political or institutional factors 
provide  better  explanations.  But  sometimes  they  don’t,  and  then  we  need  the 
construct of culture (Hofstede 2002, p. 1359). 
Thus, there are other factors that may affect the accountability relationship. In 
this chapter, the political system is discussed later in section 3.3.  
3.2.4 Thai culture and values 
As mentioned earlier, Komin (1990) grouped Thai values into nine clusters. 
For ego orientation, Komin claimed that Thai people have big egos and a sense of 
independence pride and dignity (p. 691). Therefore, most of them do not want to lose 
face. Values in this cluster include face-saving, criticism-avoidance, and kraeng jai
9
. 
The second cluster is grateful relationship orientation, including the value bunkhun 
relationship
10
, whereby one person feels appreciate towards a person who has given 
assistance.  These  two  clusters  link  to  the  third  value,  which  is  the  smooth 
interpersonal relationship. Thais like harmonisation, to be conflict free and mai pen 
rai
11
. The fourth value is flexible and adjustment orientation, where Thai people are 
situation-oriented. Their behaviour is flexible towards situation.  
  The fifth value is religio-psychical orientation.  This value is classified  by 
following religious beliefs. There are various beliefs held in Thailand, one of them 
being  the  law  of  karma.  For  education  and  competence  orientation,  education  is 
perceived  as  a  ladder  whereby  someone  may  improve  their  social  status. 
Interdependence  orientation  relates  directly  to  community  collaboration.  Co-
existence and interdependence is important for this value. Fun-pleasure orientation 
classifies Thais as normally easy going, fun-loving, and joyful. The last value cluster 
is  achievement-task  orientation.  Komin  (1990)  argues  that  this  orientation  is 
inhibited in social relationship values (p. 681). Hard work alone may not be enough 
in Thailand. Having right connections can help a person’s career.   
This  section  discusses  important  Thai  values  that  may  influence 
accountability. The first value is hierarchy. Although hierarchy may not be an exact 
value within the nine clusters, it is related to more than one value, particularly ego 
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orientation,  grateful  relationship,  smooth  interpersonal  relationship  and  religious 
value. In addition, in this part, karma, mai pen rai, face-saving, criticism-avoidance, 
kraeng jai, bunkhun relationship and personalism are discussed. All these values are 
used for discussing results later in this thesis.   
3.2.4.1 Hierarchy  
Thai  society  is  argued  as  hierarchical  society  (Holmes  and  Tangtongtavy 
1995;  Podhisita  1998).  Ranks  and  positions  are  normal  in  Thai  society,  and 
individuals  can  be  classified  as  ‘higher  or  lower,  younger  or  older,  weaker  or 
stronger, subordinate or superior, senior or junior, richer or poorer, and rarely equal, 
in  relation  to  one  another’  (Podhisita  1998,  p.  39).  The  first  hierarchical  system 
emerges from ties to family, clan or kinship (Hanks 1962), e.g. where a younger 
member pays respect to an elder.  
In Thai society, individuals establish relative hierarchy because it is natural 
for them to have effective interaction or relationship (Maisrikod 1999). They use 
terms, such as Phi (elder brother or sister) and Nong (younger brother or sister), in 
order to reinforce their relationships. Such relationships are normally based on age. 
However, some are also based on social status. Thais focus on seniority, classified by 
power, wealth, professional rank, age, merit and birth (Holmes and Tangtongtavy 
1995, p. 26). This shows that hierarchical relationships can be found in almost every 
section of Thai society. It influences Thai people from the moment they were born.    
The relationships normally depend on the convenience or benefits to both 
groups  (Hanks  1962).  If  one  group  does  not  receive  any  benefits  from  the 
relationship, the relationship may not last long. One good example in this case is that 
of a bunkhun relationship, within which both groups earn benefits. In addition, such 
relationships sometimes focus more on the individual than the organisation as ‘… 
loyalty has by custom been expressed more towards an individual than towards an 
organisation or one’s profession’ (Holmes and Tangtongtavy 1995, p. 35).   
Within  the  bureaucratic  system,  historically,  class  structure  was  based  on 
sakdina or feudalism, which indicated the level of status and power held in society 
(Vandergeest  1993).  It  related  to  individual  rights,  wealth,  political  power  and 
responsibility  to  the  state  and  society  (Kosonboon  2004).  However,  after  the 
overthrow  of  the  monarchy  in  1932,  this  system  was  discontinued  (Vandergeest 
1993). Nevertheless, this characteristic is still present in Thailand (Bowornwathana 
2001).  Although,  during  the  period  of  Americanisation,  education  played  an   70 
important role in uplifting the social status of Thai people, status and deference still 
exist  (Kosonboon  2004).  It  is  difficult  for  this  characteristic  to  be  completely 
removed from Thai society because its origin goes back many years, and is deep 
rooted in the very heart of society, i.e. the family.    
In the Thai bureaucratic system, civil servants were accustomed to an old 
management style, i.e. that of centralisation (Khlapphanitchakun
12 et al. 2003, in 
Thai). They received orders from their line managers and directors (Soralump 2004, 
in  Thai).  Their  superiors  expected  to  give  commands  and  receive  responses 
(Soralump  2004,  in  Thai).  Within  organisations,  the  superior-inferior  concept  is 
dominant in Thailand because ‘Thais perceive the role of leader as a controller rather 
than colleague’ (Thanasankit and Corbitt 2000, p. 7). Title, rank and status are the 
main indicators of a person’s power because social status or rank comes from power 
or  position.  Thai  people  usually  avoid  any  conflict.  They  want  to  keep  the 
environment harmonious (Rohitratana 1998 mentioned in Thanasankit and Corbitt 
2000). Thai culture supports hierarchical social and organisation structures, so it is 
difficult  for  lower-ranking  staff  to  contradict  higher-ranking  staff  members 
(Kosonboon 2004).  
With  regard  to  the  accountability  relation,  hierarchy  can  either  support  or 
detract  accountability  mechanisms.  Hierarchy  and  loyalty  to  superiors  in  a  work 
place  can  support  the  enhancement  of  accountability  (Frink  and  Klimoski  2004). 
However, a process of upward evaluation may not be effective. Subordinates do not 
have  the  courage  to  comment  on  their  superiors’  activities.  Moreover,  unequal 
relationships,  such  as  bunkhun  or  patron-client  relationships,  possibly  deter 
accountability mechanisms. Accountors may favour one person over another. 
3.2.4.2 Karma   
Thailand is predominantly a Buddhist society. Karma is an element of this 
religion which influences Thai society. If people do something well, they will receive 
happiness or good results but if they do something badly, the results will also be bad. 
Some Thais strongly believe in kod hang khum or law of karma. Some Thais do not 
take any action against wrongdoers because they think those people will eventually 
reap the results of their actions. Thailand also has a motto: tum dee dai dee, tum chua 
dai chua which means doing good things will get good results, doing bad things will 
                                                 
12
 Assistant Professor Khlapphanitchakun has a number of experiences in the field of political 
science. The book used in this research, Thai public sector reform for the new generation of the 
bureaucratic system, is reserved by many university libraries in Thailand.      71 
get bad results. Some Buddhists believe in rebirth (Barr 2004). They think karma will 
determine the status of people when they are reborn, i.e. Bad karma moves a person 
down  the  hierarchy  of  sentient  beings  …Good  karma  moves  a  person  up  the 
hierarchy (Barr 2004, pp. 140-141).    
This value can be related to hierarchy in society, whereby the rank or position 
of people is related to karma (Holmes and Tangtongtavy 1995, p. 28-29). Individuals 
may  have  a  different  status  or  position  because  they  have  different  karma,  bun 
(merit) or bap (sin). Buddhists believe that karma can shape their lives. If they want 
to improve their lives, they need to engage in tham bun (merit-making) in order to 
increase good karma.  Law of karma is a major influence the day-to-day lives of Thai 
people, accounting for their former lives, present life and lives thereafter (Smuckarn 
1998).  
Believing  in  karma  can  support  accountability  mechanisms  because 
accountors and accountees may be conscious about not behaving badly. However, 
this can lead to naivety in some cases, e.g. an individual may think that a person who 
behaves badly will reap similar results in the future.     
3.2.4.3 Mai pen rai  
  Another main attitude of the Thais is their easy going nature or, in Thai, mai 
pen rai which means ‘does not matter’, ‘do not worry about it’, or ‘never mind’ 
(Holmes and Tangtongtavy 1995; Podhisita 1998; Nikomborirak 1999). They think 
every problem can be easily resolved. Thais work at creating relationships, and like 
to maintain these relationships by not causing offence (Holmes and Tangtongtavy 
1995). They are normally very aware of their actions or words, and will try to avoid 
any conflicts between themselves. Within the work place, they will try to get on their 
jobs and avoid conflict.  
Thais  normally  avoid  open,  face-to-face  conflict  (Podhisita  1998),  but 
Nikomborirak (1999) argues that this attitude does not fit in with the principles of 
good  governance,  which  seeks  to  promote  transparency,  accountability  and 
participation. Thais can accept inequality easily. They are also reluctant to reveal 
their  true  feelings  or  attitude,  preferring  not  to  participate  in  certain  matters, 
particularly those which involve contradicting other people. 
3.2.4.4 Face-saving, Criticism-avoidance, and Kraeng jai  
  Some Thai norms of society include Face-saving, Criticism-avoidance, and 
Kraeng jai value (Komin 1990; Klausner 1997). Thai people do not want to make   72 
people ‘lose face’ and they try to avoid any criticism or argument. They do not want 
to make someone feel dissatisfied. Thus, they tend to avoid unpleasant situations or 
just  keep  silent  (Kosonboon  2004).  Thais  do  not  want  to  create  conflict, 
disagreement  or  embarrassment  (Kosonboon  2004).  Kraeng  jai  value,  as  a  Thai 
concept, means ‘to be considerate, to feel reluctant to impose upon another person, to 
take another person’s feelings (and ego) into account, or to take every measure not to 
cause discomfort or inconvenience for another person’ (Komin 1990, p. 691). Thais 
are likely to be afraid of annoying other people (Kosonboon 2004).     
  These values, particularly kraeng jai, link to other values. Kraeng jai can 
support a hierarchical system or an ordered society (Maisrikod 1999). Thais do not 
want any conflict with other people, particularly those with a higher rank or status. 
However,  for  governmental  and  bureaucratic  systems,  kraeng  jai  has  some 
disadvantages. For example, subordinates may not feel able to speak out against their 
superiors  (Holmes  and  Tangtongtavy  1995).  In  addition,  when  they  uncover 
incidences of corruption, kraeng jai is felt so they do not work to the best of their 
ability because they feel burdened by their rank within an organisation.  
3.2.4.5 Bunkhun relationship 
  Another main characteristic of Thai society is a bunkhun relationship. This 
relationship is ‘the psychological bond between two persons, which are one who 
renders the needy help and favours out of kindness and the other’s remembering of 
the goodness done and his ever-readiness to reciprocate the kindness, not bound by 
time  nor  distance’  (Komin  1990,  p.  691).  Since  Thais  normally  have  kraeng  jai 
value,  this  links  to  the  process  of  creating  gratitude  or  saang  bunkhun.  This 
relationship supports an order of society (Maisrikod 1999). In Thailand, loyalty to 
groups or teams is quite normal (Holmes and Tangtongtavy 1995). 
  For  individuals,  bunkhun  can  occur  on  many  occasions  and  people  owe 
bunkhun to many people, i.e. ‘what parents do for children is bunkhun; what teachers 
do  in  teaching  students  is  also  a  kind  of  bunkhun’  (Podhisita  1998,  p.  47).  This 
situation is helpful for Thai society in some ways. For example, they have close 
relationships  with  each  other  and  it  ensures  some  operational  processes  run 
smoothly.  On  the  other  hand,  this  situation  can  support  inequality  in  society. 
Individuals feel gratitude to a bunkhun giver, and rank a bunkhun giver more highly. 
Individuals who receive bunkhun normally feel dependent towards and obliged to 
individuals who give bunkhun (Komin 1998). This situation links to hierarchy.     73 
  Bunkhun can occur both inside kinship and outside kinship (Podhisita 1998). 
Both types of relationships can be strong. Thais normally build strong connections 
with each other (Holmes and Tangtongtavy 1995). However, Thais do not participate 
in  this  kind  of  relationship  easily  because  repaying  debts  is  not  easy  (Podthisita 
1998). Podthisita (1998) argues that ‘the debt of bunkhun, unlike other debts, is never 
completely repaid’ (p. 48).  
Bunkhun can be created in the work place. For example, when a subordinate 
makes  mistake,  which  could  have  a  potentially  negative  effect  on  organisational 
operations,  a  superior  would  step  in  and  deal  with  the  mistake  (Holmes  and 
Tangtongtavy 1995). The subordinate then feels grateful to his superior for resolving 
this situation. The bunkhun relationship starts from this point. This situation may not 
support  the  enhancement  of  accountability  and  can  be  classified  as  favouritism, 
which is a type of corruption according to the World Bank (1992). In relation to 
Buddhism, Thais are expected to feel gratitude and indebtedness towards someone, 
who has bunkhun over them (Holmes and Tangtongtavy 1995). This can support a 
bunkhun relationship.    
3.2.4.6 Personalism
13
  
Thai society is based on the value of personalism (Virushaniphawan 2004, in 
Thai), and Thais frequently use personal relationships in their place of work. Some 
staff can get promoted simply because of their personal relationship, rather than their 
own performance, which is an illustration of patrimonial administrative behaviour. 
This behaviour is supported by the patronage system and bunkhun relationship. This 
situation links to the achievement-task value by Komin (1990), whereby hard work 
alone  may  be  insufficient  to  achieve  success  in  operations.  However,  good 
connection may help. In organisations, superiors have their own groups within which 
they accrue power and prestige. Subordinates can get protection from their superiors. 
Therefore, in organisations, officials may pay less attention to performance and focus 
instead  on  people,  or  at  least  those  who  are  members  of  particular  groups.  For 
politics, personalism in Thailand is strong at the constituency level, but less so at the 
national level (Barr 2004). Thus, personalism may cause favouritism in operations, 
which is considered to be a form of corruption. This does not support accountability 
mechanisms. 
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3.2.4.7 Prior studies of characteristics and practices of Thai civil 
servants 
  Virushaniphawan
14
 (2004, in Thai) argues that there are seven characteristics 
and practices held by civil servants, which can obstruct administrative reform. Some 
practices have also been confirmed by other scholars (see such as Soralump 2004, in 
Thai; Phongpaichit and Baker 1995; Cooper and Cooper 2005). First of all, Thai civil 
servants  usually  use  their  power  or  positions  to  gain  rewards,  either  tangible  or 
intangible.  Civil  servants  are  motivated  by  materialism.  Some  civil  servants  may 
choose to buy positions, which can provide them with opportunities to earn further 
benefits  (Bumroongsup  et  al.
15
  2003,  in  Thai).  This  is  one  type  of  corruption. 
According to the Suan Dusit Poll (2006, in Thai), more than half of the sample group 
think that corruption is the most difficult problem to solve. Moreover, they think that 
the government will be unable to solve this problem, unless the patronage system is 
stopped. Civil servants should not be allowed to favour only their own group, and the 
sample group wants the government to be more serious in stopping this problem, and 
to increase punishments for wrongdoers. This links to the ideas of clientelism, which 
are discussed later in section 3.2.6.1. 
The second practice is related to the patronage system. Systems of patronage, 
which are related directly to the grateful relationship orientation discussed earlier, 
affect  Thai  society  and  civil  servants  directly.  The  opportunity  for  promotion  is 
dependent on superiors. Superiors usually support and protect subordinates who are 
members  of  their  groups,  even  if  the  subordinates  have  done  something  wrong. 
Therefore, civil servants tend to focus on their superior’s requirements rather than 
those of the citizen’s. The patronage system is ranked more highly than any moral 
system. This can cause problems in both the bureaucratic and the political systems. 
Corruption may occur when the patron-client relationship is used to earn benefits. 
This also results in mismanagement, because superiors may not pay much attention 
to the performance of their subordinates, with whom they have a close relationship. 
The patronage system has always existed within Thai society, thus concepts 
of kinship and patron-client are bound to occur. This relationship can be linked to the 
bunkhun relationship. Phak phuak, or people who belong to the same group or clan 
or clientele, are a normal feature of Thai society (Phongpaichit and Baker 1995). The 
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concept of phak phuak can be linked to the abuse of power, using power for corrupt 
purposes, or the concept of kin muang, which directly translates as ‘eating the state’ 
(Phongpaichit  and  Baker  1995,  p.  238).  This  links  back  to  the  first  practice 
mentioned where civil servants use their positions to gain benefits. Subordinates may 
use their position to raise unofficial revenues which are then given to their superiors. 
Superiors in return promote or look after the welfare of these subordinates in order to 
create  loyalty  (Phongpaichit  and  Baker  1995).  Patron-client  relations  are  a 
recognisable feature in Thai bureaucracy (Phongpaichit and Baker 1995; Soralump 
2004, in Thai).  
Thirdly, Thai civil servants are usually perceived as acting as though they are 
superior  to  citizens.  Since  the  Constitution  (1997)  proclaimed  the  importance  of 
citizens  for  governance,  during  public  sector  reform,  the  government  decided  to 
change certain operational styles in order to focus on citizens and provide better 
services to them. Fourthly, Thai civil servants are familiar with flattery. This links 
directly  to  a  hierarchical  system  and  criticism  avoidance.  This  obstructs  national 
development, since civil servants tend to focus on executive demands rather than the 
needs of citizens. Subordinates want to avoid any conflicts with their superiors. This 
is because executives dominate organisations and can easily influence an official’s 
career opportunity.  Flattery does not occur only in the public sector, but is used 
generally by Thais (Cooper and Cooper 2005).  
Fifthly,  civil  servants  do  not  seem  keen,  or  appear  unenthusiastic  about 
working  for  citizens.  This  can  be  related  to  civil  servants’  low  salaries,  when 
compared to the private sector (Soralump 2004, in Thai). Sixthly, civil servants are 
individualistic,  which  can  burden  a  teamwork  style  of  operation.  It  is  sometimes 
difficult for two organisations or two people to work together. Officials focus on 
results, the value of pragmatism, and on the benefits to them. Individualism is now 
becoming a value of Thai people in general. As discussed earlier in section 3.2.3.2, 
Thais tend to do what they want to do. This can lead to the problem of civil servants 
paying attention to their own benefits instead of public benefits.  
Seventhly, civil servants represent conservatism (Virushaniphawan 2004, in 
Thai). Civil servants do not like to change their operational styles and, in fact, they 
are  sometimes  afraid  to  change  anything.  This  is  confirmed  by  one  of  the  polls 
conducted by Suan Dusit University (Suan Dusit 2002b, in Thai), which revealed 
that most of the civil servants paid little attention to public sector reform, although if 
forced  to  do  so,  they  can.  This  links  to  the  value  of  flexibility  and  adjustment   76 
orientation  discussed  by  Komin  (1990).  Thais  are  situation-oriented,  i.e.  they  are 
flexible in certain situations. Some civil servants focused on the implementation of 
public sector reform because they were forced to do, not because of their initiative or 
creativity.  
In summary, the characteristics and practices of civil servants, as raised by 
Virushaniphawan (2004, in Thai), are confirmed by other researchers. These hamper 
public  sector  reform  and  do  not  support  the  implementation  of  the  concepts  of 
accountability. In addition, they can enhance fraud and corruption. 
3.2.4.8 Reflection – Thai culture and values  
In Thai society, people are quite capable of accepting inequality in society 
because  they  have  been  used  to  a  hierarchical  system  since  they  were  young, 
particularly  within  their  families  and  schools.  When  they  grow  up,  they  then 
experience  a  hierarchical  system  in  the  work  place.  In  addition,  Buddhism, 
particularly karma, tells Thais to accept differences among people. This is supported 
by one of Hofstede’s cultural perspectives, i.e. that of large power distance.  
Thais pay attention to the importance of people, or personalism. They try to 
avoid conflict and prefer to have good relationships with other people. They do not 
want to make someone lose face, particularly someone who is in a higher position. 
This also links to Hofstede’s collectivism, i.e. that group interests are important, and 
links to the patronage system and bunkhun relationship. Members of groups help 
each other in order to reach their target and maximise their own interest. This kind of 
behaviour  may  support  corruption  and  fraud.  The  patronage  system,  bunkhun 
relationships, and phak phuak all link to the concept of favouritism. This can cause 
inequality among people.  
There  are  some  conflicts  among  Thai  values,  particularly  collectivism, 
individualism,  egalitarianism,  and  inequality.  While  all  of  these  values  occur  in 
Thailand, they are found in different levels or situations and sometimes in different 
groups. Bunkhun and phak phuak are two main values that can support collectivism. 
Feeling gratitude to someone and feeling that they are in the same group are issues 
that support collectivism. Whether or not kinship exists, Thais can feel that they are 
in the same group, particularly when they expect returns from each other. On the 
other hand, some researchers argue that Thais tend to be individualistic and self-
reliant (Komin 1998), accustomed to doing what they want.    77 
  With regard to egalitarianism and inequality in society, Thai society has in 
the past been declared to be hierarchical society. One factor that can reduce hierarchy 
is education. Many Thais can use education to improve their social status. However, 
there  are  certain  relationships  that  Thais  would  find  it  difficult  to  be  egalitarian, 
particularly within families, in schools and in bunkhun relationships, because such 
relationships are more complicated and are related to other values, such as karma and 
bunkhun.  
Thai values link to the idea of clientelism (see section 3.2.6.1), first of all 
through  the  individualism  of  Thai  people.  Clientelism  is  based  on  an  idea  that 
‘authority is personal, resides with individuals’ (Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith 2002, p. 
5). In addition, personal enrichment and aggrandisement are the main values of this 
system. In Thailand, centralisation in decision making not only appears in the public 
sector,  but  also  in  the private  sector  (Holmes  and  Tangtongtavy  1995).  This  can 
cause  difficulties  for  team  working,  since  such  a  system  does  not  encourage 
subordinates to use their capability or initiative (Holmes and Tangtongtavy 1995).   
Inequality and hierarchy are core characteristics of clientelism (Brinkerhoff 
and Goldsmith 2002). Such a system possibly supports corruption, which is a major 
problem for Thailand. Hierarchy can be linked to the patron-client relationship, or 
clientelism, because this kind of relationship is an unequal relationship. Clientelism 
involves ‘a distinctive kind of power arrangement whereby persons of higher social 
status (patrons) are linked to those of lower social status (clients) in personal ties of 
reciprocity that can vary in content and purpose across time’ (Mutebi 2008, p. 149). 
Thais can accept unequal status and power and some of them use this situation to 
gain individual benefits.  
Bunkhun  and  clientelist  relationships  entail  unequal  relationships  in  either 
power or status between two groups of people. However, these two relationships are 
not  exactly  similar.  The  bunkhun  relationship  is  a  psychological  bond,  which 
recognises a sense of morality and religion, as well as the benefits to be gained. 
However, clientelism is based on the benefits and principles of reciprocity, whereby 
both  groups  expect  to  obtain  returns  (Brinkerhoff  and  Goldsmith  2002).  Thus, 
clientelism links to economic calculus (Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith 2002). This is 
different  from  bunkhun  that  tends  to  rank  personal  loyalty  before  anything  else. 
These two types of relationships are by themselves not corrupt in nature, rather it 
depends  on  the  parties  involved  in  the  relationships  and  how  they  use  power. 
However, these two types of relationships can be a cause of corruption.      78 
3.2.5 Summary – culture and values 
With regard to accountability mechanisms, there are many factors that can 
affect the accountability relationship. One such factor is the culture of each society. 
National culture is an important factor relating directly to individual behaviour in 
institutions.  Hofstede’s  national  cultural  dimensions  are  among  several  important 
ideas, which may be used to explain such behaviour.  
From the discussion earlier, the majority of Hofstede’s ideas are still valid in 
Thailand. Large power distance, strong uncertainty avoidance and femininity can all 
still  be  linked  to  Thai  values.  Large  power  distance  has  relevance  to  ideas  of 
hierarchy and sakdina in the bureaucratic system, strong uncertainty avoidance links 
with how Thai people deal with some unknown circumstances, while uncertainty 
avoidance is a consequence of large power distance. Power distance can indicate 
what individuals should do in particular situations. A bunkhun relationship relates to 
collectivism.    
Femininity links indirectly to the Thai values of mai pen rai, face-saving, 
criticism avoidance and kraeng jai. In fact, this kind of cultural perspective may not 
support  the  occurrence  of  accountability  problems  or  corruption  but,  with  the 
combination  of  other  factors,  corruption  cases  may  sometimes  occur.  Femininity 
somehow helps reducing differences between the genders, which relate to inequality. 
Long-term orientation is related to a belief in karma.   
Thai  society  represents  both  individualism  and  collectivism  as  discussed 
earlier.  Hofstede  (1991)  himself  mentions  that  these  two  dimensions  are  not  the 
direct  opposite  of  each  other.  Hofstede  argues  that  cultural  perspectives  change 
slowly (Davis and Ruhe 2003) and that there have been some changes in Thailand, 
for example relating to individualism. Thais now have access to more education so 
this is one possible reason why many Thais are more egalitarian and individualistic. 
In  addition,  there  are  some  conflicts  between  the  characteristics  of  Thailand  and 
those of Hofstede’s, in terms of the strong uncertainty avoidance discussed in section 
3.2.3.4.  
  With regard to Thai culture and values, for this research, the main focus is 
that of hierarchy. A hierarchical system is important in Thai society, from the family 
through to the work place. Hierarchy is linked to social power, wealth and authority 
between individuals. The enhancement of social status, prestige, and control over 
people and resources is the motivation for individuals (Schwartz and Sagiv 1995).    79 
  With regard to the formation of groups, there are some possible reasons for 
this  formation.  As  discussed  earlier,  Thai  people  are  likely  to  establish  relative 
hierarchy. Therefore, it is easy for Thai people to create relationships. They do not 
care whether they are in the same clan or not. In addition, geographical regions also 
affect  the  establishment  of  the  relationship.  In  each  region  in  Thailand,  people 
usually have their own customs and the way of living (Nartsupha 1994, in Thai). 
Therefore, people living in the same region normally group together.   
Political groupings are one type of group formation in Thailand. For example, 
since  2006,  during  a  period  of  political  turbulence,  two  important  groups  have 
emerged, both of whom express their opinions strongly. These groups are known as 
the red shirt and yellow shirt groups. They support different political groups and 
have different objectives. Normally, groupings may form on the basis of members of 
the groups desire to earn benefits. Either geography or politics are based on this idea. 
Perhaps they need security or power in order to facilitate negotiation, which in itself 
is a form of benefit. Thus, there are various formations of groupings, such as those 
from the same regions, those holding the same political opinions, or those graduating 
from  the  same  educational  institutions.  These  kinds  of  relationships  can  cause 
potential accountability and corruption problems if they decide to seek benefits.       
  Believing in karma is an important religious value for Buddhists and does 
influence how some Thais behave. Thus, it is important to include this value in any 
discussion  of  the  results  of  this  research.  Mai  pen  rai,  face-saving,  criticism-
avoidance, and kraeng jai are important values within Thai society, and in some 
cases,  individuals  will  use  these  values  in  their  relationships  with  other  people. 
Indeed, they are very much aware of these values and apply them in a variety of 
ways,  for  example  Thais  will  avoid  aggressive  methods.  In  this  sense,  they  are 
motivated by social security, i.e. they do not want to feel left out of the group. These 
kinds  of  values  could  help  explaining  the  relationship  between  accountors  and 
accountees in the accountability relationship.  
  Another main Thai value is bunkhun. The bunkhun relationship links to the 
concept  of  collectivism.  Since  both  bunkhun  givers  and  receivers  perceive 
themselves to be in the same groups, they will normally have the same objectives, or 
are phak phuak. Moreover, they normally do whatever is necessary to favour the 
other person. The relationship between bunkhun givers and receivers can represent 
social orders or hierarchy in Thai society. Bunkhun givers normally have more power 
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relationships  can  help  bunkhun  givers  to  achieve  some  of  their  objectives.  In 
addition, forming groups can reduce uncertainty circumstances. Both bunkhun givers 
and receivers may feel more secure when they are together. This links to the value of 
personalism. Thais sometimes focus on the person instead of on other things, such as 
performance.  
This  research  uses  these  values  in  order  to  explain  and  discuss  the 
accountability  relationship  in  the  Thai  public  sector.  With  regard  to  Hofstede’s 
cultural dimensions, although there are some criticisms of his research, Hofstede’s 
cultural dimensions provide useful frameworks as the starting point for this thesis. 
The  researcher  wants  to  keep  an  open  mind  about  the  relevance  of  his  work  to 
findings.       
  An  accountability  relationship  is  normally  one  which  occurs  between 
accountors  and  accountees.  Indeed,  many  institutions  are  involved  in  such  a 
relationship.  According  to  Scott  (1995),  there  are  several  factors  affecting 
institutions. 
  Institutions  consist  of  cognitive,  normative,  and  regulative  structures  and 
activities  that  provide  stability  and  meaning  to  social  behaviour.  Institutions  are 
transported  by  various  carriers  –  cultures,  structures,  and  routines  –  and  they 
operate at multiple levels of jurisdiction (p. 33).  
  The differing structures of institutions will lead to differences in compliance, 
mechanisms, logic, indicators and basis of legitimacy (Scott 1995). For regulative 
institutions, mechanisms are based on coercion, with regulative processes such as 
rule-setting, monitoring and sanctioning activities (Scott 1995). For the normative 
concept of institutions, values and norms are important (Scott 1995; Peters 2000), 
and social obligation will be the basis of compliance (Scott 1995). For the cognitive 
concept, the mechanisms are mimetic (Scott 1995). Prevalence and isomorphism are 
important processes for this type of institutions (Scott 1995). These ideas link to the 
accountability relationship that different types of relationships may have different 
kinds  of  mechanisms,  particular  what  accountors  should  be  accountable  for  and 
processes of accountability. 
The  next  part  to  be  discussed  is  the  main  problem  of  Thailand,  which  is 
corruption. This problem represents accountability problems, including institutional 
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3.2.6 Corruption in Thailand  
According to the World Bank (1992), corruption usually occurs in countries 
where ‘inequalities are acute, resources are scarce, rules are unclear, disclosure and 
punishment are unlikely, and upward mobility is restricted’ (p. 16). These underlying 
conditions are a feature of Thailand and may be linked to the problems of corruption 
in  the  country.  Corruption,  vote  buying,  fraud,  and  bureaucratic  intervention  are 
prevalent within Thai democracy (Mutebi 2008; Maisrikod 1999). These problems 
are  partially  originated  because  of  Thai  culture  and  values,  including  the 
characteristics  of  the  Thai  people  (Maisrikod  1999),  as  well  as  from  ineffective 
operational systems.  
There  are  several  factors  which  can  influence  corruption  processes.  For 
example,  Poocharoen  and  Tangsupvattana  (2006)  mention  research  done  by 
Phongpaichit  (1997)  which  cites  four  causes  of  public  spending  leakage  due  to 
corruption.  First  of  all,  businessmen  and  public  officials  collaborate  to  falsify 
documents for tax evasion purposes. Secondly, public officials lack the necessary 
experience required to deal with corrupt activities done by businessmen. Thirdly, 
public  officials  are  accustomed  to  receiving  ‘money  under-the-table’,  given  in 
exchange for better services. Finally, changes of laws have led to confusion among 
public officials. From Phongpaichit’s study, Thailand has problems with clientelism 
or  the  patron-client  relationship;  the  education,  training  and  competency  of  civil 
servants; the integrity and honesty of civil servants; the motivations of individuals; 
and ineffective operational and legal systems.  
  According to Phongpaichit, the collaboration of civil servants is an important 
factor  supporting  corruption.  Phongpaichit  found  that  there  are  both  internal  and 
external factors associated with corruption.  Internal factors include the  monopoly 
power  of  civil  servants,  the  scope  and  level  of  discretional  power  and  level  of 
transparency in operation. External factors were such things as political stability, 
social  class  of  the  influential  group  and  external  auditing  (Poocharoen  and 
Tangsupvattana 2006, p. 12). All these factors relate directly to the occurrence of 
corruption. During public sector reform, some projects were begun with the aim of 
solving corruption problems. These are discussed later in section 3.4.  
  The next part discusses some ideas relating to the problem of corruption in 
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3.2.6.1 Clientelism  
The nature of corruption is to use one’s position to earn benefits for oneself 
or one’s group or clan. This situation leads to policy-based corruption and conflict of 
interest.  The  use  of  the  position  links  directly  to  Hofstede’s  power  distance. 
Poocharoen  and  Tangsupvattana  (2006)  argue  that  ‘corruption  in  Thailand  stems 
from close network ties between politicians, civil servants and businessmen’ (p. 13). 
Similarly, Phongpaichit (2003) argues that corruption in Thailand is not pervasive 
throughout the system but at the intersection between business and politics instead. 
These groups of people have the same economic objectives. Therefore, they establish 
relationships with each other.  
Corruption in Thailand normally arises from a weak rule of law and rather 
primitive capitalism, as well as illegal or semi-legal business activities. Although 
corruption  comes  from  a  weak  rule  of  law,  a  lack  of  rule  is  not  the  cause  of 
corruption in Thailand (Phongpaichit 2003). The important point is that the growth of 
formal rules has actually helped businessmen benefit personally from state power 
(Phongpaichit 2003). It is easy for politicians and civil servants to abuse power for 
their own benefit.  
Business-politics relating to corruption can be  explained as ‘rent-seeking’. 
Powerful  politicians  and  bureaucrats  are  able  to  create  ‘rent’  by,  for  example, 
creating  monopolies  and  providing  protection  for  some  businesses  (Phongpaichit 
2003).  Between  1970s  and  1980s,  Thailand  was  in  midst  of  rent  seeking.  The 
political system in Thailand was not a dictatorship. Phongpaichit (2003) describes 
the  corruption  system  as  ‘competitive  clientelism’,  whereby  successful  power 
competitors allocated opportunities to their own group or business. At the political 
level, businesses would be ranked. The favoured business firm was motivated to 
invest a high proportion of the rents.    
Clientelism, or the patron-client relationship, directly influences corruption in 
Thailand. Poocharoen and Tangsupvattana (2006) mention research carried out by 
Phiriyarangsan, which considered how politicians implemented new techniques in 
order to use their public positions to ensure private gains (p. 12). This represents 
high-level political corruption. These techniques included appointing acquaintances 
as  the  head  of  public  agencies  and  independent  organisations  dealing  with  the 
procurement  system  and  public  contracts  for  long-term  investments.  Thailand 
suffered badly from this type of clientelism. As well as this, it is quite difficult to get 
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or  will  defer  to  their  superiors  rather  than  to  citizens  (Poocharoen  and 
Tangsupvattana 2006). The patron-client relationship is an obstacle to the formation 
of anti-corruption movements (Poocharoen and Tangsupvattana 2006).  
Another  main  Thai  value  that  may  support  corruption  is  that  of  bunkhun 
relationships, which relate to the ideas of favouritism, clientelism and Hofstede’s 
collectivism. Thais will normally support people who come from the same group or 
clan as themselves. As discussed in section 3.2.5, groupings may be geographical in 
nature or be a political grouping. Civil servants are sometimes forced into behaving 
corruptly because bunkhun givers ask them to. In addition, it is possible that civil 
servants feel obliged to help family members. According to the World Bank (1992), 
favouritism  is  one  characteristic  of  corruption.  However,  this  is  quite  normal  in 
Thailand, since Thai people place great emphasis on bunkhun and phak phuak.     
3.2.6.2 Positions  
The positions held by civil servants are an important motivating factor for 
individuals to participate in corrupt activities. Bumroongsup et al. (2003, in Thai) 
conducted  research  about  selling  and  buying  positions  in  the  Thai  bureaucratic 
system.  They  interviewed  seven  government  departments.  According  to  their 
research,  the  causes  of  and  motivation  for  corruption,  particularly  among  civil 
servants employed in buying positions, are due to seven main reasons. These are: 
social values; organisational structure; direct and indirect benefits obtained from the 
position  held;  personal  integrity;  defective  appointment,  transfer  and  promotion 
system; interference of politicians; and economic and social environments. 
3.2.6.3 Materialism and economic environment  
  As Virushaniphawan (2004, in Thai) argues, civil servants pay more attention 
and respect to people who have more money and power. They are not concerned with 
how these people have earned their money or accumulated wealth (Damrongchai
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2000). This claim is confirmed by the research of  Bumroongsup  et al. (2003, in 
Thai), i.e. that a particular Thai value is that of materialism.  
One  main  cause  of  corruption  is  due  to  the  low  salaries  of  civil  servants 
(Virushaniphawan 2004, in Thai; OPDC 2006, in Thai; Soralump 2004, in Thai). 
While some low-ranking civil servants may claim that their salaries are insufficient, 
others are just simply greedy. Some civil servants actually take an extra job, though 
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in such cases it is possible that some conflict of interest can occur. Thus, there are 
some civil servants who choose to engage in corrupt activities. During the period of 
public sector reform, scholars suggested that the government should raise the salaries 
of civil servants (Soralump 2004, in Thai). Indeed, the government raised salaries of 
civil servants. However, even after public sector reform, the public still believes that 
corruption is a major problem in Thailand. Thus, increasing salaries may not be all 
that helpful in reducing corruption.  
3.2.6.4 Political intervention and integrity of civil servants and 
politicians 
Political  intervention  is  directly  related  to  corruption.  Politicians  are 
important and influential people who can interfere in bureaucratic processes. From 
research  by  Phongpaichit  et  al.  (2000),  Thais  believe  that  more  instances  of 
corruption  can  be  attributed  to  politicians  than  to  civil  servants.  In  addition,  the 
individual morality and integrity of both civil servants and politicians is an important 
factor (Virushaniphawan 2004, in Thai; OPDC 2006, in Thai), and many scholars 
have been paying attention to this issue. For example, Bumroongsup et al. (2003, in 
Thai)  recommend  that  the  morality  of  the  Thai  people  is  important  for  reducing 
corruption cases, as it is not only civil servants who engage in corrupt activities. It is 
possible that citizens sometimes support corruption too, e.g. believing that when they 
pay extra money to civil servants, they will receive better service (Phongpaichit et al. 
2000). 
3.2.6.5 Centralisation  
An  ineffective  operational  system  is  one  of  the  causes  of  corruption. 
Centralised decision making can cause corruption problems because only the director 
of  a  department  has  the  power  to  decide  on  the  positions  of  civil  servants.  In 
addition, under the centralised system, a lack of transparency can occur. Therefore, 
since the director has the final say, civil servants will try to please him in order to 
enhance their career opportunities.  
3.2.6.6 A lack of transparency  
In  the  past,  it  was  claimed  that  the  bureaucratic  system  and  operational 
processes in Thailand were not transparent (Soralump 2004, in Thai). This lack of 
transparency can cause corruption or fraud. The public believed that there were some 
clear cases of corruption in certain operational processes. Although the public were 
aware  that  corruption  was  a  problem,  it  was  difficult  for  them  to  scrutinise  or 
evaluate  departmental  performance  because  civil  servants  were  able  to  withhold   85 
information  from  the  public.  However,  after  reform,  this  situation  has  improved, 
particularly since the Official Information Act B.E. 2540 (1997) was promulgated, 
which  greatly  enhanced  transparency.  As  well  as  this  law,  increasing  public 
participation was a feature of several projects raised by the government. 
After public sector reform, the government aimed to improve the level of 
transparency.  For  example,  with  regard  to  the  contracting  system,  an  electronic 
procurement system was introduced in 2006 (Poocharoen and Tangsupvattana 2006). 
Projects worth more than 2 million baht must be made public for at least three days 
(Poocharoen  and  Tangsupvattana  2006),  allowing  the  public  to  make 
recommendations before any bidding starts.   
3.2.6.7 Competency of civil servants 
The  competency  of  civil  servants  relates  directly  to  corruption  or 
mismanagement.  Factors  obstructing  the  implementation  of  certain  aspects  of 
accountability include not only culture and values, but also the capability of civil 
servants. Some previous research shows that the competency of civil servants may be 
insufficient for the projects that they are expected to implement. For example, the 
majority of accounting practitioners did not ever possess an accounting degree so 
there were many problems, which occurred during the implementation of accruals 
accounting (Selaratana 2003, in Thai). This is a problem, which still continues now, 
as  evidenced  by  the  first  interview  of  this  thesis,  in  which  civil  servants  made 
mention  of  departments  facing  such  problems,  i.e.  financial  statements  being 
produced with incorrect information.  
Some scholars in the field of political science raised the issue of improving 
the qualifications of civil servants (Soralump 2004, in Thai; Virushaniphawan 2004, 
in Thai). Even the government is in agreement and, thus one of the public sector 
reform strategic plans actually included this idea. The government aims to improve 
the competency of civil servants as a means of ensuring operational processes are 
more efficient and effective. The capability of the government and its civil servants 
was a major obstacle in the implementation of certain aspects of accountability.   
3.2.6.8 Citizens and public participation  
Public participation is one of the factors that can help reducing corruption. 
However, Thais are more familiar with inequality and hierarchy. Thais realise that 
corruption  is  a  national  problem  (Phongpaichit  et  al.  2000;  Suan  Dusit  2006,  in 
Thai). Research by Phongpaichit et al. (2000) reveals that people who pay bribes to 
civil servants believe that they will receive better services in return. Because of the   86 
small amounts of money involved, some Thais do not perceive this to be corruption 
but instead think of it as sin nam jai or ‘gifts of good will’ or money paid to express a 
sense  of  gratitude  (Phongpaichit  et  al.  2000).  This  indicates  their  willingness  to 
engage in these transactions and also shows public acceptance of corruption. Citizens 
sometimes  tolerate  corruption  and  promote  it  by  themselves.  Unfortunately,  such 
behaviour can deter accountability.  
Most Thais are unclear to whom they should report cases of corruption to, 
which  highlights  how  ineffective  communication  systems  are  in  Thailand. 
Additionally,  some  of  them  are  reluctant  to  report  incidents  because  they  would 
rather not get involved (Phongpaichit et al. 2000), which gives an insight into how 
citizens feel about corruption in their country. Obviously, such a situation cannot 
support  accountability  and  can  cause  a  lack  of  public  participation.  When  the 
government  and  its  departments  hold  seminars  with  the  aim  of  engaging  with 
citizens,  only  certain  groups  of  people  actually  attend.  More  usually,  the  real 
stakeholders do not get the chance to attend (Poocharoen and Tangsupvattana 2006).    
In  Thailand,  public  hearings  are  not  always  used  for  increasing  public 
consultation, but rather as a way of legitimising governmental policies (Poocharoen 
and Tangsupvattana 2006, p. 17). This implies that public hearings are being used by 
power wielders for their own purposes. This may not support the aims of reducing 
corruption  and  enhancing  accountability.  The  difference  between  urban  and  rural 
areas is quite big in Thailand and can be an obstacle to implementing aspects of 
accountability for the entire bureaucratic system. Previously, citizens in rural areas 
were taken advantage of by civil servants. In addition, it was only the middle classes 
who paid attention to the political circumstances of the country. However, now Thai 
people are better educated and have access to more information. Since 2006 (a period 
of  political  turbulence  in  Thailand),  groups  of  lower-class  Thais  are  now 
participating  in  politics.  This  indicates  that  Thais  in  rural  areas,  including  poor 
people, now pay more attention to politics and to governmental operations.  
3.2.6.9 Anti-corruption  
There are some anti-corruption strategies that the country needs to follow. 
These include the formation of anti-corruption agencies, the use of reliable public 
opinion  surveys,  increasing  public  sector  wages,  reducing  the  size  of  the  public 
sector,  strengthening  financial  accountability,  increasing  media  freedom, 
strengthening judicial independence, boosting citizen participation, decentralisation, 
and  changes  in  the  bureaucratic  culture  (Mutebi  2008,  p.  152-153).  All  of  these   87 
recommendations are being implemented by the Thai government, but even so they 
have  not  been  successful  at  eradicating  all  cases  of  corruption.  This  shows  that 
corruption in Thailand is more complicated. Even the government has been accused 
of corruption it would seem that corruption occurs at all levels of bureaucracy, as 
well as within the political system of Thailand.  
Should civil servants be required to investigate corruption cases, there are 
two  main  mechanisms  of  investigation,  internal  and  external  (Poocharoen  and 
Tangsupvattana 2006). Internal is where internal auditors are used, while external 
mechanisms include the Constitutional Court, judicial courts, the National Counter 
Corruption Commission (NCCC), external auditors, and an ombudsman (Poocharoen 
and Tangsupvattana 2006). However, this does not automatically mean that all these 
organisations  will  support  a  reduction  in  corruption  and  enhanced  accountability, 
because  there  are  some  problems  and  criticisms  associated  with  using  the 
involvement of organisations. For example, the NCCC were found guilty of passing 
regulations  to  raise  the  salaries  of  its  own  committee  members  (Poocharoen  and 
Tangsupvattana  2006).  This  case  shows  how  the  members  of  independent 
organisations, being responsible for controlling and investigating other people, are 
guilty of making errors themselves. This is one of the problems relating directly to 
institutions, when they do not do what they have been appointed to do.     
The Thai government implemented the Good Governance Royal Decree in 
2006 in order to improve operational performance and enhance public benefits. In 
this chapter, the Decree is itself discussed, and then linked to corruption problems 
later through discussion in section 3.5.4.     
3.2.6.10 Summary – Corruption   
  As  discussed  earlier,  there  are  certain  factors,  which  will  influence  and 
promote occurrences of corruption. For example, patron-client relationships, social 
values,  economic  environments,  ineffective  systems,  the  education,  training  and 
competency of civil servants, and the integrity and motivations of individuals. In 
addition, there are problems when the institutions that are responsible for monitoring 
and  investigating  corruption  are  themselves  criticised  by  the  public  about  their 
performance.  The  government,  civil  servants,  scholars,  and  citizens  realise  how 
important the problem of corruption is. Thus, there have been many projects and 
ideas implemented with the aim of reducing corruption cases. The Constitution B.E. 
2540 (1997) was the main tool in tackling corruption and improving governance. 
From  this  Constitution,  several  other  ideas  and  projects  were  derived.  One  good   88 
example was the establishment of independent organisations, such as the NCCC and 
the  Office  of  Auditor  General.  These  organisations  support  anti-corruption 
movements. During public sector reform, the government introduced ideas of good 
governance, including one of its main aims, to enhance and improve accountability 
in the public sector and reduce corruption. The concepts of good governance are 
discussed later in section 3.5. Such projects may not completely remove all cases of 
corruption in Thailand, but they do help lessening incidences of corruption at certain 
levels.     
3.3 Politics  
Before 1932, Thailand was ruled by an absolute monarchy. Thereafter, the 
Thai political system is a constitutional monarchy (NESDB 2006). However, it also 
has  a  history  of  military  intervention  (Barr  2004;  CountryWatch  2007).  Between 
1932 and 1973, Thailand was ruled by a succession of military governments (Baker 
and Phongpaichit 2005). After that period, there were several military coups, such as 
in 1991 by the National Peacekeeping Council (NPC) and in 2006 by the Council for 
National Security (CNS) (CountryWatch 2007). The reasons given by the military 
junta for the coups in 1991 and 2006 were similar, i.e. corruption (Mutebi 2008). 
In 1997, Thailand launched the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 
2540, which was claimed to be the best constitution the country ever had (Economist 
Intelligence  Unit  2007).  However,  after  the  political  turbulence  in  2006,  this 
constitution was merely abrogated by the CNS instead of being revised. Late in 2007, 
the new constitution was promulgated and a national election was held in December 
(CountryWatch 2007).  
  Since the 1980s, there have been a number of businessmen participating in 
the Thai political system (Baker and Phongpaichit 2005). The most obvious case is 
that of the ex-Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, the tycoon who owned one of the 
biggest telecommunication companies in Thailand. In local authority, businessmen 
are not only rich but also powerful, and participate in local politics. Some of them 
use their favoured positions in politics to support their own businesses. In rural areas, 
money politics is a normal occurrence.  
Vote buying and spending a large amount of money on political transactions 
are  normal  occurrences  in  Thailand  (Callahan  2005;  Mutebi  2008).  During  the 
Thaksin period, populist programmes were applied in order to gain electoral support 
from  rural  Thais  (Phongpaichit  2003).  Examples  of  programmes  included  a  debt   89 
moratorium for farmers, a million-baht credit scheme for each village, particularly 
rural areas, and a 30-baht charge for health care (Phongpaichit 2003). Money politics 
and  a  system  of  patronage  can  lead  to  corruption  (Vejjajiva  2007,  in Thai).  The 
political regime is one of the most important factors for good governance (World 
Bank  1994),  but  corruption  and  money  politics  can  affect  governance  and 
accountability in the public sector.   
3.3.1 Political System  
For Thailand, there are three branches of power which play important roles in 
state administration. In brief: 
Parliament  possesses  legal  powers.  Administrative  power  belongs  to  the 
Cabinet. Jurisdiction power belongs to the Court (NESDB 2006, p. 12).  
The national assembly consists of a House of Representatives and a Senate. 
There is a four-year term for the representatives and a six-year term for the senators. 
Before 1997, senators were appointed by the King on the recommendations of the 
Council of Ministers (ADB 2001a). Since the 1997 constitution, 200 senators are 
directly elected from constituents. The main duties of the National Assembly are to 
enact  new  laws,  approve  emergency  decrees,  and  amend  or  repeal  existing  laws 
(ADB  2001a,  p.  39).  Another  main  duty  is  to  control  and  scrutinise  state 
administration.  The  National  Assembly  is  empowered  to  approve  some  critical 
elements of legislation and to oversee nominations to many state organisations (ADB 
2001a, p. 39).     
With regard to executive authority, the King is the head of the state and the 
head of the government is the Prime Minister. The King acts as ‘a symbol of national 
identity and unity’ and is empowered with ‘the right to be consulted, the right to 
encourage, and the right to exercise moral authority’ (CountryWatch 2007, p. 60). He 
also serves as ‘the upholder of religion, and the head of the armed forces’ (ADB 
2001a, p. 39). However, the government administers the country, and responds to the 
will of the people (CountryWatch 2007, p. 60). After public sector reform, central 
government now consists of 20 ministries. The head of each ministry is a minister, 
who is either a politician or someone appointed by the ruling coalition (ADB 2001a). 
Other officials are civil servants, who operate under civil service laws.     
For the judicial branch, all courts are independent and are no longer under the 
Ministry of Justice, or indeed the cabinet. In Thailand, there are four main courts: the 
Constitutional Court, the Justice Court, the Administrative Court and the Military   90 
Court  (Poocharoen  and  Tangsupvattana  2006,  p.  24).  The  Constitutional  Court’s 
main responsibility is to judge complaints regarding laws and governmental actions 
that are alleged to be in contradiction of the Constitution of Thailand (Poocharoen 
and Tangsupvattana 2006, p. 27).  Under the Justice Court, there are the Supreme 
Court, the Court of Appeal, and the Court of First Instance. The Supreme Court, with 
its  judges  appointed  by  the  King,  is  the  highest  court  of  appeal  (CountryWatch 
2007).  The  Administrative  Court  was  established  as  a  result  of  the  Constitution 
(1997)  in  order  to  decide  on  disputes  between  the  state  and  citizens  or  private 
organisations,  as  well  as  disputes  between  public  agencies  (Poocharoen  and 
Tangsupvattana 2006, p. 26). This court is one channel through which citizens may 
file lawsuits against public officials, particularly those relating to an abuse of power 
or  neglect  of  duty  (Poocharoen  and  Tangsupvattana  2006).  This  can  support  the 
enhancement of accountability. 
The Thai legal system is a combination of traditional Thai legal principles 
and western concepts. The legal system is based on both the civil and common law 
system  (ADB  2001a).  The  legal  and  judicial  system  also  consists  of  other 
organisations, such as the Ministry of Justice, the Council of State, the Attorney 
General’s Office, the police, and the Department of Corrections, under the Minister 
of Interior.  
Regarding  administration
17
,  Thailand  consists  of  76  provinces,  including 
Bangkok. For Provincial Administration, the governor of Bangkok is elected by the 
Bangkokians, while the governors in other provinces are civil servants appointed by 
the Minister of Interior. With regard to local authority, local people can elect their 
own  Local  Assembly  and  local  administrative  committee,  who  serve  a  four-year 
term.  The  duties  of  local  governments  include  obtaining  revenues  from  limited 
number of sources such as property taxes (ADB 2001a).  
3.3.2 Reflection  
Regarding the three main branches, parliament, executive and judicial branch, 
ideally, they should be independent and equal in power. However, this is not easy to 
achieve  in  Thailand.  For  example,  the  Prime  Minister  is  the  leader  of  executive 
authority  and  is  usually  the  head  of  the  party  which  has  the  most  number  of 
representatives  in  the  parliament.  Therefore,  some  conflict  of  interest  may  easily 
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occur.  The  intervention  of  the  executive  branch  in  legislative  matters  may  cause 
further  problems  of  checks  and  balances.  Additionally,  some  members  of  the 
National Assembly cannot investigate the cabinet. This situation supports corruption 
and fraud. 
It is not only representatives that are induced by the executive authority, but 
also the senate who should be neutral (Poocharoen and Tangsupvattana 2006). This 
obstructs the process of investigation by legislative authority.     
In addition, within the cabinet, the plans and policies of certain members of 
the  cabinet  should  be  reviewed.  However,  there  was  some  government  where 
projects were decided upon by the Prime Minister alone, unopposed by members of 
the  cabinet  (Poocharoen  and  Tangsupvattana  2006).  This  situation  indicates 
centralised decision making led by a strong and powerful leader. In such cases, it is 
possible that operational systems may not be effective because only one person is 
making decisions.  
Since in 2006, there have been problems in the Thai political system. Even 
though a national election was held on 23 December 2007, it cannot be said that Thai 
politics  is  stable.  The  election  has  not  helped  Thailand  completely  recover  from 
political turbulence and rumours of another military coup continue. Politics is one of 
the features of the concept of good governance (World Bank 1994). It may affect 
accountability in government departments.    
3.3.3 Influence of politics on the bureaucratic system and independent 
organisations  
It is normal in some Southeast Asian countries for businesses, high-ranking 
civil servants and powerful politicians to enter into relationships with one another 
(Mutebi 2008). In the case of Thailand, the political system and the bureaucratic 
system have a close relationship. Non-elected civil servants are accountable to the 
Prime  Minister  and  members  of  the  cabinet,  who  are  politicians.  Politicians  are 
involved  in  the  selection  of  high-ranking  civil  servants  and  in  some  cases 
businessmen  are  also  involved  in  the  process  (Poocharoen  and  Tangsupvattana 
2006). Bumroongsup et al. (2003, in Thai) conducted research on selling and buying 
positions in the bureaucratic system. This revealed that one of the main causes of 
corruption is the actions of politicians. For example, politicians have the power to 
appoint  and  transfer  civil  servants.  In  addition,  they  routinely  put  their  own 
acquaintances in positions of importance within departments. As discussed earlier in   92 
Chapter 2, civil servants are accountable to politicians because politicians are their 
direct superiors. Some civil servants are loyal to politicians because they see it as a 
way of enhancing their career prospects.  
There were some arguments that politicians, particularly the members of the 
cabinet,  intervened  in  independent  organisations.  For  example,  Poocharoen  and 
Tangsupvattana (2006) argue that when the Thai Rak Thai party (TRT) was in the 
position of the power wielder, the roles of the NCCC were weakened. This led to 
questions regarding checks and balances. The cabinet members were able to use their 
power for private benefits. This situation affected the political system directly.      
In  addition,  politicians  intervened  in  the  selection  process  for  an  Auditor 
General  of  Thailand,  when  Khunying  Jaruwan  Maintaka  was  forced  to  leave  her 
position for a few months in 2005 and 2006 (Poocharoen and Tangsupvattana 2006). 
In this case, some members of the National Assembly expressed a wish for another 
person to be appointed Auditor General. This creates doubts among the public about 
the independence of individual members of the National Assembly. Such situations 
represent the importance of politicians towards the bureaucratic system. Politicians 
are important factors influencing accountability.  
These situations represent institutional problems in Thailand. Not only  do 
accountability problems occur in government departments, but also in the political 
system and independent organisations. From the above examples, both politicians 
and staff in the independent organisations tend to focus on their own preference. In 
addition, they sometimes try to legitimise these. For example, members of the NCCC 
committee tried, unsuccessfully, to pass a law increasing their salary. This situation 
links back to corruption, i.e. where high-ranking civil servants and politicians are 
inclined to use their positions for their own benefits.   
The  next  part  discusses  public  sector  reform,  which  the  Thai  government 
hoped could be used to improve operational processes and performance in a drive 
towards more efficiency and effectiveness.    
3.4 Reform 
Since 1980, Thai governments have tried to solve the problems, which exist 
in the bureaucratic system (Soralump 2004, in Thai). However, this has not been 
easy to do. Problems in the public sector have accumulated and have never been 
solved  properly.  The  main  problems  were  corruption,  the  large  number  of  civil 
servants,  efficiency  and  effectiveness  in  operations,  centralisation,  an  inflexible 
structure, outdated laws, regulations and technology, civil servants’ lack of ability, an   93 
inappropriate salary and welfare structure for civil servants, and the attitudes and 
values  of  civil  servants  (Soralump  2004,  in  Thai).  The  bureaucratic  system  was 
claimed as one of the causes of the economic crisis in 1997 (OPDC 2006, in Thai; 
Soralump  2004,  in  Thai).  After  the  crisis,  the  government  decided  to  implement 
many reforms in the bureaucratic system, particularly structural and administrative 
reform, budgetary reform and civil service reform (Soralump 2004, in Thai). In this 
section, information about this public sector reform is discussed.     
3.4.1  Recovery  from  the  economic  crisis  supported  by  international 
organisations  
The  relationship  between  Thailand  and  international  organisations  can  be 
traced back to after the Second World War (Baker and Phongpaichit 2005). During 
the  financial  and  economic  crisis  in  1997,  Thailand  called  on  the  International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) for support in order to recover from the crisis (Soontornpipit 
2002). The proposed package of rescue programmes covered many fields, such as 
financial sector restructuring, macroeconomic policies, privatisation, social services, 
education  and  the  legal  framework  (See  Thailand  Letter  of  Intent  1997-1999
18
). 
From  the  Thailand  Letter  of  Intent  1997  –  1999,  it  can  be  seen  that  there  were 
specific areas which required improvement and many projects that Thailand had to 
implement.  
In particular, the government was also required to implement public sector 
reform (see Thailand Letter of Intent 1997 - 1999). The major plans included civil 
service reform, increasing private participation in a number of transport and power 
projects,  and  privatisation  programmes  in  the  energy,  transportation,  utility  and 
communication sectors. The World Bank also gave support to Thailand, focusing on 
financial  sector  restructuring,  corporate  restructuring  and  public  sector  reform 
programmes (World Bank 2000).  
As  part  of  the  public  sector  reform  programme,  the  World  Bank  gave 
assistance in many fields, such as expenditure management, revenue management, 
human resource management, decentralisation, and accountability and transparency 
(World Bank 2000). It also gave support in the form of grants and financial support, 
technical assistance, advisory services, courses for Thai officials, and scholarships 
(World Bank 2000). In addition, the World Bank and the New Zealand government 
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helped the Thai government deal with debt management and monitoring, develop an 
internal auditing system, and implement accounting system reform (ADB 2000).   
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) supports Thailand in several fields, e.g. 
financial sector, private sector, public sector, agriculture, social, health and education 
(ADB 1999), and within these fields accountability, transparency and predictability 
of government agencies would become important features.   
Regarding civil service reform, the Thai government is the largest employer 
within  the  country.  Almost  37%  of  the  government’s  budget  was  spent  on  civil 
servants’ salaries and wages (ADB 2000). This amount of money was significantly 
large for government spending so both international organisations and some Thai 
scholars  wanted  the  government  to  reduce  this  amount  by  applying  civil  service 
reform  (see  Thailand  Letter  of  Intent  1997-1999;  Soralump  2004,  in  Thai, 
Virushaniphawan 2004, in Thai). Therefore, the government aimed to reduce these 
costs. The government assigned the Office of the Civil Service Commission (OCSC) 
to be responsible for this task. The World Bank provided support and assistance 
programmes to the Civil Service Commission (ADB 2000). 
3.4.1.1 Results  
In  accordance  with  the  requirements  of  the  aforementioned  international 
organisations, the Thai government implemented many projects in order to recover 
from the economic crisis. By these organisations’ standards, Thailand successfully 
recovered  from  the  crisis,  and  the  projects  implemented  were  done  to  their 
satisfaction (ADB 2001b).  
However, there was some criticism of the IMF’s rescue programmes. In the 
past,  the  IMF  was  criticised  for  being  mainly  concerned  with  the  ways  to  help 
foreign  banks  or  financial  institutions  get  their  money  back  (Kapur  1998;  Khor 
1998).  The  IMF  blamed  debtors  and  gave  them  strict  recovery  programmes  to 
follow, while placing no blame on the creditors (Bullard et al. 1998). In fact, both 
creditors and debtors should have been held equally responsible for the crisis because 
it  was  the  creditors  who  gave  their  loans  to  inappropriate  debtors  (Khor  1998). 
Moreover, people in the recipient countries do not always benefit from the rescue 
programmes (Khor 1998).   
Some researchers and scholars argued that the rescue programmes used were 
wrong for Thailand (Punyaratabandhu 1998). First of all, although the cause of the 
crisis came from the private sector, the programmes aimed to change some elements   95 
of the public sector system (Bullard et al. 1998). The IMF applied similar strategies 
to those used in Latin America and Africa where large foreign debts actually came 
from the public sector but for the Asian countries the debts came from the private 
sector (Khor 1998). 
Regarding public sector reform in Thailand, although there was no protest 
from civil servants, it was not easy to implement reform (Bunbongkarn 1999, in 
Thai). Thai bureaucracy was known to consist of conservative institutions, resistant 
to  change  (Bunbongkarn  1999,  in  Thai).  According  to  the  IMF  conditions,  the 
government needed to reduce expenditure. Therefore, it proposed an early retirement 
project for civil servants and gave them extra money in order to persuade them to 
retire. This project was quite successful. However, it caused a problem for the Thai 
educational system as it resulted in a lack of teachers (Matichon 2007, in Thai). This 
project  also  affected  the  human  resource  management  function  of  government 
departments. The number of officials needed for the implementation of some projects 
also needed to be considered. For example, when they first implemented accruals 
accounting, some accounting practitioners mentioned that the departments did not 
have enough accountants so it was difficult to implement the new system (Selaratana 
2003, in Thai).  
Regarding  recovering  from  the  crisis,  international  organisations  satisfied 
progresses. After these organisations left Thailand, the Thai government continued 
with some projects, such as implementing accruals accounting and new performance 
assessment. Some of them were successful, while others were stopped or cancelled. 
For example, the privatisation of some state enterprises and public universities was 
postponed.  
Thailand  was  quite  successful  in  recovering  from  the  economic  crisis.  Its 
loans were to be repaid to the IMF in 2003. However, Mutebi (2008) argues that 
although Thailand was able to pay back these loans, the country lost influential anti-
corruption donors. Both the IMF and World Bank aimed to reduce corruption, and 
there were some anti-corruption initiatives, such as the establishment of independent 
organisations and the introduction of the concept of good governance. However, after 
the loans were repaid, international organisations were not longer involved in such 
projects. The government was then able to do what it wanted, and corruption became 
a problem once more.    96 
3.4.2 Public sector reform 
After  the  crisis,  political  reform,  public  sector  reform  and  prevention  and 
suppression of corruption were implemented (Soontornpipit 2002). The government, 
led  by  Gen.  Chavalit  Yongchaiyudh  (1996-1997),  issued  a  framework  of  public 
sector reform (1997-2001), intended to be a framework, which could be developed 
by future governments (Khlapphanitchakun et al. 2003, in Thai; Soralump 2004, in 
Thai). This government also started drafting a Public Organisations Act (Soralump 
2004, in Thai).  
The government led by Prime Minister Chaun Leekbhai (1997-2001) decided 
to  focus  on  five  particular  aspects  of  public  sector  reform:  management  and 
administration,  budgetary  systems,  human  resources,  laws  and  regulations  and 
culture (Khlapphanitchakun et al. 2003, in Thai). The next government, led by the 
Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-2006), wanted to improve and upgrade the 
capacity of the Thai bureaucratic system in order to reduce corruption and fraud, and 
enhance transparency in the operational process (Khlapphanitchakun et al. 2003, in 
Thai).  
Various reforms were implemented in the Thai public sector. The first reform 
was structural, and involved changing roles, mission and structures within the public 
sector,  including  decentralising  the  processes  of  decision  making  and  increasing 
public participation in order to solve problems and respond to public requirements 
(Khlapphanitchakun et al. 2003, in Thai; OPDC 2006, in Thai; Soralump 2004, in 
Thai). The second reform was administrative reform, which was necessary in order 
to  make  operational  processes  within  the  bureaucratic  system  more  efficient  and 
effective (Khlapphanitchakun et al. 2003, in Thai; OPDC 2006, in Thai). The third 
reform  was  budgetary  reform  to  focus  more  on  results-based  budgeting 
(Khlapphanitchakun  et  al.  2003,  in  Thai;  OPDC  2006,  in  Thai).  In  addition,  the 
government aimed to improve the  auditing system to make it more efficient and 
transparent.  
The  fourth  reform  was  civil  service  reform,  which  aimed  to  improve  the 
human  resource  management  system  and  the  capability  of  civil  servants 
(Khlapphanitchakun et al. 2003, in Thai; OPDC 2006, in Thai; Soralump 2004, in 
Thai). The fifth reform was concerned with changing the culture, values and attitudes 
of civil servants to enable them to understand and be ready for a new operational 
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scrutiny, and the reduction of fraud and corruption (Khlapphanitchakun et al. 2003, 
in Thai; Virushaniphawan 2004, in Thai; OPDC 2006, in Thai; Soralump 2004, in 
Thai).  
The government produced a five-year strategic plan (2003-2007) in order to 
achieve public sector reform. There were seven strategic plans: changing operational 
processes  and  procedures;  improving  administrative  structures;  changing  and 
improving fiscal and budgetary systems; reviewing and changing the human resource 
management  system  and  the  salary  system;  changing  public  sector  culture  and 
values;  implementing  e-government;  and  supporting  the  processes  of  public 
participation  (OPDC  2006,  in  Thai).  The  following  section  explains  some  of  the 
projects arising from public sector reform, and the obstacles and factors affecting this 
reform. 
3.4.2.1 Projects arising from the reform 
The  reform  focuses  on  many  fields  because  there  were  already  several 
weaknesses  in  Thailand’s  public  sector.  For  example,  public  expenditure 
management was characterised by poor prioritisation, paying little attention to the 
results of spending, and a lack of accountability in service quality (Koeberle 2004). 
The fiscal accounts were also not fully transparent. Moreover, the Thai bureaucratic 
system was a highly centralised and control-oriented process that was not supportive 
of government operations, including that of the budgetary process (Koeberle 2004). 
There  were  some  cooperation  problems  and  fragmentation  in  operations.  The 
bureaucratic system was complicated (Soralump 2004, in Thai). Ineffective planning 
was  also  a  main  drawback  of  the  Thai  public  sector.  Two  or  more  government 
agencies  with  similar  responsibilities  or  duties  were  spread  over  more  than  one 
ministry. This led to a lack of unity, efficiency and effectiveness in operations as 
well as being a waste of money (Khlapphanitchakun et al. 2003, in Thai). Corruption 
was  also  a  significant  problem  within  the  Thai  bureaucracy  (Soralump  2004,  in 
Thai).  
Laws and regulations were quite outdated (Soralump 2004, in Thai). They did 
not  enable  prompt  responses  to  national  developments.  Moreover,  government 
departments did not respond to citizens’ requirements, and monitoring, evaluating 
and auditing processes were not appropriate. For example, in the past, the Office of 
the  Auditor  General  (OAG)  was  responsible  to  the  Prime  Minister  Office  and 
auditing  results  were  reported  directly  to  the  Prime  Minister  (Soralump  2004,  in 
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Thailand did not have a Supreme Audit Institution, so internal audit and evaluation 
was  limited.  However,  in  1999,  the  Office  of  the  Auditor  General  became  an 
independent organisation and reported audit results directly to the parliament. The 
main responsibilities of the OAG, according to  Section 7 of the State  Audit Act 
(1999), consist of auditing the statement on receipts and payments and reporting on 
the  financial  status  of  each  fiscal  year;  auditing  the  currency  reserve  account; 
auditing the receipts and payments, the custody and disbursement of money and the 
use of other properties belonging to or being the responsibility of the audited agency; 
and examining the collection of taxes, fees and other incomes of the audited agencies 
(OAG 2009). The OAG has to give an opinion on whether audited agencies are in 
compliance with laws, rules, and regulations (OAG 2009). 
The Thai government wanted to change roles of civil servants from rulers to 
service deliverers, in fairness to its citizens (Soralump 2004, in Thai). Citizens and 
private  sector  organisations  should  be  a  part  of  the  administrative  system  but  in 
Thailand  there  was  little  trust  in  the  government  because  of  the  many  cases  of 
corruption and mismanagement. Previously, powerful officials ignored applying a 
sense of morality in their operations, leading to misuse of power and the rights and 
freedom of citizens being infringed. Therefore, the government decided to implement 
public sector reform (OCSC 2007b, in Thai).    
3.4.2.2 Obstacles and factors affecting the reform  
According  to  the  report  by  the  OPDC  (2006,  in  Thai),  there  were  some 
obstacles to reform. Civil servants were confused about public sector reform because 
organisations  rarely  communicated  with  civil  servants.  Only  executives  of 
departments and senior civil servants knew about this project. This was supported by 
the Suan Dusit Poll (2002b, in Thai) which revealed that civil servants did not know 
much about the reform. There were many new projects and techniques, but these 
were  being  implemented  too  quickly  for  civil  servants  to  understand.  Thai  civil 
servants lack confidence in matters of politics and policies.  
There were various factors supporting reform in Thailand (Koeberle 2004). 
For example, since 1997, Thailand became more democratic and the Thai people had 
more  chance  to  participate  in  governmental  activities.  The  media  also  became 
involved in the monitoring process (Koeberle 2004).  In order to help the reform 
process, Thailand received some advice and technical assistance from international 
donor organisations such as the IMF, the World Bank and the ADB (World Bank 
2000).  During  that  period  of  time,  politics  in  Thailand  was  more  stable.  The   99 
government led by Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was able to operate more 
comfortably due to its parliamentary majority (CountryWatch 2007; Koeberle 2004).  
However, during 2006 and 2007, a military coup took place in Thailand. As 
well  as  the  government,  some  laws,  and  projects  were  dissolved  or  postponed 
(CountryWatch 2007). Thus, at this time, the political situation in Thailand was not 
stable, and was an obstacle to reform. Apart from the political situation, there were 
other factors holding up reform. A lack of leadership within the government in order 
to push the reform was one such obstacle (Koeberle 2004).  
There was less communication with civil servants about reform. For example, 
the Suan Dusit Poll (2002b, in Thai) investigated the opinions of civil servants on 
public sector reform a month before the implementation of organisational reform in 
October 2002. Half the civil servants polled had heard some information about the 
reform but had not paid much attention to this news. In addition, 51.56% of the 
sample did not know what their responsibilities and duties would be after the reform. 
They  just  followed  the  orders  of  their  superiors.  Civil  servants  thought  that  the 
situation was no different from the past because they were not kept well informed 
about their duties. They also thought that the government should be communicating 
more with them about the reform. The poll shows some of the problems inherent in 
the Thai public sector in the past. The government did not communicate well with 
officials. Due to the fact that Thai society is based on a hierarchical system, staff 
believe that they should wait for orders or demands from executives, before taking 
action themselves.  
Opinions from citizens are also important for the concept of good governance 
and  public  sector  reform.  According  to  a  poll  by  Assumption  University  (2006), 
citizens  think  that  it  is  the  government’s  role  to  prevent  conflict  of  interest  and 
misuses  of  power.  As  for  the  economy,  citizens  also  think  that  the  government 
should  support  them  to  participate  in  the  planning  and  operation  of  national 
investment projects. From these results, it is clear that citizens think corruption is the 
most  important  problem  for  the  Thai  political  and  bureaucratic  system  and  that 
citizen  participation  is  important  for  economic  development.  This  poll  was  done 
three years after the promulgation of the Good Governance Royal Decree. However, 
according to the ABAC Poll (2008, in Thai), corruption in the governmental and 
bureaucratic system is still one of the main problems. This shows the problems of the 
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of good governance, the implementation may not be as effective as the government 
wanted because there are still some corruption cases in the public sector.  
3.4.2.2.1 Reflection  
The concept of public sector reform did not come directly from the World 
Bank or the IMF. Thai governments had been focusing on just such a project for 
some  time.  Nevertheless,  they  did  not  focus  much  on  this  because  public  sector 
reform appeared to be difficult and complicated. However, after the political reform 
of 1995-1997 and the economic crisis in 1997, the government was forced to pay 
attention  to  public  sector  reform  because  it  offered  a  solution  to  the  crisis.  In 
addition, reform was a requirement of the international organisations.  
Reform  affects  accountability  in  Thailand  directly.  With  regard  to  the 
accountor and accountee, there are some projects, such as new systems of human 
resource management and performance evaluation that can affect the accountor and 
accountee. A citizen-centred approach and public participation in the administrative 
system should be the main focus of the government and departments after reform. 
Civil servants should pay more attention to citizens’ requirements and benefits. They 
are after all responsible to citizens. This situation also affects what the government 
and departments are accountable for. From the main objectives, it would seem that 
officials now pay more attention to public accountability than in the past.  
Some of the projects specifically relate to the processes of accountability. For 
example,  accruals  accounting  helps  with  the  provision  of  correct  and  systematic 
accounting information. The Government Fiscal Management Information System 
(GFMIS)  has  improved  transparency  in  the  public  sector.  New  performance 
assessment is now in place to improve departmental performance. In addition, the 
aim of increasing public participation is directly related to public scrutiny.  
The  Good  Governance  Royal  Decree  was  promulgated  as  a  guideline  for 
departments,  and  a  standard  of  accountability.  From  what  the  Thai  government 
decided to implement, it can be deduced that these projects relate to accountability. 
3.4.2.3 The Constitution B.E. 2540 (A.D. 1997) 
As a result of political reform, in 1997, the Constitution B.E. 2540 (A.D. 
1997)  was  promulgated.  The  parliament  hoped  this  Constitution  would  help  to 
improve governance. The Constitution emphasised the rights and liberties of the Thai 
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constitutions (Soontornpipit 2002). It also focused on citizen participation in every 
step of its operation.  
After the promulgation of the Constitution, there were some major changes 
that  helped  to  improve  transparency  and  accountability.  Some  independent 
organisations were established such as the National Counter Corruption Commission 
(NCCC) and the Ombudsman. In 1999, the Office of the Auditor General became an 
independent  public  organisation,  reporting  audit  results  directly  to  the  parliament 
(OAG 2008, in Thai). 
One  of  the  main  aims of  this  Constitution  was  to  create  an  effective  and 
efficient  operational  system  in  public  sector  entities.  Citizens  should  have  more 
chances to participate in governmental decision making in order to protect their basic 
rights. Public sector management should be more transparent and able to be verified 
by citizens (OCSC 2007b, in Thai).  
Two main controls within the Constitution are control by citizens and control 
by public sector organisations. Two very public examples of control by citizens are 
as follows. Firstly, 50,000 people or more sign their names on a petition and send to 
the President of the Parliament to remove senior officials suspected of corruption 
(ADB 2001a). Three quarters of the constituents for one local authority send their 
names to the governor of that province. Moreover, citizens can send any complaints 
or petitions directly to the ombudsman. 
   With regard to control by public sector organisations, this can be classified 
into  two  main  types:  control  by  courts  and  control  by  other  independent 
organisations. For the first type, there are four main courts, being the Constitutional 
Court,  the  Administrative  Court,  the  Supreme  Court,  and  the  Court  of  Justice. 
Independent  organisations  are  the  NCCC,  the  OAG  and  the  Ombudsman.  These 
organisations are able to control and verify public sector performance and operations. 
Regarding citizen’s opinions on the Constitution, the sample group asked for 
the Constitution to focus on more equality in society, particularly equality between 
male and female and rich and poor. They wanted rights and liberty to give opinions 
on political issues and a guaranteed quality of life and security (Suan Dusit Poll 
2002c,  in  Thai).  From  this  poll,  it  is  evident  that  there  is  still  some  perceived 
inequality in Thai society.   
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3.4.2.3.1 Reflection  
This  Constitution  affected  accountability  in  Thailand.  It  influenced  the 
relationship  between  the  accountor  and  the  accountee.  The  rights  of  citizens  to 
participate in either the political system or the bureaucratic system were more than in 
the  past.  Moreover,  these  rights  were  realised  and  understood  by  public  sector 
organisations. Public participation was enhanced, which supported public scrutiny. In 
addition,  some  independent  organisations  were  established.  The  controlling  and 
monitoring system of the country is now much improved. The Constitution was one 
of  main  factors  leading  to  public  sector  reform.  Nevertheless,  following  more 
political turbulence in 2006, this Constitution was abrogated. 
3.4.2.4 Accruals accounting  
After the Asian Economic Crisis, one system that the government wanted to 
reform was the fiscal system. In 1999, the Bureau of the Budget implemented the 
Budgetary Result Based Management (MoF 2002).  
Regarding  financial  statements,  in  the  past,  Thailand  used  a  cash  basis 
accounting system in order to report accounting transactions. However, after using 
the  result  based  management  budgetary  system,  cash  based  information  was 
insufficient for accountability and management. Therefore, the Thai government had 
to implement accruals accounting.   
The government assigned the Comptroller General’s Department (CGD) to 
study how to apply accruals accounting in government agencies (MoF 2002). The 
main  responsibilities  of  this  department  consist  of  controlling  the  receipt  and 
disbursement  system;  preparing  the  government  financial  statements;  formulating 
government  accounting  systems;  managing  treasury  revenue;  enforcing  and 
amending  fiscal  laws  and  regulations;  setting  up  the  internal  audit  system; 
administering non-budgetary funds; and refining salary and pension system
19
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were some problems caused by the transition. The most important problem was to set 
account balances for assets (Selaratana 2003, in Thai). In the past, Thailand used a 
manual  system  to  record  and  keep  documents.  A  lack  of  proper  and  systematic 
recording systems in Thai public sector organisations was one of the causes of this 
problem. For example, some assets were not recorded or records existed for assets 
which had disappeared.   
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The  Thai  government  traditionally  used  cash  accounting,  a  simple  system 
which was not difficult for the lay person to understand. The majority of accounting 
practitioners  in  government  departments  did  not  possess  an  accounting  degree. 
Before the accounting transition, the system posed no problem for these officials. 
However, the government’s plan to implement accruals accounting faced a number 
of  critics.  Most  of  the  accounting  practitioners  knew  nothing  about  accruals 
accounting. They needed to be trained and afforded a great deal of time to study and 
understand  the  new  system.  Therefore,  during  the  transition  period,  there  were 
frequently  problems  about  how  to  interpret,  how  to  classify  and  how  to  record 
transactions. During the first stage of implementation (in 2002-2003), officials from 
the Comptroller General’s Department (CGD) had to work hard to assist accounting 
practitioners in the other departments. In 2004, all the departments changed from a 
manual  based  information  system  to  a  computer  based  system,  called  the 
Government Fiscal Management Information System (CGD 2004, in Thai).  
3.4.2.4.1 Reflection    
Financial statements produced using accruals accounting are important for 
accountability  (Brinkerhoff  2001;  Ormrod  and  Cleaver  1993;  Spira  2001; 
Velayutham and Perera 2004). Accurate accounting information can help the process 
of decision making, monitoring and controlling, which link directly to the processes 
of accountability. Auditors and controllers can use this information to assess and 
evaluate  departmental  performance.  Citizens  can  use  this  information  to  keep 
themselves  informed  about  financial  performance  and  status.  They  can  use  this 
information to evaluate how effective departments are.   
From the interview with the staff from the CGD (the first interview), one of 
the main aims of the government for introducing accruals accounting was to enhance 
accountability  and  transparency  in  the  accounting  and  information  system.  The 
financial status of government departments would be clarified and officials could use 
this information to improve their operations. In this research, accruals accounting in 
the bureaucratic system will be studied and discussed in Chapter 5.   
3.4.2.5 Government Fiscal Management Information System (GFMIS)  
In 2003, the government had a plan to improve performance by introducing 
information technology into the fiscal management system. This project was called 
‘Government  Fiscal  Management  Information  System  (GFMIS)’.  The  system 
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accounting,  procurement,  cash  disbursement  and  personnel  management’  (CGD 
2004, in Thai). The government’s intention was to use GFMIS as an efficient tool to 
manage public resources (Trakarnsirinont 2005, in Thai).  
The  GFMIS  system  uses  a  computer  system  called  SAP,  and  has  eight 
procedures, consisting of planning and budgeting system; budgeting monitor system; 
e-Payment  management;  government  fiscal  and  accrual  basis  system;  purchasing 
system  for  fixed  assets;  information  system  to  monitor  and  investigate;  human 
resource  management;  and  online  real-time  information  (CGD  2004,  in  Thai). 
GFMIS is a useful tool for executives in management, able to give correct and timely 
information;  reduce  overlapping  work;  increase  efficiency  in  managing  and 
controlling budgetary system; make changes to  procurement methods; support an 
activity cost system; and reduce the time taken to obtain fiscal data (Trakarnsirinont 
2005,  in  Thai).  However,  there  are  limitations  involved  with  its  implementation, 
including problems related to hardware, software and people.  
3.4.2.5.1 Reflection  
  This system is related directly to bureaucratic, organisational accountability 
and administrative accountability. Executives can get information as soon as they 
want. It should ensure more transparency in organisations. This system can reduce 
operational  time.  For  example,  the  CGD  can  download  departmental  financial 
statements from this system. This can help in the processes of accountability.   
According to the interview with the staff from the CGD in the first interview, 
this  project  aims  to  enhance  accountability  and  transparency  in  operations. 
Executives of departments and staff acquire information as soon as they want it. This 
system can help the process of scrutiny because executives can examine transactions 
made by their staff and also have to approve some of the transactions. Government 
Departments should find their operational process faster than before. This system 
will be one of the main themes for interviews.   
3.4.2.6 Monitoring and Performance Evaluation Committee 
The  government  decided  to  improve  the  monitoring  system.  Therefore,  in 
2005, the Prime Minister’s Regulation of Public Sector Monitoring and Performance 
Evaluation  was  promulgated  (OPDC  2007,  in  Thai).  The  Monitoring  and 
Performance Evaluation Committee was appointed, consisting of politicians, high-
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The main responsibilities of the committee are to provide the policies and 
framework for monitoring and performance evaluation in public sector organisations, 
including  providing  the  topics  for  scrutinising  and  assessing;  agreeing  audit  and 
control  plans;  supporting,  revising  and  proposing  methods  for  public  sector 
organisations to follow in order to reach the aim of this regulation; making reports 
summarising the committee’s performance and giving recommendations to the prime 
minister and the cabinet at least twice a year; following up departmental performance 
and reporting this information to the prime minister and the cabinet; collaborating 
with the Public Sector Development Committee in order to evaluate departmental 
performance;  appointing  sub-committees  to  work  on  those  task  specified  by  the 
committee; and following other responsibilities given by the cabinet (OPDC 2007, in 
Thai).  
With  regard  to  the  system  of  performance  assessment,  government 
departments now have to produce their key performance indicators (KPIs) and assess 
their operations every six, nine and twelve months. The results of the KPIs are sent to 
the Office of the Public Sector Development Commission (OPDC) to be verified, as 
well as to an external organisation, Thai Rating and Information Service (TRIS), to 
analyse the results (OPDC 2007, in Thai). 
3.4.2.6.1 Reflection   
This  project  can  help  in  improving  accountability,  efficiency  and 
effectiveness  in  operations.  This  project  relates  directly  to  administrative 
accountability. Departments are responsible for submitting their performance reports 
to  the  committee  to  be  evaluated.  It  improves  the  processes  of  accountability, 
particularly  scrutiny.  The  committee  plays  an  important  role  in  examining  and 
evaluating departmental performance. Each ministry has its own committee and there 
is another committee for the national level.  
3.5 ‘Governance’ in Thailand  
After the Asian economic crisis, the concept of good governance was widely 
discussed, and the public sector has used this concept as a framework for operations. 
In this part, the concept of good governance in Thailand is discussed. The Good 
Governance Royal Decree and the similarities and differences between the Decree 
and some selected codes of good governance are analysed.     106 
3.5.1 The concept of ‘good governance’  
The World Bank defines three aspects of governance, which are ‘the form of 
political regime’; ‘the process by which authority is exercised in the management of 
a country’s economic and social resources for development’; and ‘the capacity of 
governments to design, formulate, and implement policies and discharge functions’ 
(World Bank 1994, p. xiv).  
According to the World Bank, ‘good governance’ is ‘synonymous with sound 
development management … (that) requires systems of accountability, adequate and 
reliable  information,  and  efficiency  in  resource  management  and  the  delivery  of 
public services’ (World Bank 1992, p. 1 mentioned in Orlandini 2003, p. 18) 
The World Bank focuses on three main issues for good governance, which 
are  accountability,  the  legal  framework  for  development,  and  information  and 
transparency. The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific (ESCAP) argues that good governance has eight main characteristics, namely 
participation, rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, consensus oriented, equity 
and inclusiveness, effectiveness and efficiency, and accountability. United Nations 
Development  Programme  (UNDP)  proposes  one  more  characteristic,  in  addition 
those of ESCAP, that of strategic vision. Governance combines three elements of 
society together: civil society, the private sector and the public sector (Sopchokechai 
1998,  in  Thai).  Good  governance  is  the  mechanism  which  balances  these  three 
groups (Sopchokechai 1998, in Thai).  
The IMF promotes good governance to its members through various channels 
by  giving  policy  advice,  technical  assistance,  and  promoting  transparency  in 
financial  transactions  (IMF  1997).  Basically,  the  IMF  is  concerned  with 
macroeconomic stability, economic and sustainable growth (IMF 1997). Therefore, 
the  assistance  given,  as  suggested  by  the  phrases  ‘policy  advice’  and  ‘technical 
assistance’, is based on two aspects, ‘improving the management of public resources’ 
and ‘supporting the development and maintenance of a transparent and economic and 
regulatory environment conducive to efficient private sector activities’ (IMF 1997, p. 
3).  Institutional  reforms  are  related  to  good  governance.  The  ADB  gives  a 
measurement  of  good  governance  by  focusing  on  five  criteria,  these  being 
accountability,  transparency,  predictability,  participation,  and  the  relationships  of 
these four criteria (Satsanguan 2001).    107 
Accountability  is  one  of  the  main  components  of  good  governance.  The 
World Bank (1994) mentions that: 
Accountability is at the heart of good governance and has to do with holding 
governments responsible for their actions (p. 12).  
The next part discusses the concept of ‘good governance’ in Thailand.   
3.5.2 The concept of ‘good governance’ in Thailand   
The phrase ‘good governance’ was first used in Thailand on 8 August 1997 at 
a  seminar  being  held  at  Thammasat  University  to  confront  the  economic  crisis 
(Satsanguan 2001). The meaning of ‘good governance’ in a Thai context relates to 
the ideas of ‘discipline’ and also links to ‘the nature of people’s participation in the 
political process and, through the appeal to self-reliance, place moral responsibility 
on individuals’ (Orlandini 2003, p. 21).  
Sopchokechai (1998, in Thai) argues that features of good governance consist 
of public participation, honesty and transparency, accountability, political legitimacy, 
fair legal framework and predictability, and efficiency and effectiveness. The idea of 
good governance has been discussed in the Thai academic community since before 
the implementation of the National Economic and Social Development Plan 8 (1997-
2001). In this plan, good governance was mentioned (NESDB 2007, in Thai). The 
concept of development was changed from only economic development to focusing 
on  people  and  human  resources  (NESDB  2007,  in  Thai).  During  the  crisis,  the 
government paid serious attention to this issue because one of the main reasons for 
the economic crisis was said to be a lack of good governance in Thailand (Orlandini 
2003).  
There  are  some  Thai  terms  that  are  used  to  represent  the  phrase  ‘good 
governance’  (Satsanguan  2001),  such  as  dharmarath,  and  dharmaphibal 
(Sopchokechai 1998, in Thai; Orlandini 2003). This word is widely used within the 
bureaucratic system. Dharmarath, is a combination of two Thai words, Dharma and 
Rath (Orlandini 2003). Dharma means ‘right behaviour’, ‘righteous’ and ‘good’. In 
Thai, Thamma or Dharma also means ‘justice’. Rath means ‘state’, ‘territory’ or 
‘government’.  Therefore, these words imply that the government or state should 
govern  with  justice,  righteousness  or  that  it  should  make  a  righteous  state. 
Dharmaphibal is a combination of two Thai words, Dharma and Aphibal. Aphibal 
usually means ‘to protect’, ‘nurture’ or ‘look  after’.  Dharmaphibal means to use 
righteousness and fairness as a framework in order to maximise the benefit for the   108 
state and its citizens. These two words give the sense of morality in administration 
and management.  
There are certain phrases used by public sector organisations, such as the 
OPDC and the OCSC. These are Karn borihan kijakarn banmuang thidi, and Karn 
borihan  kijkarn  banmuang  lae  sangkhom  thidi.  These  two  phrases  explain  good 
governance,  and  translated  mean  that  officials  should  manage  and  administer  the 
state  and  society  by  using  appropriate  methods.  This  meaning  is  different  from 
scholars  because  the  OCSC  meaning  focuses  more  on  management  and 
administration while the scholar’s meaning focuses on morality.  
There  is  no  exact  translation  for  the  word  ‘accountability’.  Some 
organisations  and  scholars  define  accountability  as  ‘able  to  scrutinise’, 
‘responsibility’, ‘trustworthiness’, ‘reasonable operations’, and ‘ability for scrutiny’ 
(TransparencyThailand 2007, in Thai). From the definitions, Thai scholars normally 
focus on responsibility and scrutiny, including the sense of transparency. Therefore, 
these definitions can link to the aspects of ‘accountability for what’ and ‘processes of 
accountability’.  
Public sector organisations usually translate and explain accountability as a 
responsibility to admit and accept punishment arising from one’s own actions, or 
readiness to be responsible for one’s actions and to receive effects arising (or in Thai 
Rabob kham phrom rub pid or Kham phrom rub pid). Some organisations define 
‘accountability’ as responsibility in the performance of their duties and actions (or in 
Thai Kham rub pid chob or Kham rub pid chob tor nhaa ti). Translations of the word 
‘accountability’,  include  three  main  accountability  components  in  their  meaning: 
‘accountability  for what’, ‘processes’ and ‘effect’.  Interpretation of accountability 
may affect accountability mechanisms and how Thailand implements the aspects of 
accountability. This issue will be investigated in the thesis.  
3.5.3 The Good Governance Royal Decree 
In  December  1997,  the  government  asked  for  cooperation  from  research 
institutions  in  order  to  find  suitable  methods  for  solving  the  country’s  economic 
problems  and  achieving  sustainable  development  (OCSC2007a,  in  Thai;  OCSC 
2007b,  in  Thai;  OCSC  2007c,  in  Thai).  On  23  April  1999,  the  Prime  Minister 
assigned the Office of Civil Service Commission (OCSC) to be responsible for this 
issue. The cabinet approved the proposal on 11 May 1999 and the draft of the good 
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the Prime Minister (Good Governance) was promulgated on 10 August 1999 and all 
government agencies had to follow this regulation. 
The Thai government realised that good governance is very important for its 
operations. Therefore, in 2003, the cabinet approved the Royal Decree on Criteria 
and Procedures for Good Governance
20
, effective since 1 October 2003. The Decree 
determines the scope and plan of management and administration in order to create 
good  governance by  focusing on the citizens (OPDC 2007, in Thai).  In order to 
improve understanding  of the Decree, the OPDC launched an instructional book, 
distributed to government departments.  
According to an official from the OPDC, the Good Governance Royal Decree 
came into being as a result of ideas from the World Bank. However,  due to the 
limitations of interviews and documents, it is not possible to summarise which ideas 
from the World Bank were used to create the Decree.   
The Good Governance Royal Decree relates directly to accountability, public, 
administrative  and  organisational  accountability.  The  Decree  mentions 
responsibilities and obligations of government departments, and details exactly what 
departments  should  be  doing  in  order  to  improve  governance  and  accountability. 
Thus,  it  represents  the  standard  of  accountability,  used  for  evaluating  how 
departments perform in order to uplift accountability.  
The Good Governance Royal Decree has nine parts. The first part explains 
the meaning of good governance and the last part is miscellaneous items. The seven 
main parts of the Decree are shown in Table 3.1. The first column of the table comes 
from  the  Royal  Decree  itself  and  the  instructional  book  (2003)  launched  by  the 
OPDC in order to explain the Decree for departments. The second column comes 
from the instructional book. The last column is from the OPDC reports summarising 
projects arising from the Decree. 
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Table 3.1 The Components of the Good Governance Royal Decree
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Targets  Objectives  Projects/Assessment 
(examples) 
1. Responsiveness 
 
1. Creating pleasant and good 
living conditions for citizens  
2. Maintaining public order 
and safety 
3. Maximising benefit of the 
nation 
4. Receiving opinion from the 
citizens 
1. Performance indicators 
about citizen’s good living 
conditions or satisfaction on 
service delivery 
2. Information disclosure 
3. Seminars or meeting 
attended by citizens  
2. Result-based 
management 
 
1. Having clear vision, 
mission, and objectives 
2. Executives have clear 
operational targets 
3. Having performance 
indicators 
4. Having proper budgetary 
allocation 
5. Civil servants acknowledge 
their responsibilities 
6. Empowerment in decision 
making 
7. Knowledge development 
8. Civil servants are 
enthusiastic workers 
1. Strategic planning, annual 
plan 
2. Performance agreement 
3. Key performance indicators 
4. Performance auditing 
5. Coordination among public 
sector organisations  
6. Seminars, training and 
research 
7. State Administration Plan 
 
3. Effectiveness and 
value for money  
 
1. Transparency  
- disclosing information on 
operations and performance to 
the citizens and receiving 
comments and examination 
from them 
- civil servants should know 
about this information as well 
2. Value for money 
- producing cost accounting  
- evaluating value for money 
- having appropriate 
procurement process 
3. Responsibility 
- clear responsibility for each 
staff member 
- clear responsibility for each 
government agency 
1. Operational plans and 
targets  
2. Performance agreement 
3. Responsibility of each staff 
member 
4. Cost accounting report 
5. The amount of expenditure 
that can be reduced 
6. Planned operational time 
and time actually used 
4. Lessening 
unnecessary steps 
of work  
 
1. Empowerment for quick 
service and lessening 
unnecessary steps of work  
2. One Stop Service Centre 
(OSSC) – reducing service  
1. Gantt chart showing steps 
of work and operational time 
2. Regulations about 
empowerment  
3. Information on OSSC  
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Table 3.1 the Components of the Good Governance Royal Decree (con.) 
Targets  Objectives  Projects/Assessment 
(examples) 
  time and steps  project 
5. Mission review   1. Reviewing mission 
regularly 
2. Reviewing laws and 
regulations  
1. Information on mission 
review such as blueprint for 
change  
2. Key performance indicators 
about this issue 
6. Convenient and 
Favourable Public 
Services
22
  
1. Specifying operational time 
such as due date of each task 
2. Having information 
technology system 
3. Having system of receiving 
a complaint, suggestion or 
comment  
4. Information disclosure  
1. The amount of service 
delivery time  
2. Departmental website  
3. Response to complaints, 
suggestions or comments 
4. Information disclosure by 
following the Freedom of 
Information Act (1997) 
7. Performance 
evaluation  
1. Performance evaluation 
2. Performance evaluation for 
the purpose of personnel 
evaluation  
1. Performance agreement 
2. Performance assessment 
reports 
3. Civil servant’s performance 
evaluation report 
Table  3.2  shows  the  relationship  between  the  four  concepts,  namely 
responsibility, transparency, scrutiny and answerability, and the Good Governance 
Royal  Decree.  The  Decree  mentions  mainly  ‘accountability  for  what’  and  ‘the 
processes  of  accountability’.  Four  concepts,  namely  responsibility,  transparency, 
scrutiny and answerability, are applied to discuss the Decree. The numbers referred 
to in the table are the relevant sections in the Decree.  
3.5.3.1 Responsiveness  
This  part  aims  to  increase  citizen  participation  and  make  operational 
processes  more  transparent  and  effective.  With  regard  to  the  instructional  book, 
taking a citizen-centred approach is the main theme. During an operational process, 
departments should pay attention to citizens’ requirements. Each project should have 
key performance indicators in order to evaluate the results. The operational process 
should be transparent in order to reduce the number of corruption cases. Departments 
should give citizens a chance to participate in the process, particularly in projects that 
will directly affect them. Departments should pay attention to comments given by the 
public  and  use  these  comments  to  improve  their  operations.  Departments  should 
analyse obstacles or problems arising from the operations and find solutions as soon 
as they can.  
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Table  3.2  The  relationship  between  the  four  concepts  and  the  Good  Governance 
Royal Decree 
Concepts  Decree 
Responsibility  Transparency  Answerability  Scrutiny 
Responsiveness  8.1, 8.2, 8.3, 
8.4, 8.5 
8.2, 8.3  8.3, 8.4  8.2, 8.3 
Result-based 
management 
9.1, 9.3, 9.4, 
10, 11, 12, 13, 
15, 16, 17 
9.2, 14, 16    9.3 
Effectiveness and 
value for money 
21, 22, 23, 24, 
25, 26 
20, 23    22, 23 
Lessening 
unnecessary steps of 
work 
27, 29, 30, 31, 
32 
27, 29  30, 31, 32  27 
Mission review  33, 35, 36      33, 35 
Convenient and 
favourable public 
services 
37, 38, 39, 40, 
41, 42 
37, 39, 40, 43, 
44 
38, 39, 41, 42  37, 41, 42 
Performance 
evaluation 
45, 46, 48, 49      45, 46, 47, 
48, 49 
 
As  shown  in  Table  3.2,  the  section  on  responsiveness  relates  to  all  four 
concepts. Regarding responsibility, sections 8.1 relates to responsibility as a duty, 
which tells government departments what they should be doing in order to meet their 
targets. Section 8.2’s aim is that government departments should operate in good 
faith, transparency, and they should respond to public needs. Sections 8.3 and 8.4 
involve listening to public opinions. For section 8.5, departments are responsible for 
any problems or obstacles arising from their operations. They should find solutions 
and  methods  to  overcome  any  obstacles.  There  is  an  obligation  for  government 
departments to perform, and they should be responsible for what they have done. 
Regarding  transparency,  the  Decree  (sections  8.2  and  8.3)  stresses  that 
operational  processes  should  be  transparent.  Section  8.5  mentions  that  the 
departments should keep partner organisations and the OPDC informed about any 
problems and obstacles. This relates to transparency within the bureaucratic system.   
Sections 8.3 and 8.4 also relate to the concept of answerability. With projects 
that can affect a number of people, organisations should consult with the public in 
order to effectively explain the public benefits arising from the proposed mission. 
Civil servants should listen to public opinions and if appropriate use the comments to 
improve their operation.    113 
For the concept of scrutiny, the operational process must be open to scrutiny 
and departments should have  a verification system to measure each step of their 
operations. Enhancing public participation can improve public scrutiny.     
3.5.3.2 Result-based management 
The  part  on  result-based  management  focuses  on  the  outcome  of  an 
operational  process,  rather  than  the  input.  It  focuses  on  strategic  planning  and 
operational planning and should link to performance based budgeting. Staff should 
have clear responsibilities and operational targets. Senior civil servants have to sign 
performance agreements.  
For responsibility, sections 9.1, 9.3 and 10 relate to duties that departments 
have  to  perform,  while  section  9.4  is  concerned  with  liability,  responsibility  or 
obligation. If departments come across problems or obstacles that can affect people, 
they should find methods or solutions to relieve those obstacles. Section 11 relates to 
how qualified civil servants are, including their attitudes and opinions. Civil servants 
need to improve and develop their capability and knowledge in order to support their 
operations. They should realise what their responsibilities are.  
Sections 12 and 13  relate to the specific responsibilities of two particular 
organisations. Section 12 covers the duties of the OPDC and section 13 the duties of 
the cabinet. Section 15 sets out the responsibilities of the Office of the Council of 
State  and  the  Office  of  the  Prime  Minister.  Section  16  outlines  the  duties  of 
government departments and the Bureau of the Budget (BB) while section 17 covers 
the BB and the OPDC.  
Transparency  is  not  mentioned  directly  in  this  section  of  the  Decree. 
However, there is some information relating to this concept. Sections 9.2, 14 and 16 
specify information that should be put in the performance plan, four year plan and 
annual plan.  
As for scrutiny, section 9.3 mentions that departments should evaluate and do 
follow-up  operational  performance  by  reviewing  and  then  comparing  this  against 
standard  criteria  and  procedures.  From  the  instructional  book,  performance 
evaluation  is  important  for  measuring  the  outcomes  of  their  activities.  All 
government  agencies  should  produce  and  assess  their  performance  by  using  key 
performance  indicators.  Performance  auditing  is  important  in  order  to  ensure  the 
trustworthiness  of  the  data.  The  instruction  book  mentions  that  devolution  and 
autonomy are important factors to enhance the prospects of those middle level staff   114 
to  work  with  their  full  capability.  Civil  servants  have  a  chance  to  show  their 
capability in working because, as discussed in section 3.2.6.4, centralised decision 
making does not support enhancing accountability. In addition, local authorities have 
power to do some transactions that in the past they did not have. Some processes are 
faster  and  there  is  a  possibility  that  operational  processes  are  more  efficient  and 
effective. However, this section of the Decree does not have sections relating to the 
concept of answerability. 
3.5.3.3 Effectiveness and value for money 
This  target  relates  to  transparency,  value  for  money  and  responsibility. 
Transparency in this case covers both information disclosure and civil servants who 
should have knowledge about the information being provided to the public. In terms 
of value for money, this is related to the process of the use of money and reports of 
the actions. Comparison between input and outcome is important in order to analyse 
efficiency and effectiveness. Cost accounting for public services is a good example 
of a tool which can be used to analyse performance. Staff should realise and have a 
clear idea about their responsibilities. The main aim of this criterion is to know who 
is responsible, should some mistake or fault occur. This could reduce the amount of 
time used in the process. Therefore, from the objectives, this target relates to the 
concepts of responsibility, transparency and scrutiny.  
For  responsibility,  sections  21  and  22  relate  to  the  duties  of  departments. 
Section 24 covers the responsibility of departments. However, the last paragraph of 
this  section  mentions  that  directors  of  departments  and  staff,  who  involve  in 
processes, are guilty if they cannot make decisions within the specified period of 
time quoted in paragraphs one and two of section 24. This is responsibility, whereby 
the  responsible  person  should  be  prepared  for  any  possible  effects  from  his/her 
actions, including penalties.     
Regarding transparency, sections 20 and 23 mention types of information that 
should  be  presented  to  the  public.  According  to  section  20,  departments  should 
specify  the  target,  plan,  due  date  and  budget  for  its  projects,  and  present  this 
information to civil servants and citizens. For section 23, departments should make 
their procurement process transparent. This section is also related to the concept of 
scrutiny. Departments should retain the fairness of their processes.  
3.5.3.4 Lessening unnecessary steps of work 
The main aim of this target is to reduce the amount of time used for service 
delivery. According to the instructional book, there are some methods which can   115 
help to reduce the amount of operational time. The first method is empowerment. 
The Thai bureaucratic system was centralised, which made any operational process 
much  slower  than  it  should  be.  In  the  past,  the  public  criticised  public  sector 
activities for their lack of transparency, because the process was very slow and did 
not provide much information to the public. According to the instructional book, the 
government’s  aim  was  that  decentralisation  in  decision  making  should  help  to 
enhance transparency by speeding up processes and enhancing citizens’ satisfaction. 
There were some projects arising from this idea, such as transferring some tasks to 
provincial  offices  and  local  authorities,  and  improving  the  human  resource 
management system.   
Responsibility is similar to the other sections, in that it is considered to be a 
sense  of  duty.  The  Decree  mentions  the  process  and  activities  that  departments 
should follow. If departments come across any obstacles or problems, they have to 
report these to the OPDC, who will then report these to the cabinet.  
For  transparency,  the  Decree  explains  which  information  should  be 
publicised.  The  concept  of  empowerment  can  help  the  control,  follow-up  and 
surveillance of the use of power, and this relates to the concept of scrutiny.  
For answerability, the Decree aims to help people when they make contact 
with  departments.  Departments  should  provide  useful  information  and  should 
respond to requests made by citizens. This information is in sections 30, 31 and 32.  
3.5.3.5 Mission review 
  The  public  sector  organisations  should  review  their  mission,  laws  and 
regulations regularly in order to keep their policies and strategies up-to-date. This 
target  links  to  responsibility  in  the  sense  of  duty.  These  sections  confirm  what 
actions/functions  government  departments  should  perform.  In  section  35,  a 
department should take  the results of public consultation into consideration. This 
shows that the Decree pays attention to public opinion.   
  From the explanation in the instructional book, departments should evaluate 
and examine their mission regularly in order to assess cost and results, and decide 
whether they should continue with or cancel a project. This section of the Decree 
links to the concept of scrutiny.  
3.5.3.6 Convenient and favourable public services 
This part is directly related to the response to citizens’ requirements. The 
main theme is to respond to such requirements as soon as possible, and to make   116 
citizens feel more satisfied with the services. Departments should specify operational 
time and a due date for each service or project. They should disclose information and 
have an information technology system to support service delivery. Citizens have 
rights to gain access to governmental data and the public sector should not hide any 
information from the public. If the information affects national security, economic 
stability  or  public  order,  or  infringes  personal  rights,  officials  can  use  their 
judgement  to  decide  whether  or  not  to  provide  this  information  (section  43). 
However, the main aim of this Decree is to provide as much information as they can. 
In  order  to  support  citizens,  departments  should  have  a  system  for  receiving 
complaints, suggestions and comments. Departments should answer questions from 
citizens and departments, which have power to launch regulations, should amend any 
problematic regulations.  
This part of the Decree relates to all four concepts. Responsibility is the duty 
that departments have to perform in order to succeed with their objectives. However, 
some sections (e.g. sections 38 and 42) also specify a due date for activities. This 
means it is also an obligation of departments to ensure the tasks are completed by the 
due date. If departments fail to do this, they need to provide their reasons.  
For  transparency,  the  Decree  mentions  that  departments  should  publicise 
information  about  their  actions.  The  Decree  does  not  only  focus  on  providing 
information to the public, but it also focuses on the civil servants. The Decree wants 
civil servants to be knowledgeable about departmental activities. It also concentrates 
on  information  technology  and  requires  government  departments  to  set  up  an 
information  network  to  help  people  who  want  to  make  contact  with  departments 
(section 39).  
The  Decree  refers  to  the  Ministry  of  Information  and  Communication 
Technology, which is able to help any of the government agencies to develop their 
own  system.  Thus,  the  importance  of  information  technology  in  departments  is 
highlighted. Government agencies should present information about their operations 
to the public, as mentioned in section 43. According to section 44, they should ensure 
transparency in their annual budget and procurement process. This shows that the 
Decree aims to enhance the level of transparency in operations.  
Regarding  answerability,  the  Decree  mentions  the  period  of  time  that 
departments  should  take  to  respond  to  queries  from  the  public,  relating  to  their 
responsibility (section 38). The Decree does recommend time limits but it does not   117 
mention any penalties if departments exceeds these. This section allows departments 
a degree of flexibility in their implementation. Information technology is highlighted 
as  an  important  medium  with  which  to  communicate  with  citizens.  Section  39 
recommends  departments  should  establish  an  information  network  for  making 
contact with citizens.  
For  scrutiny,  departments  should  have  some  method  for  scrutiny  or 
verification when they receive complaints or petitions. Departments should provide 
information to citizens, which would allow citizens to evaluate performance. This 
links the concept of scrutiny to the concept of transparency.   
3.5.3.7 Performance evaluation  
The  last  target  of  the  Good  Governance  Royal  Decree  is  performance 
evaluation. This issue focuses on the performance agreement that senior officials 
have to sign with higher executives. The agreement indicates that officials will work 
to  their  highest  capability  and  that  they  aim  to  reach  the  targets  they  plan. 
Performance  evaluation  reports  are  important  for  this  target,  consisting  of 
departmental  and  personal  assessment.  After  operations,  officials  should  be 
responsible for evaluating how efficient and effective they have been at performing 
during the year.    
This  section  mainly  relates  to  scrutiny,  through  reference  to  performance 
evaluation. Organisations should evaluate staff performance at all levels, and if the 
results reach the benchmark, the OPDC should propose to the cabinet in order to give 
rewards to organisations and civil servants. However, the Decree does not mention 
anything about apportioning blame or penalties if the government agency fails to 
reach its targets.  
The Decree mentions the responsibilities of the OPDC, which collects results 
for the purposes of evaluation, proposes the result summary to the cabinet and asks 
for rewards for successful organisations.  
3.5.3.8 Reflection   
The  Good  Governance  Royal  Decree  relates  to  all  three  types  of 
accountability,  i.e.  public,  administrative  and  organisational  accountability.  For 
public accountability, the Decree mentions what duties departments should perform 
for the public. However, it does not clarify the rights of citizens in the Decree. For 
administrative accountability, the Decree mentions duties of departments to deal with 
their controllers, who evaluate and control departmental activities, transactions and   118 
performance, or auditors, who audit financial statements and financial transactions. 
There are some sections that mention departmental obligation. However, while the 
Decree does not mention much about organisational accountability, some sections 
mention  departmental  responsibilities.  Executives,  senior  staff  and  lower-ranking 
staff can use this Decree as a guideline for their operations. The Decree is likely to 
relate  to  bureaucratic  accountability.  It  informs  what  duties  departments  should 
perform in order to improve governance.  
The  Decree  relates  directly  to  ‘accountability  for  what’  and  ‘processes  of 
accountability’  as  shown  in  Table  3.2.  It  acts  as  a  practical  guideline  for  the 
government  departments  to  follow.  Mostly,  the  Decree  mentions  duties  that 
departments should perform. While most sections can be related to the four concepts, 
as mentioned earlier in Table 3.2, there is one part in the Decree that seems unrelated 
to accountability, that of lessening unnecessary steps of work. However, from the 
instructional  book,  this  part  is  likely  to  relate  all  of  the  four  concepts,  i.e.  the 
instructional book explains and gives more details than stated in the Decree.  
The concept of responsibility in the sense of duty is mainly mentioned in the 
Decree. Only some sections mention responsibility in the sense of accountability. 
Section 24, for example, states that departments or civil servants should take full 
responsibility if they cannot make decisions within the time limit. Some sections, 
such as 8.5 and 31, mention that departments have to be responsible for problems or 
obstacles arising as a result of their activities.  
For  transparency,  the  Decree  mentions  that  departments  should  provide 
information  about  their  operations  and  performance,  except  some  confidential 
information  (section  43).  This  shows  the  importance  of  this  concept.  From  the 
instructional  book,  the  Official  Information  Act  B.E.  2540  (1997)  is  used  as  a 
guideline for departments to follow. The Decree also focuses on communication with 
civil servants. Departments should make details available to civil servants, because 
some civil servants do not know what the government and/or departments have done. 
There were some examples of a lack of transparency within the bureaucratic system. 
For instance, as mentioned in section 3.2.2.2, according to Suan Dusit Poll (2002b, in 
Thai), half of the respondents did not know their responsibilities after the reform.  
The concept of transparency links to the concept of responsibility because 
departments have a duty to follow the guideline to provide the information listed in   119 
the  Decree.  Organisations  should  prepare  information  ready  for  presenting  to  the 
public or other public sector entities, including civil servants.  
For answerability, departments should answer questions from citizens, should 
specify the period of time for the response and should inform citizens about this. 
Another point arising from the Decree is how important information networks are for 
communication.  It  follows,  therefore,  that  departmental  websites  are  the  main 
communication medium for departments. Departmental websites will be studied and 
discussed in Chapter 6.  
It is the responsibility of departments to answer questions from questioners. 
Departments  should  disclose  the  steps  and  the  time  taken  for  operations.  When 
citizens ask questions, departments should respond within specific time limits. They 
should provide information if requested to by citizens. The concept of answerability 
can link to both responsibility and transparency.  
The  concept  of  scrutiny  usually  links  to  the  concept  of  transparency.  For 
example, section 44 mentions that departments should provide information to the 
public and then citizens can scrutinise departmental performance, if they want to do. 
However,  apart  from  this,  the  Decree  does  not  mention  much  about  scrutiny.  It 
mentions that departments should have to perform duties and they should have some 
system for scrutinising these actions. Although the Decree mentions little about the 
control or auditing system, it does focus on performance evaluation.  
The  concept  of  scrutiny  also  relates  to  responsibility.  Departments  are 
responsible for setting the systems and providing information to both civil servants 
and the public in order to enhance the process of scrutiny. Answerability links to 
scrutiny, because when organisations receive petitions, complaints, accusations and 
questions from the public, or civil servants, they have to check and examine those 
cases and then give a response to those parties.    
The Decree alone is not easy to understand. Although the OPDC published an 
instructional booklet and explanation of the Decree, this book was only distributed 
within the public sector. From the main aims of the Decree in the instructional book, 
one apparent theme is that of helping people, responding to their requirements and 
improving the quality of life. However, although the Decree mentions something 
about citizens, this is only from the public sector’s point of view. People cannot 
know which rights and duties they have. This information is possibly included in 
other laws but it would be time consuming for citizens to search for this information.   120 
Regarding  the  meaning  of  good  governance,  from  the  interview  with  an 
official from the OPDC, it appears that the Decree originated from the World Bank’s 
concepts of good governance. However, there is no evidence to tell which concept 
was used to develop the Decree. Nevertheless, from section 3.5.1, good governance 
requires systems of accountability, adequate and reliable information, and efficiency 
in resource management and delivery of public services (World Bank 1992, p. 1 
mentioned in Orlandini 2003, p. 18).  
From the above discussion, the Decree can link to accountability. Regarding 
adequate  and  reliable  information,  the  Decree  requires  departments  to  provide  as 
much information to the public and civil servants as they can with the exception of 
some confidential information. However, apart from section 21, the Decree does not 
mention much about reliable information. For efficiency in resource management 
and  delivery  of  services,  the  Decree  mentions  value  for  money  and  performance 
evaluation. It requires departments to produce cost accounting reports. The Decree 
expects departments to reduce the amount of time they take for operations, which can 
satisfy citizens when they make contact with departments.  
From the previous paragraph, the contents of the Good Governance Royal 
Decree  relates  to  the  concept  of  good  governance  raised  by  the  World  Bank. 
However, the Decree very much focuses on the public sector side.    
3.5.4 The Good Governance Royal Decree and corruption   
As discussed earlier in section 3.2, in Thailand, business and politics cannot 
be  separated  (Mutebi  2008).  In  fact,  a  politician  is  one  of  the  main  factors 
determining how successful a businessman is likely to be. This kind of corruption is 
indirectly related to money, and is likely to be structural corruption. However, there 
are also some corruption cases relating directly to money. Good examples include 
vote buying, additional payments to civil servants, bribes and buying positions.                  
The contents of the Thai Decree can be linked to aspects of accountability. 
Projects arising from the Decree support reducing corruption and some ideas, such as 
transparency, decentralisation, public participation and performance evaluation, can 
help reducing corruption arising from operations.  
Transparency can reduce corruption, fraud and mismanagement (Soralump 
2004,  in  Thai).  Decentralisation  can  help  reducing  misuses  of  power  in  decision 
making by departmental executives (Soralump 2004, in Thai). In addition, executives 
are less likely to be able to use their positions for their own advantage because it is   121 
no longer only them who decide on departmental operations. Decentralisation can 
possibly reduce some of the problems related to social environment. For example, 
some civil servants come under pressure from biased appointment and it is possible 
that they will do everything, including buying positions, in order to escape from their 
current positions (Bumroongsup et al. 2003, in Thai). This problem may be reduced 
after implementing decentralisation. Public participation can enhance public scrutiny, 
which  is  an  important  factor  for  accountability.  The  Decree  also  focuses  on 
performance evaluation. This can reduce mismanagement.  
A project to do with lessening unnecessary steps of work may not seem to 
relate to the concept of accountability but does actually relate to reducing corruption,  
because some Thais will pay bribes in order to get better, faster services from civil 
servants (Phongpaichit et al. 2000).  This project wants to improve the quality of 
service  delivery,  which  is  one  way  to  reduce  corruption.  Corruption  in  this  case 
occurs  in  a  practitioner  level.  Arising  from  ideas  of  the  Decree,  the  government 
implemented a project called ‘clean organisation’ in order to improve the morality 
and  integrity  of  civil  servants.  The  government  thinks  that  the  morality  of  civil 
servants is important.   
Although politicians are the main cause of corruption problems in Thailand 
(Bumroongsup et al. 2003, in Thai), as well as one of the main factors affecting the 
bureaucratic  system,  the  Decree  cannot  do  anything  to  stop  interference  by 
politicians.  This  is  because  the  Decree  applies  only  to  government  departments. 
Therefore, the Decree is unable to remove all incidences of corruption. It can deal 
with certain levels of corruption, particularly those at the departmental operational 
level. However, for higher level incidences, such as ministerial and governmental, 
the Decree may not be an effective tool. To solve corruption at these higher levels 
would require more tools, such as public participation, freedom of the press, effective 
law and regulations, and counter corruption organisations.  
As  well  as  being  unable  to  remove  all  corruption  being  carried  out  by 
politicians,  the  Decree  may  also  be  unable  to  solve  some  structural  corruption 
problems, particularly clientelism. Politicians can give opportunities and benefits to 
their families, groups and clan. For example, an ex-Prime Minister was accused of 
launching a new law to help his own business and relatives (Matichon 2008, in Thai).   
In  summary,  the  Good  Governance  Royal  Decree  aims  to  improve 
operational processes and enhance accountability in the public sector. The Decree   122 
can partially support reducing corruption. Problems caused by politicians and high-
ranking civil servants themselves are difficult to resolve. Therefore, even after the 
implementation of the Decree, corruption problems still occur in both the political 
and bureaucratic systems.   
3.5.5  Comparing  the  Thai  Decree  to  some  selected  codes  of  good 
governance  
The  concept  of  good  governance  is  an  important  concept  for  raising  the 
quality of the operational process in organisations. Some international organisations 
and some developed countries have launched codes of good corporate governance to 
be used as guidelines for organisations to improve their operation and performance. 
The main aim of this section is to discuss the similarities and the differences between 
the Thai Decree and a selection of these other codes.  
3.5.5.1 The Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
The  ADB  proposes  corporate  governance  principles  for  companies.  The 
ADB’s aim is for its principles to help enterprises and governments design codes of 
good corporate governance, and to help investors and fund managers seek corporate 
governance in investee enterprises. These principles focus on the use of resources, 
quality of leadership of an enterprise, transparency, an effective audit committee, 
codes of conduct, the issues of conflict of interest, social and environmental factors, 
conduct  of  the  board  of  directors,  responsibilities  of  investors,  and  the  roles  of 
directors in turnaround situations.  
Although  the  code  is  for  companies,  it  also  provides  useful  ideas  for  the 
public sector, for example how organisations and staff should perform in order to 
create  good  governance  in  operations.  There  are  some  differences  between  the 
ADB’s principles and the Thai Decree. The main difference is that the Thai Decree 
does not specify the roles of the audit committee, conduct of the board of directors, 
responsibilities of investors and codes of conduct. The Decree only specifies general 
duties and some processes that departments should do. For disclosure, the Decree 
mentions only general ideas that departments should provide as much information as 
they can, and then goes on to suggest some items that should provided to the public. 
The ADB principles focus on all stakeholders while the Decree focuses more on civil 
servants.  The  Decree  does  not  pay  much  attention  to  citizens’  rights  and 
responsibilities to participate in public sector transactions.   123 
However, the Thai Decree is a law. It only sets out the main theme of good 
governance. For areas of governance, there are specific laws such as the Official 
Information  Act.  However,  this  situation  can  lead  to  an  abundance  of  laws  and 
regulations. It is possible that civil servants may not even know which laws they 
have  to  follow.  The  Decree  rarely  mentions  control  and  contains  no  information 
about  internal  auditing.  Thailand  does  have  a  separate  act  which  covers  internal 
auditing.  However,  internal  control  is  an  important  factor  that  can  improve 
governance so information regarding this should be included in the Decree.  
3.5.5.2 The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004) 
The  OECD  Principles  of  Corporate  Governance  (2004)  focus  on 
stakeholders, shareholders and boards of directors. The principles pay attention to 
transparency  and  disclosure.  Transparency  is  an  important  element  of  good 
governance. For the public sector, budgets are one of the most important documents. 
Therefore,  the  OECD  launched  OECD  Best  Practices  for  Budget  Transparency 
(2001).  
Comparing the Decree with the OECD best practice (2004), there are some 
differences. The main differences are similar to those of the ADB’s. The OECD 
mentions  the  rights  of  shareholders,  key  ownership  functions,  and  the  equitable 
treatment  of  shareholders.  However,  in  the  Thai  Decree,  there  is  no  mention  the 
rights of citizens. It mentions only that citizens can gain access to information, and 
that they can send their complaints to departments.  
The OECD details the roles of stakeholders in  corporate  governance. The 
Decree provides a little information about this, but this is mainly about the duties 
which officials have to perform. It does not mention the rights of stakeholders. Also, 
although the Decree mentions some responsibilities of the executives, this is not the 
major focus of the Decree.  
3.5.5.3 The International Monetary Fund (IMF)  
  The  IMF  focuses  on  the  concept  of  good  governance.  It  promotes  good 
governance  to  its  members  through  various  channels  by  giving  policy  advice, 
technical assistance, and promoting transparency in financial transactions. Basically, 
the IMF is concerned with macroeconomic stability, and economic and sustainable 
growth. Its policy advice and technical assistance are based on the following two 
aspects:  ‘improving  the  management  of  public  resources’  and  ‘supporting  the 
development  and  maintenance  of  a  transparent  and  economic  and  regulatory 
environment  conducive  to  efficient  private  sector  activities’  (IMF  1997,  p.  3).   124 
Institutional  reform  plays  an  important  part  in  relation  to  good  governance.  One 
example of an IMF code of best practice is the Code of Good Practices on Fiscal 
Transparency. This code includes roles and responsibilities of the government sector, 
available information to the public, budget preparation, execution and reporting, and 
assurances. The Thai government does not have a code of this kind. However, what 
the Thai public sector does have is the Official Information Act, which details which 
information should be provided to the public. However, even this Act does not give 
specific details.  
3.5.5.4 Better Practice Guide – Australia  
  Australia has the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 and the 
Commonwealth  Authorities  and  Companies  Act  1997.  From  those  two  acts,  the 
Australian National Audit Office also launched Public Sector Governance Volume 1: 
Better  Practice  Sector  Governance:  Framework,  Processes  and  Practices,  and 
Volume  2:  Governance  Guidance  Papers.  Volume  1  explains  the  context  and 
framework for public sector governance and discusses processes and practices that 
can  produce  good  governance  in  public  sector  organisations.  Volume  2  provides 
guidance on current governance issues in the Commonwealth. All this information is 
provided  to  the  public.  This  is  different  from  Thailand,  which  provides  only  the 
Decree not the instructional book. Volume 1 provides a lot of details about good 
governance. On the other hand, although some Thai public sector organisations, such 
as the OPDC, explain the concept of good governance, it is only briefly mentioned 
and usually focuses on the public sector side rather than citizens. From the Decree, it 
is  difficult  to  tell  what  the  government  plans  to  do  and  what  effects  relating 
organisations will receive.     
3.5.5.5 United Kingdom 
For private sector organisations and companies, the example of best practice 
is provided by the Combined Code: Principles of Good Governance and Code of 
Best  Practice.  This  is  intended  to  be  used  as  a  guideline  for  creating  good 
governance,  and  includes  information  for  both  companies  and  institutional 
shareholders. For companies, the code details what the responsibilities of the board, 
chairman and CEO should be. It also suggests that information about appointment of 
the board should be provided. Remunerations and relations with shareholders are 
important information and need to be transparent. Accountability and audit are also 
significant and should be included in the best practice. With regard to institutional 
shareholders, the code gives the responsibilities of the shareholders.    125 
Regarding the public sector and public services, the Chartered Institute of 
Public  Finance  and  Accountancy  launched  the  Good  Governance  Standards  for 
Public  Services.  Good  governance,  according  to  this  guide  to  best  practice,  can 
happen by focusing on an organisation’s purpose and the outcomes for citizens and 
service  users;  clearly  defined  functions  and  roles;  promoting  values  for  the 
organisation and demonstrating the values of good governance through behaviour; 
being transparent and managing risk; developing the capacity and capability of the 
governing  body  to  be  effective;  and  engaging  stakeholders  and  making 
accountability real.  
In comparing this with Thailand, the Thai Decree provides very little about 
the  responsibilities  of  the  executives,  staff  and  citizens.  Information  about 
remunerations or appointments is also not included, although it is in other acts. Thus, 
it is not easy for people to find certain information, should they want to study and 
understand the Decree. 
3.5.5.6 Reflection  
From the discussion of the Good Governance Royal Decree, it can be seen 
that  the  Thai  government  hoped  the  Decree  would  help  to  improve  operational 
processes and enhance public benefits (OPDC 2003, in Thai). It is possible that the 
Thai government paid more attention to operational processes either because of the 
accumulation of problems within the bureaucratic system or because they believe 
that the main problem arose directly from operations. This is different from other 
selected  codes  of  good  corporate  governance  that  focus  on  the  roles  and 
responsibilities of actors in the relationship.  
From an interview with OPDC staff, it would seem that the Decree came 
about following suggestions from the World Bank. However, she does not know 
exactly which suggestions were used. Therefore, it cannot be summarised to what 
degree the Decree matched the World Bank’s ideas. However, as discussed in section 
3.5.3.8,  the  decree  complies  with  and  can  be  directly  related  to  three  main 
components of good governance as defined by the World Bank (1992).  
In summary, the Thai Decree is different from other codes of best practice 
because  it  focuses  on  only  the  public  sector.  Also,  it  is  difficult  for  citizens  to 
understand what the government and departments intend to do in order to improve 
governance  and  enhance  accountability.  However,  from  the  above  discussion 
(section 3.5.3), it can be seen that this Decree can be linked to accountability and can 
be considered one of the tools to enhance accountability.    126 
3.6 Conclusion   
This chapter discusses culture, values and politics in Thailand. In addition, 
the context of accountability in the Thai public sector is also discussed. The Thai 
government  implemented  public  sector  reform  in  order  to  improve  operational 
processes  and  reduce  bureaucratic  problems.  In  addition,  it  then  introduced  the 
concept of good governance to the bureaucratic system. The aim of this chapter is to 
use  this  information  to  discuss  findings  in  order  to  answer  the  specific  research 
questions.  
One  factor  influencing  accountability  mechanisms  is  culture  and  values. 
Hofstede argues that Thai society is based on large power distance, collectivism, 
strong uncertainty avoidance, femininity, and long-term orientation (see section 3.2). 
However,  due  to  the  influence  of  westernisation,  some  scholars  argue  that 
individualism is also a characteristic of some Thais, particularly those of the younger 
generation.  There  are  both  similarities  and  conflicts  between  Hofstede’s  cultural 
dimensions and Thai culture and values.   
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions can be compared with Thai values (see details 
in section 3.2). Large power distance relates to hierarchy and sakdina. Collectivism 
relates  to  a  bunkhun  relationship.  Uncertainty  avoidance  is  the  consequence  of  a 
dimension of power distance. Power distance indicates what an individual should do. 
Femininity links to values, such as face-saving, criticism avoidance, and kraeng jai. 
From  these,  it  can  be  implied  that  Hofstede’s  dimensions  are  mainly  valid  in 
Thailand,  even  though  there  are  some  conflicts  between  these  and  Thai  values. 
National cultural perspectives by Hofstede will be one of the frameworks used in this 
thesis in order to discuss the findings of this thesis because the researcher would like 
to keep an open mind about the relevance of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions to the 
findings.  
With  regard  to  Thai  culture  and  values  (see  section  3.2.4),  this  research 
focuses on hierarchy; religious value, particularly karma; ego orientation of face-
saving, criticism avoidance and kraeng jai; grateful relationship of bunkhun; smooth 
interpersonal  relationship  of  mai  pen  rai;  and  personalism.  All  these  values  are 
important values that can either support or deter the enhancement of accountability. 
Culture and values affect the accountability relationship directly. These issues can 
explain the actions of the accountor and the accountee. They will be used to discuss 
findings.    127 
Some  values  can  support  fraud  and  corruption  (see  section  3.2.6).  For 
example,  a  bunkhun  relationship  and  a  patron-client  relationship,  leading  to  the 
concept of clientelism, can support corruption. Large power distance and hierarchy 
lead to centralised decision making. This situation helps power wielders to use their 
positions for private benefits. For face-saving, criticism avoidance, and kraeng jai, 
subordinates may not feel able to contradict their superiors. Therefore, superiors can 
basically do whatever they want to. However, culture and values are not the only 
factor influencing corruption. There are also other factors, such as political stability, 
systems of checks and balances, competency of individuals, economic environments, 
integrity and honesty of individuals, ineffective operational systems, ineffective legal 
systems  and  public  participation,  which  influence  individuals  to  commit  corrupt 
activities.  
Thailand  realises  the  importance  of  resolving  problems  in  its  bureaucratic 
systems, particularly that of corruption. Indeed, some projects arose particularly to 
solve these problems. Such project was that of public sector reform. Thailand had 
focused  on  this  issue  since  before  the  economic  crisis  but  the  intention  of 
implementing  public  sector  reform  was  not  obvious.  However,  after  the  Asian 
economic crisis (1997), Thailand received support programmes mainly from the IMF 
(see  details  in  section  3.4).  The  World  Bank  and  ADB  also  supported  Thailand. 
Although some researchers argue that the public sector was not the cause of the 
Asian crisis, reform was a condition required by the IMF, which Thailand had to 
implement. The Thai government also wanted to improve operational efficiency and 
effectiveness. Therefore, after the crisis, it was the time that Thailand had to pay 
attention to the reform.  
After  the  political  reform,  the  Constitution  of  Thailand  (1997)  was 
promulgated. This Constitution altered the roles and responsibilities of accountors 
and accountees in terms of accountability relationships within Thai public sector. 
This law emphasised the rights and liberties of the Thai people. Public accountability 
is featured more than in the past. The parliament hoped this would help to improve 
governance  in  the  public  sector  (see  section  3.4.2),  and  reduce  bureaucratic 
problems.  The  Constitution  was  the  first  step  towards  improving  operations  and 
administration and to paying more attention to the rights and liberties of its citizens.   
Changing roles and responsibilities relates to what accountors are accountable 
for. As mentioned earlier, public accountability is paid attention by the government. 
The use of public money also comes into focus. Departmental operations should be   128 
efficient  and  effective.  Information  should  be  provided  to  the  public.  Therefore, 
during reform, the Thai government implemented some projects in order to improve 
their  operations  (see  details  in  section  3.4.2).  These  projects  can  improve  the 
processes of accountability.  
For example, accruals accounting was introduced to government agencies in 
order to improve the accounting system. The accounting system plays an important 
role  in  the  accountability  relationship,  particularly  scrutiny.  It  can  support  and 
improve  the  control  system.  Information  from  accruals  accounting  can  increase 
transparency in the governmental accounting and financial system. Other projects, 
such as the Government Fiscal Management Information System (GFMIS) and the 
Monitoring  and  Performance  Evaluation  Committee,  were  implemented  and 
established in order to improve operational processes and to enhance accountability, 
particularly administrative, bureaucratic and organisational accountability.  
The  GFMIS  increases  transparency  in  operations  and  supports  the 
scrutinising  process.  Similarly,  the  Monitoring  and  Performance  Evaluation 
Committee can improve the scrutinising process and the assessment system. This 
information will be used to develop questions for the interviews, in order to study 
what government departments have done in order to operationalise the processes of 
accountability (see Chapter 4).  
An important project of the reform was the introduction of the concept of 
good governance into the bureaucratic system, in an attempt to solve problems such 
as corruption and mismanagement, the main obstacle of the bureaucratic system. The 
Good Governance Royal Decree was promulgated to be the main law for this project. 
Departments use the Decree as a framework, which they follow in order to enhance 
accountability. The Decree is, therefore, the standard of accountability for all Thai 
government departments (see section 3.5).  
The  contents  in  the  Decree  can  link  to  ‘accountability  for  what’  and 
‘processes of accountability’. The Decree informs departments on how they should 
perform in order to improve governance and enhance accountability. It mentions the 
responsibilities and obligations of government departments.  With regard to types of 
accountability, the Decree relates to administrative and public accountability. For 
administrative accountability, the Decree specifies duties, both for departments and 
controllers.    129 
Regarding public accountability, the  Decree has some sections setting  out 
what departments should be doing for the public but it does not mention the rights of 
citizens or what citizens should do. However, the public can use the Decree as a 
guideline to evaluate the performance of departments or if they want to contact a 
department or make a complaint. For organisational accountability, the Decree rarely 
mentions operations within organisations.    
Compared  with  some  selected  codes  of  good  governance  created  by 
international  organisations  and  developed  countries,  the  Thai  Decree  is  different 
because the other codes focus on the rights of  stakeholders of organisations (see 
details in section 3.5.5), while the Thai Decree focuses on the bureaucratic system, 
particularly  government  departments.  The  Decree  cannot  solve  some  types  of 
corruption, particularly causing from politicians.  
The Good Governance Royal Decree will first be used to develop questions 
for the interviews (see Chapter 4) and then to discuss the findings (see Chapters 5 
and  6).  The  next  chapter  is  Chapter  4  Research  Methods,  which  discusses  the 
methods used for data collection and data analysis, including development of coding 
schemes. 
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Chapter 4 Research Methods 
4.1 Introduction  
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the research methods and research 
design employed in this study to achieve the research objectives set out in Chapter 1. 
Qualitative methods using primary data sources are suitable for answering both the 
general and the specific research questions.  
Interviews  are  used  to  gather  the  information  necessary  to  study  how  the 
implementation of accountability is reflected in the Thai public sector, including an 
investigation of the attitudes and understanding of Thai civil servants.  
Content analysis is applied to analyse Thai departmental websites and annual 
reports. Websites and annual reports are among the most important techniques used 
to  distribute  information  to  the  public  and  other  public  sector  organisations.  An 
analysis of these can show how departments use these media to present information 
relating  to  accountability.  Communications  by  websites  and  annual  reports  are 
important  for  ‘the  processes  of  accountability’.  Some  components  such  as 
‘accountability  for  what’  ‘standards’,  ‘effects’  and  roles  and  responsibilities  of 
‘accountors’ can also be studied from an analysis of these. The contents of websites 
and annual reports are an important topic to be studied in order to answer the specific 
research  questions,  particularly  How  is  accountability  evidenced  following  public 
sector reform and the Good Governance Royal Decree, in the particular case of 
government departments? 
This chapter starts with research design in section 4.2. Research methods are 
then discussed in section 4.3. Section 4.4 contains the conclusion.  
4.2 Research Design   
There are two main directions to the research investigation. The first direction 
is deductive, which ‘… begin with an abstract, logical relationship among concepts, 
then  move  toward  concrete  empirical  evidence’  (Neuman  2000,  p.  49).  Another 
approach is inductive, which ‘… begin with detailed observations of the world and 
move toward more abstract generalisations and ideas’ (Neuman 2000, p. 49). This 
study  is  a  combination  of  deductive  and  inductive  approaches,  as  indicated  in 
Chapter 1. Research methodology is mentioned in Chapter 1. 
Eisenhardt (1989), quoted in Yin (2003, p. 29), argues that the development 
of theory takes time and can be difficult. It is possible that, for some topics, existing  
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works can provide rich information and a theoretical framework (Yin 2003). This 
research  uses  some  ideas  from  previous  research  papers,  particularly  theoretical 
papers  about  accountability.  The  first  part  of  the  research  starts  with  a  literature 
review in order to gather information and ideas from previous research to create the 
practical framework. The framework is used to develop coding schemes to be used to 
analyse  information  from  interviews.  Another  set  of  coding  schemes  is  also 
developed from the literature review in order to analyse websites and annual reports. 
The  second  part  of  the  research  is  an  inductive  approach.  Information  from 
interviews  and  content  analysis  of  websites  and  annual  reports  will  be  used  to 
develop some new perspectives on accountability in the public sector of a developing 
country. The results will increase knowledge and understanding of accountability 
theory in a developing country.     
Research  methods  used  in  this  research  are  determined  by  the  research 
questions and research  objectives. One purpose of this research is to explore the 
reflection  of  the  implementation  of  accountability,  including  obstacles  to 
implementation and the role of financial information. This aim can be achieved by 
using  a  qualitative  research  style  because  constructing  social  reality  and  cultural 
meaning is characteristic of this area of research (Neuman 2000). A relatively small 
number  of  cases  and  thematic  analysis,  which  are  also  the  characteristics  of 
qualitative research  (Neuman 2000), are applied in this research instead of using 
large data sets and statistical analysis.   
 However, it is not easy to generalise the results from a single case study. The 
validity of the case study material is supported in this project by conducting a first 
round  of  interviews  in  order  to  understand  the  characteristics  of  the  government 
agencies and to investigate whether the characteristics of departments are similar or 
different.    To  the  extent  that  there  are  common  characteristics,  the  results  from 
subsequent case study interviews can be taken to represent features of all government 
departments in Thailand. Another main aim of the first round of interviews is to 
obtain background information to help in developing coding schemes and checklists.  
Another specific objective of this research is to explore the importance and 
the usefulness of departmental communication tools. The aim is to measure objective 
facts, which could be regarded as a quantitative style of research (Neuman 2000). 
However, this stage of the research focuses on only the nature of the information 
provided in the two media. Statistical analysis is not applied.  
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The results of all investigations in the study are used to fulfil the general 
objectives  in  order  to  give  some  perspectives  on  public  sector  accountability  in 
Thailand as a developing country.  
4.3 Research Methods  
This  thesis  employs  primary  data  analysis  through  interviews  and  content 
analysis to investigate the implementation of accountability as reflected in the Thai 
public  sector,  including  the  accountability  relationship  described  in  Chapter  2. 
Attitudes and opinions towards accountability are investigated through interviews. 
The contents of departmental websites and annual reports are studied to identify the 
information presented in order to establish whether departments use the opportunity 
to communicate information relating the aspects of accountability to the public.  
4.3.1 Interviews  
The  interview  method  gives  ‘the  opportunity  for  the  researcher  to  probe 
deeply to uncover new clues, open up new dimensions of a problem and to secure 
vivid, accurate inclusive accounts that are based on personal experience’ (Burgess 
1982, p. 107 mentioned in Easterby-Smith et al. 2002, pp. 86-87). Interviews can 
help to obtain targeted information on the studied topic and insightful information by 
providing causal inference (Yin 2003, p. 86). This research aims to uncover ideas, 
attitudes,  and  reflection  on  the  aspects  of  accountability,  particularly  the 
accountability relationship and components of accountability.  
The type of interview depends on the information that researchers want to 
receive from interviews. The first form of interview is open-ended, in  which the 
researcher can ask interviewees to give their opinions or even propose their own 
insights  into  situations  and  the  researcher  can  use  these  propositions  for  further 
inquiry  (Yin  2003,  pp.  89-90).  In  this  case,  the  respondent  is  considered  as  an 
informant rather than a respondent (Yin 2003).  
Open-ended  interviews  are  used  in  this  research  for  the  first  round  of 
interviews,  in  order  to  understand  the  general  nature  of  the  Thai  public  sector, 
accountability and good governance. This initial set of interviews is also used to help 
develop the research process and questions for subsequent case study interviews. 
Semi-structured interviews are used in the second round of interviews, for 
several reasons. First of all, when compared with a structured interview, the semi-
structured interview is more flexible for a researcher in collecting data because the 
researcher  can  ask  additional  questions  if  the  researcher  thinks  they  are  useful  
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(Bryman 2004). An interviewee can respond freely, and the researcher can receive 
rich  and  detailed  answers  (Bryman  2004).  Each  interviewee  will  have  different 
characteristics, thus it is difficult to adhere strictly to questions prepared in advance. 
In an unstructured interview in which an interviewee has free choice over his actions, 
opinions and behaviour (Ghauri and Grønhaug 2002), some important information 
may be overlooked because the researcher fails to ask some important questions. 
Using  unstructured  interviews  can  also  cause  a  lack  of  comparability  when 
comparing one interview with another (Silverman 1993, p. 92). 
Although the interview method can gather useful information, its complexity 
is  sometimes  underestimated  (Easterby-Smith  et  al.  2002,  p.  86).  Although  other 
methods may be used to gather information if it is more appropriate (Easterby-Smith 
et al. 2002), for this thesis, one of the main aims is to know the attitudes and opinions 
of civil servants. These would be difficult to gather via other research methods and 
sources  of  information.  Interviewing  is,  thus,  an  appropriate  tool  to  collect  this 
information.  
Good audio recording is recommended to ensure the researcher has accurate 
transcripts, and to enable the researcher to listen again to the interviews (Easterby-
Smith et al. 2002, p. 92). This can improve reliability in the data collected. However, 
there are some cases where respondents may not allow the researcher to use a tape 
recorder. In addition, some researchers may ignore or neglect the content of some 
interviews because they believe that this information is in a tape recorder (Yin 2003). 
Therefore, in this research, note taking is also utilised during the interviews.  
4.3.1.1 First round of interviews   
The first round of interviews was carried out during July and August 2006. 
The aim of these interviews was to obtain general information and to understand the 
real situation of government departments, and then use this information to develop 
the  analytical  framework  and  research  design.  Those  interviews  are  used  to  add 
insight and explanation in Chapter 3.   
In Thailand, a ministry is equal to a government department in the United 
Kingdom. Ministers, who are normally politicians, head the ministries, and under the 
ministry, there are departments.  The directors of the departments are non-elected 
civil servants. For the first round of interviews, 22 persons were interviewed across 
eight  departments.  The  departments  selected  were  from  within  the  Ministry  of 
Finance,  Ministry  of  Transportation,  Ministry  of  Agriculture  and  Cooperatives,  
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Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Labour, Ministry of Public Health and Ministry 
of Energy. These departments were chosen because they are important to both the 
government and citizens. One department works closely with national resources. One 
department plays  an important role in the  governmental accounting and financial 
system.  One  department  is  the  main  revenue  centre  of  the  government.  Two 
departments  are  the  main  governmental  investment  centres.  The  other  three 
departments work directly with citizens.  
The  main  reason  for  choosing  such  a  variety  of  departments  was  to 
understand Thai public sector attitudes as much as possible, particularly concerning 
the introduction of the concept of good governance and reform, in order to use this 
information to develop questions for the second round of interviews. The interviews 
consisted of four main parts:  
1.  accruals accounting 
2.  budgets and accounts 
3.  evaluation and control 
4.  communication 
From  the  literature  review,  accounting  information,  particularly  from  the 
accruals accounting system, is important for accountability (section 2.5.4). Audited 
financial  statements  should  be  provided  to  the  public  in  order  to  enhance  public 
accountability.  For  Thailand,  the  transition  from  cash  accounting  to  accruals 
accounting was one of the projects by which the government planned to enhance 
accountability.  The  implementation  of  the  Government  Fiscal  Management 
Information System (GFMIS) was also one of the projects to improve operational 
processes and transparency in public sector (section 3.4). This project can directly 
improve transparency and scrutiny. In addition, producing financial statements is a 
departmental responsibility, which allows departments to present their performance 
to the resource owners. This relates to ‘accountability for what’.   
The researcher aimed to study budgetary and accounting preparation after the 
introduction of accruals accounting. Since the budgetary and accounting system is 
important  for  departmental  fiscal  management,  this  topic  is  important  for  the 
enhancement of accountability (see section 2.5.4). In other words, this information 
reveals the efficiency and effectiveness of government departments. This topic is 
also  important  for  the  accountability  relationship,  particularly  ‘accountability  for 
what’ and ‘processes of accountability’.    
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Evaluation  and  control  are  important  for  accountability,  particularly 
‘processes of accountability’, and ‘effects’ (see details in sections 2.5.6 and 2.6.3). 
The  Thai  government  implemented  a  new  performance  assessment  system, 
specifically the introduction of KPIs, and focused on internal control. For the fourth 
topic,  communication,  this  topic  relates  directly  to  ‘processes  of  accountability’, 
particularly  transparency.  The  aim  of  choosing  this  topic  was  to  study  how 
departments  use  the  media  to  communicate  with  the  public,  and  which  methods 
departments use for this purpose.  
From the above topics, the main components of accountability investigated in 
the  first  round  of  interviews  are  ‘accountability  for  what’,  ‘processes  of 
accountability’  and  ‘effects’.  The  reason  for  this  is  the  Good  Governance  Royal 
Decree, the main law relating to good governance and accountability in the Thai 
public  sector.  As  discussed  in  section  3.5.3,  the  Decree  is  mainly  about  the 
operational process. Therefore, the interviews used the Decree as a guideline, so that 
the topics followed the contents in the Decree.  
In addition to the main themes decided in advance, the first interviews aimed 
to gather useful information about the bureaucratic system and the attitudes of civil 
servants towards the aspects of accountability and good governance. Table 4.1 shows 
the departments chosen for these interviews and lists the interviewees’ positions. The 
main reason for choosing accounting staff as the main interviewees is because their 
responsibilities  relate  directly  to  the  topics  of  the  interviews.  However,  after 
interviewing the accounting staff, some new and interesting topics emerged, so civil 
servants from other divisions were also chosen to be interviewed. These interviews 
have informed the background material in Chapter 3.   
4.3.1.2 Interview-based case study 
The researcher decided to follow up the first round of interviews with case 
study research in order to investigate accountability in government departments in 
more depth. Case study research helps researcher obtain detailed and in-depth data 
(Creswell 2007; Yin 2003). A case study is as ‘an empirical inquiry that investigates 
a  contemporary  phenomenon  within  its  real-life  context,  especially  when  the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident’ (Yin 2003, p. 
13). Case study interviewing benefits from prior research and interviews that can 
provide some useful information for the development of an analytical framework 
(Yin 2003).  
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Table 4.1 Lists of departments interviewed – First interview  
Departments  Number of 
interviewees 
Position 
1. Comptroller General’s 
Department 
1  - The Director of the Office of 
the Public Sector Accounting 
Standards
1
  
2. Excise Department  6  - Accounting practitioners 
- The Director and staff from 
the Division of Public Relations 
- Staff from the Tax Planning 
Division 
- The head of the Public Sector 
Development Division 
3. Department of Highways   5  - Accounting practitioners 
- Staff from the Division of 
Planning 
- The Director of the Public 
Sector Development Division 
- The Director of Public 
Relations  
4. Royal Irrigation Department   2  - The Director of the 
Accounting and Finance 
Division 
- Accounting practitioners 
5. Department of Insurance  2  - Accounting practitioners 
6. Department of Employment  2  - The Head of the Accounting 
Section 
- Accounting practitioners 
7. Department of Disease 
Control 
3  - The Director of Finance and 
Accounting Division 
8. Department of Alternative 
Energy Development and 
Efficiency 
1  - Accounting practitioner  
 
One ministry, the Ministry of Labour, was chosen as the case study in this 
thesis. The rationale for doing so is that the case study chosen is considered to be the 
representative  or  typical  case  (Yin  2003),  in  this  case  representative  of  the  Thai 
departments. From the first round of interviews, it would seem that there are not 
many differences in the operational systems among the ministries. Although there are 
five departments under the ministry chosen, they are all under the control of the same 
ministers, and, therefore, there are not many differences in the plans and policies. 
The main research method used is interviews, conducted during July and August 
                                                 
1
 The director is appointed by, and reports to the Comptroller General. The main responsibilities of 
this section consist of developing the government accounting system, including accounting standards 
and policies; producing and analysing government financial statements; developing and managing the 
Government Fiscal Management Information System (GFMIS); managing financial transactions; and 
managing and developing the cost accounting system.  
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2007. In-depth information about departmental operational process and procedures, 
including staff attitudes, was studied. These interviews focused on information on the 
process  of  the  public  sector  reform,  performance  assessment  and  the  Good 
Governance Royal Decree. During the interviews, a tape recorder was used to record 
all the conversations.  
This research used a non-random sampling method, often used in qualitative 
research (Neuman 2000) to select the case. Purposive sampling was used to select the 
specific and informative case (Neuman 2000). The Ministry of Labour was chosen 
for the case study because its main responsibilities are directly related to citizens, 
particularly employers and employees. This ministry would be expected to give more 
information on public accountability. There are five departments within the ministry, 
which  are  the  Office  of  the  Permanent  Secretary,  Department  of  Employment, 
Department of Skill Development, Department of Labour Protection and Welfare and 
Social  Security  Office.  The  planned  interviewees consisted  of  the  following  staff 
groups.   
1.  Directors of Accounting and Finance Division 
2.  Accounting practitioners 
3.  Internal auditors  
4.  Staff from the Division of Public Relations 
5.  Staff from the Division of Information technology 
These  interviewees  were  chosen  because  they  play  important  roles  in  the 
departmental  accounting  system,  controlling  and  monitoring  system,  and 
communication system. Accountants take an important part in budgetary, accounting 
and  controlling  systems.  Their  responsibilities  directly  relate  to  the  processes  of 
accountability,  particularly  transparency  and  scrutiny.  Internal  auditors  are 
responsible  for  the  controlling  and  monitoring  system  of  the  departments.  Their 
responsibilities relate directly to effects and the concept of scrutiny. Civil servants 
from  the  Division  of  Public  Relations  and  Civil  servants  from  the  Division  of 
Information Technology deal with the communication system of the departments. PR 
officials are directly responsible for providing information to the public by using 
some channels such as publication, brochures and websites. IT staff play important 
roles in the information and communication system. They are the medium by which 
information from departmental divisions is provided to the public via departmental 
websites. Their responsibilities support the processes of accountability.  
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Table 4.2 Lists of departments interviewed – Interview-based case study  
Departments  Planned No. 
of 
Interviewees  
Actual No. 
of 
interviewees 
Position 
1. A  5  6  1. Director of Internal Auditing 
2. Head of Accounting Section 
3. Accounting staff  
4. Staff from IT Division (higher 
position) 
5. Staff from IT Division  
6. Head of Public Relations Section 
2. B  5  8  1. Director of Internal Auditing 
Division 
2. Head of Accounting Section 
3. Accounting staff 
4. Accounting staff (focusing on the 
budget) 
5. IT staff 
6. Head of Public Relations Section 
7. PR staff (PR section) 
8. PR staff (audiovisual aid) 
3. C   5  5  1. Head of Accounting Section  
2. IT staff (higher position) 
3. IT staff 
4. Staff from the Personal Division 
5. Internal auditors 
4. D   5  3  1. Head of Accounting Section 
2. Director of the Internal Auditing 
Division 
3. IT staff 
5. E  5  12  1. Director of the Internal Auditing 
Division 
2. Head of Accounting Section 
3. Head of Statistics Section 
4. Staff from the Research and 
Development Division 
5. IT staff (higher position) 
6. IT staff  
7. Accounting staff, Fund 
Accounting Division (higher 
position) 
8. Accounting staff, Fund 
Accounting Division 
9. Accounting and financial staff, 
Fund Accounting Division 
10. Accounting and financial staff, 
Fund Accounting Division 
11. Accounting and financial staff, 
Fund Accounting Division 
12. Accounting and financial staff, 
Fund Accounting Division 
Total   25  34    
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For  the  interviews,  there  were  seven  topics,  as  shown  in  Table  4.3.  The 
questions for each interviewee were different regarding their responsibilities. The 
questions used in the interviews are given in Appendix 2.  
Table 4.3 The topics of the interviews   
Topics  Reasons   Field of study 
1. Plans and policies 
 
- Giving useful information 
about departmental 
strategies, plans and policies 
- Relating directly to 
‘accountor’, ‘accountee’, 
‘accountability for what’, 
‘processes’ and ‘standards’  
- The process of plan and 
policy making 
- The process of evaluation 
and assessment  
2. Budgetary system   - Financial information is 
important to enhance 
accountability in the public 
sector and budgetary 
information is one of the 
most important sources of 
financial information in the 
government departments 
- Relating to ‘processes’ of 
accountability  
- Budgetary system, 
particularly production and 
reporting process 
- Budgetary evaluation and 
control 
3. Internal control  - Control is a significant 
factor to reduce the amount 
of corruption and fraud in 
the organisations. 
- Relating to ‘processes’, 
‘standards’ and ‘effects’ of 
accountability  
- Standards and framework 
of internal control 
- The process and results 
from internal auditing 
- Benefits from using an 
internal control report 
 
4. Reports  - From an accountability 
framework, access to 
information is essential for 
the enhancement of 
accountability. 
Departmental reports are 
one of the most important 
channels for providing 
information to both internal 
and external users.  
- Relating to ‘processes’ of 
accountability  
- The process of annual 
report production  
- The use of the reports by 
both internal and external 
users 
- Policies and regulations 
relating to departmental 
reports 
5. Websites  - Websites are also one of 
the most important 
communication channels of 
the government departments 
- The departments also give 
on-line services via the 
websites 
- Relating to ‘processes’ of 
accountability  
- Website creation, 
particularly website 
designing and information 
included on the websites 
- The process of quality 
control and assessment 
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Table 4.3 The topics of the interviews (con.) 
Topics  Reasons   Field of study 
6. Accruals accounting   - Accounting is important 
for accountability.  
- In addition, financial 
information is important for 
an accountability 
mechanism 
- Relating to ‘processes’ of 
accountability  
- Public sector accounting 
after the implementation of 
accruals accounting 
- The process of financial 
statement producing  
7. Organisation 
structure 
- Staff roles and 
responsibilities are 
important for accountability 
- It can show the 
relationship between an 
accountor and an accountee 
of an accountability 
mechanism 
- Relating to ‘accountor’, 
‘accountee’ and 
‘accountability for what’ 
- Structure of the 
departments 
- Staff roles and 
responsibilities 
- Code of conduct 
 
In addition to the above interviewees, a civil servant from the Office of the 
Public  Sector  Development  Commission  (OPDC)  was  interviewed,  acting  as  a 
controller in case of administrative accountability. After the public sector reform, the 
government decided to establish a new organisation, called the Office of the Public 
Sector  Development  Commission,  separate  from  the  Office  of  the  Civil  Service 
Commission (OCSC). This department is responsible for many projects arising from 
public  sector  reform  and  the  introduction  of  good  governance,  such  as  the 
introduction of the Good Governance Royal Decree and projects arising from this. 
The  main  responsibilities  of  the  OPDC  consist  of  supporting  public  sector 
development;  monitoring  and  evaluating  ministerial  and  departmental  operations; 
disseminating data and knowledge; organising training programmes; and reporting 
data and results in relevance to strategic plans (OPDC 2009).   
As  discussed  in  Chapter  2,  scrutiny  is  one  of  the  main  features  of  the 
processes of accountability. In this research, an external auditor from the Office of 
the  Auditor  General  (OAG)
2
  was  interviewed  as  the  accountee  in  case  of 
administrative accountability. The aim of this interview is to acknowledge useful 
information about the Thai public sector monitoring and controlling system. 
                                                 
2
 The responsibilities of the OAG are described in section 3.4.2.1.  
 
141 
Both the OAG and the OPDC are important accountability mechanisms in the 
Thai  public  sector.  They  are  main  accountees  in  the  case  of  administrative 
accountability. However, the roles and responsibilities of these two organisations are 
different. The main responsibilities for the OAG are to audit and scrutinise financial 
transactions, while one of the responsibilities of the OPDC is to monitor and evaluate 
ministerial and departmental operations. The OPDC focuses more on the results of 
operations or performance but the OAG scrutinises all the processes.    
This research focuses on the Thai public sector at a departmental level. The 
Good  Governance  Royal  Decree  focuses  on  departmental  operations  rather  than 
other issues. Therefore, some groups of people such as citizens, politicians, courts 
and the legislators are not interviewed in this research. Opinions and attitudes from 
citizens are observed from secondary sources of information, such as documents and 
research papers.  This information is used to explain Thai public sector reform and 
good  governance  in  sections  3.4  and  3.5,  the  results  in  sections  5.4,  and  the 
accountability relationship in section 7.2.   
4.3.1.3 Limitations of interviews  
There  are  some  limitations  arising  from  using  an  interview  as  a  research 
method. First of all, it is sometimes difficult to conduct an interview because each 
interviewee has different characteristics. Therefore, it is hard to use the same pattern 
or  same  method  of  interview.  For  example,  from  the  researcher’s  previous 
experience, some interviewees will answer only ‘yes’ and ‘no’ and are reluctant to 
explain much.  
Although the possibility of obtaining in-depth information from interviews is 
a benefit, if interviewees do not tell the truth or do not know the true situation, 
information is devalued. Moreover, if the researcher is unaware that this is the case, 
the  result  of  the  research  will  be  incorrect.  Since,  this  research  focuses  on  the 
attitudes of civil servants, this problem may not be the main obstacle because the 
information  will  show  what  the  interviewees  think  and  believe.  In  addition, 
information  from  other  sources  is  used  to  confirm  the  data  obtained  from  the 
interviewees.  
There is also a concern about the potential for generalisation. This research 
focuses on the particular case of Thailand, and one ministry is chosen as the case 
study. However, a case study cannot be used for statistical generalisation, since, for a 
particular issue, it provides only a narrow basis (Yin 2003). This problem could be a  
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feature of this research. However, the concept studied in this research is a general 
concept that can be applied to other cases. Aspects of accountability in Thailand may 
give  indications  of  the  nature  of  accountability  in  developing  countries  more 
generally. The procedures of the study and the example of this information can help 
other researchers in this field to understand differences from the western context. 
Also, the results of this research can possibly help these researchers to understand 
public sector accountability in a developing country. Although the results cannot be 
generalised in order to create a new theory, the research can give some ideas of 
public sector accountability in a developing country.  
4.3.1.4 Validity and reliability  
Reliability is defined as ‘dependability and consistency’ (Neuman 2000, p. 
170). There are various techniques such as interviews, participation, photographs and 
document studies which qualitative researchers use for recording their observations 
consistently (Neuman 2000, p. 170). During the research process, there are some 
concerns, such as errors and bias. The target of reliability is to reduce errors and bias 
(Yin 2003). The reliability of data is directly affected by ‘the way the information is 
recorded and the choice as to what is recorded’ (Boyatzis 1998). The consistency of 
observation  is  important  for  reliability  (Neuman  2000).  Audiotape  and  videotape 
recording are important methods of recording information (Boyatzis 1998). In this 
study, a tape recorder was used to record the interviews together with note taking 
during the interviews.  
During  the  interviews,  cross-checked  questions  were  helpful  to  ensure 
reliability. For example, the researcher asked the same question more than once but 
phrased  differently  and  at  different  times,  or  asked  a  question  related  to  prior 
questions to check that interviewees’ answers are similar. The researcher also used 
evidence from other sources to confirm information the researcher received from the 
interviews.  
Neuman  (2000)  argues  that  qualitative  researchers  are  more  interested  in 
authenticity than in validity, which means giving a fair, honest, and balanced account 
of social life from the viewpoint of someone who lives it everyday (p. 171). In this 
research, the information from the first round of interviews can help the researcher to 
understand the system and situations in the Thai government departments. Therefore, 
in the process of the second round of interviews, there is greater confidence that the  
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methods, topics, and interviewees are the right choices and can represent what the 
researcher aims to achieve.  
4.3.1.5 Coding and analysing  
Three  main  methods  to  develop  themes  and  codes  are  the  theory-driven 
approach, prior-research-driven approach and data-driven approach (Boyatzis 1998). 
For this research, the main methods used are theory-driven and prior-research-driven. 
With  regard  to  Chapter  2,  previous  research  and  theoretical  papers  were  used  to 
develop the analytical framework to be used as coding schemes. Four main concepts, 
responsibility, transparency, scrutiny and answerability, are used as main themes for 
coding. Responsibility represents ‘accountability for what’ and the rest are features 
of ‘the processes of accountability’ (see section 2.6).    
Data  from  the  interviews  are  analysed  by  using  coding,  which  is  two 
simultaneous activities: mechanical data reduction and analysis categorisation of 
data  into  themes  (Neuman  2000,  p.  421).  In  this  research,  the  main  aim  is  to 
summarise data and categorise data into information relating to accountability. There 
are two types of coding used in this research. The first type is open coding, which 
condenses the bulk of the data into categories (Neuman 2000). In this research, the 
open codes consist of four main concepts, which are responsibility, transparency, 
answerability  and  scrutiny.  Any  words  relating  to  these  concepts  are  categorised 
under the respective themes. The second type of coding is axial coding, whereby the 
researcher  focuses  on  an  organised  set  of  initial  codes  or  preliminary  concepts 
(Neuman 2000). At this step, additional codes or new ideas can possibly emerge but 
the researcher mainly focuses on reviewing data with the primary codes (Neuman 
2000). At this point, the coding schemes developed in Chapter 2 are used to analyse 
the data.  
With regard to coding, the researcher used the coding schemes to analyse data 
from the interviews by using coloured highlighters
3
. For the first round, any of the 
four main words mentioned were highlighted using different colours. For the second 
round,  the  four  main  themes  were  then  classified  into  sub-types.  For  example, 
responsibility  was  classified  as  responsibility  to  the  public,  responsibility  to 
executives and responsibility to other public sector organisations. For the third round, 
information  that  would  not  fit  in  any  of  the  four  themes  such  as  opinions  or 
                                                 
3
 See an example in Appendix 3  
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constraints was highlighted using another colour. After this, the researcher reread the 
transcript in order to ensure consistency.  
One limitation of this analysis is the fact that the interviews were conducted 
in Thai. Since it would be time consuming to translate all conversations into English, 
the  analysis  is  also  in  Thai.  Therefore,  in  this  research,  a  computer  software 
programme  is  not  used  to  analyse  data.  Although  some  scholars  mention  that 
software can make the analysing process faster and more efficient (Bryman and Bell 
2007), in this research, the number of interviewees is only 34. Since this is not a very 
big data set, the data are analysed manually.   
For  analysis,  a  researcher  may  translate  qualitative  information  into  a 
quantitative form. However, if the sample size is small or only one organisation is 
being studied, the researcher can use descriptive statistics to analyse data (Boyatzis 
1998).   
4.3.2 Content analysis 
The  main  aim  of  this  part  is  to  study  which  information  is  provided  on 
departmental  websites  and  annual  reports,  in  order  to  know  how  the  selected 
departments use these two media to enhance accountability.   
From the literature review, an annual report is the main tool for representing 
accountability in organisations (Dixon et al. 1991; Pablos et al. 2002; Sharman of 
Redlynch 2001). In order to enhance accountability for the use of public resources, 
public sector entities need to publish an annual report within a reasonable time scale 
after the end of the fiscal year (IFAC 2001).  
Regarding websites, the internet has become an important tool with which 
both  public  and  private  sector  organisations  can  present  their  financial  and  non-
financial  information  to  stakeholders.  Websites  are  mainly  used  to  provide 
information about organisations, and the direct cost of websites is cheaper than the 
cost of producing an annual report (Prat 2006). In addition, websites can be used to 
provide more timely information than annual reports. Therefore, some organisations, 
including Thai government departments, focus on websites more than annual reports.  
The Thai government pays attention to these communication tools. It requires 
all government agencies to produce a departmental report annually, and to create 
departmental websites. How important information technology is considered to be 
within the Thai bureaucratic system is confirmed by the existence of the Ministry of 
Information and Communication Technology. This ministry was established in 2003  
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in order to take charge of the governmental information systems. The websites are an 
important tool in enhancing transparency directly, and also help to support scrutiny 
and  answerability.  Organisations  can  provide  information  about  responsibilities, 
standards  and  effects  through  their  websites.  At  the  present  time,  in  Thailand, 
departmental websites are becoming an important medium. In the Good Governance 
Royal Decree, websites are seen as the main tool for communicating with citizens, 
and citizens can now do some transactions online, or contact the departments. In 
2006, departments were required to produce annual reports. This implies that these 
two forms of media are considered as important tools by government departments.   
Due  to  the  importance  of  annual  reports  and  departmental  websites,  this 
research analyses these using checklists produced by the literature review, in order to 
evaluate  how  departments  use  these  to  communicate  and  enhance  accountability. 
This part can help in understanding what information is actually being provided to 
the public. It also supports the case study because if the interviewees do not provide 
much  information  about  public  accountability,  then  analysis  of  the  websites  and 
annual reports can help the researcher obtain the information necessary to analyse 
public accountability. The information from these two media is also used to confirm 
some of the information obtained via the interviews.  
4.3.2.1 Validity and reliability   
This checklist is created by drawing on previous research papers, as shown in 
Table 4.4. The items from this previous research are used as a benchmark for Thai 
government  agencies.  The  checklist  is  then  tested  against  the  Thai  websites  and 
annual reports. If some criteria are missing, perhaps because this information is not 
available  in  Thailand  at  that  time,  or  is  not  required  to  be  produced  by  the 
government, then these items are removed. Likewise, any additional items found on 
websites or annual reports are added to the checklists. These procedures ensure that 
the checklist is relevant to Thailand. Potential ‘omissions bias’ is not considered to 
be significant for the context of this study.   
4.3.2.2 Contents in the checklists 
Table 4.4 presents the items that will be used to analyse websites and annual 
reports. Some items such as financial statements and performance are extended in 
more detail.  For example, financial statements should include balance sheet, income 
statement, cash flow statement, accounting policies and notes to financial statements. 
Financial accounts should be audited (Pendlebury et al. 1994; Debreceny and Gray 
1999; Coy and Dixon 2004; Bolívar et al. 2006).   
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Auditing  is  an  important  approach  to  enhancing  financial  accountability 
(Barata  et  al.  1999;  Premchand  1999;  Brinkerhoff  2001).  The  reports  are  more 
helpful  when  they  are  produced  by  using  accruals  accounting  (Barrett  2004). 
Performance  is  classified  as  either  financial  or  non-financial  performance.  The 
departments  that  provide  information  about  their  performance,  performance 
evaluation  and  achievements,  including  key  performance  indicators  and  self 
assessment reports, are analysed where available.  
Financial  information  such  as  financial  statements,  budgetary  reports,  and 
financial  performance  measures  are  important  for  an  accountability  mechanism, 
particularly the relationship in the case of administrative accountability. It is also 
important to provide non-financial information and qualitative information on the 
internet as background information, supported by other items such as information 
about  staffing,  social  and  environmental  information  (Xiao  et  al.  2002).  This 
information  is  useful  for  users  to  understand  organisational  responsibilities  and 
actions,  and  can  help  users  know  who  to  contact  within  the  organisations.  This 
information can show whether departments focus on their responsibilities.  
Some information, such as financial statements, trends, ratios, and budgetary 
reports should be presented in the form of graphics in order to make it easier for 
users to understand (Coy et al. 2001; Marston and Polei 2004). Additionally, some 
reports should have more than one format (e.g. both HTML and pdf files) (Marston 
and Polei 2004). This gives options when users downloading data. One item that is 
tested by the researcher is the language used. Although English is not an official 
language of Thailand, it is appropriate for some government agencies to have both 
Thai  and  English  in  their  annual  reports  and  on  their  websites  because  some 
departments such as the Department of Employment and the Department of Export 
Promotion  also  deal  with  foreigners.  Therefore,  they  should  have  bilingual 
communication in both websites and annual reports.         
Table 4.4 Content in the checklists  
Structure and references  Components of 
accountability 
1. Financial statement after auditing  
Agencies and Public Bodies Team (2004); Barata et al. 
(1999); Barrett (2004); IFAC (2001); Sharman of 
Redlynch (2001); Premchand (1999); Hyndman and 
Anderson (1995); Alijarde (1997); Pendlebury et al. 
(1994); Coy et al. (2001); Coy and Dixon (2004); Wynn-
Williams (2005); Matheson (1995); Marston and Polei 
(2004); Gowthorpe and Amat (1999); Bolívar et al. 
(2006); Debreceny and Gray (1999); Xiao et al. (2002) 
- Accountability for 
what, processes of 
accountability 
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Table 4.4 Content in the checklists (con.) 
Structure and references  Components of 
accountability   
2. Mission, vision and strategy 
- IFAC (2001); Coy and Dixon (2004); Meek et al. 
(1995)  
- Accountability for 
what, standards, effects 
 
3. Trends and future plan 
- McTigue et al. (2005); Coy and Dixon (2004); Meek et 
al. (1995); Marston and Polei (2004); Steinberg (1999) 
- Accountability for 
what, process, 
standards 
 
4. Annual plan 
- Meek et al. (1995) 
- Accountability for 
what, processes, 
standards  
5. Accounting practices and information 
- Barata et al. (1999); Brinkerhoff (2001); Carnegie and 
West (2003); Steccolini (2004); Hyndman and Anderson 
(1995); Alijarde (1997); Pendlebury et al. (1994); Coy 
and Dixon (2004); Matheson (1995); Meek et al. (1995); 
Marston and Polei (2004); Bolívar, et al. (2006); Xiao et 
al. (2002) 
- Processes  
 
6. Resources and assets 
- Barata et al. (1999); Brinkerhoff (2001); Steccolini 
(2004); Boyne and Law (1991); Coy et al. (2001); Coy 
and Dixon (2004); Meek et al. (1995); Marston and Polei 
(2004) 
- Processes  
 
7. Liabilities and commitments 
- Barata et al. (1999); IFAC (2001); Coy and Dixon 
(2004); Meek et al. (1995); Marston and Polei (2004) 
- Processes  
 
8. Laws and regulations 
- Barata et al. (1999) 
- Standards  
 
9. Budgeted and actual revenues and expenditures 
- Barrett (2004); Ives(1987); McTigue et al. (2005); 
Premchand (1999); Steccolini (2004); Boyne and Law 
(1991); Hyndman and Anderson (1995); Alijarde (1997); 
Coy and Dixon (2004); Meek et al. (1995); Bolívar et al. 
(2006) 
- Processes  
 
10. Performance 
- IFAC (2001); OECD (2004a); Steccolini (2004); Boyne 
and Law (1991); Hyndman and Anderson (1995); 
Alijarde (1997); Coy et al. (2001); Coy and Dixon 
(2004); Wynn-Williams (2005); Matheson (1995); Meek 
et al. (1995); Marston and Polei (2004) 
- Processes  
 
11. Service 
- Ives (1987); Steccolini (2004); Boyne and Law (1991); 
Coy et al. (2001); Coy and Dixon (2004) 
- Processes 
 
12. Staffing 
- IFAC (2001); Boyne and Law (1991); Hyndman and 
Anderson (1995); Coy and Dixon (2004); Meek et al. 
(1995); Marston and Polei (2004) 
- Accountors and 
accountees 
 
13. Organisation structure 
- Coy and Dixon (2004); Meek et al. (1995) 
- Accountors, 
accountees, 
accountability for what 
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Table 4.4 Content in the checklists (con.) 
Structure and references  Components of 
accountability 
14. Contact information 
- Coy and Dixon (2004); Marston and Polei (2004) 
- Processes 
 
15. Evaluating the government's or unit's 
performance 
- Barata et al. (1999); McTigue et al. (2005); Wall and 
Martin (2003); Boyne and Law (1991); Hyndman and 
Anderson (1995); Coy et al. (2001); Coy and Dixon 
(2004); Wynn-Williams (2005); Matheson (1995); Meek 
et al. (1995); Marston and Polei (2004) 
 - Processes, standards, 
effects 
 
16. The explanations why objectives are not met 
- McTigue et al. (2005); Steinberg (1999); Coy and 
Dixon (2004) 
- Processes, standards, 
effects  
 
17. Mission, strategic goals, and summary of 
accomplishments 
- McTigue et al. (2005); OECD (2004a); Boyne and Law 
(1991); Hyndman and Anderson (1995); Coy et al. 
(2001); Coy and Dixon (2004); Matheson (1995); Meek 
et al. (1995); Marston and Polei (2004) 
- Accountability for 
what, processes, 
standards, effects  
 
18. Updated data 
- Coy et al. (2001); Coy and Dixon (2004); Marston and 
Polei (2004); Gowthorpe and Amat (1999); Bolívar et al. 
(2006) 
- Processes 
 
 
In the Thai bureaucratic system, there are 20 ministries, with 150 departments 
under them. Therefore, in order to analyse departmental websites, seven ministries, 
with 55 departments under them, were chosen for study. These departments were 
chosen specifically because they are among the most important ministries of the Thai 
government,  and  each  receives  a  vast  budget  from  the  government.  The  seven 
ministries chosen were: 
·  Ministry of Finance  
·  Ministry of Commerce 
·  Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives 
·  Ministry of Interior  
·  Ministry of Education 
·  Ministry of Public Health  
·  Ministry of Employment.  
The first two ministries play important roles in the economy of Thailand. 
Since Thailand is an agricultural country, and the main products of Thailand come 
from  agriculture,  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture  and  Cooperatives  is,  therefore,  
 
149 
important and relevant to a great number of Thais. The Ministry of the Interior is also 
important.  Its  main  responsibilities  are  for  local  and  provincial  administration, 
preservation  of  peace  and  safeguarding  life  and  property,  urban  management, 
infrastructure development, administration and management of natural resources and 
environment,  and  social  development  and  public  services.  The  Ministry  of 
Education, Ministry of Public Health and Ministry of Employment are also important 
because their responsibilities relate directly to Thai citizens in three main categories, 
education, health and employment. The period of study is between November 2006 
and January 2007. 
  Before 2005 only some government departments produced annual reports, as 
it was optional for them to do so. However, in 2006, the government required all 
departments  to  produce  annual  reports.  At  the  time  of  this  research,  some 
departments were not ready to produce annual reports. Annual reports used in this 
research are the reports of the fiscal  year 2005. The researcher was only able to 
obtain reports from 33 departments. Consequently, the sample of 33 reports is non-
random.    
4.3.2.3 Analysis  
  Percentages are used to analyse the results because the main aim of this study 
is to investigate what information the departments provide to the public. During the 
time of the research, government agencies were only starting to pay attention to these 
two communication tools. Hence, detailed correlation analysis is not attempted.  
4.4 Conclusion  
 The specific objectives of this research are to study the implementation of 
accountability  in  government  departments,  including  civil  servants’  perspectives 
towards  the  public  sector  reform  and  the  idea  of  good  governance,  to  explore 
constraints  and  obstacles  arising,  to  explore  the  importance  and  usefulness  of 
departmental  media,  and  to  explore  the  role  of  financial  information  used  by 
executives  and  staff  in  government  departments.  To  achieve  these  objectives, 
qualitative research is the main research approach for this study. This research is 
designed as a combination of deductive and inductive approaches. With regard to 
research  methods,  primary  data  analysis  of  interviews  and  content  analysis  were 
employed.  
Two rounds of interviews were conducted. The main aim of the first round of 
interviews was to obtain background information relating to public sector reform,  
 
150 
good governance, projects and problems arising from the reform, and organisational 
cultures, which would then be used to support the design of the second round of 
interviews. One ministry was chosen to be the case study. The main aim of these 
interviews was to study the effects  from the implementation of the public sector 
reform, Good Governance Royal Decree and the accountability relationship. In order 
to analyse data from the interviews, coding schemes were developed and used to 
analyse the data by using coloured highlighters. The results of the interviews are 
reported in Chapter 5.    
The  second  main  research  method  is  content  analysis  of  departmental 
websites  and  annual  reports.  These  two  communication  media  were  analysed  by 
checklists, which were developed by using the literature review, particularly previous 
research papers, codes  of best practice, standards and examples of  accountability 
reports. With regard to sampling, non-random sampling is applied in this research. 
Due  to  the  limitations  of  time  and  the  number  of  annual  reports  involved,  55 
departmental websites and 33 annual reports are studied. Percentages are used to 
explain the data, and the results from this research method are reported in Chapter 6.  
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Chapter 5 Interview based case study 
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter reports on the conduct and analysis of interviews undertaken 
with Thai civil servants on the theme of accountability and their perspectives on 
accountability issues and practices. The main aim of the work reported on here was 
to study accountability in the particular context of Thai government departments in 
order to answer certain specific research questions:  
SQ1: How is accountability evidenced following public sector reform and the 
Good Governance Royal Decree, in the particular case of government departments? 
SQ1.1:  How  do  departmental  communications,  including  reports, 
show evidence of accountability? 
SQ2: What are the constraints on departments from the implementation of 
public sector reform and the Good Governance Royal Decree?  
The results are analysed by  using six main components of  accountability, 
accountor, accountee, accountable for what, processes, standards and effects. The 
relationships of three main types of accountability, organisational, administrative and 
public accountability, are studied. In order to facilitate the interviews to follow, the 
concept  of  responsibility  is  used  for  ‘accountability  for  what’,  and  transparency, 
scrutiny  and  answerability  are  features  of  ‘the  processes  of  accountability’  (see 
section 4.3).  
With regard to the interviewees, one Thai ministry, with five departments 
under  it,  has  been  chosen  to  be  the  case  study  (see  details  in  section  4.3).  The 
positions  of  the  interviewees  include  practitioners,  senior  staff,  heads  of  section, 
heads of divisions, and directors of divisions. Among the interviewees are senior 
accounting  staff,  accounting  practitioners,  internal  auditors,  staff  from  the  public 
relations division and staff from the information technology division. These positions 
relate directly to three types of the accountability relationship. Officials from the 
Office of the Public Sector Development Commission and the Office of the Auditor 
general, who act as controllers and auditors, are also interviewed. The interviewees 
are referred in this chapter by using respondent codes mentioned in Table 4.2. The 
alphabets mean departments, while the numbers are positions. An official from the 
OPDC is mentioned as ‘OPDC staff’, while an auditor from the OAG is referred as 
‘External auditor’.  
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However, a limitation of these interviews is that members of the public are 
not included. Therefore, the accountors of all three types are interviewed but only the 
accountees in administrative and organisational accountability are interviewed. The 
positions of these interviewees relate to the implementation of the concepts of good 
governance and accountability (see details in section 4.3).  
The  interviews  cover  seven  themes,  consisting  of  plans  and  policies, 
budgetary  system,  internal  control,  accruals  accounting,  organisation  structure, 
departmental websites, and annual reports (see details in section 4.3). These items 
can  provide  information  about  how  departments  and  civil  servants  deal  with 
accountability.  
Departmental  plans  and  policies  can  link  to  the  concept  of  responsibility, 
since these can reveal the scope of their operations. The obligation that departments 
have  to  perform  and  the  policies  of  departments  towards  the  concepts  of 
transparency, answerability and scrutiny are also revealed. How departments deal 
with these concepts may be reflected in their plans and policies. The departments are 
responsible for having an appropriate budgetary system and are required to produce 
budgetary  reports.  This  is  directly  related  to  the  concept  of  scrutiny  because  the 
accountee can use this financial information to analyse how the departments deal 
with the money they have. Consequently, accruals accounting is important for the 
scrutinising process.   
Internal control is another important topic relating to the concept of scrutiny, 
while  organisation  structure  can  represent  the  chain  of  command  within 
organisations,  and  the  responsibilities  of  each  section  in  each  department. 
Departmental websites and annual reports are the primary tools of communication. 
The  government  persuades  departments  to  use  these  to  communicate  with  other 
public sector organisations and the public. An aim of the Good Governance Royal 
Decree is that departments should improve their information technology system. This 
is important, since departments are responsible for providing up-to-date information, 
answering questions and dealing with complaints and petitions.  
From these seven themes, questions
1
 are derived which relate to the public 
sector reform and the concept of good governance, including the Good Governance 
Royal  Decree,  which  is  the  standard  of  appraisal  for  good  governance  and 
accountability  in  Thailand  (see  section  3.5.3).  With  regard  to  the  analysis, 
                                                 
1
 The questions used for interviews are in Appendix 2.   
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responsibility,  transparency,  scrutiny  and  answerability  are  used  to  discuss  the 
results. Thai culture and values (see section 3.2) are among factors used to explain 
the behaviour and actions of the accountor and accountee.  
The findings are reported
2
 in terms of the six components of accountability 
discussed  in  Chapter  2.  In  each  section,  the  findings  are  reported  first  and  then 
opinions and discussion drawn from the findings are presented in the ‘reflections’ 
subsection.    
This chapter is classified into 9 parts, including the introduction. Section 5.2 
discusses accountors and accountees. Sections 5.3 and 5.4 discuss accountability for 
what  and  the  processes  of  accountability  respectively.  Section  5.5  discusses 
standards  of  accountability  and  section  5.6  discusses  effects  from  standards  of 
appraisal. Section 5.7 reflects on the components of accountability while section 5.8 
describes constraints arising during public sector reform and the implementation of 
the concept of good governance. Section 5.9 is the conclusion.  
5.2 Accountors and accountees 
  With regard to the accountability relationship, the two main groups of people 
or organisations in the relationship are the accountors and the accountees. This part 
discusses the findings relating to these two groups.  
5.2.1 Accountors  
Depending on the function or position under discussion, the accountors will 
either be civil servants or departments. Regarding public accountability and service 
delivery, eight officials (A4, A6, B5, B6, B7, C2, D3, E5) said that they have more 
direct contact with the public, and are, therefore, more likely to be held accountable 
to citizens. With other transactions, the accountors may be departments or corporate 
bodies. After the reform, civil servants realised the importance of citizens (A2, A6, 
B6).   
After the reform, citizens are important. I now know this concept. Now, we 
focus very much on citizens. We pay attention to citizens’ requirements. One of the 
main  objectives  of  our  division  is  to  satisfy  citizens’  requirements.  …  There  is 
equality between the attention paid to executives and citizens. I rank them equally. 
(A6) 
                                                 
2
 An example of the transcription is in Appendix 3.  
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For administrative accountability, the accountors are normally departments. 
However, if particular mistakes have been made, civil servants sometimes have to be 
responsible for those actions (A3, B3, C1, E8, E10, E11).  
I have to be careful for the accuracy of the information submitted to the OAG 
because if there are mistakes, it is possible that I will be held responsible for those 
mistakes. (B3)  
For organisational accountability, all interviewees said that subordinates have 
to be accountable to their superiors. Accountors can be individual staff, divisions or 
departments. In addition, executives of departments are accountable to higher-level 
executives (either the permanent secretary or ministers). This is the relationship in 
the case of bureaucratic accountability.  
For my operations, I have to follow what my superior wants me to do. If I do 
not do this, then problems may occur. For example, it is possible that I will not get 
any  annual  promotion  or  I  shall  be  moved  from  my  current  position  to  a  worse 
position than my present one. (E7) 
Table 5.1 shows who interviewees feel accountable to. Three main types of 
accountees,  i.e.  the  public;  auditors,  controllers,  including  other  public  sector 
organisations; and superiors or executives, are focused in this research.  
 
Table 5.1 Accountees and accountors  
Accountees / 
Accountors 
Public  Auditors, 
Controllers and 
Other Public 
Sector 
Organisations 
Superiors, 
Executives 
Senior staff – higher 
level  
(n = 4) 
2 
50% 
4 
100% 
4 
100% 
Senior staff – lower 
level  
(n = 11) 
7 
63.6% 
8 
72.7% 
11 
100% 
Practitioner – higher 
level  
(n = 10) 
6 
60% 
9 
90% 
10 
100% 
Practitioner  
(n = 9)  
5 
55.6% 
4 
44.4% 
9 
100% 
Total (n = 34)  20 
58.8% 
25 
73.5% 
34 
100% 
5.2.2 Accountees   
 Three types of accountability are focused on in this research, each of which 
has different accountees. For public accountability, the accountees are citizens, the 
media, NGOs, and private sector organisations (A5, A6, B5, B6, B7, C2, D3, E4, 
E5).   
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I  know  that  after  the  public  sector  reform,  citizens  are  now  considered 
important for governance and the bureaucratic  system. Departments have to pay 
attention  to  them.  …  Additional  to  citizens,  there  are  some  groups  of  people  or 
organisations that are also important for our operations. For example, for NGOs 
and the media, I have to pay a lot of attention to these groups because they can 
provide information to the public, and our executives do not want them to have a bad 
impression of the department.  We want to make good impression, because if the 
media reports bad things about departments, this will cause the problems for me. 
Executives will not be satisfied about this situation. (A6) 
The media is an important accountee, which  acts as the medium between 
departments and the public. The media can provide the facts to the public or even 
investigate  departmental  performance  (A6,  B7).  Thus,  with  regard  to  public 
accountability, three interviewees (A6, B6, B7) said that civil servants pay a lot of 
attention to this group.  
From Table 5.1, it can be seen that twenty interviewees think of the public as 
one  of  their  accountees.  Whether  officials  have  contact  or  not  depends  on  their 
position and fourteen respondents, particularly accountants, mention that they do not 
have direct contact with the public at all. Consequently, this kind of civil servant 
pays little direct attention to citizens’ requirements. Instead they are more concerned 
with accountability in terms of organisational or bureaucratic accountability.  
I know that during this time the government pays attention to the public. 
However, my responsibility rarely relates to the pubic. I focus on only my direct 
duties and the order from the executives. (B3)  
From  the  above  statement,  whole  departments  can  be  either  directly  or 
indirectly accountable to the public. For example, if departments are accountable for 
information provided to the public, then they have to be responsible for the accuracy 
of this information. With regard to indirect accountability, this relationship is through 
the parliament.  
For  administrative  accountability,  auditors  and  controllers  are  the  main 
accountees. In this research, they are the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) and 
the Office of the Public Sector Development Commission (OPDC)
3
. There are some 
differences  in  the  responsibilities  of  the  OAG  and  OPDC.  The  OAG  is  an 
independent  organisation,  whose  main  duty  is  to  scrutinise  departmental 
performance.  
                                                 
3
 Roles and responsibilities of the OAG are mentioned in section 3.5 and of the OPDC are mentioned 
in section 4.3.  
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The OAG is an important organisation which scrutinises our performance. 
The relationship between us and the OAG is prescribed by laws and regulations. By 
law, we have to provide reports to them within a specified time period. (C1) 
On  the  other  hand,  the  OPDC  is  a  government  department  which  gives 
support and evaluates departmental performance, particularly financial statements.   
Regarding the relationship with the OPDC, I have to follow guidelines from 
the OPDC. Additionally, I have to send reports to the OPDC within the time required 
by the regulations. However, I can ask permission for this to be extended if I am not 
ready, though normally I can only do this at the beginning of the project if we want 
some time to understand the system better. After that period, we must submit the 
reports on time. (A2) 
From  the  above  statement,  the  relationship  between  departments  and  the 
OPDC is quite loose and more flexible to rely on situation than the relationship with 
the OAG. This may be due to the differences in the types of organisations and types 
of jobs they perform.   
For organisational accountability, the main accountees are the superiors of 
civil  servants.  All  interviewees  think  of  their  superiors  in  this  way.  However,  if 
someone has a bad working relationship with their superior, they will normally keep 
quiet (A5, B1, B3, C5, E7, E10, E11). As for colleagues, the relationship with them 
is normally one of cooperation rather than accountability (A5, A6, B2, B3, B5, B6, 
B7, C2, C4, D3, E3, E5, E6, E7, E8).  
For  the  relationship  within  the  organisation,  I  have  to  be  responsible  to 
superiors. I have to follow superiors’ requirements. If I do not do this, it will affect 
my position, because superiors will not be satisfied with my behaviour. This situation 
will affect my promotion, i.e. promotion is directly related to this situation. (E10) 
From the above statement, subordinates follow the wishes of their superiors 
because  of  how  superiors  can  affect  them.  This  kind  of  relationship  is  based  on 
hierarchical accountability, i.e. that of an unequal relationship. 
5.2.3 Reflection  
With regard to the relationship between accountors and accountees, for public 
accountability, civil servants can be either individuals or departments (Bovens 2005). 
Those individuals will be officials who have a direct connection with the public and 
who are thus accountable for their actions and to the public. This shows that the 
relevance of someone’s position within an organisation to accountability, and why 
some  officials  feel  more  accountable  to  the  public  than  others.  In  the  case  of 
departments, they can be either directly or indirectly accountable to the public.  
With administrative accountability, generally, the accountors will be an entire 
department. However, some departments assign particular staff to deal with auditors  
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and controllers. Consequently, if something wrong happens, it will possibly be those 
officials who may have to take responsibility for the activities they have done. For 
organisational accountability, accountors are either divisions or individuals, based on 
the notion of hierarchical accountability. 
The Thai bureaucratic system is based on a hierarchical relationship and some 
particularly  Thai  values,  such  as  large  power  distance,  i.e.  sakdina,  grateful 
relationship  orientation,  i.e.  bunkhun,  the  patronage  system  and  personal 
relationships  (see  details  in  section  3.2).  Within  organisations,  subordinates  are 
accountable to superiors, and respond to commands and requirements of superiors. 
The  relationship  in  the  case  of  organisational  accountability  can  explain  how 
accountors  deal  with  other  accountees  in  the  cases  of  administrative  and  public 
accountability, because some accountors will just follow what their superiors want 
them to do. Civil servants will cooperate  with  the public and/or auditors if their 
superiors want them to.  
With  regard  to  the  relationship  with  the  public,  there  are  two  groups  of 
thought about the accountability of civil servants. One group of scholars argues that 
civil  servants  do  not  have  to  be  accountable  directly  to  citizens,  only  to  their 
superiors  (Axworthy  2005).  Another  group  argues  that  both  civil  servants  and 
politicians  should  be  accountable  to  citizens  by  ensuring  transparency  in  policy 
implementation and service delivery (Brinkerhoff 2001). In Thailand, this depends 
on departments and positions and responsibilities of civil servants.    
Some positions, particularly PR staff, are accountable to citizens as well as to 
their superiors, but other officials such as internal auditors are mainly accountable to 
the director of a department. From the interviews, there are some projects where the 
department or the director should be accountable for the results, but instead passes 
the responsibility to lower-ranking staff because it is a risky project. This is different 
from  previous  literature  in  which  superiors  are  deemed  to  be  responsible  for 
activities done by subordinates (Lucas 1993).     
Figure 5.1 shows the accountability relationship in the Thai public sector. 
Civil  servants  are  accountable  to  their  superiors.  Some  civil  servants  are  also 
accountable  to  the  public.  The  director  of  a  department  is  accountable  to  the 
permanent secretary, who is a non-elected official. Then the permanent secretary is 
accountable to the ministers and cabinet, who are politicians. The cabinet is then 
accountable to the parliament, which is directly accountable to the public.   
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Civil servants
Head of the Internal 
Auditing Division  
Director of the Department
Ministers 
Cabinet
Parliament 
External 
auditors
Permanent Secretary 
Deputy directors of 
the Department
Directors of 
divisions
Public
Public
Public
(either directly accountable or 
through the media)
Public
(either directly accountable or 
through the media)
Report auditing results 
directly to the 
parliament
Exchange information 
Independent organisations 
such as ombudsman and 
court  
 
Figure 5.1 Accountability relationships in the Thai public sector 
Some officials, such as internal auditors report their audit results directly to 
the director of  a department.  In this case, the  reports are not passed through the 
deputy directors because according to the State Audit Act B.E. 2542 (1999), the 
director of the department has to be responsible for dealing with the auditing system 
and  he  cannot  pass  this  responsibility  to  other  staff.  Internal  auditors  sometimes 
exchange  their  audit  information  with  external  auditors  from  the  Office  of  the 
Auditor General (OAG). However, this is dependent on the relationship between the 
internal and external auditors, including the sense of morality, because there were no 
laws mentioning that internal auditors had to give internal audit reports to external 
auditors.  This  type  of  the  relationship  can  affect  administrative  accountability. 
Internal auditors do have to give audit results to the head of the audited offices or 
divisions. By the end of the year, they have to produce an audit result summary and  
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pass it to the divisions within each department, even though these results cannot be 
provided to the public.  
While departments do not have to give internal audit results to the OAG, all 
government departments have to submit annual audit plans to the OAG. Accountants 
are responsible for providing financial data such as budgetary reports and financial 
statements to auditors and controllers. This is a legal requirement, which departments 
have  to  follow.  This  represents  the  relationship  in  the  case  of  administrative 
accountability.  
For organisational accountability, the director of a department usually assigns 
the deputy directors to work on behalf of him. However, for important cases, he will 
take responsibility himself. When the ministers or the members of parliament have 
questions,  or  want  more  information  about  particular  issues,  executives  or  senior 
accountants  have  to  respond.  This  is  the  relationship  in  the  case  of  bureaucratic 
accountability.  
According to Ijiri (1983), accountants play an important role ensuring the 
smooth flow of information between the accountor and the accountee. However, in 
the Thai public sector, accounting practitioners do not have such a role. Instead, they 
have  to  either  follow  requirements  from  executives  or  laws  and  regulations. 
Executives of departments and other staff tend to think of accounting information as 
not being important and therefore do not pay much attention to it (A2, A3, B2, B3, 
C1, D1, E2, E3). 
Regarding public relations (PR), departments usually have a call centre for 
answering  citizens  questions  about  departmental  services  or  provide  other 
information  (A6,  B6,  B7).  Some  PR  staff  have  to  deal  with  the  media  when 
departments want to hold a press conference and want to distribute departmental 
information  and  news  to  the  public.  This  shows  that  they  also  have  an  indirect 
relationship with the public through the media. Therefore, it is no wonder that PR 
officials mention the public and citizens more than officials from other divisions. In a 
democratic society, the media plays an important role, i.e. to provide information to 
citizens and investigate governmental performance (UN 2004). Civil servants know 
the importance of the media. Therefore, when considering public accountability, it is 
sometimes the case that officials are more interested in the media than citizens.   
Additional  to  direct  accountability  to  the  public,  departments  also  have 
indirect  accountability  through  ministers  and  the  parliament.  From  Figure  5.1,  
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accountors and accountees in three types of accountability, public, administrative, 
and organisational accountability, link to each other. Thai values are possibly one of 
the  factors  explaining  the  accountability  relationship.  The  relationship  between 
subordinates and superiors can sometimes explain the relationship in the cases of 
administrative and public accountability. Accountors in one type of accountability 
can be accountees in another type. For example, superiors are accountees in the case 
of organisational accountability but they are accountors in public accountability.     
5.3 Accountability for what  
  This section relates to what accountors should be accountable to accountees 
for. In order to facilitate interviews, the concept of responsibility is used to represent 
‘accountability for what’ (see section 2.5). From previous literature, the accountor 
should be responsible for their actions and their decisions (IFAC 2001). Actions and 
decisions  vary  among  the  different  types  of  accountability.  The  reasons  why  the 
accountor  acts  or  makes  decisions  is  important  for  accountability.  To  enhance 
accountability, accountors should clarify their roles and responsibilities in order to 
help  accountees  understand  why  certain  duties  and  actions  are  being  performed 
(Gosling 2005). The findings are summarised in Table 5.2. 
5.3.1 Responsibility  
1) Public accountability  
With regard to public accountability, for this research, the ministry is chosen 
because its responsibilities are directly related to citizens. However, there are some 
differences  among  departments.  One  department,  the  Office  of  the  Permanent 
Secretary, does not have a close relationship with citizens. 
Our  department  is  a  strategy  centre.  We  follow  governmental  plans  and 
policies. We rarely engage in any service delivery to citizens. We usually provide 
services to other public sector organisations. (A2) 
From this statement, A2 believes that her department has few links with the 
public. If citizens have any problems with these, they need to make direct contact 
with the relevant departments. 
Table  5.2  shows  how  interviewees  are  responsible  to  three  main  types  of 
accountees.  
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Table 5.2 Accountability for what  
Accountability 
for what  
Senior staff 
– higher 
level 
(n= 4) 
Senior staff 
– lower level 
(n = 11) 
Practitioner 
– higher level 
(n = 10) 
Practitioner 
(n = 9) 
Total  
(n = 34) 
Dealing with 
complaints and 
petitions from the 
public 
4 
100% 
1 
9.1% 
1 
10% 
-  6 
17.6% 
Providing 
information to the 
public  
-  6 
54.5% 
3 
30% 
3 
33.3% 
12 
35.3% 
Providing 
information to 
other public 
sector 
organisations 
4 
100% 
7 
63.6% 
5 
50% 
-  16 
47.1% 
Responding  to 
other public 
sector 
organisations 
-  4 
36.4% 
1 
10% 
1 
11.1% 
6 
17.6% 
Developing plans 
and policies  
-  1 
9.1% 
1 
10% 
-  2 
5.9% 
Assessing and 
scrutinising  
performance  
3 
75% 
10 
90.9% 
9 
90% 
3 
33.3% 
25 
73.5% 
Providing 
information to 
superiors  
4 
100% 
11 
100% 
10 
100% 
9 
100% 
34 
100% 
  Differing  roles  can  cause  civil  servants  to  have  different  ideas  towards 
public accountability. Some staff members think of the public but others do not. This 
relates to the results in Table 5.2 that only six interviewees think of dealing with the 
complaints and petitions from the public and twelve interviewees think of providing 
information to the public.   
I have to be responsible to both executives and citizens but I rank citizens’ 
requirements  before  the  executives’  because  the  main  aim  of  the  PR  staff  is  to 
provide departmental services and information, communicate with the public, and 
support citizens. (A6) 
Although A6 mentions that she pays attention to both superiors and citizens, 
when  she  talked  about  her  duties  during  the  interviews,  these  related  mainly  to 
executives instead of citizens.  
The responsibilities of departments and civil servants can be both legal and 
moral. There are some laws that officials have to follow in order to support and 
deliver services to the public. Some civil servants, i.e. those who come into a direct 
contact with citizens, sometimes have to practise a sense of moral responsibility
4
, 
                                                 
4
 Moral responsibility is mentioned in Chapter 2 (section 2.6.1).   
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especially now. Three respondents said that the monitoring and controlling process is 
stronger than in the past. They also said that officials have to protect themselves 
against any mistakes, which may be made, so officials tend to adhere to laws and 
regulations.  
For operations, I usually follow laws and regulations. It is important that I 
protect myself. If I do not follow laws and something bad were to happen, I alone am 
responsible for the actions. However, if I follow the laws, the actions are not my full 
responsibility. Executives cannot penalise me or complain. As for the citizens, they 
may complain but they cannot give me any penalty. …With regard to the process of 
operations, there are some stages undertaken. However, if citizens have an urgent 
requirement, it is possible that I can speed up the process. However, the processes 
should follow laws and regulations. (C2)  
In addition, C2 gives almost the same answer, i.e. that she follows plans and 
policies. She says, however, she also  applies a sense of moral responsibility, for 
example,  she  can  do  something  better  for  citizens  if  citizens  require  services 
urgently.  
We have an annual plan detailing service delivery to citizens. In addition, at 
this time, the government wants departments to produce time limits for each activity 
and we have to follow this plan. This plan is as a standard that we have to follow. 
The results relate directly to departmental performance and KPIs. … It is possible 
that sometimes we cannot give citizens what they want. We try our best but it is not 
easy to please every person. In addition, some steps cannot be skipped. Therefore, 
some processes take a long time. However, if citizens are in urgent need or have 
particular  reasons,  we  can  prioritise  their  cases  and  process  things  as  fast  as 
possible. (B6)   
From the statements of these interviewees, it can be inferred that they both 
follow  laws  and  regulations.  In  addition,  they  also  follow  the  plans  and  policies 
raised  by  the  government.  From  the  statements,  and  additional  to  these 
responsibilities, officials also use their morality in operations. They do not apply 
only legal responsibility, but also moral responsibility in their operations. 
As discussed in section 5.2, citizens are considered important for governance, 
and departments have had to improve their services and attitudes. One PR official 
recommends  departments  should  approach  citizens  rather  than  the  reverse  (B6).  
However, from the contents of interviews, many officials still pay more attention to 
superiors, as shown in Table 5.2 which details how civil servants normally think of 
their superiors. For instance, PR officials (A6, B6, B8) provide information that they 
think is important rather than information which the public may require.  
Now,  the  Thai  government  pays  more  attention  to  citizens.  We  also  pay 
attention to them. There are some projects produced in order to satisfy citizens’ 
requirements. … For the relationship with executives, I have to prepare information, 
news and analysis to them every day. In addition, for the press conference, I also  
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have to produce information to be used in the conference. If I cannot do so by myself, 
I have to ask staff from other divisions to help me in this process. … I focus on the 
requirements of citizens and the public equally. … There is no survey for citizen 
requirements. (A6) 
This statement comes from one civil servant. Although she mentions that she 
pays  attention  to  superiors  and  citizens  equally,  the  interview  responses  actually 
suggest that the majority of her work relates to superiors instead of the public. In this 
case, the relationship with organisational accountability is possibly stronger than the 
relationship with public accountability.  
Civil  servants  from  the  IT  division  are  responsible  for  their  superiors’ 
commands through management of the websites (A4, B5, C2, E5). They also deal 
with answering questions or comments posted on the web board. This is the main 
responsibility to the public.  
I am responsible for what the executives want me to do. In this case, I focus 
on  the  information  technology  of  the  department.  In  addition,  I  have  to  be 
responsible  for  departmental  media,  particularly  departmental  websites.  I  deal 
mainly with technical issues. However, for some issues like answering questions, I 
also have to be responsible as well. I focus on answering general questions that I can 
answer. For some specific information, I will forward questions to other divisions 
within organisations. (B5) 
All accountants, except some from the Social Security Office, have no direct 
connection with citizens, because from the nature of their work they are not required 
to deliver any services to citizens. Only accounting students and researchers ask for 
financial reports (A2, E3), since accruals accounting is difficult for lay people to 
understand (A2). Again for other reports such as annual reports and departmental 
statistics, only researchers and students pay attention to this information (E3). The 
remit of these accountants is to carry out their duties successfully. They are indirectly 
responsible to the public through departments, cabinet, and parliament respectively.  
I do not have any connection with citizens. I only do my job as assigned by 
the department and executives. In addition, if there are some special cases, which the 
director of the division wants me to do, I will do. (B2) 
Accountants believe that their responsibilities lie away from citizens. They 
just  follow  what  they  are  required  to  do  by  law  and  the  executives.  Similar  to 
accountants, internal auditors (B1, C5, E1) rarely have any relations with citizens, 
except when citizens send in complaints relating to money or budgetary issues. When 
departments receive such complaints, officials report the cases to the director of a 
department, who will then decide what to do next (A1, B1, C5, D2, E1). He may 
ignore some cases but for the cases he is concerned about, he will send internal 
auditors to that office to discover the facts, which will then be reported to the director  
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(A1,  B1,  C5,  D2,  E1).  This  is  the  only  time  that  internal  auditors  think  about 
responsibilities to the public (A1, B1, C5, D2, E1). Otherwise, internal auditors relate 
their responsibilities directly to the director of the department.  
My responsibility is not directly related to the public. I report audit results 
directly to the director of the department and audited office. In addition, the reports 
cannot be provided to the public.  We use these only within organisations. …For 
audited organisations, we usually have the plan throughout the year. However, if 
there are some urgent jobs such as complaints from the media or citizens, we have to 
stop the scheduled plan of activities and pay attention to what the director assigns us 
to do. (C5)  
According to the statement above, an internal auditor (C5) rarely has any 
relationship with the public. Audit reports and information are not provided to the 
public. The relationship is based on organisational or bureaucratic accountability, 
and is not reliant on public accountability.  
Only two interviewees (A2, A6) realise and mention the concept of taking a 
citizen-centred approach, which was one of the main plans of the government. These 
interviewees know that the government pays attention to this idea. However, A2’s 
own primary responsibilities do not relate to service delivery, so she does not have 
any direct connection with citizens.  
I know that the government pays attention to the concept of citizen-centred 
approach. Departments have to pay attention to this concept. Civil servants knew 
and heard about this concept after the reform. The government is interested and 
produces many projects and ideas. Departments have to follow this idea. This idea 
affects how we operate and affect our responsibilities. Departments have to do and 
follow what the government wants. I believe that this concept will help to improve 
service  delivery  and  satisfy  citizens’  requirements.  Some  responsibilities,  such  as 
cost accounting and information, link to the public and the use of public resources. 
However, my direct responsibilities are not related to the public. Therefore, I do not 
have many relationships with the public. (C1) 
From the above statement, it appears that the interviewee, particularly at a 
higher level, pays attention to this concept, perhaps when dealing departmental plans. 
Therefore, they do have to focus on this issue. However, it is possible that because 
their main responsibility is not related to the public, they do not pay much attention 
to  the  topic.  This  statement  is  confirmation  that  civil  servants  tend  to  rely  on 
organisational or bureaucratic accountability instead of other types of accountability.   
2) Administrative accountability  
Administrative  accountability  is  the  relationship  between  departments  and 
their  controllers  and  auditors.  Departments  are  responsible  for  their  performance 
during the year by submitting their financial statements and performance reports to  
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auditors  and  controllers  to  scrutinise.  They  send  their  financial  statements  to  the 
OAG for auditing (A2, A3, B2, B3, C1, D1, E2, E7, E9). Performance reports are 
sent to the OPDC to evaluate (A2, A6, B2, B3, B4, C1, C4, D1, E2, E8, E11).  This 
relationship is based on laws and regulations. Both accountors and accountees follow 
out the requirements of the law and those contained in the regulations.  
However, with regard to the accountee’s point of view, an external auditor 
mentions that there are some difficulties in cooperation with civil servants during an 
auditing  period.  Some  civil  servants  delay  the  provision  of  reports  to  auditors, 
forcing auditors to contact the higher-ranking staff of these departments to chase 
these up.  
Sometimes, it is not easy for us to do our work. They do not give us the 
reports at the correct time. We have to wait and wait for them to get them to us on 
time. However, if they do not give us the information and reports, we will directly 
request these reports from the executives. At this point, we will get the information. 
(External auditor) 
In  some  cases,  five  internal  auditors  and  an  external  auditor  believe  that 
morality and motivation of civil servants can overcome difficulties in cooperation. 
Auditors may be given some important details that may be useful for operations.  
I usually follow the act and do what the act wants me to do. I do not have to 
give internal audit reports to external auditors. These reports are used only within 
organisations. However, if external auditors want to use the information and make 
the request, we can give them the information. There is no problem. … There is no 
problem cooperating because I give auditors the information they want as soon as I 
can. When they want something, they will make a request, and I have to follow this 
up by providing that information to them. Some information may take some time to 
prepare. However, I try my best and do everything I can do. (D2) 
From  this  statement,  moral  responsibility  plays  an  important  part  in  the 
relationship. Accountors sometimes use human sympathy to decide their actions. D2 
thinks that she should respond to external auditors by providing information they 
want to support audit processes. Internal auditors also have to be responsible to the 
OAG.  They  have  to  follow  the  State  Audit  Act  (A1,  B1,  C5,  D2,  E1).  This 
relationship is likely to be one of professional accountability. Auditors have to follow 
the standards set by peer groups. However, on this matter, the points of view of 
auditors  and  civil  servants  differ.  The  external auditor  believes  there  to  be  some 
problems regarding a lack of cooperation between civil servants i.e. when she does 
not  receive  the  information  she  needs  on  time.  However,  the  civil  servants  in 
departments believe that they are doing everything they can (A3, B3, B4, C1, E11).  
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They give information to the auditors within the time limits required by law. This is 
different in points of views.  
Rank of civil servants is a factor in explaining how people feel about other 
organisations.  From  Table  5.2,  the  number  of  higher-ranking  officials,  who  feel 
responsible to other organisations, is greater than the lower-ranking officials. This is 
because  when departments make contact with other organisations, higher ranking 
officials are responsible for this duty. For administrative accountability or corporate 
accountability, the accountor is normally a whole department.  
3) Organisational accountability  
For  organisational  accountability,  subordinates  have  to  follow  superiors’ 
orders and requirements. Their responsibilities can be both legal and moral. 
I have to follow those responsibilities mentioned in the job description. It is 
important  for  me  to  know  about  the  duties  of  my  positions.  …  There  is  an 
organisational structure to show the chain of command within organisations. I have 
to follow what my superior wants me to do. … The relationship with the superiors is 
sometimes not like on the papers. I have to decide what I should do. Some processes 
require personal relationship in operations. It is easier to use personal connection. 
Although I have to follow my superior’s requirements, it does not mean that I have to 
follow every thing. If actions are risky, I will decide on course of action, though this 
situation  can  affect  my  position  and  promotion.  However,  I  have  to  be  careful 
because executives can ask me to do a bad thing or sign risky documents. (C2)   
From  the  statement,  it  can  be  inferred  that  the  relationship  within 
organisations is sometimes adjustable to situation. Nine interviewees (A3, A5, B3, 
B7, C3, C5, D2, E9, E 12) said that officials can use personal relationship for their 
operations.  Civil  servants  pay  attention  to  executives’  requirements  than  other 
accountees and follow executives’ order because promotion is dependent on these 
executives’ decisions.  
Performance  does  not  affect  promotion.  Personal  relationship  is  more 
important.  Someone does not work well and properly but he still gets promoted. On 
the other hand, someone who works very hard does not get anything back. (D2) 
This statement represents inequality and favouritism in promotion. Different 
civil  servants  are  treated  differently.  All  interviewees  mention  that  subordinates 
usually think of their superior’s requirements. One accountant (B4) mentions that 
‘apart from the requirements, we should not do any other thing’. This represents an 
attitude of some civil servants, from which it can be deduced that the relationship in 
the case of organisational accountability is stronger than the relationship in the case 
of public or administrative accountability.   
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Twenty nine interviewees mention that political pressure and politicians are 
the main factors influencing an operational process. They mention that they have to 
follow  politicians’  requirements.  Politicians,  particularly  the  Prime  Minister  and 
ministers, are important because they are the direct executives of departments. Civil 
servants  comply  with  governmental  plans  and  policies.  The  Prime  Minister  and 
ministers appoint and transfer civil servants. Some higher-ranking civil servants are 
appointed in good positions because they are acquainted with these politicians (B2, 
C5). Although politicians may not affect lower-ranking civil servants much, their 
power  can  extend  to  directly  affect  the  director  and  deputy  directors  of  the 
departments. This can influence directors’ behaviour and can affect how departments 
perform during the year.  
The important factor affecting the operational process is politics, particularly 
politicians. They are direct executives of departments. Executives receive policies 
from politicians. Executives have to follow the requirements because if they do not 
do,  this  situation  can  affect  their  positions.  Executives  may  be  moved  to  other 
positions that are considered to be worse than at the present time. Some of them do 
not want to move. … For me, I do not receive much effect because I do not have any 
direct  contact  with  them.  Executives  are  affected  by  politicians  because  they  are 
directly  appointed  by  them.  Therefore,  they  try  to  follow  all  politicians’ 
requirements. It is possible that executives have personal connection with politicians 
so which is why they get the appointment. … However, this situation can affect us, 
practitioners. I also have to follow these plans and policies. Some of them are risky 
projects. I have to use my judgement and decisions to decide whether or not to follow 
these. (B2)  
From the idea of good governance and performance assessment, executives of 
departments,  ranging  from  the  directors  of  the  divisions  to  the  directors  of  the 
departments, have to sign a commitment with their superiors to confirm that they will 
work to the best of their ability, and will follow plans in order to achieve all projects 
in the forthcoming  year (A1, A2, B1, D2, E1, OPDC staff).  Lower-ranking civil 
servants have not yet to sign commitments (OPDC staff). By the end of the year, all 
interviewees  mention  that  they  have  to  provide  a  performance  summary  to  the 
Permanent Secretary, ministers, the cabinet and the parliament. These commitments 
are legal responsibilities of executives of departments. They should reach targets that 
they give commitments. If departments cannot reach the targets they set, they need to 
write reports to justify their activities, though they will not get penalised (A1, B1, 
B2, C4, D2, E2, OPDC staff).  
Therefore, civil servants have to follow the requirements of their executives 
and politicians. However, at the same time, they also have to protect themselves (A2,  
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C2, E5). This may involve committing to any risky ventures, e.g. signing document 
which make them the responsible party. 
I do not want to sign any documents. Other people who do not work in the 
public sector do not understand this. However, I have to work as best as I can. I do 
not care who my boss is or who the new government is. I just do my own work. 
Nevertheless, it is worse for staff who have to be responsible for money. They have to 
be sure of their actions because this area comes under a lot of scrutiny. (A2) 
From this statement, A2 pays more attention to her own duty as assigned by 
the  department.  She  avoids  any  conflicts  that  may  occur  and  she  focuses  on  the 
success  of  departmental  objectives.  Superiors  can  use  their  power  for  their  own 
benefit. Subordinates may be ordered to do something risky and thus be responsible 
for the situation on behalf of superiors. 
At this time, when I sign any documents I have to be careful because the 
process of scrutiny by external organisations is quite strong. Some executives of the 
department do not want to be responsible for the results of projects by themselves. 
They want lower-ranking staff to be responsible for them. I have to decide what I 
want to do. If I do not follow executives’ needs, it will be affect my positions and 
promotion by the end of the year. (C2)  
Some officials who may be entirely innocent of any wrongdoing sometimes 
find themselves held responsible for actions have been forced to do.  
…there are some cases that wrongdoers do not have any intention to make 
corruption. They were ordered by their superiors but verbally not in writing. Who 
makes transactions or documents has to be accountable for that action. But the real 
wrongdoers  can  escape  from  punishment  because  our  auditing  is  based  on 
documents. … The operational process is sometimes interfered with by politicians. 
They usually instruct verbally not in writing. (E5) 
Three  interviewees  (A2,  C2,  E5)  mention  that  some  executives,  both 
politicians and departmental executives, want to make subordinates responsible for 
risky projects. If mistakes were to occur, the person who signed the documents will 
be held responsible. In this case, executives want to pass their responsibilities to 
staff.   
5.3.2 Reflection  
What  accountors  should  be  accountable  for  depends  on  the  types  of 
accountability.  For  public  accountability,  departments  normally  follow  laws  and 
regulations,  because  officials  cannot  be  held  personally  liable,  if  they  are  just 
following the law. However, there are some cases where human sympathy, morality 
and personal motivations of accountors are used in order to help accountees. It is 
possible  that  using  morality  can  cause  bias  or  prejudice  towards  accountees.  
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Favouritism  and  bias  are  defined  as  corruption  by  the  World  Bank  (1992).  This 
situation does not help enhance accountability.     
For  administrative  accountability,  departments  and  civil  servants  are 
responsible for departmental performance. This relationship is controlled by laws and 
regulations  so  officials  know  what  dealings  they  will  have  with  auditors  and 
controllers.  However,  in  some  cases,  there  are  some  problems  in  cooperation 
between civil servants and auditors because civil servants believe that auditors are 
trying to uncover their mistakes. It sometimes appears that officials are deliberately 
obstructing the audit process. This situation shows that some civil servants ignore the 
laws and regulations, displaying a lack of discipline. As discussed in section 3.2, ‘to 
do as one wishes is to be a genuine Thai’ (Podhisita 1998, p. 51) is an important 
motto  to  describe  behaviour  of  Thais.  This  can  affect  the  enhancement  of 
accountability.   
For  organisational  accountability,  subordinates  are  responsible  for 
compliance with the requirements of their superiors. Civil servants are conscious of 
this duty because from the context of the interview conversations, officials place 
more emphasis on executives than on other groups of accountees.     
The interviewees were employed in different positions, and each had different 
responsibilities. Some officials come into direct contact with the public. Others do 
not.  Therefore,  the  ways  of  thinking  may  be  different.  The  attention  paid  to  the 
various  accountors  will  differ  depending  on  the  accountees’  objectives  and 
requirements. For example, citizens tend to focus more on the officials responsible 
for  delivering  services  but  they  are  less  interested  in  financial  statements.  From 
previous  research,  citizens  have  been  satisfied  with  the  public  sector  reform 
(Temchavala  et  al.  2004,  in  Thai).  One  of  the  main  factors  of  satisfaction  is  to 
receive  better  services  from  departments.  This  shows  that  both  accountors  and 
accountees tend to pay more attention to what they require, and what is necessary for 
them.  Different  accountees  have  different  requirements  and  focus  on  different 
perspectives.  Therefore,  responses  from  accountors  are  also  different.  Both 
accountors and accountees concentrate less on actions unrelated to them. However, 
this reluctance possibly causes some problems for accountability mechanisms.  
5.4 Processes of Accountability  
With  regard  to  the  processes  of  accountability,  while  conducting  the 
interviews in Thailand, transparency, scrutiny and answerability have been used as  
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features of the processes of accountability. The results are discussed through these 
three concepts.  
5.4.1 Transparency 
  This  part  reports  and  discusses  evidence  relating  to  the  concept  of 
transparency. Table 5.3 shows the groups of accountees, whom the accountors or 
interviewees apply the ideas of transparency with.   
Table 5.3 Transparency 
Accountors / 
Accountees  
Senior staff – 
higher level 
(n = 4) 
Senior staff – 
lower level 
(n = 11) 
Practitioner 
– higher level 
(n = 10) 
Practitioner 
(n = 9) 
Total  
(n = 34) 
Public  -  6 
54.5% 
3 
30% 
3 
33.3% 
12 
35.3% 
Other public 
sector 
organisations 
4 
100% 
7 
63.6% 
5 
50% 
-  16 
47.1% 
Superiors   4 
100% 
11 
100% 
10 
100% 
9 
100% 
34 
100% 
1) Public accountability 
With regard to public accountability, Thailand has the Official Information 
Act B.E. 2540 (1997). This act is a framework for government departments to use in 
providing information to the public (A4, A5, D2). The Ministry of Communication 
and  Information  Technology  also  has  guidelines  concerning  which  information 
should be provided on the websites (A4). IT divisions have informal meetings to 
decide which information to post on the websites and any of the other divisions can 
send the information that they want relayed to the public to the IT divisions (A4, C2, 
E5). The main aim of the government’s websites is to provide useful information and 
services to the public (B5). General information can be posted directly on to the 
websites by PR staff but for other important information, they need to get permission 
before doing so (D3). In this way, the likelihood of providing incorrect information 
to the public is reduced. However, too many processes can cause problems relating to 
the timeliness of information.  
There are some processes to provide information to the public. It normally 
depends on the sort of information. Important and sensitive information, such as 
financial statements and performance reports, has to be approved by higher-ranking 
executives.  For  general  information,  there  are  not  that  many  processes.  The 
information can be provided as soon as possible. However, for some cases, I can ask 
other officials to skip some part of the process, meaning the information can be 
provided before the documents arrive. (B5) 
With regard to the information on the websites, information prepared by the 
IT division is checked by them (A4, A5, B5, C2, D3, E5). The information produced 
by any other division is monitored by those divisions (A4, A5, B5, C2, D3, E5).  
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However, some reports, e.g. financial statements and performance reports, are not 
audited  by  auditors  or  controllers  (E3).  This  may  mean  there  is  some  question 
regarding the reliability of information.    
Audit  information  and  audit  reports  are  used  only  inside  organisations.  I 
cannot provide this information to the public. It is information for the organisation to 
use. … This information is distributed within organisations in order to inform them 
about results during the year. They would know what they should improve on and 
change within their operational processes. (E1)  
Although departmental websites are used to communicate with the public, IT 
divisions have not ever conducted a survey about citizens’ information requirements 
(A4,  A5,  C2).  Officials  provide  the  information  that  they  think  is  important  and 
useful for citizens, but they do not actually know whether citizens want or use this 
information (A4). In other words, they just provide information that they want to 
provide. As shown in Table 5.3, only twelve interviewees think of transparency to 
the public and citizens. 
At the present time, we do not have any survey to search for requirements 
from the public. We have only some discussion with internal users in the department. 
However, I think information we provide covers all information that citizens want to 
know. (A5) 
At IT division meetings, staff from other divisions are sometimes asked about 
which  information  internal  users  want,  but  it  is  not  a  formal  survey  (C2). 
Additionally,  on  the  websites,  there  is  a  web  board  for  exchanging  ideas  and 
opinions, so if users want departments to do something, they can post their request 
on  the  web  board  (C2).  Some  departments  (E5)  use  brainstorming  within 
organisations to discuss which information should be posted on the websites. The 
Office  of  the  Permanent  Secretary  has  a  plan  for  all  the  departments  under  this 
ministry to have the same style of website in order to give the ministry’s websites a 
more unified appearance (A4).   
In order to provide information to the public, PR staff recommended that the 
divisions within each department should collaborate with each other (A6, B6, B7). 
One senior PR staff mentions that: 
  I  think  staff  from  all  divisions  in  the  department  should  cooperate  and 
brainstorm in order to discuss which information or answers we want to transfer to 
the public. This job should belong to all staff in the department. It should not belong 
to only PR staff. (A6) 
 Departments  have  online  surveys  about  citizen  satisfaction  on  using 
departmental  websites  (A4,  B5,  C2,  D3,  E5).  However,  in  some  cases,  officials 
cannot classify the types of users from these (A4, B5). Although they may know the  
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IP address, they cannot be sure whether these are internal or external users. One user 
can complete more than one survey. Thus, there are limitations to such surveys.  
Apart from IT staff and departmental websites, PR staff play an important 
role  in  communicating  with  the  public  (B6).  They  use  many  channels  to  deliver 
information to citizens such as brochures, radio, newspapers, and websites (B6, B8). 
However, departments do not conduct the survey of citizens’ requirements (A6, B6, 
B8). One PR staff member (B8) mentions: 
We provide all the information that citizens should know so the survey is not 
really important. This information is related to all our departmental services. (B8)  
While another official mentions that  
I hope citizens can get the information that the division wants to present. 
(A6)   
PR officials have to contact the media in order to invite correspondents to 
attend departmental press conferences (A6). At these press conferences, executives 
of departments will provide information about new projects of the departments, or 
answer  questions  relating  to  current  topics.  PR  officials  have  prepared  the 
information  and  speeches  for  executives.  PR  staff  then  have  to  attend  the  press 
conference, along with executives, in order to support them (A6, B6). PR officials 
spend a lot of their time following up departmental information appearing in the 
media, and reporting this to executives (A6).   
Some departments use brochures as a way of providing information to the 
public (A6, B6, B8). Departments distribute these brochures to the provincial offices 
and local offices, thereby transferring information to people in local areas (A6, B7, 
B8). This method does not always ensure that all people will get the information. 
This raises the issue of the availability of information for some groups of citizens. 
For the brochures, we distribute them to provincial offices. Citizens can go 
there and ask for information. During the year, we have to estimate the number of 
brochures  to  be  produced.  However,  it  is  possible  that  this  number  may  be  not 
enough to provide to the public. (B7) 
PR staff do sometimes not make contact with citizens directly because of 
some constraints (A6, B6, B7). One of these is budget constraints (A6, B6, B7). For 
example, they cannot broadcast their news, or other information on TV because it is 
too  expensive.  Officials  may  choose  radio  instead  but  they  do  not  have  enough 
money to advertise on the popular stations (A6, B7). Therefore, because they have to  
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use the less popular stations, the information will not reach all groups of citizens. 
This situation illustrates the problems of the availability of information.   
We  have  a  tight  budget  for  communication  and  publication.  We  have  to 
decide and allocate the budget as well as possible. I know that some media such as 
television or newspapers are better but we cannot use them. It is too expensive to do 
so. We do not receive that much money. We have to use the cheapest, such as radio, 
but we cannot choose the popular channel. We have to use the government’s one. It 
is not popular and only a small group of people listen to this channel. I know that it 
is possible that information cannot be reached by a target group. However, we have 
no choice. We have to use this medium because of our budget. (B7) 
Another main communication medium, that of annual reports, is not widely 
publicised to the public. Only a group of people can reach this information (B7, E3, 
E4). In fact, after the change of government, some officials are not even sure whether 
they have to produce annual reports or not. 
We really do not know whether we have to produce annual reports or not 
after we have the new government. However, it is up to executives. If they want us to 
produce, I can produce but if they do not want, we can do something else. (E3) 
For departmental performance, all accountants mention that if citizens want 
financial statements, they  can  request these from departments. Some departments 
provide this information on their websites but others do not. However, the financial 
reports seen by the public are unaudited. After being audited, departments have to 
make quite a number of corrections. Audit reports are used only within public sector 
organisations and cannot be given to the public (A1, C5, D2). Seven interviewees 
(A2, A3, B2, B3, C1, D1, E2) claim that accruals accounting is not easily understood 
by civil servants, and they believe that it is also not easy for citizens.  
I think many people do not know and understand financial statements. It is 
quite  difficult  for  them  to  understand.  Even  executives  normally  use  budgetary 
reports  instead  of  financial  statements.  In  addition,  for  the  public,  only  some 
accounting students use this information. Apart from this group, no one requests 
financial statements. (A3) 
For performance reports, relevant divisions have to produce data to be posted 
on websites or in annual reports (A4, A5, B5, C2, D3, E3). IT officials do not know 
what this information will be or when they will get the reports. They have to wait for 
this information to be sent from relevant divisions.  
I do not know much about performance reports. Relevant divisions produce 
these reports and send them to me to post on the website. …However, these reports 
should be checked by the executives before posting on the websites. (C2) 
From  the  above  statement,  staff  just  wait  for  other  divisions  to  give  her 
reports. There are many stages relating to posting information on websites.   
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2) Administrative accountability  
In the case of administrative accountability, departments have to submit their 
reports or information to auditors and controllers (B1). Most of them do not have an 
issue  with  this  because  this  process  is  controlled  by  laws  and  regulations,  and 
officials  have  to  follow  these  laws.  Departments  have  to  submit  their  financial 
statements to the OAG (A2, A3, B2, B3, C1, D1, E2, E7, E9). However, from an 
auditor’s point of view, getting information from departments is sometimes not easy, 
as mentioned in section 5.3.  
The relationship between accountors and accountees sometimes depends on 
situation.  Departments  may  ask  for  an  extension  period  in  order  to  postpone 
submitting performance reports (A3, C2).  
It is possible to make a request for an extension from the OPDC, particularly 
at the starting point of the new projects. However, I try to do submit reports in time, 
even though it is not easy to do. Nevertheless, this situation is a normal occurrence 
in the first year of implementation. I think for next year the situation should be better 
and I will not have to ask for extension. (C2)  
  After the OAG finishes auditing, it sends the results back to departments to 
amend the reports. Departments then have to send the reports to the Monitoring and 
Performance  Evaluation  Committee  as  well  (A1).  This  committee  reports  to  the 
ministers, cabinet and parliament (A1). For the purpose of providing information to 
the public, the departments usually provide unaudited financial statements, because 
the process of auditing takes such a long time (A2, B2, C1, D1, E2). The OAG 
cannot  audit  all  government  departments’  performance  in  one  year.  The  main 
problem is insufficient external auditors. It is possible that some organisations are 
audited only once in three years (External auditor)
5
.    
We  do  not  have  enough  staff  to  do  this.  We  have  to  prioritise  which 
organisations  should  be  firstly  audited.  These  organisations  should  be  risky 
organisations, state enterprises or main revenue centres of the government. (External 
auditor) 
3) Organisational accountability 
In the case of organisational accountability, due to the hierarchical system, all 
respondents  mention  that  there  is  no  problem  getting  information  to  superiors 
quickly.  The  government  implemented  the  GFMIS,  which  allows  executives  of 
departments to obtain information as soon as possible (A2, A3, B2, B3, C1, D1, E2, 
                                                 
5
 The State Audit Act (1999) does not mention that the OAG has to audit all public sector 
organisations in one fiscal year.  
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E7, E9, E10, E11). However, executives do not go directly to the system and see the 
data  (A2,  A3,  B2,  B3,  C1,  D1,  E2,  E7,  E9,  E10,  E11).  They  usually  order 
subordinates to produce easier understandable versions of the reports for them.  
At this time, the implementation of the GFMIS does not save any cost or time 
because we have to print reports out for executives. I also have to change patterns 
and styles of reports to be easier to understand for executives. Therefore, it is no 
difference from before. (A2) 
Within  the  bureaucratic  system,  from  the  staff’s  point  of  view,  after  the 
reform, there is more transparency than before (B7). For example, in the past, when 
the government or departments wanted to buy something or build a new building and 
they wanted the private sector to join the bid, the government did not provide any 
information to the public. However, after the reform, the government uses electronic 
auction that provides information about all bidders on websites (External auditor). 
The government wants  to improve procurement processes to be more transparent 
(External auditor). However, one senior staff member of the Office of the Auditor 
General of Thailand mentions that while, from its appearance, this system looks like 
transparent,  in  fact  it  is  not.  Rather  it  depends  on  the  personnel  not  the  system. 
Therefore, when the government decided to change the system, with no consideration 
of personnel, any existing problems keep continuing.  
The government aims to make the system more transparent than in the past. It 
adopted new systems such as e-auction. While it is good that the government wants 
to solve corruption problem, in fact, it does not help much because some people can 
still find ways to take advantage of the system. It does not help to stamp out the 
corruption cases at all. (External auditor)  
5.4.2 Scrutiny  
In  this  part,  the  concept  of  scrutiny  is  discussed.  The  main  focus  of  this 
concept  is  accountees’  participation  and  awareness.  Table  5.4  shows  what 
interviewees think of the concept of scrutiny.  
Table 5.4 Scrutiny  
Positions/ 
For 
Senior staff 
– higher 
level 
(n =4) 
Senior staff 
– lower 
level 
(n = 11) 
Practitioner 
– higher 
level 
(n = 10) 
Practitioner 
(n =9) 
Total 
(n=34) 
External 
auditing  
-  3 
27.3% 
4 
40% 
-  7 
20.6% 
Performance 
assessment  
3 
75% 
10 
90.9% 
9 
90% 
3 
33.3% 
25 
73.5% 
Internal 
auditing  
4 
100% 
3 
27.3% 
5 
50% 
-  12 
35.3% 
Internal 
control 
3 
75% 
6 
54.5% 
2 
20% 
1 
11.1% 
12 
35.3%  
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1) Public accountability  
From the civil servants point of view, citizens focus more on departmental 
services than operational performance (A4, A6, B5, B7, C2, D3, E3, E4). Only a few 
people actually request financial statements and ask about departmental performance 
(A2,  B2,  B3,  C1,  D1,  E2,  E3).  If  citizens  do  not  get  what  they  want,  they  will 
complain (A4, A6, B5, B7, D3, E5, E9). However, some citizens are uncomfortable 
complaining or do so anonymously (B1, B3). Some citizens support mismanagement 
and fraud. If the public want a process to be speeded up they may bribe civil servants 
(B1) as some citizens are uninterested in departmental performance.  
No one requests financial statements. Only some accounting students want 
this information for their study. I think they do not use this information because it is 
difficult for them to understand. I think they focus more on service delivery. …  
… There are a number of complaints sent to our departments. The majority of 
the complaints are normally about service delivery, citizens not satisfied with our 
performance,  who  do  not  get  what  they  want.  However,  there  are  also  some 
complaints about corruption or fraud. If related to this topic, it is the responsibility 
of our division. We have to investigate whether the complaints are reliable or not in 
order  to  decide  whether  to  proceed.  However,  for  corruption  cases,  there  are 
sometimes anonymous complaints. In such cases, we do not pay much attention. If 
they want to complain, they should not do so anonymously. (B3)  
PR officials (A6, B7) confirm the above statement to be true because they 
sometimes get the feedback from the public, particularly regarding service delivery. 
They then have to analyse these comments or problems (A6, B6, B7, C2).  
Feedback  and  complaints  from  citizens  are  normally  about  departmental 
services.  They  normally  complain  about  not  being  satisfied  with  departmental 
actions. (C2) 
2) Administrative accountability    
In the  case of administrative accountability, due to the limited number of 
auditors, the OAG cannot examine all organisations in one year (External auditor). It 
has  to  prioritise  which  organisations  should  be  verified  first.  However,  state 
enterprise,  risky  organisations  and  revenue-based  organisations  are  audited  every 
year. The external auditor mentions that the implementation of the GFMIS causes 
some problems to external auditors because they began studying this system after the 
practitioners. Therefore, at this time, jobs may be delayed and the audit process is 
more time-consuming than before.  
I  know  the  importance  of  the  public  sector  reform  and  the  projects 
implemented  by  the  government.  It  is  important  for  governance.  I  think  many 
projects  are  important  such  as  the  GFMIS.  However,  I  think  the  government 
implemented this system too early. Some staff did not understand the system well,  
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and  many  problems  occurred.  We,  external  auditors,  studied  this  system  after 
practitioners in departments so it is difficult for us to perform our duties well. This 
situation can make operational processes slower than they should be. However, after 
studying,  I  think  we  can  improve  performance  and  improve  our  operational 
processes, just as practitioners have done. (External auditor)   
With regard to external auditing, the external auditor claims that there are 
some  problems  in  obtaining  information  and  cooperating  with  civil  servants.  As 
shown  in  Table  5.4,  officials  do  not  pay  much  attention  to  external  auditing. 
Although  ultimately  departments  have  to  provide  the  information  required  by 
auditors, they sometimes delay the process, which makes the auditing process much 
slower. This does not enhance accountability.  
From  an  auditor’s  point  of  view,  if  departments  do  not  have  a  proper 
controlling  system,  officials  can  find  a  way  to  seek  benefits  from  this  drawback 
(External auditor). Civil servants and politicians can collaborate with each other to 
earn private benefits. It is the responsibility of auditors to investigate departmental 
performance.  Some  may  in  fact  be  threatened  by  wrongdoers,  who  do  not  want 
auditors to carry out their duties smoothly. 
In some cases auditors are threatened by wrongdoers. It is sometimes not 
easy  for  auditors  to  perform  their  duty  as  well  as  they  can.  Some  auditors  feel 
scared. (External auditor) 
Auditors are normally rotated in order to prevent the building up of personal 
relationships and familiarity between auditors and departments (External auditor). If 
this  was  allowed  to  happen,  the  auditors  may  relax  strictness  of  operations.  The 
auditors may not use their full capability to audit departmental performance. They 
have to regularly improve their qualifications by studying Masters Degree, attending 
seminars  held  by  the  Federation  of  Accountants  of  Thailand  and  universities 
(External auditor). Due to both qualification improvement and low salaries, some of 
them work part-time as certified public accountants (External auditor).      
For performance assessment, twenty five interviewees mention that public 
sector  organisations  have  to  evaluate  their  performance  by  using  a  series  of  key 
performance indicators (KPIs) produced by the OPDC. Departmental performance is 
evaluated by both themselves and a private firm, Thai Rating Information Services 
(TRIS), hired by the OPDC. Departments have to prepare information for the OPDC 
every six months. The evaluation results determine the bonus that departments will 
receive  from  the  government.  However,  evaluation  is  only  carried  out  at  a 
departmental and divisional level, not at an individual level. In addition, departments 
follow an OCSC code of ethics (A2).   
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Regarding performance assessment, as shown in Table 5.4, interviewees pay 
attention to this issue. Some staff know that it is important to perform well, but there 
are some officials who do not understand the main objectives of this exercise and try 
to fabricate information to have better performance (C2). This situation is confirmed 
by an OPDC official, who discovers this to be the case every year. Whenever this is 
uncovered, departments are asked to improve and amend the information and reports.  
After  the  implementation  of  the  new  system  of  performance  assessment, 
operational  systems  are  more  systematic  than  in  the  past.  I  have  to  produce 
performance  reports  regularly.  We  know  the  aims  and  targets  of  operations. 
However, if you have seen the information during the year, you will know that there 
is some incorrect information in the reports. However, at the end of the year the 
information  is  correct.  This  is  a  normal  occurrence.  …I  know  it  is  not  good  to 
fabricate some information in the reports. However, I have to do because we want to 
reach targets and the system is not easy to understand. (C2) 
The statement shows that C2 focuses so much on results. In addition, she 
focuses on departmental and individual benefits. The reward and bonus system can 
both improve and hamper accountability mechanisms, as one official from the OPDC 
mentions below. 
Since the government decided to implement the reward system, departments 
now pay more attention to their operations and performance. They focus on their 
performance because they do not want their departments to be at the bottom of the 
tables  because  it  can  affect  executives’  reputation  and  positions.  …Some 
departments do not want other departments to know that they cannot reach their 
targets, or they want to ensure they get a bonus from the government. Therefore, they 
make up information on their departmental reports. However, by checking we can 
uncover this. After that we send the reports back to departments for them to make the 
necessary corrections. …However, overall departmental performance is better than 
before the implementation of the public sector reform and the introduction of the 
concept of good governance. (OPDC staff) 
Some officials think that performance assessment increases their duties (A3, 
E8, E11, E12). They now have to do many other things in addition to their main task. 
Nevertheless, it is a government requirement so they have no option but to comply. 
Apart from KPIs, departments rarely have any other evaluation (A2, A4, B1, B5, C2, 
E2, E3, E5).  
I think KPIs are good but I have a lot of work to do already. This project 
increases what I have to do during the year. I think it is too much for me. In addition, 
during this time, the number of civil servants has decreased. Therefore, I have to be 
responsible  for  the  duties  of  other  people  and  I  have  to  deal  with  performance 
assessment reports. I think it is too much for me. (E11) 
The government introduced ‘clean organisation’ projects in order to promote 
morality and ethics in operations (C4, C5 and see details in section 3.5). Changing 
civil servants’ attitudes is also important for this project (C5). However, this project  
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is quite abstract. It is not easy to change ideas, because at the higher level there are 
still some cases of corruption (C4). 
3) Organisational accountability  
For organisational accountability, superiors should assess and evaluate the 
performance of their subordinates, in order to promote or penalise. The controlling 
and monitoring system is important for this process. If superiors do not concentrate 
much on internal control or even internal audit results, neither do officials (B1, C5, 
D2, E1).  
If wrongdoers are under that executive’s group, the case may be ignored. 
Wrongdoers  can  avoid  being  penalised.  Wrongdoers  may  be  changed  from  one 
position  to  another  position.  For  example,  if  wrongdoers’  jobs  were  related  to 
money, executives will find jobs for them that do not relate to money, although I think 
these people will just cause problems for the new divisions. In addition, there are 
normally reasons why wrongdoers escape punishment. For example, executives may 
have  known  about  this  activity  beforehand,  or  wrongdoers  have  a  personal 
relationship  with  executives.  It  is  not  easy  for  internal  auditors  to  deal  with.  … 
Sometimes I think my job is not important. Why should I pay so much attention to 
this, when no one else cares about it. (B1) 
This shows that an internal auditor (B1) is aware of executives’ reluctance. 
Executives  of  departments  are  unconcerned  with  this  and,  moreover,  do  not  pay 
much  attention  to  financial  statements  (B1).  As  mentioned  earlier  in  section  5.4, 
departments implemented the GFMIS in order to exchange information faster and to 
improve transparency. However, executives do not read reports through the GFMIS 
(A2,  A3,  B2,  B3,  C1,  D1,  E2,  E7,  E9,  E10,  E11).  They  get  their  officials  to 
reproduce these reports in a more readable format.  
With regard to internal auditors (A1, B1, D2, E1), at the present time they 
have to use risk analysis to prioritise which offices should be audited first, because 
the number of internal auditors is inadequate. Risky divisions or offices, such as 
those with a lot of revenue and divisions, or offices that have not been audited for a 
long time are the first group to be examined (A1, B1, C5, D2, E1). Auditing is to 
ensure  efficiency  and  effectiveness  in  operations  as  well  as  to  uncover  any 
incidences of corruption. However, departments lack some auditing specialists such 
as IT auditors (E1).  
At this time, there are still some problems for internal auditors. The number 
of internal auditors is not enough for operations. We have to decide which divisions 
or sections should be audited. The risky divisions or offices are first audited. … 
During this time, we have a lot of duties but the number of internal auditors is few. 
We cannot increase the number of staff because we do not have permission to do so. 
The OCSC aims to reduce the number of officials but it does not study the system or  
 
180 
positions  of  other  departments.  Therefore,  there  are  some  problems  which  have 
arisen. (B1)   
From the statement, there are some limitations of internal auditors. Internal 
auditors cannot perform well because the number of internal auditors is insufficient. 
The  government  forced  the  OCSC  to  produce  these  guidelines  and  reduce  the 
number of officials, without focusing on differences among positions. This situation 
affects organisational and administrative accountability directly.  
Some executives of departments do not want internal auditing to scrutinise 
certain transactions because they are a party in that process, or they have a personal 
relationship  with  a  wrongdoer  (B1,  C5,  D2,  E1).  One  senior  auditing  staff  (B1) 
mentions that: 
Sometimes  I  can  get  to  examine  these,  but  only  in  order  to  give 
recommendations to them, rather than scrutinise for signs of corruption.  … The 
department rarely gives any penalty to a wrongdoer and I do not have any power to 
do this. (B1)  
Internal auditors sometimes cannot obtain an appropriate level of cooperation 
with  audited  organisations  because  they  think  internal  auditors  are  out  to  try  to 
uncover their mistakes (A1, B1, C5, D2, E1). This is almost the same situation faced 
by external auditors.   
It  is  sometimes  difficult  to  have  proper  cooperation  with  audited 
organisations.  They  do  not  give  proper  responses.  When  we  ask  for  some 
information, they sometimes do not give the information as soon as we would want. 
They believe that we are trying to find mistakes so they do not want to cooperate. 
(External auditor) 
One interviewee (A2) mentions the internal control system should be better 
because staff can obtain information as soon as they want. Departmental executives 
can  check  and  approve  transactions  at  anytime.  However,  there  are  some 
misunderstandings  about  internal  control  and  the  GFMIS.  For  example,  for  the 
GFMIS, the executives may give their username and password to practitioners (E2), 
while  internal  auditors  do  not  have  a  username  and  password  (E1).  In  addition, 
executives rarely  attend seminars about internal control (B1, C5, D2,  E1). These 
obstacles do not help in improving the internal control system (E1, E2). From the 
internal auditors’ point of views (A1, B2), they think that staff in departments may 
not understand the themes of an internal control system. Departmental staff think that 
internal control is a duty of the Internal Auditing Division, though different positions 
or jobs have different perspectives. However, after extensive training, they now have 
a better understanding (A1, B2).       
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In the past, civil servants including executives did not know and understand 
much about internal control. They believed that this topic was the responsibility of 
internal auditors. Therefore, they passed all responsibility to the Internal Auditing 
Division.  They  wanted  us  to  do  everything.  They  did  not  pay  any  attention  to 
seminars about internal control. When the CGD held seminars for internal control, 
executives normally assigned other officials to attend the seminars.  This situation 
did not support the system. However, after the  government paid attention to this 
topic, they are more interested in this topic than in the past. Many of them now know 
that  internal  control  is  important  and  relates  to  their  activities.  However,  some 
executives do not understand the concept much. For instance, they give their GFMIS 
password to practitioners. This does not support improved internal control. (E1)   
From  the  statement,  there  are  some  problems  of  understanding  and 
competency of civil servants. Some officials do not have a full understanding of the 
projects they are involved in implementing. They applied the projects too early
6
. 
This reveals problems relating to education and training in the public sector.  
Internal auditors realise that their job is important to the bureaucratic system. 
However, all internal auditors mention that other officials in the organisations do not 
think like that (A1, B1, C5, D2, E1). Some executives of departments do not pay 
attention to internal auditing (A1, B1, C5, D2, E1). In some cases, this is a possible 
cause of difficulties in cooperation between internal auditors and other civil servants.  
At the present time, the Comptroller General’s Department wants to improve 
the  quality  of  the  internal  auditors  by  raising  an  idea  about  Certified  Public 
Governmental Internal Auditors (CPGIA) (A1, B1, C5, D2, E1). In the near future, 
internal auditors will have to pass an exam to get this certificate. The CGD wants to 
do this because it wants to improve the quality of this job and support the new human 
resource  management  system  (A1,  D2).  This  project  can  improve  professional 
accountability. In this case, the CGD is as a professional peer for internal auditors, 
who perform professional jobs. The CGD sets standards of internal control and wants 
to improve and uplift the quality of this profession (A1, B1, C5, D2, E1). However, 
some internal auditors consider this project as a burden and a waste of their time (C5, 
D2, E1). They do not think it is appropriate to implement. The problem seems to be 
understanding what the government wants to do.  
I know about the CPGIA. I know that I have to sit the exam in order to get the 
certificate. However, I do not know what I will get after I pass the exam. I think it 
wastes my time. I have to attend seminars and training. I have a lot of work to do and 
I have to waste my time on something without knowing what the result will be. I do 
not think it will make any difference. (E1)  
                                                 
6
 This issue will be discussed later in section 5.8.  
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5.4.3 Answerability  
In  this  part,  the  concept  of  answerability  is  discussed.  Table  5.5  presents 
results about to whom accountors are answerable. 
Table 5.5 Answerability   
Accountors/ 
For 
Senior staff – 
higher level 
(n = 4) 
Senior staff – 
lower level 
(n = 11) 
Practitioner 
– higher 
level 
(n = 10) 
Practitioner 
(n = 9) 
Total  
(n =34) 
Answering 
questions, 
complaints and 
petitions from 
the public  
3 
75% 
2 
18.2% 
4 
40% 
2 
22.2% 
11 
32.4% 
Answering 
questions, 
complaints and 
petitions from 
public sector 
organisations  
-  4 
36.4% 
1 
10% 
1 
11.1% 
6 
17.6% 
Answering 
questions, 
complaints and 
petitions from 
superiors 
4 
100% 
11 
100% 
10 
100% 
9 
100% 
34 
100% 
1) Public accountability  
In  the  case  of  public  accountability,  departments  and  officials  have  a 
responsibility  to  handle  petitions  and  complaints  from  the  public  and  to  provide 
answers.  However,  from  Table  5.5,  only  eleven  interviewees  think  of  this  role. 
Internal auditors are responsible for dealing with any complaints relating to money or 
allegations of corruption (A1, B1, C5, D2, E1). They focus on corruption or fraud. 
Citizens or civil servants can complain by email, post or direct to internal auditing 
division (A1, B1, C5, D2, E1). When the internal auditing division receives a query 
or  complaint,  they  will  forward  this  to  the  director  of  the  departments  who  will 
decide on the correct course of action. The director can choose to either ignore or 
follow  up  the  case  (A1,  B1,  C5,  D2,  E1).  If  the  better,  the  director  appoints  a 
committee, or asks internal auditors to be responsible for this (A1, B1, C5, D2, E1). 
The process can take at least a year to finish. However, if the complaints are not 
related to money, they are passed to other divisions.  
Regarding replying to the public, if the questions relate to a responsibility of 
mine,  I  can  answer  the  questions  as  soon  as  possible.  However,  the  questions 
sometimes relate to topics, which are the responsibility of other divisions. In such 
cases, I have to pass the questions to staff in other divisions. I do not know when the 
public will get answers. … In the case of accusations, I will submit the information to 
executives to deal with. What happens then depends on what the executives decide to 
do.   
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With  regard  to  complaints,  the  process  takes  some  time  to  finish.  It  is 
normally about a year. The investigating committee has to investigate the case. It is 
not easy for them to summarise. They have to be careful handling such cases. (C1) 
From the above statement, the decision of executives of departments plays an 
important  part  in  determining  how  questions  from  the  public  should  be  handled. 
Departments  use  web  boards  to  answer  questions  from  both  civil  servants  and 
citizens (A4, A5, C2, D3, E5). IT staff are responsible for checking the comments 
and questions being posted and passing them on the relevant divisions to answer. 
First of all, IT staff will wait for the relevant staff to answer questions on the web 
board by themselves. If nobody answers the questions, the IT staff will forward these 
to the relevant divisions (A5, B5, C2, D3, E5). The time of response varies from case 
to case (A5, B5, C2, D3, E5). IT officials cannot force officials from other divisions 
to  do  what  they  want  (A5,  B5,  C2,  D3,  E5).  This  relationship  is  based  on 
cooperation, not hierarchy, and is horizontal.  
PR divisions have a call centre which handles questions from citizens (B6). If 
call centre staff cannot answer certain questions, they will forward them to the most 
appropriate  divisions  for  a  response  (B6).  In  such  case  they  will  record  contact 
details in order to call citizens back. Officials mention that they do try to answer all 
the questions they receive from the public, and record all types of questions in their 
database (B6).  
2) Administrative accountability  
In  the  case  of  administrative  accountability,  departments  follow  laws  and 
regulations. If auditors and controllers require certain information, staff are expected 
to provide this (A3, B3, C1, D1, E2, E8, E9, E11, E12). However, some difficulties 
in cooperation still occur, particularly for external auditors.  
I  usually  follow  the  laws  and  regulations  to  give  information  to  external 
auditors. However, if there is a special request for some information, I may or may 
not give auditors the information they want. It depends on the information. (A3)  
Based on the above statement, officials may not, in fact, provide auditors with 
all the information they want. Rather this depends on the sort of information asked 
for. This can link back to human sympathy of civil servants. External auditors will 
receive more information if officials decide to apply a sense of morality. If officials 
want to help auditors and pay attention to public benefits, they will provide more 
information to auditors.   
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3) Organisational accountability  
For  organisational  accountability,  subordinates  promptly  respond  to  their 
superiors requests, as shown in Table 5.5. There is no problem with direct superiors 
getting information as soon as they want.   
If executives require any information, I have to provide this as soon as they 
want it. I sometimes cannot provide the information that quickly but I try my best to 
do so. (B4)  
5.4.4 Reflection   
1) Transparency 
  With regard to transparency, in the case of public accountability, there are 
several forms of communication, such as websites, annual reports, brochures and 
paper documents, used by departments when providing information to the public. 
Although  both  the  government  and  departments  have  the  intention  of  providing 
information to the public, there are some problems associated with doing so, such as 
the  availability  and  reliability  of  information.  For  the  availability  of  information, 
annual reports and other information on websites cannot be accessed by some groups 
of Thai people. It is difficult for people in rural areas to gain access to the internet, 
and the distribution of annual reports is limited. In fact, some departments had ever 
produced annual reports, but as a source of information they were rarely used by the 
public (E3, E4). From the interviews, officials are aware that there is a problem of 
availability of information, primarily due to the limited budget.   
  For the reliability of information, although departments check information 
before making it public, there is still some information that cannot be guaranteed by 
departments. For example, financial statements are unaudited so it is possible that 
there will be some incorrect information in the accounts. Since citizens do not pay 
that  much  attention  to  financial  statements  or  indeed  use  this  information, 
departments continue to provide this kind of information to the public. A lack of 
interest by citizens can, thus, hamper the enhancement of accountability in the public 
sector.  
This lack of interest possibly occurs as a result of several factors. First of all, 
financial information is not easy for laypeople to understand. In addition, there are 
many  processes  if  they  want  to  get  involved.  It  is  difficult  for  them  to  access 
departmental  information,  particularly  in  rural  areas.  Moreover,  some  Thais  may 
think that their representatives already do this job for them, and indeed if this were 
the case then there would be no issue with citizens’ lack of interest. However, it is  
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possible that this lack of interest can support corruption cases. Many Thais are aware 
that there are problems of corruption. They think it is difficult for the government to 
solve  the  problem  (Suan  Dusit  Poll  2006,  in  Thai).  In  addition,  they  have  no 
confidence in the bureaucratic system (Suan Dusit Poll 2001, in Thai) and may not 
want to report any incidences of corruption, which they may encounter (section 3.2).  
  Some civil servants are aware of the need for information to be reliable. They 
check some information, such as news and departmental background, several times. 
However, for financial information, officials cannot provide final audited financial 
statements.  If  they  have  to  provide  this  kind  of  information,  they  present  the 
unaudited one. This can imply that they do not focus very much on the reliability of 
information.  
  With regard to timely information, there are problems with the information 
contained  in  both  websites  and  annual  reports.  For  annual  reports,  departments 
normally produce the reports quite late. However, since the public have no particular 
interest in the reports, departments are doing very little to solve this problem. For 
websites,  while  information  about  service  delivery  is  updated,  information  about 
departmental performance is not. Again, this situation persists because citizens are 
less  interested  in  departmental  performance,  and  are  mainly  concerned  with  the 
information about services.   
  With  regard  to  administrative  accountability,  the  main  problem  of  this 
relationship is cooperation. It is sometimes difficult for auditors to get information as 
soon as they would want. Thai civil servants work less well if they have to work as a 
team (Virushaniphawan 2004, in Thai). However, due to requirements by law and 
regulations, departments have to give reports to auditors. In some cases, executives 
tell  their  subordinates  to  fully  cooperate  with  auditors  and  controllers.  There  are 
some  differences  between  the  level  of  cooperation  experienced  by  auditors  and 
controllers, controllers not having as many problems as auditors because controllers 
are not looking for mistakes. Due to the implementation of the reward system, some 
departments fabricate information, so auditors and controllers have to work harder to 
investigate  incorrect  information.  This  problem  relates  to  the  reliability  of 
information.  
  In  the  case  of  organisational  accountability,  there  is  no  problem  with 
superiors  obtaining  information  from  subordinates.  Even  though  the  government 
implemented the new GFMIS project in order to facilitate operational systems (see  
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section 3.4), superiors still ask their subordinates to produce reports for them. This 
also indicates a lack of interest in new techniques or new projects, and problems with 
the competency of civil servants. Sometimes neither superiors nor subordinates want 
to change things. They focus on what they are comfortable with and are resistant to 
change. This is related to a characteristic of Thai civil servants, i.e. that they prefer 
conservatism (Virushaniphawan 2004, in Thai).  
However, if their superiors insist that they want to change, then civil servants 
have to do. If they do not, they would face some problems, particularly in relation to 
their jobs or positions. This represents the importance of pressure from a powerful 
group of people. It is possible that there are some problems with the competency of 
civil servants, including education and training, and the capability of departments. 
Thai culture, values and characteristics, particularly grateful relationship orientation, 
e.g. a bunkhun relationship, and personal relationship, influence processes of access 
to information. Some people find it easier to access departmental information than 
others.  These  ideas  relating  to  Thailand  are  discussed  in  Chapter  7  and  factors 
affecting the accountability are further discussed in Chapter 8 (section 8.3).        
2) Scrutiny 
  For  public  accountability,  public  participation  is  an  important  element  in 
public scrutiny (section 2.6). In this research, citizens are not interviewed. However, 
from  the  point  of  view  of  civil  servants,  citizens  pay  more  attention  to  service 
delivery than departmental performance. This can confirm that Thai people focus on 
their own self-interest instead of others. Service delivery relates directly to citizens 
but departmental performance seems to be far away from citizens’ attention. The 
media plays an important role in the relationship, because it is the medium between 
the  government  or  departments  and  citizens.  From  the  results,  departments 
concentrate  on  providing  information  and  responding  to  the  media.  In  fact,  they 
spend their time preparing information for the media. However, the media cannot 
focus on every case. This situation can actually encourage fraud, mismanagement 
and corruption, and deter accountability mechanisms.  
  In the case of administrative accountability, controlling and monitoring are 
the main responsibilities of auditors and controllers. While there is no problem with 
their participation, there are some factors, such as intimidation by wrongdoers and 
familiarity  with  departments,  which  can  obstruct  the  operational  process.  Some  
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auditors  also  have  part-time  jobs,  as  certified  public  accountants,  so  conflict  of 
interest can occur.  
  For organisational accountability, the reluctance of executives of departments 
and civil servants in internal control is one of the most important factors that can 
deter accountability. Some civil servants do not understand the concept of internal 
control well. In addition, they sometimes focus on only their own responsibility. In 
other words, officials do not think the system is important, and do not want to waste 
their time studying the new system. In addition, civil servants may feel that, as a not-
for-profit organisation, they do not really have to focus on operations. In the worst 
cases of reluctance, it is possible that some officials actually support mismanagement 
or corruption
7
, so, naturally, they do not want a strong internal control system. The 
behaviour of some departmental executives shows that they do not understand much 
about  internal  control,  for  example,  they  give  out  their  GFMIS  user  names  and 
passwords to accounting staff. This can be a problem of education and training.   
When executives of departments ignore internal control, it sends a signal to 
other  officials  to  do  the  same.  Both  promotions  and  penalties  are  decided  by 
executives. Therefore, it is no wonder that subordinates are ready to follow their 
executives lead. Nevertheless, some researchers believe that loyalty to superiors can 
help to enhance accountability (Frink and Klimoski 2004). In the case of Thailand, 
personal relationship, phak phuak, bunkhun relationship, sakdina and the hierarchical 
system are quite strong (see details in section 3.2), while loyalty can sometimes be an 
obstacle to accountability. Although many Thais are more individualism, they are 
ready to follow collective ideas if they earn benefits. In this case, the bureaucratic 
system is a hierarchical system. They have to follow superiors
8
.      
Not only do civil servants have problem, but also standard setters. Both the 
CGD  and  the  OAG  launched  guidelines  about  internal  control.  This  made  some 
confusion  for  civil  servants.  This  shows  a  problem  of  communication  within  the 
bureaucratic system.    
3) Answerability  
In the case of public accountability in terms of service delivery, there are not 
many problems. Departments have a call centre to respond to the questions from the 
                                                 
7
 Information in relation to corruption is discussed in section 3.2. 
8
 More discussion about this issue is in Chapters 7 and 8  
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public. However, from the findings, it would seem that the processes of answering 
accusations or complaints are time-consuming, since departments have to investigate 
each case individually. Some officials do not want to pay attention or deal such cases 
and may try to delay the process. Answering accusations or complaints is an extra 
duty  and  a  civil  servant’s  normal  duty  will  take  precedence.  However,  if  the 
complainers are important people or if they have a personal connection with certain 
civil servants, then the process will be faster. This is confirmed by the researcher’s 
own experience. This links to Thai values that Thais pay attention to relationship and 
social interaction (see details in section 3.2). They love creating relative hierarchy 
(section 3.2). In addition, due to grateful relationship orientation, this kind of values 
supports  favouritism,  which  leads  to  prejudice  in  operations.  A  good  example  is 
promotion given to civil servants discussed later in section 5.6.   
For administrative accountability, there are not many problems involved in 
answering both accusations and questions, because this relationship is mainly based 
on legal requirements. Nevertheless, if departments and officials possessed a sense of 
morality, auditing and monitoring processes would be more effective because both 
groups  normally  have  different  objectives.  Therefore,  individual  motivation  is 
important for effective processes.   
In the case of organisational accountability, there is no problem regarding 
superiors getting answers from their subordinates. As mentioned earlier, superiors 
are responsible for awarding promotions or penalties to subordinates. In addition, the 
Thai bureaucratic system is a hierarchical system (see Chapter 3). Officials know that 
they should respond to their executives as soon as possible, and they normally follow 
what their superiors want.  
From the findings, it can be summarised that accountors respond to different 
accountees in different ways. Accountees who have direct power over accountors can 
get  a  better  response  from  accountees.  In  this  case,  accountors  consider  their 
superiors’  requirements  to  be  above  those  of  other  accountees.  Officials  rely  on 
organisational  or  bureaucratic  accountability.  In  addition,  accountors  focus  on 
accountees who may have some influence on their career. They are motivated by 
career advancement. Additional to superiors, from the findings, another accountee 
paid attention to is the media, which can publicise departmental information to the 
public. This implication comes from the fact that when departments have a press 
conference,  both  superiors  and  subordinates  make  sure  they  are  well  prepared.  
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Officials do not, however, pay that much attention to citizens, with the exception of 
some powerful individuals, or someone with whom they have a personal relationship.  
5.5 Standards of accountability  
The interest of civil servants towards the concept of good governance  
After the Asian economic crisis in 1997, the concept of good governance has 
been widely discussed in Thailand (see section 3.5). The Good Governance Royal 
Decree  was  promulgated  to  be  a  guideline  for  departments  to  follow,  so  as  to 
improve their operational process and to improve governance. Many projects have 
been implemented due to this Decree.    
Some  interviewees  are  unaware  of  good  governance  or  are  only  vaguely 
aware  of  the  concept  of  good  governance  (A6,  C4,  E1,  E2,  E3).  From  the  staff 
perspective,  some  interviewees  think  that  public  sector  reform,  particularly  the 
introduction  of  the  good  governance  approach,  will  change  and  improve  their 
operational styles and performance (A1, B7, E6, E9, E10, E11, E12). While some 
officials use the idea of good governance as an operational framework, others think 
this idea, as well as reform and the Good Governance Royal Decree, will have little 
effect on their responsibilities (A6, C4, E1, E2, E3). One PR staff member mentions 
that  
My  responsibilities  rarely  change  because  I  get  more  freedom  to  work 
already so this Decree does not affect me at all. I have the same responsibilities as 
before the implementation of the Decree (A6).  
From this above statement, A6 thinks of good governance only in relation to 
freedom in their work place, i.e. there is no awareness of its effects on other people’s 
roles. One senior internal auditor mentions that  
I think the theme of good governance does not help to improve the quality of 
the operation and performance because we have all laws and regulations to control 
and monitor the operational process. I think it depends on officials rather than the 
system. (E1) 
  This statement implies that the attitudes and behaviour of civil servants are 
more  important  than  other  factors.  Another  accountant  (E2)  thinks  that  the  good 
governance approach affects other jobs, such as officials in the procurement division, 
rather than accounting jobs because an accountant is controlled and monitored by 
regulations already. Some officials do not clearly understand the concept of good 
governance. In addition, some civil servants do not want to change what they had 
been doing before the implementation.   
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  The job I have is also the same as before. I do not think it has changed or is 
different. …For example, the government wants us to use an information technology 
system  to  communicate  within  departments,  but  executives  still  want  paper 
documents and do not want to use IT. Therefore, we have to produce pretty much the 
same style of reports as before. (E7) 
  One internal auditor thinks that the interest in good governance depends on 
executives (E1).  
  For  any  issues,  if  the  executives  are  interested  in  certain  projects,  these 
projects are easier to implement successfully. Easier than projects that the executives 
pay no attention to because officials are ready to follow what the executives want 
them to do. Some officials only want to follow what the executives want them to do. 
… For the concept of good governance, it also depends on executives. If executives 
focus on this topic, other civil servants will be ready to follow. Therefore, if the 
government  wants  to  change  something  within  organisations,  executives  are 
important for doing this. … In addition, executives know more about governmental 
plans and policies so they will know what the government wants them to do and aim 
for them. (E1)  
The  government  implemented  the  performance  assessment  system  and 
improved  the  monitoring  system  (section  3.4).  Therefore,  some  interviewees  are 
aware of these criteria. For example, a senior accounting official (A2) mentions that 
she knows and understands the concept of the Good Governance Royal Decree. She 
realises that transparency is an important issue, and that citizens are an important part 
of  governance.  The  monitoring  and  controlling  system  is  stricter  than  before. 
Therefore, she has to perform as best as she can. The positions of employees are the 
main  factor  determining  which  officials  understand  this  issue.  Civil  servants  pay 
attention only to their jobs. Therefore, they focus on projects arising from the Good 
Governance Royal Decree that relate directly to their duties.  
A  civil  servant  from  the  OPDC  and  an  auditor  from  the  OAG  think  the 
concept  of  good  governance  is  very  important  for  operations  at  this  time.  This 
illustrates  the  difference  between  officials  who  have  different  positions,  duties, 
motivations  and  educational  background.  Ranking  of  civil  servants  is  also  an 
important factor to explain how they think. 
The concept of good governance is important for operational processes. I 
think departmental operations are better than in the past. Civil servants pay more 
attention to their duties and responsibilities. The processes are more systematic than 
before. (OPDC staff)  
This  statement  is  different  from  the  civil  servant  who  believes  that  her 
responsibilities are the same as they were before the introduction of the concept of 
good governance.   
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The  external  auditor  expresses  the  idea  that  while  the  Good  Governance 
Royal Decree attempts to make operational processes more transparent, in fact it 
does not. 
Although the Good Governance Royal Decree helps some processes become 
more  transparent,  in  fact  it  is  not.  There  are  still  some  processes  that  are  not 
transparent. For example, e-auction seems to be a transparent process but people 
can find the ways to benefit themselves. For example, one company uses different 
names for bidding and civil servants help the process. …At the present time, it still 
depends on people’s integrity. The process seems to be transparent but in fact it is 
not. (External auditor) 
Standards for professional jobs  
For  some  professional  roles  such  as  accounting  and  internal  auditing, 
employees have to  follow specific laws, i.e. there is supposed to be professional 
accountability. Some professions have their own code of ethical issues. For example, 
the  Comptroller  General’s  Department  has  an  ethical  standard  for  accountants  to 
follow (A2, B2, C1, D1, E2). Nevertheless, it is only a standard so there is no penalty 
for non-compliance. Some departments do not pay attention to such matters. At the 
first stage of the implementation of internal control in the public sector, both the 
CGD and OAG launched standards for internal control (B1, D2). This caused some 
confusion amongst civil servants. For providing information, departments adhere to 
the Official Information Act. This act relates directly to transparency. This issue will 
be discussed later in Chapter 6.  
Service delivery 
  With regard to service delivery mentioned in the Decree, departments have to 
present their plans to the public, within certain time limits (section 3.5). Officials 
may have to implement improvements themselves in order to keep within the time 
limits because if they do not, it will affect operational results. This topic is one of the 
KPIs, and civil servants now pay more attention to citizens due to this project (A6). 
For  KPIs,  departments  normally  set  targets  that  they  think  they  can  achieve. 
Unsurprisingly, many departments reach their targets. 
  Some departments want to reach targets and to do this they try to do anything 
they  can.  Some  of  them  fabricate  the  information.  They  may  think  we  will  not 
discover  this  but  we  do.  In  addition,  some  of  them  try  to  set  reachable  targets. 
However,  for  this  one,  the  targets  have  to  be  evaluated  by  the  committee.  Some 
targets are acceptable but others are not. (OPDC staff)   
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Codes of conduct  
For  codes  of  conduct  for  civil  servants,  departments  and  civil  servants 
normally  follow  the  codes  produced  by  the  Office  of  Civil  Service  Commission 
(OCSC) (A2, C4). Some departments and some divisions produce their own codes 
(C4).  These  codes  are  only  a  guideline  for  departments  and  officials  to  follow. 
Departments can produce their own codes. With regard to the  Good Governance 
Royal Decree, departments and civil servants have to use this Decree as a guideline 
in order to enhance accountability (OPDC staff).  
5.5.1 Reflection  
Regarding  standards  of  accountability,  in  this  research,  the  main  law  for 
enhancing accountability is the Good Governance Royal Decree. From the findings, 
it appears that some civil servants do understand and know the aims of the Decree. 
However, there are also some officials who are not really interested in the Decree. 
Some of them dependent on rank/position do not understand how the Decree affects 
their operations. Higher-ranking officials realise and understand better than lower-
ranking officials because some of them are involved in policy making or receive their 
instructions directly from executives. Lower-ranking civil servants, meanwhile, will 
just comply with whatever their superiors want them to do.  
This shows that for the Thai bureaucratic system civil servants normally take 
their  lead  from  executives.  Practitioners  rarely  propose  ideas  to  their  superiors. 
Someone who disagrees with executives will normally just keep quiet. Operational 
processes  in  the  public  sector  are  a  result  of  executives’  decisions  and  ideas. 
Differences in competency of civil servants and in access to information are among 
factors affecting the interest in the Decree. In addition, individual motivation and 
incentives are also important.    
For other standards and regulations, both departments and civil servants only 
follow what they are supposed to follow. However, some standards, such as codes of 
conduct or codes of ethics do not affect officials’ career or benefits, so civil servants 
do not pay much attention to these. Civil servants pay more attention to laws and 
regulations  that  relate  directly  to  their  duties,  or  which  can  give  them  reward  or 
penalty.  
Laws  and  regulations  in  the  public  sector  are  quite  flexible  and  allow 
departments  to  use  their  own  judgement.  In  fact,  it  is  sometimes  not  easy  for 
practitioners to interpret the laws and regulations. For operations, at the moment,  
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departments have to set targets for KPIs. These standards of operations are quite 
clear  for  civil  servants  to  follow.  Clear  standards  and  laws  can  help  enhancing 
accountability.  
5.6 Effects  
With regard to public accountability, departments are scrutinised by citizens 
and sometimes the media, which in turn is accountable to news recipients (A6, B5, 
B6, B7). Though may be scrutinised by the public, it is not clear what will happen 
should something be found to be amiss (A6, B5, B6, B7). As for complaints and 
accusations by the public, the consequences are not clearly specified and there is no 
information provided on how departments will handle these cases (A6, B1, B7, C2, 
C5, D2, D3, E1, E9, E10). Corruption cases will normally depend on the results of an 
investigation, which can take quite a long time, i.e. nobody actually knows what the 
exact result will be (B1, C5, D2, E1). It is difficult for civil servants to know about 
effects.  Some  wrongdoers  can  escape  without  penalty,  if  they  have  powerful 
supporters.  
It is quite difficult to tell what the effects on me will be, should I receive 
complaints  or  accusations.  Although  there  are  some  laws  and  regulations  which 
mention  about  penalties,  there  are  more  factors  than  many  people  know.  It 
sometimes depends on the evidence or excuses. That means it depends on the cases. 
There is no exact result for the cases. Therefore, no one knows the exact results. 
…The decision of departmental executives is important. Some executives can ignore 
some  complaints  from  civil  servants  because  they  do  not  want  to  investigate  the 
situation.  They  will  do  this  when  the  complaints  are  related  to  someone  the 
executives know well. (B1) 
Promotion  is  also  difficult  for  civil  servants  to  predict  because  some 
executives do not use appropriate standards.  
For rewards, it is not clear. Some staff do receive a promotion but they do 
not deserve this promotion. Some officials may work very hard but cannot get a 
promotion, because executives do not know them or they want to promote someone 
else. It is quite easy for the Thai public sector to award a promotion to someone the 
executives want. The rotation system is also important for promotion. If you received 
a promotion last year that means this year, even though you may work very hard, you 
may not get promotion. Executives will promote other officials. On the other hand, 
penalties are different, because the process takes a long time and no one knows what 
the outcome will be. I do not know and I cannot make any prediction. It is not easy to 
know. It depends on evidence and other issues such as personal relationship with 
executives. It is possible that someone can escape penalty if they have a personal 
relationship with executives. I think no one can predict the results. (C5) 
From  the  above  statement,  there  are  many  factors  affecting  promotion  or 
penalty. Superiors’ decisions are the main factor. Personal relationship is also an 
important factor for processes of performance assessment and promotion. Due to a  
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hierarchical system, even if civil servants felt that a particular promotion was unfair, 
they will not say so. Ideas relating to culture and values will be discussed in Chapters 
7 and 8.  
Regarding service delivery, the effects are not clear either (A6, B7, C2, D3). 
Although the public are entitled to make complaints, the process of determination is 
dependent  on  executives.  Civil  servants  do  not  know  what  will  come  of  the 
complaints received. Some cases may be ignored while others may be dealt with. It 
depends  on  a  number  of  factors  (A6,  B7,  C2,  D3).  Some  people  complain 
anonymously and these are the kinds of cases which departments are likely to pay 
scant attention to (A6, B1, B3, B7, C2, D3).  
There are many complaints that the department receives. It is impossible to 
deal with all complaints. We have to select and decide which complaints we will 
manage.  If  complainers  complain  anonymously,  we  rank  this  kind  of  complaints 
lower  than  other  complaints,  because  of  the  amount  of  time  it  would  take  to 
investigate. Plus, we cannot be sure that the complaints are true or not. (B1) 
The severity of the case is also taken into account (A6, B1, B7, C2, C5, D2, 
D3, E1). If it is only about delivering services, it is possible that nothing will happen, 
but if it is related to corruption then it will be sure to be investigated (A6, B1, B7, 
C2, C5, D2, D3, E1). Nevertheless, if citizens do not follow the case up, departments 
may not spend much time on investigation (B1, C5, D2). In addition, if civil servants 
have a lot of power, it is sometimes difficult for complainers to get the results they 
want (B1, C5, D2, E1).   
  With regard to administrative accountability, there are no serious penalties for 
unintended  and  less  severe  cases,  such  as  incorrect  financial  statements  or 
performance reports. Controllers and auditors just ask officials to amend the reports 
(A2, B1, B2, C1, C5, D2). However, for corruption cases, there is a range of penalty, 
dependent on the particular case (A6, B1, B7, C2, C5, D2, D3, E1). It is possible that 
wrongdoers may not get penalised if they are powerful enough (B1, C5, D2, E1).  
I  sometimes  do  not  know  what  will  happen  in  a  case,  because  our 
responsibilities  are  to  scrutinise  departmental  performance  and  reports.  We  just 
report the audit results to parliament and audited organisations. Therefore, it is up 
to them to decide what should be done. Our job is done already. (External auditor)  
  The government has now implemented a reward system in order to provide 
an  incentive  for  effective  operations  (section  3.5).  Regarding  reward,  after  the 
implementation  of  the  new  performance  assessment  system,  departments  can  be 
rewarded if they reach their targets (OPDC staff). The government wants to persuade 
departments  to  be  more  efficient  and  effective  in  their  operations  (OPDC  staff).  
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However,  in  order  to  ensure  they  will  receive  reward,  some  departments  create 
information in order to appear to have reached their targets. This does not support 
accountability in the public sector. 
  With regard to organisational accountability, all interviewees mention that by 
the end of the year departments conduct individual assessments to decide who will 
receive  promotion.  Performance  during  the  year  will  be  assessed  in  order  to 
determine who will be promoted. However, good performance does not guarantee 
that those staff will get promotion (A3, B1, B3, C5, D2, E1, E10, E11). It sometimes 
depends on other factors such as personal relationship, phak phuak, or rotation.  
  For  promotion  at  the  end  of  the  year,  it  sometimes  depends  on  the 
relationship between executives and civil servants. Some officials get a promotion 
because they are ‘phak phuak’ of executives. Some of them get it because of rotation. 
It is possible that performance does not affect giving promotion. The process is not 
clear. (B3) 
  With regard to the evaluation system, all interviewees mention that it is only 
a one-way evaluation. Only executives can evaluate their subordinates. It is difficult 
for  civil  servants  to  complain  if  they  feel  the  assessment  result  is  unjustified. 
Executives hold all the power, as they determine whether to penalise or promote. As 
the external auditor mentions 
…If  subordinates  do  not  follow  superior’s  requirement,  they  may  get 
transferred,  framed,  not  promoted.  In  the  worst  case,  they  may  be  accused  of 
wrongdoing. … It depends on civil servants. They should be stronger and not follow 
some inappropriate order. (External auditor)    
5.6.1 Reflection   
This research does not focus much on the effects of accountability. However, 
from  the  findings,  the  government  and  departments  do  not  appear  to  have  clear 
effects of cases of corruption or mismanagement. This can inhibit the enhancement 
of accountability, because clear effects can help enhancing accountability. Moreover, 
Thai values such as personal connections, bunkhun, and phak phuak, can influence 
the process of decision making on giving effects to accountors. Some Thai people 
accept this situation as they also accept inequality in their society. They have been 
familiar with these values since they were young (section 3.2).   
The  unclear  effects  are  also  a  feature  of  the  promotion  process.  It  is 
sometimes not clear why some staff are being promoted. This is one of the obstacles 
that deter accountability, because it seems that executives can use their power to do 
what they want. This situation does not help in enhancing accountability in the Thai 
public sector. Due to some Thai culture and values, the rewards and punishments  
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which should be given to the accountor may not follow in the way that they should. 
Rewards may be given to someone who is not worthy, while wrongdoers may escape 
penalty. Ideas of culture and values are discussed later in Chapters 7 and 8.  
5.7 Summary  
  With regard to the accountability relationship in the Thai public sector, there 
are  some  factors  that  can  affect  and  explain  the  relationship  and  accountability 
mechanisms. The main factor is Thai values, culture and characteristics, and in many 
cases,  some  values,  such  as  grateful  relationship  orientation,  i.e.  phak  phuak, 
bunkhun,  and  personal  relationship,  can  help  and  support  the  accountability 
relationship. This can be both a benefit and drawback. It can help the relationship run 
more smoothly. By contrast, it can result in some inappropriate behaviour such as 
helping wrongdoers.  
  Collectivism can make accountors focus on group thinking. However, Thai 
people are more individualistic now than in the past (section 3.2). People focus on 
themselves instead of other people. They focus on their jobs and their benefits. These 
values can be the reason why accountors focus more on their superiors than on other 
accountees. The incentives are for themselves.  
Accountors, in terms of either departments or individuals, do know what their 
roles are (section 5.2). They know to whom they should be accountable either by 
legal requirements or hierarchy. However, although they may have knowledge of 
this, how they practise it is another matter. Some staff (e.g. PR staff) know that they 
should  be  responsible  to  the  public  as  well  as  to  executives  of  departments. 
Nevertheless,  from  their  answers,  they  focus  more  on  the  tasks  carried  out  for 
executives (sections 5.2 and 5.3). This situation confirms the previous study that civil 
servants  do  not  focus  much  on  the  public  (Virushaniphawan  2004,  in  Thai). 
Although  it  is  true  that  subordinates  are  accountable  to  their  superiors,  some 
positions have direct responsibilities and connection to the public. In this case, they 
are also accountable to the public but some do not focus much on this.  
Civil  servants  only  pay  attention  to  that  which  is  of  benefit  to  them.  For 
example, executives determine both rewards and penalties, so if they do not follow 
orders  of  their  superiors,  they  risk  being  punished.  Still,  although  they  may  not 
actually receive a reward, they do not want their executives to dislike them. With 
regard to the Thai sakdina, some executives are used to having power and do not  
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want officials to initiate any conflict or argument with them. Some of them feel that 
they lose face if their subordinates argue with them. 
Career  opportunity  sometimes  depends  upon  executives.  Personal 
relationship, and grateful relationship orientation, i.e. bunkhun relationship and phak 
phuak, are factors influencing who will get promoted. Therefore, civil servants want 
to be a member of the executive’s group. Some executives love hearing only praise 
by subordinates. Therefore, they feel more benevolent to this group and will promote 
them  regardless  of  performance.  This  situation  leads  to  the  case  of  fraud  and 
corruption, because no one feels able to stand up to executives. Civil servants try to 
focus only on what matters to them, and on protecting their own position. 
With regard to the relationship with the public, the public cannot give civil 
servants any rewards. Even though citizens can complain, they cannot determine the 
penalty  directly.  It  has  to  be  sanctioned  by  executives.  This  summarises  the 
relationship  in  the  case  of  organisational  accountability  influencing  public 
accountability.  Civil  servants  normally  rely  on  organisational  accountability  or 
bureaucratic accountability.  
Thai values do not affect only accountors, but they also affect accountees. A 
lack of interest in public sector performance derives from many factors and one of 
them comes from Thai characteristics and values, whereby citizens can easily accept 
inequality in their society (section 3.2). Citizens may think of karma. They cannot 
change  anything.  In  addition,  it  is  possible  that  accountees  do  not  pay  attention 
because they fear threatened by civil servants and politicians. From previous research 
(section 3.2), citizens do not know where to report and they do not want to involve 
the case. This represents the problems of communication with the public because 
some people do not know where they can send complaints. In addition, some people 
report anonymously (section 5.4).  
  Some  interviews  mention  that  politics  is  the  determining  factor  of  the 
bureaucratic system at the present time. This is confirmed by the poll that politicians 
deal with the process of transferring civil servants (Suan Dusit Poll 2001, in Thai). 
Executives  of  departments  have  to  follow  politicians’  requirements  because 
politicians are the direct superiors of the executives. This can show that executives 
also do things for their own benefits. They rely on bureaucratic accountability.   
  The factor that supports the use of Thai values and culture is that standards 
and effects are not clear. Departments and executives can use their own judgement,  
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and when they do so, Thai values and culture, such as patron-client, phak phuak, and 
bunkhun play an important part in the accountability relationship. This can lead to 
corruption cases. The ideas in relation to culture and values will be discussed in 
Chapters 7 and 8.  
  With  regard  to  characteristics  of  Thai  civil  servants  discussed  by 
Virushaniphawan (2004, in Thai)
9
, although the results of this research cannot be 
generalised to include all civil servants, the interviewees gave opinions and examples 
that can be linked to Virushaniphawan’s characteristics. There are some similarities 
and  differences  among  these.  The  similarities  include  the  abuse  of  power  and 
position
10
, the patronage system
11
, and individualism
12
. The differences, during this 
time, are that civil servants focus more on citizens and do not consider themselves 
superior to citizens. Certain characteristics, i.e. flattery and conservatism, cannot be 
summarised from the results. In summary, during the period of this research, some 
behaviour  still  persists which  does  not  help  with  enhancing  accountability  in  the 
public sector.      
5.8 Constraints  
As a result of public sector reform, many new techniques were implemented 
in  the  Thai  public  sector.  Some  officials  have  not  been  familiar  with  the  new 
systems. In this part, the constraints from the reform and the implementation of the 
concept of the good governance are reported and discussed. The constraints can be 
classified into six main criteria as shown in Table 5.6 
Table 5.6 Constraints  
Officials/ 
Constraints  
Senior staff – 
higher level 
(n = 4) 
Senior staff – 
lower level 
(n = 11) 
Practitioner 
– higher level 
(n = 10) 
Practitioner 
(n = 9) 
Total 
(n =34)  
The number of 
civil servants 
and 
qualification 
4 
100% 
7 
63.6% 
6 
60% 
1 
11.1% 
18 
52.9% 
Civil servant’s 
perspectives 
and 
understanding 
2 
50% 
8 
72.7% 
-  2 
22.2% 
12 
35.3% 
                                                 
9
 Details are in section 3.2. 
10
 Superiors sometimes ask subordinates to sign risky documents (section 5.3) 
11
 An example of this is when executives help wrongdoers whom executives know very well (section 
5.4) 
12
 Some civil servants focus more on their own responsibilities, and there are some difficulties in 
working as teams and in cooperation  (sections 5.3, 5.4 and 5.8)  
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Table 5.6 Constraints (con.) 
Officials/ 
Constraints  
Senior staff – 
higher level 
(n = 4) 
Senior staff – 
lower level 
(n = 11) 
Practitioner 
– higher level 
(n = 10) 
Practitioner 
(n = 9) 
Total 
(n =34)  
System and 
equipments 
1 
10% 
4 
36.4% 
6 
60% 
1 
11.1% 
12 
35.3% 
Time constraint  -  3 
27.3% 
1 
10% 
-  4 
11.8% 
Cooperation  2 
20% 
6 
54.5% 
1 
10% 
1 
11.1% 
10 
29.4% 
Budget 
constraint 
-  2 
18.2% 
1 
10% 
-  3 
8.8% 
 
5.8.1 The number of civil servants and qualifications  
As shown in Table 5.6, one of the most important constraints from a civil 
servant’s point of view is about civil servants. First of all, one project arising from 
the reform is to reduce the number of civil servants, in order to reduce government 
expenditure (OPDC staff). The government has an early retirement campaign and 
when officials retire, the positions are cancelled. This project affects accountability 
directly in some fields. For example, the number of internal auditors is inadequate 
yet they cannot recruit new staff (B1, C5, D2, E1). This can affect the quality of 
internal auditing, and can deter both organisational and administrative accountability. 
One  interviewee  (E1)  mentions  that  the  Office  of  the  Civil  Service  Commission 
(OCSC) does not study the nature of each department and each job.  In addition, 
departments lack not executives or planning staff, but operational staff because the 
government has not reduced the number of executive positions.  
I know that the government aims to reduce operational cost by reducing the 
number of civil servants. I know the importance of this project. However, there are 
differences among departments and divisions. For some divisions, like my division, 
we have only 7-8 persons but we have to scrutinise a lot of offices. We have a lot of 
provincial offices. The OCSC should study the system before the implementation. I 
think  the  OCSC  did  not  study  the  system.  There  are  some  differences  among 
positions. However, the OCSC applied the project in the same way. (C5) 
The government decided to change the types of civil servants. In the past, 
when officials retired, they received a pension from the government for the rest of 
their  life.  However,  after  the  reform,  the  government  stopped  this  system.  New 
officials are normally appointed to the departments but on a short term contract (A6). 
This also causes problems because a highly qualified person, particularly in the fields 
of IT, accounting and auditing, does not want to work for the government because 
the salary and welfare are not attractive (A6, B5, C2, E5). Working in the private 
sector,  people  have  the  opportunity  to  earn  a  higher  salary.  Therefore,  the  
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bureaucratic system lacks high qualified civil servants. This can affect operational 
processes, particularly a process of scrutiny and performance evaluation.   
5.8.2 Civil servant’s perspectives and understandings  
From  the  interviews,  twelve  interviewees  mentioned  that  some  executives 
and officials in the departments are still confused and do not understand the concept 
of good governance. For example, one senior member of accounting staff (A2) does 
not  know  the  real  aims  and  outcomes  of  the  GFMIS  system,  only  that  as  an 
operational process it is faster than before.  
After the public sector reform, there are many projects implemented by the 
government. I have to study the new systems. It is sometimes difficult to understand. 
…For GFMIS, I think it is difficult for me to understand. I know that the operational 
processes are faster than before because we can send information or do transaction 
via the system. However, I am not sure what more we can get from the systems. We 
still  have  to  use  documents  for  communication.  In  addition,  for  some  processes, 
executives do not use the GFMIS by themselves. Practitioners have to print out all 
information  for  executives.  Executives  even  give  their  password  to  practitioners. 
(B3) 
The main aim of the GFMIS is to allow officials to gain access to information 
as  soon  as  possible  in  order  to  enhance  transparency  (section  3.4).  However, 
executives do not use the reports generated from the system because the characters 
are too small and the actual reports are too difficult to understand (section 5.4). That 
means civil servants have to change the format of these reports, which increases their 
duties. Some executives do not pay attention to this system (section 5.4). When the 
CGD held a training course for executives, most of them did not attend the seminar 
themselves, but sent other staff in their place (section 5.4)   
The  government  also  introduced  a  new  performance  assessment  system 
(section 3.4). This project can improve and develop the monitoring and controlling 
system. Thus, it can improve both internal and external scrutiny. Since 2003, public 
sector  organisations  have  had  to  assess  their  performance  by  using  the  KPIs 
framework from the OPDC, and departments have had to prepare information and 
reports for submission to the OPDC (OPDC staff). The OPDC then hires a private 
organisation to evaluate departmental performance. For this assessment, it measures 
the achievement of plans and budgets used during the year. However, some officials 
think their responsibilities increase because of this project (section 5.4). They may 
not understand the importance of performance evaluation.   
From  the  interviews,  executives,  senior  staff  and  accounting  practitioners 
realise the importance of budgetary reports, which illustrate the use of money in the  
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department (A3, B3, B4, E8, E9, E12). They use this information in the planning and 
decision making stages. However, the executives rarely take an interest in financial 
statements (A3, B2, B3, C1, D1, E2). Accountants (B2, E2) mention that reports are 
too complicated for executives to understand. Additionally, departments are not-for-
profit  organisations.  Financial  statements,  especially  income  statement,  do  not 
support  their  operations.  The  reports  are  issued  later  than  the  executives  require. 
Departments just follow the laws, by producing financial accounts and giving them 
to the OAG and CGD. 
After  the  implementation  of  public  sector  reform,  the  government  raised 
many new projects to improve the qualifications of staff. In future, internal auditors 
should pass the Certified Public Governmental Internal Auditors (CPGIA) exam in 
order to improve and develop the quality of the internal auditing system, and to make 
it more standardised. However, from the internal auditors’ perspectives, they think 
this is a waste of their time because they have to attend the training over five to six 
days, on top of their other duties. In addition, some executives pay little attention to 
the  use  of  audit  results  (B1,  E1).  Nevertheless,  they  do  mention  that  if  the 
government forces them to implement this project, they will have no option but to do 
so. This shows that there are some problems regarding the attitudes of officials. They 
implement projects because they are required to do so.  
In  addition,  although  the  government  paid  attention  to  efficiency  and 
effectiveness  in  operations,  one  interview  (B4)  does  not  want  to  reduce  budget 
spending  because  he  does  not  want  a  tight  budget.  This  shows  that  some  civil 
servants still focus on their own benefits instead of public benefits.   
5.8.3 System and equipment  
Another main project of reform was changing a governmental information 
system from a manual system to a computer based system, called the Government 
Fiscal  Management  Information  System  (GFMIS).  However,  it  is  clear  from  the 
interviews that this is only in the first stage of implementation. Neither the system 
nor equipment are ready (A3, B3). The existing GFMIS terminals are considered to 
be  inadequate,  and  a  plan  to  purchase  new  terminals  has  been  postponed  due  to 
political  turbulence  during  the  period  of  this  research.  However,  one  accountant 
gives  opinions  that  in  fact  the  number  of  terminal  is  enough  but  civil  servants 
sometimes postpone their work until the due date (C1). Regarding internal auditing, 
the Internal Auditing Division does not even have any terminals capable of accessing  
 
202 
the  GFMIS  database.  Therefore,  when  they  want  a  report,  they  have  to  ask 
accounting staff to print it for them.  
One of the main reasons for the problems with the GFMIS system is because 
the programmers involved are not used to a public sector system. They come from 
private  companies  that  use  less  complicated  systems.  Additionally,  during  a  trial 
period, small departments were chosen to test a trial system. This is the reason why 
the system is not  complete and ready to use. A lack of  IT  and internal auditing 
specialists  in  the  public  sector  is  also  one  of  the  main  obstacles  to  enhancing 
accountability.  This  means  internal  auditors  cannot  scrutinise  the  entire  GFMIS 
system.  One  accountant  complains  about  an  organisation  structure  that  does  not 
support operational process, because after the GFMIS implementation, they have to 
examine transactions recorded by other divisions. This is difficult because there is no 
way of knowing whether the records are correct or not
13
.  
This  constraint  may  not  affect  the  accountability  relationship  directly. 
However, it affects the operational process, by making certain tasks more difficult, 
and  increasing  the  likelihood  of  errors  in  some  processes.  This  would  affect 
accountability.  
5.8.4 Time constraint  
In the Thai public sector, the government changed the information system 
only two years after implementing accruals accounting. Departments had to change 
from a manual system to a computer based system, and civil servants were not given 
enough time to understand the system. In addition, departments had to run both the 
manual system and the computer based system at the same time
14
. Thus, accountants 
think of it as a burden which can distract them from their other duties (A3, B3, C1). 
Data and account balances from the two systems are not equal. Staff cannot be sure 
which  information  is  correct,  meaning  mistakes  are  likely  to  happen.  One 
interviewee mentions that she had to amend almost 20,000 transactions according to 
the OAG comments.  
Due to changes being implemented too quickly, and lack of training for the 
executives, executives do not understand the system very well so they usually give 
their username and password to their staff in order to approve transactions. This 
degrades the quality of the internal control system.   
                                                 
13
 Information in this paragraph comes from the first interview.   
14
 This information comes from the first interview.   
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5.8.5 Cooperation  
Internal auditors usually come across problems with cooperation (A1, B1, C5, 
D2,  E1).  Some  divisions  or  provincial  offices  do  not  want  internal  auditors  to 
examine their performance because they think the internal auditors are out to find 
their  mistakes.  Additionally,  some  internal  auditors  (B1,  C5,  D2)  mention  that 
executives of departments can obstruct them in their duties because some of them do 
not want them to find incidents of fraud and even if they do, executives will not do 
anything about it. However, in 2005, the Monitoring and Performance Evaluation 
Committee was established (section 3.4). Each ministry has its own committee and 
the National Monitoring and Performance Evaluation Committee oversees each of 
these. This committee evaluates departmental plans and performance in order to give 
recommendations on ways to improve operational processes. 
As well as problems with cooperation within the civil service, there are also 
problems between PR staff and the press because departments have to pay to use the 
press  if  they  want  to  publicise  their  news  or  information  (A6,  B7).  The  press  is 
usually  not  interested  in  ordinary  news.  They  prefer  to  report  about  mistakes  or 
incidences of wrongdoing. Thus, the press keeps an eye on departmental operations 
and  performance,  and  when  they  discover  something,  they  will  provide  this 
information to the public. 
There  are  some  difficulties  in  cooperation  between  public  sector 
organisations that also affect departmental operations. For example, both the Office 
of the Auditor General and the Comptroller General’s Department launched internal 
auditing standards and this caused confusion amongst the civil servants (C5, D2). 
However, after coming to an understanding with the public sector, this problem has 
now been solved. However, a similar problem arose when the CGD and the Bureau 
of the Budget asked the departments to produce activity cost reports, but each issued 
different guidelines for this (A2, B4). Some interviewees think this wastes their time, 
even though they acknowledge that it is useful for departments. 
With regard to the relationship in the case of administrative accountability, as 
mentioned in section 5.3, the situation shows the differences in the points of view of 
auditors and civil servants. Such differences sometimes do nothing to help enhance 
accountability  and  are  difficult  to  overcome,  because  one  person  maintains  that 
everything is fine, while someone else thinks that there is a problem. This problem 
links  to  the  differences  in  objectives,  in  positions,  in  status,  and  in  educational 
background. Therefore, they sometimes have different behaviour.    
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5.8.6 Budget constraint  
In  the  Thai  bureaucratic  system,  it  is  sometimes  difficult  to  change  plans 
during the year, because the budget is fixed for each activity and the departments 
have  to  ask  for  the  budget  before  the  fiscal  year  starts  (A3,  B4).  It  sometimes 
happens that during the year departments have to change their plans, but the process 
is not easy and takes a long period of time. Due to budget limitations, departments 
are sometimes unable to send their staff on training courses held by private sector 
organisations (A4, C2).  
5.9 Conclusion  
The main aim of this chapter is to discuss accountability implemented by 
Thai government departments, and to look at accountability from the civil servant’s 
perspective.  With  regard  to  the  accountability  relationship  and  components  of 
accountability  mentioned  in  Chapter  2,  this  chapter  focuses  on  the  relationship 
between  the  acountor  and  accountee  from  three  types  of  accountability,  namely 
organisational, administrative and public accountability. ‘Accountability  for what’ 
and  ‘the  processes  of  accountability’  are  explained  by  using  four  concepts, 
responsibility, transparency, scrutiny and answerability. These concepts were used 
when conducting interviews in Thailand. Responsibility explains what the accountor 
is responsible for. The rest are features of the processes of accountability.  
With  regard  to  the  accountor  and  the  accountee  (see  section  5.2),  public 
accountability  is  the  relationship  between  departments  or  civil  servants  and  the 
public.  Administrative  accountability  is  the  relationship  between  departments  and 
controllers or auditors. In this research, the auditors come from the Office of the 
Auditor General (OAG) and the controllers are from the Office of the Public Sector 
Development Commission (OPDC). Organisational accountability is the relationship 
between  civil  servants  and  executives.  Within  the  Thai  bureaucratic  system, 
accountors  respond  to  different  accountees  in  different  ways.  For  example, 
accountors  tend  to  focus  on  people  more  powerful  than  themselves  and  who  are 
responsible for awarding rewards or punishments to the accountors. The relationship 
between these two groups can be explained by a variety of factors, including Thai 
culture and values, which will be discussed in Chapters 7 and 8.     
With  regard  to  accountability  for  what  (see  section  5.3),  for  public 
accountability,  the  accountor  is  responsible  to  the  accountee  because  of  legal 
requirements. While some civil servants take moral responsibility into account, it is  
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possible that bias does take place. Some civil servants feel responsible to the public, 
but other officials focus only on their executives because their responsibilities do not 
relate to the public. The opinions of civil servants will differ depending on their job 
role.  Although  laws  are  the  main  factor  forcing  PR  staff  and  IT  staff  to  be 
responsible to the public, legal requirements are not the only reason. The government 
is focusing its attention on a citizen centred approach, and wants departments and 
executives  to  carry  this  forward.  The  officials  then  have  to  focus  on  this  issue 
because  it  is  what  their  superiors  want  them  to  do.  This  is  an  example  of  a 
hierarchical  system  and  shows  the  influence  of  organisational  or  bureaucratic 
accountability on public accountability.    
For administrative accountability, the relationship between the accountor and 
the accountee tends to be one of cooperation, rather than hierarchy. With regard to 
responsibility, both accountors and accountees follow laws and legal requirements. If 
accountors apply moral responsibility, accountees may get more useful information 
for  operations.  However,  difficulties  in  cooperation  can  occur.  Organisational 
accountability  can  influence  the  relationship  in  the  case  of  administrative 
accountability, because civil servants will follow what their executives want. There 
are  some  factors,  particularly  career  advancement  and  a  hierarchical  system, 
supporting this idea.  
Three  main  features,  transparency,  answerability  and  scrutiny  are  used  to 
explain the processes of accountability (see section 5.4). For public accountability, 
departments and civil servants follow the Official Information Act B.E. 2540 (1997) 
to decide which information should be made public (see details in section 5.4.1). 
However, departments do not know what specific information citizens want to know, 
since no survey has ever been conducted to establish this. Values, such as personal 
relationship,  patronage  system  or  bunkhun  relationship,  can  make  it  easier  for 
citizens to get the information they want. Openness and availability of information 
are  important  when  considering  the  concept  of  transparency  but  there  are  also 
problems  about  access  to  the  information.  Two  main  methods  of  communication 
used  by  departments  to  deliver  information  to  the  public  are  annual  reports  and 
departmental websites (discussed in Chapter 6).  For the concept of answerability, 
civil  servants  also  follow  laws  and  regulations  (see  section  5.4.3).  They  answer 
questions,  receive  complaints,  and  provide  further  information  to  the  public. 
However,  having  personal  connections  with  civil  servants  can  make  the  process 
quicker. Regarding scrutiny, public participation and availability of information is  
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important for this concept (Bertók et al. 2002). However, it is sometimes the case 
that  important  information  cannot  be  provided  to  the  public  e.g.  audit  reports, 
whereas unreliable information, such as unaudited financial statements are widely 
available. From the official’s point of view, citizens rarely seem to pay attention to 
these financial statements. They are more interested in departmental services. Only 
accounting students seek out these financial statements. This situation can help some 
civil servants who want to use their positions to earn private benefits.  
For administrative accountability, there are some difficulties in cooperation 
between departments and auditors. Although the accountor is the department, the 
director nominates someone to liaise with the auditors or controllers. However, the 
director or deputy director still retains the absolute right to give permission or make 
agreement. When external auditors want more information, have some questions they 
need answered, or are not getting the information they need, they will initially try to 
use their personal connections to overcome these issues. This is a particular Thai 
characteristic. They try to avoid any conflict but if auditors are still unable to obtain 
the information they want, they will then make contact with the other executives of 
the departments (see details in section 5.4.1). 
Regarding performance evaluation, departments submit their reports to the 
OPDC who analyse their results. Although a law specifies the date of submission, 
staff sometimes ask for an extension if they are not ready to submit on the due date. 
Thai  society  is  classified  as  being  loosely  structured  and  its  people  easy  going 
(Embree 1950; Nikomborirak 1999; section 3.2). Thus, such requests  are usually 
approved. They think of themselves as belonging to a similar profession and they 
understand each other. Therefore, it is possible that sometimes they can negotiate 
with each other.   
Some  Thai  culture  and  values,  such  as  bunkhun  relationship,  patronage 
system,  phak  phuak,  and  sakdina,  tend  to  support  fraud  and  corruption  and  may 
obstruct  the  scrutinising  process  (section  5.4.2).  Some  factors,  such  as  a  lack  of 
interest in the internal control systems and problems about education and training, 
can  also  support  corruption.  External  auditors  are  sometimes  threatened  by 
wrongdoers,  yet the executives of the departments may not even take  any action 
against  these  wrongdoers.  However,  the  Office  of  the  Auditor  General  is  an 
independent organisation. External auditors report audit results directly to parliament 
and have a number of options when considering how to deal with cases of corruption. 
Regarding performance evaluation, in order to make it seem that they have reached  
 
207 
their departmental objectives, some departments may fabricate results. This shows 
that  they  are  driven  by  results  and  not  processes.  They  also  focus  on  their  own 
benefits. In this case, the reward system has both advantages and drawbacks.  
With regard to organisational accountability, for the concepts of transparency 
and  answerability,  subordinates  have  to  respond  to  their  superiors’  requirements 
(sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.3), and they will try to respond as soon as possible. However, 
in terms of scrutiny, both executives and officials sometimes ignore cases of fraud or 
corruption (see details section 5.4.2). They pay little attention to financial statements 
and  accounting  information,  and  some  activities  that  should  be  carried  out  by 
executives  are  passed  to  someone  else.  When  internal  auditors  uncover  fraud  or 
corruption,  executives  sometimes  appear  uninterested  because  they  may  have  a 
personal connection with the wrongdoers. Another reason for this may be that the 
wrongdoers are members of groups, clans, families or having similar interests, and 
that the executive has already known about the wrongdoers. Internal auditors are 
unable to do anything because if they do, it may affect their own position.   
Some Thai values can support the occurrence of fraud and corruption (see 
section  5.4.4).  If  executives  are  involved  in  such  cases,  it  is  a  difficult  issue  to 
manage and solve. In the past, Thai bureaucracy was based on Sakdina or feudalism, 
and this system has affected the Thai public sector up until now. Civil servants pay 
respect to their executives and try not to create any conflict with them because this 
can affect working opportunity and promotion. Whichever issues executives focus 
their attention on will be the issues which civil servants pay most attention to. More 
discussion about Thai culture and value is in Chapters 7 and 8.    
Due to the hierarchical system and the patronage system, some executives 
protect  wrongdoers  from  punishment.  Internal  auditors  and  other  staff  are 
knowledgeable about their own roles and responsibilities and the benefits to them of 
adhering to these. Therefore, in some cases, no action is taken against corruption. 
Thai people believe in Karma. They think bad people will get bad returned to them in 
the near future. Therefore, they may not feel guilty for not taking any action on these 
cases at the time.  
To enhance accountability in public sector organisations, the government and 
departments use the Good Governance Royal Decree as the standard of appraisal 
(section 5.5). However, practitioners do not pay much attention to this concept. Some 
practitioners do not know much about the concept of good governance. They do not  
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even realise that the projects they have participated in originated from this idea. In 
other words, they tend to just follow the orders of their executives. Officials do not 
want  to  focus  on  anything  that  does  not  affect  their  work.  Whether  they  get 
promotion or punishment depends on their executives. Therefore, they just do what 
their superiors want them to do. However, senior staff do realise the importance of 
this concept and they know what the government is trying to achieve, because they 
receive policies directly from the directors, permanent secretary and ministers. In 
some cases, they are responsible for what their subordinates have done.  
With regard to effects of accountability (see section 5.6), for organisational 
accountability, due to certain Thai culture, promotion may not relate to performance. 
Civil  servants  only  focus  on  the  job  assigned  to  them  by  executives.  For 
administrative  accountability,  if  auditors  uncover  the  incidence  of  corruption,  an 
auditing committee is established to investigate the case. The investigative process 
takes quite long time to complete. As well as corrupt cases, officials of the Public 
Sector Development Commission may uncover departmental reports which contain 
false information. This is because some departments fabricate certain parts of their 
reports in order to make it appear they have performed well. However, there is no 
penalty or action taken against departments who do this. OPDC officials only ask 
them to amend the reports. For public accountability, while citizens are not able to 
reward  departments  and  officials,  they  can  make  complaints  about  departments. 
However, investigating these complaints also takes a long time. If the case is not 
severe, staff may escape without penalty. Thus, even officials do not know which 
effects they will receive.   
There  are  some  problems  and  obstacles  arising  from  the  reform  and  the 
implementation of the concept of good governance (see details in section 5.8). These 
are staff, staff perspectives, system and equipment, time, cooperation, and budget. 
The main factor that should be focused on in order to solve these problems is that 
concerning the attitudes of the accountors and the accountees in the accountability 
relationship, including politicians, public sector executives and civil servants. These 
groups of people play important roles in the process of reform. The perspectives and 
understanding of these groups towards each plan and project are important for the 
improvement  and  enhancement  of  accountability.  Any  constraints  and  problems 
which do occur are usually due to human nature, rather than any flaws in the system. 
As  one  interviewee  mentions,  government  departments  already  have  laws  and 
regulations and if officials adhere to these then good governance will follow.   
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The next chapter covers website and annual report analysis. Information from 
these  two  communication  media  will  be  analysed  in  order  to  establish  how 
departments  use  these  to  provide  accountability  to  the  public  and  external 
organisations. Chapter 7 will discuss findings from this chapter, as well as findings 
from Chapter 6.   
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Chapter 6 Website and annual report analysis 
6.1 Introduction  
The purpose of this chapter is to study how information relating to aspects of 
accountability is presented in two of the main communication tools for government 
departments  in  Thailand,  namely  departmental  websites  and  annual  reports.    The 
chapter contributes to answering the specific research questions:  
SQ1: How is accountability evidenced following public sector reform and the 
Good Governance Royal Decree, in the particular case of government departments? 
SQ1.1:  How  do  departmental  communications,  including  reports, 
show evidence of accountability?  
Websites  and  annual  reports  are  important  communication  tools  for 
transferring information from the accountor to the accountee. At present, websites 
are one of the main tools with which Thai departments can communicate with the 
public, and each department is encouraged to have its own website (NECTEC
1
 2004, 
in Thai). Another main medium of communication is the use of publications. Prior 
academic literature has indicated that annual reports are one of the most important 
tools  of  accountability  (Pendlebury  et  al.  1994;  Sharman  of  Redlynch  2001)  and 
government departments use their annual reports as a means of presenting their plans 
and performance.  
In the past, Thai departments did not have to produce annual reports. It was 
optional, and departments could decide whether they wanted to produce a report or 
not. However, in 2006 the Office of the Public Sector Development Commission 
(OPDC) declared annual reports to be one of the key performance indicators and the 
cabinet decided that departments should produce an annual report containing four 
main  parts:  general  information  about  the  department,  departmental  performance, 
financial statements, and other information
2
. The cabinet required departments to 
finish producing their reports by February, five months after the fiscal year ended in 
September.  
Some laws support information disclosure to the public. For example, the 
Good Governance Royal Decree advocates communicating with the public and wants 
                                                 
1
 National Electronics and Computer Technology Center, Thailand 
2
 From the document launched by the cabinet (Excise Department 2006, in Thai)  
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departments  to  improve  information  technology  (section  3.5).  The  Official 
Information Act B.E. 2540 lists information that should be publicised, and details 
how departments should handle governmental information. 
Different types of accountability relationship have different responsibilities 
and obligations (section 2.3). For public accountability, departments are responsible 
for the use of public resources because they use public money in their operations and 
are responsible for delivering services. In terms of relationships with controllers or 
auditors,  departments  are  responsible  for  their  performance,  and  provide  full  and 
detailed information if required. This is different from their relationship with the 
public that requires only summarisation (Pablos et al. 2002). Therefore, websites and 
annual reports are not appropriate sources of information for auditors and controllers. 
As with administrative accountability, for organisational accountability, executives 
and civil servants use full and detailed information.  
Although  departmental  websites  and  annual  reports  are  not  used  for 
communication in the accountability relationship in the case of administrative and 
organisational accountability, the amount of information available from these sources 
can  represent  an  effective  and  efficient  accountability  mechanism  in  relation  to 
administrative and organisational accountability.  
There are differences between the main aim of producing annual reports and 
the main aim of creating departmental websites. For annual reports, the main aim is 
to present departmental performance, including financial statements and background 
information  on  the  departments,  while  the  websites  provide  departmental 
information, including departmental performance and online services. It is possible 
that some departments have annual reports on websites. It seems that the scope of 
information on websites is wider than annual reports.   
In order to analyse websites and annual reports, checklists were developed by 
taking into account previous research, speeches, working papers, theoretical papers 
and government guidance (see details in section 4.3.2). Section 6.2 analyses the types 
of  information  disclosed  on  the  Thai  government’s  departmental  websites, 
classifying the results according to accountability components, Section 6.3 discusses 
annual reports. In each section, the findings are reported first and then opinions and 
discussion  drawn  from  the  findings  are  presented  in  the  ‘reflections’  subsection. 
Section 6.4 is the conclusion.  
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6.2 Website 
6.2.1 Introduction  
All Thai government departments have their own websites (NECTEC 2004, 
in Thai). From having only 30 users in 1991, by 2007 there were about 9.32 million 
internet  users  in  Thailand  (NSO
3
  2007,  in  Thai).  The  majority  of  these  are  in 
Bangkok and the central part of Thailand. However, most Thai citizens have neither 
computers nor access to the internet (NSO 2007, in Thai). Only people living in the 
capital or in larger provinces have access to the internet. As a result of the Good 
Governance  Royal  Decree,  information  technology  has  become  an  important 
technique  by  which  government  departments  communicate  with  the  public  (see 
section 3.5). Therefore, this chapter analyses these departmental websites by using 
checklists, produced by using the literature review (see section 4.3). Each item in the 
checklists relates to accountability.  
In this section, departmental websites under seven ministries are studied, as 
listed in Table 6.1. The period of study was between November 2006 and January 
2007. One limitation of this study is the fact that information on websites can be 
changed later. The information is true only at the time of the study. This section 
comprises six main subsections corresponding to the components of accountability 
discussed in section 2.5.  
The purpose of this section is to analyse how accountability is presented on 
departmental websites and what information departments actually disclose. Table 6.2 
lists fifteen items on the checklists of website content (see details in section 4.3.2). 
Table 6.2 presents an analysis of the website content of the seven ministries listed in 
Table  6.1.  The  total  number  of  departments  under  these  ministries  is  fifty-five 
departments. Each cell shows the number and percentage of departments disclosing 
the  respective  item  on  their  website.  Table  6.3  describes  reports  provided  by 
departments on websites, focusing on three main reports, namely the annual reports, 
financial statements, and budgetary reports. Table 6.4 provides more detail on the 
reported  performance  of  those  ministries  listed  in  Table  6.2,  with  Table  6.5  and 
Table 6.6 providing more information on annual plans and future plans respectively. 
Table 6.7 details language structure found on the websites. 
 
 
                                                 
3
 National Statistics Office  
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Table 6.1 Thai Ministries and Departments examined for websites 
Ministry  Departments 
Ministry of Finance 
Manages and creates 
sustainability in fiscal and 
financial systems including 
maintaining and developing a 
national economic system 
(www.mof.go.th) 
1.  Office of the Permanent Secretary 
Ministry of Finance 
2.  Treasury Department 
3.  Comptroller General’s Department 
4.  Customs Department 
5.  Excise Department 
6.  Revenue Department 
7.  State Enterprise Policy Office 
8.  Public Debt Management Office 
9.  Fiscal Policy Office 
Ministry of Commerce 
Deals with ‘trade in goods and 
services, intellectual property 
rights and other duties assigned 
to it by law’ (www.moc.go.th).  
10. Office of the Permanent Secretary 
Ministry of Commerce 
11. Department of Foreign Trade 
12. Department of Internal Trade 
13. Department of Insurance 
14. Department of Trade Negotiations 
15. Department of Intellectual Property 
16. Department of Export Promotion 
17. Department of Business Development 
Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives 
Administers the ‘agriculture, 
forestry, water resources 
provision, irrigation, promotion 
and development of farmers 
and cooperative system, 
including manufacturing 
process and agricultural 
products as well as other 
issues, as required by law to be 
under the responsibility of the 
ministry or other government 
agencies in the ministry’ 
(www.moac.go.th).  
18. Office of the Permanent Secretary 
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives 
19. National Bureau of Agricultural 
Commodity and Food Standards 
20. Royal Irrigation Department 
21. Cooperative Auditing Department 
22. Department of Fisheries 
23. Department of Livestock Development 
24. Land Development Department 
25. Department of Agriculture 
26. Department of Agricultural Extension 
27. Cooperative Promotion Department 
28. Office of Agricultural Economics 
29. Agricultural Land Reform Office 
Ministry of Interior 
Responsible for local 
administration and provincial 
administration, preservation of 
peace and safeguarding life and 
property, urban management, 
infrastructure development, 
administration and 
management of natural 
resources and environment, 
social development and public 
services (www.dopa.go.th).  
30. Office of the Permanent Secretary 
Ministry of Interior 
31. Department of Provincial Administration 
32. Community Development Department 
33. Department of Lands 
34. Department of Disaster Prevention and 
Mitigation 
35. Department of Public Works and Town 
and Country Planning 
36. Department of Local Administration 
Ministry of Education 
Manages and administers the 
Thai educational system. 
(www.moe.go.th) 
37. Office of the Permanent Secretary 
Ministry of Education 
38. Office of the Basic Education 
Commission 
39. Vocational Education Commission  
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Table 6.1 Thai Ministries and Departments examined for websites (con.) 
Ministry  Departments 
  40. Office of the Education Council 
41. Commission on Higher Education 
Ministry of Public Health 
Enhances good health in 
citizens, prevents and controls 
disease and ensures the 
provision of adequate medical 
treatment to citizens  
(www.moph.go.th) 
42. Office the Permanent Secretary 
43. Department of Medical Services 
44. Department of Disease Control 
45. Department for Development of Thai 
Traditional and Alternative Medicine 
46. Department of Medical Sciences 
47. Department of Health Service Support 
48. Department of Mental Health 
49. Department of Health 
50. Food and Drug Administration 
Ministry of Labour  
Deals with labour management 
and development. Its work 
involves improving the quality 
of the labour force, securing 
employment for the labour 
force and enhancing and 
supporting national 
competitive competencies 
(www.mol.go.th)  
51. Office of the Permanent Secretary 
Ministry of Labour  
52. Department of Employment 
53. Department of Skill Development 
54. Department of Labour Protection and 
Welfare 
55. Social Security Office 
6.2.2 Accountees and accountors  
With regard to accountees and accountors, as shown in Table 6.2, the results 
of the analysis indicate that most of the information provided on websites is that 
relating to departmental services. From the interviews, executives of departments use 
both  internal  documents  and  the  intranet
4
  for  communication.  Auditors  and 
controllers  use  other  detailed  types  of  information,  not  normally  provided  to  the 
public. Therefore, the main users of these websites tend to be the public.  
Information  provided  on  websites  is  of  relevance  to  the  accountability 
relationship  in  the  case  of  administrative  and  organisational  accountability.  Both 
accountors and accountees in these two types deal with information disclosure to the 
public.  Regarding  laws  and  regulations,  there  is  no  law  covering  information 
provided on websites. The Official Information Act (1997) has some lists detailing 
information that departments should present to the public. However, it does not mean 
that departments have to provide this information through their websites. They could 
use  other  methods,  such  as  through  publications.  Similarly,  although  the  Good 
Governance  Royal  Decree  persuades  departments  to  provide  information  to  the 
public and to use information technology in their operations, the Decree does not 
                                                 
4
 It is an internet system using only within departments and ministries.   
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mention  the  types  of  information  to  be  provided  on  the  websites.  Therefore,  the 
amount and types of information on departmental websites may depend on other 
factors. They are not based solely on laws and regulations. For example, the needs of 
executives for information disclosure may be an important factor.  
With  regard  to  administrative  accountability,  from  the  interviews  and  the 
literature, the Office of the Public Sector Development Commission (OPDC) set out 
its aims to enhance information disclosure and improved the information and online 
service system (OPDC 2006, in Thai). The OPDC then persuaded departments to 
meet these objectives. Since these objectives came from the governmental plans, this 
means  that  bureaucratic  accountability  is  an  important  part  of  the  relationship  in 
matters of administrative accountability.  
For  organisational  accountability,  the  relationship  between  accountors  and 
accountees affects information disclosure directly. The process normally depends on 
the policies of executives, at either a ministerial or departmental level. Even if IT 
officials want to provide information to the public, they cannot do this on their own 
initiative  (section  5.4).  They  have  to  ask  for  cooperation  from  officials  in  other 
divisions in order to produce information and documents (section 5.4). If superiors 
do not instruct their subordinates, officials may not cooperate and fail to pay any 
attention to information disclosure. This is confirmed by the interviews in Chapter 5 
that there are many steps in the process of information disclosure (section 5.4). IT 
officials have to cooperate with staff from other divisions. Only if executives issue 
an  instruction  will  staff  act  upon  it.  Civil  servants  pay  much  attention  to  the 
requirements  of  superiors  (section  5.3).  Therefore,  it  can  be  inferred  that  the 
information provided on websites is an indicator how much significance executives 
place on information disclosure.  
With regard to accountors, from the results in Table 6.2, departments do not 
provide  much  information  about  staffing,  particularly  information  about  how  the 
board is appointed, terms of appointment, messages from ministers and executives, 
and remuneration. This information could be important because this group of people 
plays an important role in departmental operations (sections 5.2 and 5.3). Messages 
from ministers and executives can show vision, including plans, of departments. In 
the absence of such information, users may not know what ministers and executives 
plan and decide to do.  
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Table 6.2 Contents of the websites 
Key to table. 
Column 1 shows the checklist of disclosure items. Columns 2 to 8 show the seven 
ministries of Table 6.1.  Each cell shows the number and percentage of departments 
within that ministry reporting the respective disclosure item. 
Disclosure items  Fin 
n = 9 
Com 
n = 8 
Agri 
n = 12  
Int 
n = 7 
Edu 
n = 5 
Hea 
n = 9 
Lab 
n = 5 
Total 
n = 55 
1. Mission, vision and 
strategy  
9 
100% 
8 
100% 
12 
100% 
7 
100% 
5 
100% 
9 
100% 
5 
100% 
55 
100% 
- Unique purpose  6 
66.7% 
5 
62.5% 
5 
41.7% 
6 
85.7% 
3 
60% 
4 
44.4% 
1 
20% 
30 
54.5% 
- Scope of operations 
in terms of its product 
or services 
6 
66.7% 
4 
50% 
7 
58.3% 
6 
85.7% 
1 
20% 
2 
22.2% 
1 
20% 
27 
49.1% 
2. Trends and future 
plan 
5 
55.6% 
3 
37.5% 
8 
66.7% 
6 
85.7% 
2 
40% 
5 
55.6% 
2 
40% 
31 
56.4% 
- Specific steps  1 
11.1% 
-  1 
8.3% 
-  -  -  1 
20% 
3 
5.5% 
- Estimated time 
frames 
-  -  -  -  -  -  1 
20% 
1 
1.8% 
3. Annual plan  8 
88.9% 
8 
100% 
8 
66.7% 
5 
71.4% 
3 
60% 
8 
88.9% 
2 
40% 
42 
76.4% 
4. Monthly plan  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
5. Accounting 
practices and 
information 
9 
100% 
2 
25% 
2 
16.7% 
-  -  -  -  13 
23.6% 
6. Resources and 
assets 
9 
100% 
2 
25% 
1 
8.3% 
-  -  -  -  12 
21.8% 
- Sources of resources  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
- Use of resources  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
- Resource plan  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
- Capital employed  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
7. Liabilities and 
commitments 
9 
100% 
2 
25% 
1 
8.3% 
-  -  -  -  12 
21.8% 
8. Laws and 
regulations 
8 
88.9% 
7 
87.5% 
10 
83.3% 
5 
71.4% 
5 
100% 
9 
100% 
5 
100% 
49 
89.1% 
9. Budget  7 
77.8% 
5 
62.5% 
7 
58.3% 
6 
85.7% 
3 
60% 
8 
88.9% 
2 
40% 
38 
69.1% 
- Comparing between 
budget and actual 
1 
11.1% 
1 
12.5% 
2 
16.7% 
4 
57.1% 
-  1 
11.1% 
1 
20% 
10 
18.2% 
- Forecast budget  -  3 
37.5% 
2 
16.7% 
4 
57.1% 
2 
40% 
2 
22.2% 
1 
20% 
14 
25.5% 
- Information from 
prior fiscal year 
-  3 
37.5% 
2 
16.7% 
-  1 
20% 
2 
22.2% 
-  8 
14.5% 
10. Performance                  
- Financial   9 
100% 
4 
50% 
7 
58.3% 
4 
57.1% 
-  2 
22.2% 
1 
20% 
27 
49.1% 
·  Monthly  3 
33.3% 
2 
25% 
-  3 
42.9% 
-  -  -  8 
14.5% 
- Non-financial  8 
88.9% 
8 
100% 
10 
83.3% 
5 
71.4% 
4 
80% 
9 
100% 
4 
80% 
48 
87.3% 
·  Monthly  -  2 
25% 
1 
8.3% 
2 
28.6% 
-  -  -  5 
9.1% 
- Performance 
improvement 
1 
11.1% 
1 
12.5% 
1 
8.3% 
1 
14.3% 
-  -  2 
40% 
6 
10.9% 
11. Service  9 
100% 
7 
87.5% 
11 
91.7% 
6 
85.7% 
5 
100% 
9 
100% 
5 
100% 
52 
94.5% 
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Table 6.2 Contents of the websites (con.) 
Disclosure items  Fin 
n = 9 
Com 
n = 8 
Agri 
n = 12  
Int 
n = 7 
Edu 
n = 5 
Hea 
n = 9 
Lab 
n = 5 
Total 
n = 55 
12. Staffing                 
- A statement about 
how the board or 
committee are 
appointed 
-  -  -  -  1 
20% 
-  1 
20% 
2 
3.6% 
- The term of 
appointment 
1 
11.1% 
-  -  -  -  -  -  1 
1.8% 
- Remuneration  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
- Message from the 
Minister or 
executives 
5 
55.6% 
2 
25% 
4 
33.3% 
1 
14.3% 
1 
20% 
1 
11.1% 
-  14 
25.5% 
- List of executives  9 
100% 
8 
100% 
11 
91.7% 
6 
85.7% 
3 
60% 
9 
100% 
3 
60% 
49 
89.1% 
- The number of staff  9 
100% 
3 
37.5% 
6 
50% 
4 
57.1% 
-  1 
11.1% 
-  23 
41.8% 
13. Organisation 
structure 
9 
100% 
8 
100% 
11 
91.7% 
6 
85.7% 
2 
40% 
6 
66.7% 
3 
60% 
45 
81.8% 
- The purpose and 
functions of each 
section 
6 
66.7% 
6 
75% 
6 
50% 
2 
28.6% 
2 
40% 
3 
33.3% 
3 
60% 
28 
50.9 
14. Submit petitions 
and complaints 
5 
55.6% 
7 
87.5% 
6 
50% 
6 
85.7% 
-  5 
55.6% 
3 
60% 
32 
58.2% 
- Submit comments  1 
11.1% 
2 
25% 
1 
8.3% 
2 
28.6% 
-  1 
11.1% 
3 
60% 
10 
18.2% 
- Response from a 
department 
1 
11.1% 
-  -  -  -  -  2 
40% 
3 
5.5% 
15. Contact 
information 
9 
100% 
8 
100% 
12 
100% 
7 
100% 
5 
100% 
9 
100% 
5 
100% 
55 
100% 
- Specific contact 
details (specific 
duties and 
responsibilities) 
5 
55.6% 
8 
100% 
11 
91.7% 
7 
100% 
3 
60% 
7 
77.8% 
5 
100% 
46 
83.6% 
- Graphics (e.g. 
maps) 
3 
33.3% 
7 
87.5% 
6 
50% 
5 
71.4% 
2 
40% 
5 
55.6% 
3 
60% 
31 
56.4% 
Abbreviations: 
Fin = Ministry of Finance        Com = Ministry of Commerce  
Agri = Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives  Edu = Ministry of Education 
Hea = Ministry of Public Health      Lab = Ministry of Labour 
6.2.2.1 Reflection  
From  the  interviews  (section  5.4),  the  main  factor  affecting  information 
disclosure is the interest and intent of executives of departments because during the 
period  of  the  research  there  were  no  laws  or  regulations  to  control  information 
disclosure on websites. From information disclosed on the websites, departments do 
not provide much information about the appointment of their board, which may have 
affected what departments have done and deterred accountability. If the process of 
appointment and recruitment is not transparent, undesirable behaviour such as fraud 
may occur within organisations.  
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Table 6.3 Reports on the websites  
Column 1 shows the checklist of disclosure items. Columns 2 to 8 show the seven 
ministries of Table 6.1.  Each cell shows the number and percentage of departments 
within that ministry reporting the respective disclosure item. 
 
Disclosure items  Fin 
n = 9 
Com 
n = 8 
Agri 
n = 12  
Int 
n = 7 
Edu 
n = 5 
Hea 
n = 9 
Lab 
n = 5 
Total 
n = 55 
1. Annual reports  9 
100% 
4 
50% 
6 
50% 
-  -  1 
11.1% 
1 
20% 
21 
38.2% 
- Downloadable  9 
100% 
3 
37.5% 
5 
41.7% 
-  -  1 
11.1% 
1 
20% 
19 
34.5% 
2. Annual accounts or 
financial statement 
(Resource accounts) 
               
2.1 Statement of 
Financial Position  
8 
88.9% 
2 
25% 
1 
8.3% 
-  -  -  -  11 
20% 
- Audited Statement 
of Financial Position 
-  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
- Comparing data                 
·  Prior fiscal 
year 
3 
33.3% 
-  -  -  -  -  -  3 
5.5% 
·  Forecast  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
- Analysis (e.g. 
common size) 
5 
55.6% 
1 
12.5% 
1 
8.3% 
-  -  -  -  7 
12.7% 
2.2 Statement of 
Financial 
Performance 
8 
88.9% 
2 
25% 
1 
8.3% 
-  -  -  -  11 
20% 
- Audited Statement 
of Financial 
Performance 
-  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
- Comparing data                 
·  Prior fiscal 
year 
3 
33.3% 
-  -  -  -  -  -  3 
5.5% 
·  Forecast  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
- Analysis (e.g. 
common size) 
5 
55.5% 
1 
12.5% 
1 
8.3% 
-  -  -  -  7 
12.7% 
2.3 Cash Flow 
Statement  
-  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
- Audited Cash Flow 
Statement 
-  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
- Comparing data                 
·  Prior fiscal 
year 
-  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
·  Forecast  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
- Analysis (e.g. 
common size) 
-  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
2.4 Accounting 
policies and notes to 
the financial 
statements 
6 
66.7% 
1 
12.5% 
1 
8.3% 
-  -  -  -  8 
14.5% 
2.5 Cost analysis  -  1 
12.5% 
-  -  -  -  -  1 
1.8% 
2.6 Downloadable  8 
88.9% 
1 
12.5% 
-  -  -  -  -  9 
16.4% 
3.Budget and budget 
summary 
7 
77.8% 
5 
62.5% 
7 
58.3% 
6 
85.7% 
3 
60% 
8 
88.9% 
1 
20% 
37 
67.3% 
- Full details of 
budget 
-  3 
37.5% 
3 
25% 
4 
57.1% 
2 
40% 
3 
33.3% 
-  15 
27.3% 
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Table 6.3 Reports on the websites (con.) 
Disclosure items  Fin 
n = 9 
Com 
n = 8 
Agri 
n = 12  
Int 
n = 7 
Edu 
n = 5 
Hea 
n = 9 
Lab 
n = 5 
Total 
n = 55 
- Using graphics  -  1 
12.5% 
1 
8.3% 
2 
28.6% 
1 
20% 
-  -  5 
9.1% 
- Downloadable  7 
77.8% 
4 
50% 
7 
58.3% 
6 
85.7% 
2 
40% 
7 
77.8% 
1 
20% 
34 
61.8% 
6.2.3 Accountability for what  
It would appear from the results that departments normally use their websites 
to provide information about departmental services and deliver online services. Even 
though departments use public resources and they should report on what they have 
done, they have no legal obligation to provide this information via their websites. 
The  Good  Governance  Royal  Decree  mentions  that  departments  should  provide 
information to public, except information relating to national and economic stability. 
However,  it  does  not  mention  types  of  communication  tools.  There  is  some 
information that departments must provide but the law does not mention the methods 
by  which  such  information  should  be  conveyed.  According  to  section  7  of  the 
Official Information Act B.E. 2540, departments should present some information 
through  the  Government  Gazette.  While  some  departments  use  this  act  as  a 
guideline, it does not apply directly to websites or annual reports.  
From the results in Table 6.2, departments do not provide much information 
about performance. Although most departments disclose non-financial performance, 
only  some  departments  provide  details  of  their  financial  performance.  Thus,  the 
public  cannot  know  how  effectively  and  efficiently  departments  have  performed 
during  the  year.  From  table  6.3,  departments  do  not  present  much  about  their 
financial  statements  and  budgetary  reports.  As  shown  in  Table  6.4,  departments 
rarely summarise their accomplishments or failures, making it difficult for the public 
to know and understand.   
Almost  all  departments  provide  information  on  their  mission,  vision  and 
strategy details. This information can illustrate the responsibilities of departments 
through  their  commitments  towards  their  accountees,  including  the  public. 
Departments also provide information about their roles and responsibilities. Citizens 
can use this information as a guide when they want to make contact with a particular 
department. However, some departments give only limited information about roles 
and responsibilities.  
With  regard  to  departmental  plans,  which  illustrate  departments’ 
commitments to the public, the government assigned the Office of the Public Sector  
 
220 
Development Commission (OPDC) to issue guidelines and give examples of annual 
and future plans for departments to follow. As a result, the information contained in 
the plans of each department is almost identical. Despite this, Tables 6.5 and 6.6 
show some differences among the departments. For instance, some of them provide 
only a shorter version of the plans. Some departments do not include all elements in 
their plans. In addition, the Good Governance Royal Decree mentions that  
…  for  effective  performance,  the  government  agency  shall  specify  target, 
action plan, due date of work or project, and budget for each work or project and 
shall then make such determination known to its officials and people (section 20 of 
the Good Governance Royal Decree).  
That means all departments have adopted the same style for their annual and 
future plans. It depends on departments to decide types of information to be posted 
on websites. Some departments may think it is enough to provide only an annual plan 
to the public, and that this plan can be changed later. It is true that some departments 
change  their  plans  throughout  the  year.  This  was  confirmed  by  some  of  the 
interviewees (section 5.8). Departments make revisions to their plans and some of 
them may have no interest in providing information about these changes.   
 
Table 6.4 Performance evaluation on the websites  
Column 1 shows the checklist of disclosure items. Columns 2 to 8 show the seven 
ministries of Table 6.1.  Each cell shows the number and percentage of departments 
within that ministry reporting the respective disclosure item. 
 
Disclosure items  Fin  Com  Agri  Int  Edu  Hea  Lab  Total 
 
At least one type of 
performance 
9 
100% 
8 
100% 
10 
83.3% 
6 
85.7% 
4 
80% 
9 
100% 
4 
80% 
50
5
 
90.9% 
Financial 
performance 
9 
100% 
4 
50% 
7 
58.3% 
4 
57.1% 
-  2 
22.2% 
1 
20% 
27 
49.1% 
Non-financial 
performance 
8 
88.9% 
8 
100% 
10 
83.3% 
5 
71.4% 
4 
80% 
9 
100% 
4 
80% 
48 
87.3% 
1. Evaluating the 
government's or unit's 
performance 
9 
100% 
3 
37.5% 
6 
60% 
3 
60% 
3 
75% 
7 
77.8% 
3 
75% 
34 
68% 
-  Key performance 
indicator used to 
evaluate its 
performance 
9 
100% 
3 
37.5% 
6 
60% 
3 
60% 
3 
75% 
5 
55.6% 
3 
75% 
32 
64% 
- Self assessment 
report 
1 
11.1% 
1 
12.5% 
4 
40% 
1 
16.7% 
-  5 
55.6% 
1 
25% 
13 
26% 
2. Explanation of why 
objectives are not met 
5 
55.6% 
1 
12.5% 
5 
50% 
2 
33.3% 
2 
50% 
3 
33.3% 
-  18 
36% 
- Planned actions to 
improve 
5 
55.6% 
1 
12.5% 
-  -  2 
50% 
-  -  8 
16% 
3. Mission, strategic 
goals, and summary 
of accomplishments 
1 
11.1% 
2 
25% 
2 
20% 
-  -  -  1 
25% 
6 
12% 
                                                 
5
 n = 50  
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Table 6.5 Annual plans 
Column 1 shows the checklist of disclosure items. Columns 2 to 8 show the seven 
ministries of Table 6.1.  Each cell shows the number and percentage of departments 
within that ministry reporting the respective disclosure item. 
 
Disclosure items  Fin  Com  Agri  Int  Edu  Hea  Lab  Total 
Annual plans  8 
88.9% 
8 
100% 
8 
66.7% 
5 
71.4% 
3 
60% 
8 
88.9% 
2 
40% 
42
6
 
76.4% 
- Vision, mission, 
strategy 
8 
100% 
8 
100% 
6 
75% 
4 
80% 
2 
66.7% 
6 
75% 
2 
100% 
36 
85.7% 
- KPIs  8 
100% 
8 
100% 
7 
87.5% 
3 
60% 
2 
66.7% 
7 
87.5% 
2 
100% 
37 
88.1% 
- Targets or goals  8 
100% 
7 
87.5% 
8 
100% 
5 
100% 
2 
66.7% 
7 
87.5% 
2 
100% 
39 
92.9% 
- Responsible 
divisions  
3 
37.5% 
3 
37.5% 
4 
50% 
3 
60% 
1 
33.3% 
3 
37.5% 
2 
100% 
19 
45.2% 
- Projects  2 
25% 
3 
37.5% 
2 
25% 
1 
20% 
1 
33.3% 
5 
62.5% 
2 
100% 
16 
38.1% 
 
Table 6.6 Future plans  
Disclosure items  Fin  Com  Agri  Int  Edu  Hea  Lab  Total 
Future plans  5 
55.6% 
3 
37.5% 
8 
66.7% 
6 
85.7% 
2 
40% 
5 
55.6% 
2 
40% 
31
7
 
56.4% 
- Vision, mission, 
strategy 
5 
100% 
3 
100% 
8 
100% 
6 
100% 
2 
100% 
5 
100% 
2 
100% 
31 
100% 
- KPIs  2 
40% 
1 
33.3% 
5 
62.5% 
6 
100% 
2 
100% 
5 
100% 
2 
100% 
23 
74.2% 
- Targets or goals  3 
60% 
2 
66.7% 
 
6 
75% 
5 
83.3% 
2 
100% 
5 
100% 
2 
100% 
25 
80.6% 
- Responsible 
divisions  
2 
40% 
1 
33.3% 
2 
25% 
4 
66.7% 
1 
50% 
5 
100% 
2 
100% 
17 
54.8% 
- Projects  3 
60% 
2 
66.7% 
5 
62.5% 
5 
83.3% 
2 
100% 
4 
80% 
2 
100% 
23 
74.2% 
 
Table 6.7 Language  
Column 1 shows the checklist of disclosure items. Columns 2 to 8 show the seven 
ministries of Table 6.1.  Each cell shows the number and percentage of departments 
within that ministry reporting the respective disclosure item. 
 
Language  Fin 
n = 9 
Com 
n = 8 
Agri 
n = 12  
Int 
n = 7 
Edu 
n = 5 
Hea 
n = 9 
Lab 
n = 5 
Total 
n = 55 
- Informative in both 
Thai and English 
1 
11.1% 
2 
25% 
-  1 
14.3% 
1 
20% 
1 
11.1% 
-  6 
10.9% 
- Informative in Thai 
but limited in English 
4 
44.4% 
2 
25% 
9 
75% 
2 
28.6% 
1 
20% 
3 
33.3% 
2 
40% 
23 
41.8% 
- Informative in Thai 
but no English 
website 
4 
44.4% 
4 
50% 
3 
25% 
4 
57.1% 
3 
60% 
5 
55.6% 
3 
60% 
26 
47.3% 
 
                                                 
6
 n = 42 
7
 n = 31  
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6.2.3.1 Reflection  
As specified by laws and regulations, particularly the Official Information 
Act and the Good Governance Royal Decree, departments have a legal responsibility 
to provide information to the public, but this does not mean that they have to provide 
the  information  through  websites.  This  is  normally  decided  by  ministerial  and 
departmental  executives  and,  even  within  the  same  ministry,  there  are  varying 
degrees of information disclosure. This represents the importance of the decisions 
being made by the executives of departments, and relates to morality, motivations 
and reasons of civil servants. If staff realise the importance of information disclosure 
and  feel  that  they  should  be  accountable  to  society,  it  is  possible  that  they  will 
provide more information (section 5.4).  
From  the  results,  departments  normally  present  information  about 
departmental services, which indicates that departments pay more attention to their 
responsibility as a service deliverer than to the need for accountability.  The focus on 
service delivery can be an obstacle to enhancing accountability. However, improving 
the processes of service delivery is one of the objectives of the Good Governance 
Royal Decree.    
Regarding types of information provided on websites, from the interviews 
(section 5.4), interviewees mention that there is no survey of citizens’ requirements.  
Departments  decide  themselves  what  type  of  information  should  be  included, 
sometimes even asking their own staff what information they want to see on the 
websites.  This implies that departments rely more on the opinions of civil servants 
than those of the public.  
When  civil  servants  want  to  present  some  information  via  a  departmental 
website, they first have to obtain the necessary permission from the executives. The 
chain of command within the Thai bureaucratic system is based on a hierarchical 
system (see section 5.2). However, it sometimes depends on the types of information 
included. If the information is particularly sensitive, officials have to ask permission 
from the director or deputy director of the departments, but if it is less important, 
they can obtain the necessary permission from the director or deputy director of the 
division (section 5.4). 
From the literature (section 2.5.3), departments should be accountable for the 
use of public resources. However, they do not provide much information on their 
financial performance. They provide the information that they feel comfortable to  
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provide. They are rarely under pressure from citizens because citizens rarely ask for 
this kind of information (section 5.4). Even though departments do not provide much 
information  about  their  own  performance,  they  do  care  about  their  responsibility 
towards citizens and other organisations acting as service recipients. Nevertheless, 
this situation can affect the accountability relationship, particularly the processes of 
accountability, and can burden the process of scrutiny. The degree to which a sense 
of moral responsibility is felt by executives and civil servants can play an important 
part in the types of information provided on websites.  
6.2.4 Processes of accountability    
Information  provided  on  websites  relates  directly  to  the  processes  of 
accountability,  particularly  transparency.  The  results  can  show  how  departments 
focus on transparency, which can affect the process of scrutiny and answerability.  
6.2.4.1 Transparency  
As shown in Table 6.2, departments normally provide general background 
information  such  as  mission,  vision,  strategy,  services,  laws  and  regulations  and 
contact information. This background information is not difficult to prepare and if 
some information is incorrect or missing, it will not affect anyone in the departments. 
Departments  also  provide  information  about  plans  and  policies.  However, 
departments do not provide so much financial information. Sometimes the financial 
information is not ready for release (sections 5.4 and 5.8). Whether departments want 
to provide  financial information or not is not  clear.  It is up to the officials who 
produce the information.  
The Good Governance Royal Decree gives options for departments to use 
their judgement. If departments think that information is confidential, they may not 
provide  this  kind  of  information  to  the  public.  As  shown  in  Table  6.3,  although 
departments should provide budgetary information to the public as stipulated by the 
Good  Governance  Royal  Decree  (section  44  of  the  Decree),  there  are  some 
departments that do not provide this information. Reports are not detailed, instead 
consisting  of  a  summarisation  of  only  a  few  lines.  With  regard  to  financial 
statements, the majority of the accounts posted on websites are already included in 
the annual reports. The reports are downloadable and are in the form of PDF files.   
As can be seen in Table 6.3 of the three types of reports, departments provide 
relatively more information about their budget. This shows that civil servants pay  
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more  attention  to  budgetary  information  than  to  financial  statements  and  that 
departments are willing to provide this information.  
One factor, relating to the availability of information, is the language used on 
websites.  This  can  help  departments  to  spread  information  to  all  groups  of 
accountees because some departments have connections with foreigners or foreign 
businesses. From Table 6.7, it can be seen that there are six departments providing 
informative  English  language  websites,  and  whose  main  duties  relate  to  foreign 
users,  businesses  or  countries.  However,  there  are  some  departments  such  as  the 
Department of Foreign Trade that also have contact with foreigners but that only 
provide information in Thai or less informative English. This may be because they 
are not yet ready to provide information in this format or they may not have any staff 
to translate the information from Thai to English.  
Those other departments that provide less information in English on their 
websites,  that  which  is  in  English  is  usually  of  a  general  nature  regarding  the 
background information of the departments, vision, mission and strategy, and contact 
information. It is possible that these departments only give this basic information in 
English  because  they  feel  that  if  foreigners  want  further  information,  they  can 
directly contact departments.  
From the sample group, there is one department that provides information in 
Japanese. This is the Department of Export Promotion (16), whose main duty is to 
promote and expand the market for Thai exports. Japan imports a large number of 
goods and services from Thailand. Therefore, it is reasonable for this department to 
have information in Japanese on its websites.  
6.2.4.1.1 Reflection 
The types of information provided on websites are wide ranging. Even where 
departments disclose similar types of information, the amount provided may differ. 
In  addition,  the  range  of  information  produced  by  departments  under  the  same 
ministries also varies. It can be inferred, therefore, that during the period of study, 
there has been no requirement for uniformity of websites, with departments using 
their own judgement to decide which information should be provided to the public. 
They have used their initiative in deciding on the styles and types of information 
presented.  
With regard to transparency in the public sector, the reliability of information 
is important (see detail in section 2.6.2). From the interviews, departments usually  
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check  general  information  such  as  departmental  background,  plans  and  policies, 
before it is posted on websites (section 5.4). Since this type of information can only 
be checked within organisations, it is likely that this information is reliable.   
Departments normally have reliability problems when preparing information 
such as financial statements, budgetary reports and performance reports, information 
which should be scrutinised and audited by external auditors and controllers (section 
5.4). There is no statement confirming that financial statements or budgetary reports 
have been audited by auditors. Some accounting information, in particular assets, is 
still incorrect because, in the past, departments did not have a proper and systematic 
information  recording  system  (see  section  5.8).  This  caused  problems  when 
departments started recording transactions by using accruals accounting (see section 
5.8). Another possible reason is that executives do not pay much attention to this 
information  and  citizens  do  not  ask  for  the  information  (see  section  5.4). 
Departments may think that accounting information is not useful for citizens. This 
shows that there may be problems understanding the perceptions of executives and 
citizens.  This  situation  relates  to  both  public  and  organisational  accountability, 
particularly public participation.  
Even though this financial information is not audited and may be incorrect, 
departments continue providing it to the public, indicating that only a few people feel 
worried  about  a  lack  of  reliability.  Nevertheless,  it  can  be  inferred  that  some 
departments are willing to provide information to the public and that the executives 
of  departments  try  to  ensure  this  information  is  posted  on  websites.  Some 
information,  such  as  departmental  news  and  services,  is  regularly  updated.  The 
information  provided  may  not  support  enhanced  public  scrutiny  on  departmental 
performance but it helps service recipients.  
The decisions taken by the executives of departments relating to information 
disclosure are important because although law and regulations support information 
disclosure,  they  still  allow  departments  options.  Departments  can  choose  which 
information they want to present. In addition, for some types of information such as 
accounting  data,  accountants  do  not  have  specific  responsibilities  to  post  this 
information on websites. IT staff cannot force the accountants to prepare accounting 
reports for publication on websites (section 5.4). They do not know whether certain 
financial information would be posted or not (section 5.4) because they first have to 
wait for the relevant divisions to send the pertinent information to them. Such cases 
will depend on the executives’ policies on information disclosure.     
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As explained in the interviews (section 5.4), budgetary reports are mainly 
used in departments and by executives. However, organisations rarely use financial 
statements because the reports are difficult for officials to understand (section 5.4). 
Education and training is one problem for those seeking to implement the use of 
accruals  accounting  information  in  departments  (section  5.8).  Furthermore,  some 
account  balances  are  incorrect  (section  5.8).  In  addition,  from  the  interviews 
(sections 5.2 and 5.3) and literature review (section 3.2), the bureaucratic approach is 
based  on  a  hierarchical  structure  and  civil  servants  normally  pay  attention  to 
executives’  requirements.  When  executives  do  not  pay  attention  to  financial 
statements, civil servants also do not pay attention. Consequently, departments do 
not provide much information about financial statements on their websites. 
Regarding the availability of information, there are some departments that fail 
to  provide  certain  information  such  as  financial  information  and,  in  particular 
financial statements. Although departments should provide such reports if citizens 
request  them  to,  in  fact,  the  process  is  not  easy.  From  the  researcher’s  own 
experience,  it  is  quite  difficult  for  citizens  who  do  not  know  anyone  in  these 
organisations to obtain this information. There are many processes for citizens to 
receive information. Therefore, it is possible that some citizens do not want to spend 
valuable  time  on  this.  This  situation  leads  to  a  lack  of  interest  in  departmental 
performance and reduces the level of public participation. One of the main aims of 
public  sector  reform  was  to  enhance  public  participation  (section  2.6),  but  the 
processes for requesting information do not support public participation.  
Although the task of enhancing public participation rates is being addressed 
by the government, if the government starts to focus less attention on this, or does 
not follow through with the project, departments may also pay less attention to the 
project  (section  5.4).  Civil  servants  do  have  other  responsibilities.  For  example, 
preparing financial reports to be posted on websites is not an accountant primary 
responsibility. Therefore, it is possible that they would postpone certain processes, 
i.e. preparing information for disclosure to the public, in order to concentrate on 
other duties (section 5.4). Team-working is another important factor (section 5.4). If 
only IT staff pay attention to information disclosure and other officials do not, it is 
difficult to increase the amount of information disclosed.  
There  is  an  argument  that  some  Thai  people  may  not  like  to  work  hard 
(Soralump 2004, in Thai). Some interviewees also support this idea (section 5.8) but 
it cannot be generalised to the entire body of civil servants. Due to the low salaries  
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paid, some civil servants have part-time jobs (sections 3.2 and 5.4), which may affect 
the work effort of civil servants and, therefore, the level of information disclosure. If 
civil servants are reluctant to prepare the information to be posted on websites, then 
the level of transparency may not be improved.  
According  to  the  World  Bank,  there  are  three  areas  that  can  improve 
information  and  enhance  transparency:  ‘economic  efficiency;  transparency  as  a 
means of preventing corruption; and the importance of information in the analysis, 
articulation and acceptance of policy choices’ (World Bank 1992, p. 39). Information 
about governmental policies and actions should be available (World Bank 1992, p. 
40). However, Thai departments rarely provide information in support of these areas. 
They are more likely to provide information about services. This situation can affect 
the process of scrutiny and public participation because if citizens want to evaluate or 
examine departmental performance, it will be difficult for them to do so.  
From  the  results,  there  are  some  problems  regarding  transparency. 
Specifically,  the  main  problem  is  the  reliability  and  availability  of  information, 
which then relates to other concepts, particularly scrutiny.    
6.2.4.2 Scrutiny 
With regard to scrutiny, the main accountee using information from websites 
is the public. Public participation is therefore important (section 2.6.3). From Table 
6.3, some departments have communication tools, which allow the public to make 
contact  with  departments.  For  comments,  complaints  and  petitions  from  citizens, 
only  half  of  the  departments  allow  citizens  to  make  contact  via  their  websites. 
However, the majority  of departments do provide contact information  should the 
public wish to make contact in other ways, e.g. telephone, post or in person.  
For the enhancement of accountability, it is important for the public to know 
about public sector performance evaluation and the reasons why some organisations 
fail  to  meet  their  objectives  (see  section  2.6.3).  When  departments  disclose  this 
information on their websites, it could mean that they are ready to be scrutinised and 
examined by the public. This process may improve and enhance accountability in the 
public sector.  
According  to  the  OPDC  staff,  departments  have  to  assess  and  produce 
departmental  reports  in  the  sixth,  ninth  and  twelfth  month  of  each  fiscal  year. 
However, the results in Table 6.4 show that some departments do not provide this 
information to the public. There are various possible reasons for this. First of all, it is  
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possible that departments have met their objectives so they do not have any reasons 
to explain why they fail to meet objectives to citizens. An alternative reason is that 
government departments do not want to publicise information related to unsuccessful 
performance. Departments want to present only positive outcomes. It is also possible 
that officials may not have time to produce this information or departments do not 
have the staff available to post the information on the websites.  
There is no statement in either the Good Governance Royal Decree or the 
Official Information Act specifically instructing departments to provide this kind of 
information. It is not easy for citizens to analyse whether departments are succeeding 
with their objectives because not enough information is provided. This may cause 
some difficulty for public scrutiny.  
 Departments  may  not  have  information  about  performance  evaluation  on 
their websites, but if they gave details about their plans, actions, operational process 
and performance, citizens could possibly assess and examine that information for 
themselves. However, citizens may not want to spend their time doing this. This 
situation could result in ignorance by the public. Prior research indicates that general 
users, such as citizens and the media, usually require only a summary, and do not 
actually want detailed information (Pablos et al. 2002).   
6.2.4.2.1 Reflection 
Public  participation  and  awareness  are  important  for  scrutiny  (see  section 
2.6). By means of the information provided on websites, scrutiny would be related to 
service  delivery  instead  of  accountability.  For  departmental  performance,  public 
scrutiny  is  difficult  to  achieve  due  to  the  limitations  of  information  discussed  in 
connection with transparency.  
From the interviews, citizens tend to complain about service delivery (section 
5.4), and they rarely focus on departmental performance. This situation represents a 
lack of interest by the  public towards accountability mechanisms.  It may be that 
citizens think that scrutinising departmental performance is not their duty, but that of 
their  representatives.  In  addition,  the  media  will  also  want  to  scrutinise  some 
departmental performance. Therefore, if these two groups are effective at scrutinising 
departments, there is no problem with the public being uninterested in departmental 
performance. However, in Thailand, alleged incidences of corruption and criticism 
regarding media freedom (section 3.2) mean that a lack of interest by citizens may 
support  an  increase  in  corruption  and  fraud.  Since  civil  servants  experience  no  
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pressure from citizens, some officials are unconcerned with public accountability. 
This lack of interest may come from a lack of access to reliable information, a lack of 
knowledge, or a lack of awareness.  
With  regard  to  information  that  can  illustrate  the  concept  of  scrutiny  in 
departments, there is no information about either internal control or internal auditing. 
This kind of information could reveal the techniques which departments apply to 
control their operational process and performance, which could help the public to 
know  and  understand  how  departments  control  their  operations.  However,  this 
information is only used within the bureaucratic system (section 5.4). It is possible 
that departments believe this information should be kept secret. In addition, since the 
information  is  not  related  to  service  delivery,  citizens  may  not  actually  need  his 
information.  
In  addition,  some  civil  servants  may  not  understand  the  importance  of 
control.  That  may  be  a  problem  of  education  and  training.  From  the  interviews, 
departmental  officials,  other  than  internal  auditors,  are  not  interested  in  internal 
control (section 5.4). Alternatively, the process of control may not be effective so 
they do not want to have this information on websites. In addition, the laws do not 
require departments to provide this information on websites. The public cannot be 
assured whether departments use public resources wisely or whether departments use 
power for their own benefits. There is some support from the interviews that some 
civil servants take bribes from citizens in exchange for faster service (section 5.4). 
Thus,  not  providing  this  kind  of  information  increases  the  possibility  of 
maladministration.  
6.2.4.3 Answerability  
According  to  sections  38  and  39  of  the  Good  Governance  Royal  Decree, 
departments have to respond to questions from the people  and other  government 
departments.  However,  the  Decree  does  not  specify  by  which  medium  so  some 
departments choose to use other methods instead. Departments are also advised to 
improve their information technology system and network so it seems reasonable to 
expect that departments would provide a medium for people to make contact with 
them via their websites. Nevertheless, from Table 6.2, websites do not provide much 
information  on  responses  to  complaint,  petition  or  question.  Although  such 
information is possibly confidential and private for complainers, departments should 
summarise  what  they  have  done  during  the  year.  However,  from  the  interviews  
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(section  5.6),  sometimes  even  civil  servants  do  not  know  the  results.  Thus,  the 
process is not clear.   
6.2.4.3.1 Reflection  
Departments should be answerable for their actions. Section 38 of the Good 
Governance Royal Decree mentions that 
The government agency, after having received a written question on any task 
under its responsibility from people or other government agency, shall have the duty 
to answer the question or provide  information on what it has done to the person or 
government asking such a  question within fifteen days or within the specified due 
date under Section 37. 
The Decree shows that it is a legal responsibility for departments to respond 
to questions from the public. However, if questions relate to accusations, the process 
is longer and involves more than just answering questions (section 5.4.3). On the 
websites,  some  departments  have  channels  for  the  public  to  send  questions  or 
complaints. However, departments do not summarise what they have done in such 
cases. Consequently,  citizens cannot know and  evaluate departmental reaction on 
questions or complaints. This situation does not help enhance public accountability 
specifically.  Although  departments  cannot  provide  personal  details  or  in-depth 
details about each case since this may allow complainers to trace a case, departments 
should  ideally  summarise  what  they  have  done  with  complaints  or  petitions. 
Otherwise the public cannot know how departments manage these. It can be inferred 
that  there  is  the  problem  of  a  lack  of  transparency  in  the  departments.  Some 
departments  do  not  have  any  way  for  the  public  to  register  complaints  online, 
although they do provide contact details. Citizens can then make complaints using 
other methods. 
6.2.4.4 The similarities and differences between the ministries  
Within each ministry, there is a range across departments. Taking the average 
scores, departments under the Ministry of Finance have more items than those of 
other ministries. This is not surprising because its main responsibilities are concerned 
with the national financial and economic systems so it is expected to provide more 
information on websites. Under this ministry, the Excise Department provides the 
most items and Revenue Department provides the second most items. These two 
departments  are  the  most  important  revenue  centres  of  the  government  so  it  is 
reasonable that they should disclose as much information as they can in order to 
illustrate  transparency  of  their  operations.  As  confirmed  by  NECTEC  (2004,  in  
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Thai),  the  Revenue  Department’s  website  had  high  scores  in  all  aspects  of 
information, interaction and transaction.  
On the other hand, the Comptroller General’s Department (CGD) discloses 
the  least  items  when  compared  with  other  departments  under  this  ministry.  It 
provides information used by other public sector organisations. This is the main duty 
of  the  CGD.  Nevertheless,  it  does  not  disclose  much  information  about  its  own 
performance. This is disappointing because the CGD plays an important part in the 
governmental accounting system. Therefore, the main aim of its website is to provide 
information only to its direct users, which are public sector organisations, rather than 
to the public.  
The second best result is from the Ministry of Commerce, the duties of which 
are related to businesses and trade. By contrast, from the average percentages, the 
Ministry of Education has the least score, with the percentage of each department 
about  20-30%.  From  the  results,  they  provide  information  on  their  services  to 
citizens, particularly students, teachers and parents. Departments who focus on the 
services  they  give  to  citizens,  instead  of  providing  information  on  their  own 
performance, do not do many things to enhance accountability.  
Within the Ministry of Public Health, the number of items provided on the 
websites does not vary much between departments. By contrast, for the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Cooperatives and the Ministry of Labour, there is a higher level of 
variation between the best and the worst. During the period of the research, there 
were no ministerial guidelines related to styles or patterns, which departments should 
follow. Thus, each department has its own style and own range of information. The 
intention  and  attention  of  executives  with  regard  to  information  disclosure  is 
important. For some departments, which provide more information, it can be inferred 
that executives of departments pay more attention to information disclosure. For the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, the Cooperative Auditing Department has 
the most items on its website. As part of its mission, the department’s duties relate to 
cooperative  accounting  and  auditing.  Therefore,  it  is  not  surprising  for  this 
department to have more accounting information.  
With regard to the Ministry of Labour, the Office of the Permanent Secretary 
and the Social Security Office have the most and second most items. This is not 
surprising because, from the interviews, the Office of the Permanent Secretary is 
frequently developing its system and has a plan for all the departments under this  
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ministry to have the same style of website in order to give the ministry’s websites a 
more unified appearance (section 5.4). The Social Security Office spends a lot of 
money on developing information technology systems. The result for this department 
is better than some other departments because the government and the media pay 
particular attention to this department’s operations. Because of this, executives are 
also interested in providing more information to the public. This ministry is not only 
influenced  by  organisational  accountability  but  also  by  public  accountability.  In 
addition, the department uses IT systems to support its own operations, and therefore 
knows the importance of using IT systems and the internet effectively.  
The results show that if departmental responsibilities relate to money, the 
economy, and  accounting, or if departments’  responsibilities are the focus of the 
government attention or public attention, then they tend to provide more information, 
which can support accountability.  
6.2.5 Standards of accountability 
  With regard to standards, which the public may use to analyse departmental 
activities and performance, as mentioned earlier, departments provide information 
about their mission, vision, strategy, plans and policies. Therefore, the public can use 
this information when evaluating performance.  However, it is difficult  to do this 
when  departments  do  not  provide  this  information  online.  The  majority  of 
departmental websites refer the public to the appropriate laws and regulations and the 
public can then evaluate whether departments are following these or not.  
  With regard to information disclosure, the Good Governance Royal Decree 
and the Official Information Act want departments to disclose information to the 
public, with the exception of, for example, information relating to economic and 
national stability. Thus, although the intention of these acts is for departments to 
provide as much information as they can, they do include a paragraph which gives 
departments the option not to provide some information. Therefore, departments can 
decide the types of information to be disclosed.   
6.2.5.1 Reflection    
At  the  present  time,  Thai  departments  have  no  clear  standards  relating  to 
information disclosure on websites. Disclosure will vary depending on ministries or 
departments. For sensitive information, such as financial and accounting information, 
the executives of departments will first decide whether or not the information should 
be  posted  on  websites  (section  5.4).  However,  with  general  information,  such  as  
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departmental news, IT staff and PR staff can update the information themselves. In 
summary, the decisions of both executives and civil servants are important factors 
influencing information disclosure.    
6.2.6 Effects    
With  regard  to  effects,  websites  rarely  mention  this  information.  This 
accountability component is not clear for the public. The public cannot tell from 
departmental websites how departments have handled complaints or petitions. This is 
confirmed by the interviews when even civil servants claimed not to know much 
about the outcome of complaints or petitions or what would happen if mistakes were 
to happen (section 5.6). Effects are, therefore, unclear and will normally vary from 
case to case, i.e. individual cases may result in different effects.    
6.3 Annual reports  
An annual report is one of the main communication tools for departments to 
communicate with the public. It represents an important element of accountability 
(Dixon et al. 1991; Pablos et al. 2002). In the past, annual reports were optional for 
departments, which could choose to either produce or not produce a report. However, 
in 2006, Thai departments were encouraged to each produce annual reports. This 
shows  a  realisation  by  the  government  of  the  importance  of  annual  reports.  The 
purpose of this section is to study what information is provided in annual reports and 
how this information relates to accountability. Reports from the departments listed in 
Table 6.8 are analysed. Table 6.9 is an analysis of the contents of annual reports and 
Table 6.10 is the extension of ‘performance’ in Table 6.9. Both tables can be found 
at the end of the chapter.  
6.3.1 Accountees and accountors  
  With regard to accountees for annual reports, the main aim of this report is to 
provide  departmental  information  to  the  public  or  to  organisations  that  have  a 
relationship  with  these  departments.  From  the  interviews,  departments  normally 
distribute their annual reports to other public sector organisations, libraries, and other 
stakeholders
8
.  Departments  do  not  distribute  their  reports  to  citizens  directly. 
However, if citizens were to make a request, then departments will supply them with 
an annual report. 
 
                                                 
8
 Information from interviews is given by E3 and information from the first interview.   
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Table 6.8 Lists of Ministries and Departments examined for annual reports 
Ministry  Departments 
Ministry of Finance  1.  Office of the Permanent Secretary Ministry of 
Finance 
2.  Treasury Department 
3.  Comptroller General’s Department 
4.  Customs Department 
5.  Excise Department 
6.  Revenue Department 
7.  State Enterprise Policy Office 
8.  Public Debt Management Office 
9.  Fiscal Policy Office 
Ministry of Labour  10. Department of Labour Protection and Welfare 
11. Department of Employment 
Ministry of Industry  12. Department of Primary Industries and Mines 
13. The Office of Industrial Economics 
Ministry of Social 
Development and 
Security  
14. Department of Social Development and Welfare 
15. Women’s Affairs and Family Development 
Office of the Prime 
Minister  
16. The Secretariat of Prime Minister 
17. Bureau of the Budget 
18. Office of the Civil Service Commission 
Ministry of Justice   19. The Office of Permanent Secretary of Ministry 
of Justice 
20. Department of Probation 
Ministry of Commerce  21. Department of Export Promotion 
22. Department of Foreign Trade 
23. Department of Insurance 
Ministry of Public 
Health 
24. Department of Medical Sciences 
Ministry of Interior  25. Department of Local Administration 
Ministry of Agriculture 
and Cooperatives 
26. Department of Agriculture 
27. Department of Agricultural Extension 
28. Cooperative Auditing Department 
29. Agricultural Land Reform Office 
Ministry of 
Transportation  
30. Department of Civil Aviation 
Ministry of Energy  31. Department of Mineral Fuels 
Ministry of Natural 
Resources and 
Environment  
32. Pollution Control Department 
33. Department of Mineral Resources 
  Thus, this could imply that annual reports are accessed by accountees in all 
three  types  of  accountability.  However,  in  the  case  of  administrative  and 
organisational accountability, superiors, auditors and controllers rarely use annual 
reports in their operations. For some departments, annual reports are produced only 
because of the requirements from the government.  
With  regard  to  public  accountability,  from  the  interviews,  it  seems  only 
researchers and students request annual reports (section 5.4). Generally, people do  
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not pay much attention. Producing annual reports relates directly to the relationship 
in case of bureaucratic accountability. The government wants departments to produce 
annual  reports.  Some  departments  have  started  producing  annual  reports  already, 
using lists provided by the government as their guideline. The government is a direct 
superior of the departments, explaining why departments decided to produce annual 
reports.  
As shown in Table 6.9, none of the departments provides some important 
information about staffing such as the statement about how the board or committee is 
appointed,  the  term  of  appointment  and  remuneration.  This  can  deter  the 
enhancement of accountability because the board or committee plays an important 
part in operations and decision making. They deal with vast amounts of money but 
this information is not available to the public. Therefore, the public cannot know 
whether the recruitment or appointment process is transparent or not. Departments 
may  think  this  information  is  not  important  for  the  public  to  know,  so  they  use 
annual reports just to present their performance and activities from the preceding 
year.    
6.3.1.1 Reflection  
Annual reports are normally distributed to other public sector organisations, 
and people who have a direct contact with departments. It is not easy for citizens to 
obtain these reports because they have to actually go and request these from the 
departments. From the interviews, only researchers and students used annual reports. 
Other citizens may have no interest in these or believe it is a waste of time to get the 
reports. This shows a lack of interest of the public. However, this lack of interest 
may come from a lack of access to information. Since it is not easy for citizens to 
obtain these annual reports so it is possible that departments may not focus much on 
public  accountability.  Departments  produce  annual  reports  because  they  rely  on 
bureaucratic accountability. They only follow what their superiors want them to do.  
6.3.2 Accountability for what 
  The main purpose of annual reports is for departments to provide information 
about their performance. Departments are responsible for their actions and how they 
have used public resources. Annual reports can support this objective. From Table 
6.9
9
, annual reports have information about departmental performance. There is less 
                                                 
9
 At the end of the chapter   
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information about service delivery so it can be deduced that annual reports mainly 
provide information about departmental performance during the year.  
All  departments  provide  their  mission,  vision  and  strategy  in  their  annual 
reports, information which can be considered as being the commitments between 
departments and their accountees. Some information on departmental background 
such as organisation structure, and some information about staff and executives, is 
also provided in these reports. This information can identify the responsibilities of 
departments towards accountees.  
Like  the  websites,  the  information  contained  in  annual  reports  is  general 
information.  Annual  reports  are  produced  at  the  request  of  the  cabinet.  Thus, 
although not a legal responsibility, departments tend to comply because it is normal 
for them to adhere to the wishes of their superiors (section 5.2). The relationship in 
the case of organisational and bureaucratic accountability is important.  
Unlike websites, annual reports do not contain very much information about 
services, in fact they do not focus much at all on services. This reflects the different 
objectives of websites and annual reports. There are only a few departments that 
outline their plans in annual reports. From this result, citizens cannot know what 
activities  departments  are  committed  to  during  the  year.  The  public  get  only 
operational  results,  which  does  not  help  them  understand  actual  departmental 
performance. Most departments do not set out their future plans in annual reports, 
only past information. People cannot therefore know what departments plan to do the 
following year.  
6.3.2.1 Reflection  
In  preparing  the  information  to  be  provided  in  annual  reports,  some 
departments are guided by recommendations of the cabinet. Thus, the structure of 
many annual reports is very similar. Some of them produced an annual report but one 
which did not include all the information the government required them to because 
these were only recommendations. There is no penalty for those departments who do 
not comply. This is confirmed by the literature review that accountability without 
sanctions  may  not  be  useful  (Brinkerhoff  2001).  However,  if  the  government 
continues  to  pay  attention  to  producing  annual  reports,  the  department  will 
undoubtedly take these ideas on board. The year 2005-2006 was, after all, only the 
first year of these recommendations. Also, some departments may not yet be ready to 
produce the reports.   
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One  interviewee  mentioned  that  she  will  produce  annual  reports  if  the 
government continues to focus on this issue (section 5.4.1). However, if not, she is 
unsure  whether  or  not  her  department  will  produce  annual  reports.  This  can  be 
problematic for the enhancement of accountability. Superiors have to keep track of 
the  operations  of  their  subordinates  because  if  they  do  not,  subordinates  tend  to 
ignore those transactions that are not directly related to their duties. As discussed in 
section  5.4,  some  civil  servants  pay  attention  to  their  direct  jobs.  This  situation 
comes from attitudes, education, understanding, and competency of civil servants.  
Departments are responsible for explaining why they performed as they did. 
If departments fail to meet targets, they should explain this in their annual reports. 
However, as shown in Table 6.10, some departments do not provide this information. 
From the results, it is difficult for the public to evaluate how effectively departments 
are at using public resources. This difficulty can cause public ignorance, which can 
affect public participation and scrutiny.  
6.3.3 Processes of accountability 
Providing information in annual reports relates directly to the processes of 
accountability,  particularly  transparency  and  scrutiny.  The  amount  and  types  of 
information can show if and how departments intend to present their information to 
the public.  
6.3.3.1 Transparency  
From  the  interviews  and  literature  review,  departments  follow  the 
requirements  of  the  government  and  provide  four  main  types  of  information. 
Information  about  performance  and  operational  results  are  important  for 
accountability.  This  information  is  one  of  the  components  required  by  the 
government so, as shown in Table 6.9, all departments provide information about 
non-financial  performance  and  almost  all  of  them  provide  details  of  financial 
performance in their annual reports, although there may be reliability problems with 
some of this information.   
  With  regard  to  financial  statements  and  accounting  information,  although 
more  than  half  of  the  sample  group  provides  financial  accounts  in  their  annual 
reports, the usefulness of these cannot be confirmed. For example, there is possibly 
an issue of reliability because the accounts are unaudited. The interview findings 
confirmed that financial statements are unaudited and there are many transactions 
which require being amended (section 5.4). There are four departments that present  
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financial  statements  in  their  annual  reports  but  do  not  supplement  these  with 
explanatory notes. This shows that departments do not appreciate the importance of 
such notes to the lay person attempting to make sense of financial statements. 
During the period of study, the cash flow statement is not required because 
the Government Fiscal Management Information System (GFMIS) is not yet ready 
for  producing  these
10
.  Despite  this,  one  department  does  produce  the  cash  flow 
statement. While it is possible that this cash flow statement may be incorrect, the fact 
that  the  department  is  interested  enough  to  produce  one  is  a  positive  sign. 
Surprisingly, the department, which produced the cash flow statement, is not the 
Comptroller  General’s  Department,  which  would  be  expected  to  provide  more 
accounting information than others.  
Regarding budgetary information, departments provide only information on 
the budgets received from the government, with few departments providing details 
on the use of the budgets. However, only focusing on the budget received from the 
government alone may not be useful for accountability because this does not show 
departmental  activities.  Almost  the  entire  sample  group  provides  only  brief 
information  about  the  budget.  The  majority  of  the  departments  use  types  of 
expenditure  to  categorise  their  expenditures.  Some  departments  do  not  give 
budgetary details for departmental projects or plans. The public would not know how 
departments manage projects and plans, and it would be difficult for the public to 
evaluate departmental performance.    
  Regarding annual and future plans, from Table 6.9, only a few departments 
give this information. Only one department provides information in the form of an 
annual plan. Although departments provide information on their performance, they 
do  not  provide  specific  plans.  It  is  difficult  for  citizens  to  decide  whether  the 
departments have succeeded with their plans or not because some of them do not 
summarise their accomplishments.  
  Additional  to  the  above  information,  departments  also  provide  some 
background information, such as mission, vision, and strategy. However, there are 
some  departments  that  fail  to  provide  contact  information.  Nevertheless,  to  gain 
access to annual reports, citizens have to go to departments or libraries so it is not 
actually  difficult  for  citizens  to  obtain  this  information.  As  mentioned  earlier, 
departments also fail to provide much information about staffing and services.    
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With regard to language used in the reports, there are some departments, such 
as the Customs Department and the Department of Foreign Trade that despite having 
links  with  other  countries  do  not  provide  information  in  English  in  their  annual 
reports. Perhaps these departments are not to do this, do not have the staff to translate 
Thai data to English, or believe that only Thais are users of these reports.  
Regarding  the  methods  of  presentation,  departments  present  their 
performance by using graphics such as tables, pie charts and graphs. This can help 
people  understand  more  about  department’s  operational  results.  These  are 
appropriate ways to present departmental performance because when citizens view 
the information, they can tell immediately whether the department has reached its 
goals  or  not.  These  graphics  can  help  them  understand  the  information  that  the 
departments want to communicate. 
6.3.3.1.1 Reflection  
Prior  literature  indicates  that,  to  achieve  transparency,  the  availability, 
reliability,  relevance  and  timeliness  of  information  is  important  (Kondo  2002). 
Regarding the availability of information in Thailand, it is not easy for lay people to 
obtain  annual  reports  because  departments  only  distribute  their  reports  to  certain 
groups of recipients. However, some departments do provide these reports on their 
websites. A lack of access to information can cause a lack of interest in departmental 
performance and this in turn can lead to a lack of public participation. This situation 
may hamper public scrutiny.   
Regarding the reliability of information, there are a number of stages which 
departments need to go through when producing an annual report. Information is 
checked  by  both  staff  and  executives  of  departments.  Therefore,  general  and 
background information can possibly be assured. However, with regard to financial 
information, e.g. financial statements and budgetary information, this information is 
not audited. Therefore, it is possible that there will be a reliability problem. Users 
have  to  use  their  own  judgement  when  using  this  information.  This  can  hamper 
public scrutiny. The reason why the government and departments do not solve this 
problem may come from a lack of awareness from the public. However, although 
citizens  are  aware  of  this  problem,  it  remains  difficult  to  solve  due  to  a  lack  of 
external auditors, who cannot audit every department in a year. In addition, the State 
Audit Act (1999) does not specify that auditors have to audit every organisation each 
year.  Consequently,  it  is  impossible  for  some  departments  to  provide  audited 
financial  statements  to  the  public.  The  State  Audit  Act  (1999)  offers  auditors  
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flexibility in deciding which organisations should be audited and which audit reports 
should be provided to the public.    
The relevance of information, in this case, will depend on the user’s reasons 
for using annual reports. The main purpose of annual reports is to provide the public 
with  information  about  department’s  activities  and  performance.  Therefore,  the 
reports tend to contain information of this type, which is an important tool for the 
purpose of accountability. However, the reports contain less information on actual 
services so if the public need this, they should refer to the departmental websites.  
As  for  timely  information,  information  inside  the  reports  is  about  past 
transactions. Unlike websites, information in the reports is rarely used for decision 
making  or  service  delivery.  The  information  is  used  for  assessment  and  scrutiny 
instead.  In  the  past,  there  was  no  due  date  for  the  production  process.  This  was 
dependent on the readiness of the individual departments. In 2006, the cabinet asked 
departments to finish production of their annual reports by February, though there is 
no penalty if departments cannot do this. From the interviews, it seems that while 
departments set targets, the due date of these can be changed (section 5.4).  
In summary, as with websites, there are some problems related to the concept 
of transparency, particularly the availability and reliability of information contained 
within annual reports. These can deter the enhancement of accountability and can 
affect the process of public scrutiny.       
6.3.3.2 Scrutiny  
With regard to the concept of scrutiny, participation is an important feature 
for this concept. However, due to limitations on the availability of information, the 
public cannot easily obtain annual reports. Therefore, it is not easy to enhance the 
participation  rate  by  means  of  annual  reports.  Regarding  the  reliability  of 
information,  as  mentioned  earlier  in  section  6.3.3.1.1,  the  financial  statements  of 
some departments are not audited every year. Therefore, although citizens may want 
to examine departmental reports, they have to do with unaudited financial statements. 
This may not improve public scrutiny.      
As  for  the  information  provided  in  annual  reports,  see  Table  6.10, 
surprisingly, two of the departments that explain why some of their objectives are not 
met do not outline planned actions to improve their performance. They know already 
what their problems are so it is not difficult to find the methods with which to solve 
these. The departments should inform the public of these solutions. In addition, it is  
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only  two  departments  that  have  a  summary  of  accomplishments  in  their  reports. 
Other departments explain their performance in detail that it is not easy to discern 
which projects have been accomplished and which projects have not. In addition, 
some of them do not provide their plans so it is difficult for the public to evaluate 
performance.  Prior  research  shows  that  the  public  normally  uses  only  summary 
information, not a fully detailed report (Pablos et al. 2002). From the current research 
only four departments have self assessment reports. With regard to explanations of 
why objectives have not been met, there are fifteen departments that do not report 
this information. For these departments, it cannot be ascertained from their reports 
whether they have succeeded in meeting their objectives or whether they just do not 
want to disclose this information.  
As with websites, departments do not provide information about systems of 
controlling and monitoring. However, this information is not a main requirement of 
the government so departments may simply be uninterested in this area.  
6.3.3.2.1 Reflection   
With regard to public participation, due to the limitation of data collection, 
citizens are not interviewed in this research. However, the interviews (section 5.4) 
suggest that only students make requests for annual reports because they want to use 
reports  in  their  study.  Due  to  the  limitation  of  the  availability  of  information 
discussed earlier, it is not easy for the public to obtain annual reports. Only a very 
few people are interested enough in annual reports to take the time to obtain them. 
This does not contribute to enhancing accountability.  
For performance evaluation, as shown in Table 6.10, although departments 
provide information about their performance, departments do not explain much about 
their results. However, citizens do not ask departments for more information. This 
situation  shows  that  the  public  is  uninterested  in  this  information.  As  discussed 
earlier  in  section  5.4,  this  responsibility  can  be  done  by  other  groups  such  as 
representatives, so this is a possible reason for a lack of interest.   
In the past, some departments did not produce annual reports and no one 
needed or wanted to use them. This situation illustrates that people have for a long 
time not paid much attention to annual reports. From the interviews, citizens may pay 
more attention to services than performance. This shows that the process of public 
scrutiny,  particularly  on  departmental  performance,  rarely  occurs.  Therefore,  it  is  
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easy  for  civil  servants  to  work  because  the  public  do  not  investigate  their 
performance. Maladministration can occur.  
6.3.3.3 Answerability    
  For  answerability,  information  about  the  contact  address  is  important  and 
helpful should citizens wish to make contact with departments. Moreover, from the 
Good Governance Royal Decree and the Official Information Act, departments are 
advised to provide this information to the public, though, in the requirements, the 
government  does  not  actually  mention  contact  information.  The  government  may 
think that departments already provide this information, since this information is of a 
general nature, which all departments should have. From the results, only half of the 
sample  departments  provide  contact  information  in  their  annual  reports  and  it  is 
sometimes easier for the public to get these details from other sources, such as from 
websites or by telephone. In comparison with the websites, annual reports are less 
widespread, with only public sector organisations, universities, libraries and specific 
groups of people being able to obtain these reports.  
6.3.3.3.1 Reflection  
Annual reports are possibly not the right communication medium by which 
the public can make contact with departments. Departments do not provide much 
contact information or information on how citizens can make complaints or petitions 
to departments. Also, departments do not provide information about the responses to 
any  actual  complaints  or  petitions.  This  situation  cannot  support  accountability 
mechanisms  if  the  public  do  not  know  how  departments  deal  with  questions  or 
accusations.  
6.3.3.4 The comparison between departments    
The departments that provide the greatest number of items in their annual 
reports are the Bureau of the Budget and the Customs Department. Not surprisingly, 
the  Bureau  of  the  Budget  is  responsible  for  the  national  budgetary  system,  and 
therefore  provided  detailed  information  about  budget  preparation,  including  the 
principles used to prepare the budget. The Customs Department is one of the main 
revenue centres of the government so it also has a duty to provide clear information 
to the public.    
The Department of Labour Protection and Welfare and Women’s Affairs and 
Family Development also provide more items in their annual report compared with 
other sample departments. The duties of the Department of Labour Protection and  
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Welfare are related to the labour force, which affect a great number of people. The 
Department of Women’s Affairs and Family Development’s role is also related to a 
significant number of citizens. Disappointingly, as for its website, the Comptroller 
General’s  Department  does  not  provide  much  information.  It  does  not  have 
departmental  financial  statements  or  even  a  report  on  its  own  performance,  only 
national financial reports.  
Although departments have similar items in their reports because they are all 
following  the  cabinet  guideline,  the  amount  of  information  provided  by  each 
department is not equal. Based on the results, the government needs to have similar 
pattern and appropriate styles of annual reports because in the past departments were 
not  required  to  produce  annual  reports  at  all  or  if  they  did,  they  did  so  without 
guidance or requirements in relation to content. From these results, it appears that 
many departments follow the government guidelines so in the future it is possible 
that annual reports can all follow the same pattern.  
6.3.4 Standards of accountability 
With regard to standards of accountability, departments are required by the 
government  to  produce  annual  reports,  which  should  consist  of  four  main 
components,  namely  general  background,  financial  statements,  performance  and 
other information. Departments use this requirement as the basis for producing their 
annual reports. However, this can depend on the vigilance of the government because 
if the government pays scant attention to the annual reports, departments may do the 
same.  
Regarding information that the public can use as a standard for appraisal, in 
annual reports, only some departments provide information about their plans and 
projects. They only report on their past performance. Therefore, it is quite difficult 
for the public to assess departmental performance. It is not easy for citizens to use an 
annual  report  as  a  main  tool  for  public  accountability.  It  is  difficult  for  them  to 
evaluate departmental performance by using an annual report alone.  
6.3.5 Effects  
According  to  the  interviews,  during  the  period  of  this  thesis  conducted, 
departments that do not produce annual reports are not penalised
11
. Other effects, 
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e.g.  resulting  from  operations,  performance  and  complaints,  are  not  presented  in 
annual reports and this is the same with websites.  
6.4 Conclusion    
The  main  aim  of  this  chapter  is  to  analyse  how  information  relating  to 
accountability is presented in two communication tools, websites and annual reports. 
Checklists were developed and used to analyse these tools (see details in section 
4.3.2).  
Although three main types of accountability  are the primary  focus of  this 
research,  the  results  in  this  chapter  relate  directly  to  public  accountability. 
Departments  are  responsible  for  allocating  budgets  and  delivering  services  to 
citizens. The public require only general details and, unlike auditors and controllers, 
they do not want the full details. Although the purpose of these tools is to deliver 
information and services to the public, from the interviews, departments and staff 
pay  more  attention  to  the  requirements  of  internal  users  instead  of  the  public’s 
(section 5.4).  
For the purpose of administrative accountability, auditors and controllers do 
not use the information from these tools. These two groups require full details, and 
not just the summary information. For organisational accountability, superiors and 
subordinates  use  other  types  of  information.  For  instance  they  use  internal 
communication, such as the intranet or internal documents, instead of the websites or 
annual reports of departments.  
However,  superiors,  auditors  and  controllers  play  important  roles  in 
information disclosure. For administrative accountability, the aims of the OPDC, i.e. 
the  controller,  are  that  departments  should  improve  their  information  technology 
system  and  online  services.  For  bureaucratic  accountability,  the  cabinet  wants 
departments to produce annual reports and develop websites. Therefore, departments 
have to follow recommendations of their superiors. This shows the influence of some 
types  of  accountees  towards  departments  and  civil  servants.  This  result  will  be 
further discussed and explained by taking Thai values and culture into consideration 
in Chapters 7 and 8.  
In terms of ‘accountability for what’, departments should be responsible for 
service delivery and the use of public resources. However, this type differs between 
websites and annual reports (see sections 6.2.3 and 6.3.2). For websites, the main 
focus  tends  to  be  on  service  delivery.  By  contrast,  annual  reports  present  
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departmental  activities  and  performance.  For  the  information  disclosed  both  on 
websites and in annual reports, moral responsibility felt by executives and officials 
can increase the amount of information because of no exact legal responsibility to 
produce information and no penalty for not producing. This relates to yet another 
component  of  accountability,  that  of  standards  of  accountability.  While  unclear 
standards do not enhance accountability in the public sector, Thai values and culture 
are  among  the  factors  which  can  explain  accountors’  and  accountees’  behaviour. 
This issue will be discussed in Chapters 7 and 8.   
Information  disclosure  relates  directly  to  the  processes  of  accountability. 
With regard to transparency, for websites, the majority of the departments disclose 
general information such as mission, vision and strategy, plans, contact information 
and non-financial performance (section 6.2.4). Departments also provide information 
about  responsibilities  and  organisational  structure.  This  kind  of  information  is 
required by the Official Information Act to be presented to the public, but the choice 
of communication tools is left to departments. On the other hand, departments rarely 
present full financial information, particularly financial performance and accounting 
information. However, even where information is disclosed, there may be reliability 
problems with this.  
Financial statements are unaudited, and though some budgetary information 
may be reliable, reports about the use of the budgets are doubtful because there is no 
statement mentioning whether this information is audited or unaudited. Another main 
issue  for  transparency  concerns  that  of  timely  information.  Departments  do  keep 
some information up to date such as news and services but not other information 
such as performance reports or annual reports, since departments may not have latest 
version  available.  Regarding  the  availability  of  information,  there  are  some 
limitations in gaining access to the internet. Even though the number of internet users 
in Thailand is increasing continuously, only certain groups of people can actually use 
the internet. Also, it is sometimes difficult to gain access certain information, such as 
financial statements, if departments do not actually provide this on their websites. 
Factors such as pressure from accountees, Thai values and cultural perspectives can 
also be involved in the process of information disclosure, and these will be further 
discussed in Chapters 7 and 8.  
With regard to the difficulties in gaining access to information, it is possible 
that Thais in rural areas receive less information than those living in urban areas. 
Therefore, public participation is mainly carried out by urban Thais. For example, in  
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the past, middle class Thais participated in political matters but not those of the lower 
class,  especially  in  rural  areas  (section  3.2).  However,  lower  class  Thais  now 
participate more because they receive more information (section 3.2). With regard to 
the concept of scrutiny, after receiving information, the public should examine and 
evaluate performance in order to give feedback to departments (see section 6.2.4). 
However, the public normally only focus on departmental services (section 5.4). For 
departmental performance, departments do not provide much information about their 
performance and the public do not request this information. Therefore, the public 
may not be aware of departmental performance.  
Limitations of the reliability and availability of information are obstacles that 
can burden the process of scrutiny. This can cause fraud, corruption and abuse of 
power in some government departments. Some aspects of Thai values, such as the 
presence of hierarchical relationships, grateful relationship orientation, i.e. bunkhun 
relationships, large power distance, and the use of power for one’s own benefit can 
contribute to such actions. This will be further discussed in Chapters 7 and 8. 
For the concept of answerability, websites have channels through which the 
public send questions, complaints, or petitions to departments (6.2.4). Although some 
sections in the Good Governance Royal Decree mention that departments should 
specify a period of time for any steps of their operations, citizens cannot know how 
much time departments spend on dealing with problems. Departments do not provide 
much information about what they have done with questions or complaints. They 
mention only whether they have succeeded with their tasks or not. 
For annual reports, the main aim of this tool is to provide information about 
departmental  performance.  As  is  the  case  with  websites,  regarding  transparency, 
reliability  of  information  is  the  main  obstacle  (section  6.3.3).  The  availability  of 
information is also a problem because of the difficulties the public have in gaining 
access  to  the  reports.  This  relates  directly  to  the  concept  of  public  scrutiny.  For 
answerability, departments do not provide much information about how they have 
dealt with complaints or petitions during the past year. Some of them do not even 
provide  contact  details.  Thus,  these  are  problems,  which  can  impede  the 
enhancement of accountability, but which can lead to a discussion on accountability 
in the Thai public sector, consisting of topics such as Thai culture and values in 
Chapters 7 and 8.   
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With regard to the standards of accountability, departments use the Official 
Information Act B.E. 2540 (1997) as a guideline for providing information to the 
public. However, the Act gives only general ideas, and departments can use their 
own judgement to decide which information they should deliver to the public. The 
Act does not mention the method of communication for delivering the information. 
Therefore,  departments  are  not  legally  responsible  for  providing  information  via 
either websites or annual reports. Regarding the Good Governance Royal Decree, it 
is recommended that departments should provide information to the public, except 
information  that  affects  national  security,  national  economic  stability,  or  public 
order. It is also permission to withhold information in order to protect personal rights 
(section  43  in  the  Decree).  Similar  to  the  Official  Information  Act,  the  Good 
Governance  Royal  Decree  just  gives  general  ideas  and  does  not  specify 
communication tools. There is no law requiring information disclosure via websites. 
This  will  depend  on  departments.  Both  executives  and  practitioners  play  an 
important  part  in  this  stage.  For  instance,  for  some  important  and  sensitive 
information,  permission  to  disclose  information  is  granted  by  the  executives  of 
departments,  while  the  decision  to  release  general  information  is  made  by 
practitioners.  Therefore,  centralised  decision  making  occurs  at  some  level  of 
information  disclosure.  Once  executives  give  their  permission,  it  is  then  the 
responsibility of civil servants to update the information.  
Some departments deliver information that they are specifically required to 
by laws. However, this information may not be enough to enhance accountability. 
For  instance,  there  is  no  organisation  to  control  the  quality  of  information  on 
websites. Although the Ministry of Information and Communication Technology was 
established, this ministry helps with the technical systems to be used but does not 
deal with the actual specifics of the information.  
Regarding the effects of accountability, the effect is not clear and this result is 
confirmed by the interviews (section 5.6). There is only a little information about the 
effects on websites or in annual reports. Unclear rewards or penalties can obstruct the 
enhancement of accountability.   
The results will be further discussed in Chapter 7, together with data from the 
interviews and literature. Conclusions and recommendations will be given in Chapter 
8. 
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Table 6.9 Contents of the annual reports (1) 
Key to table. 
Column 1 shows the checklist of disclosure items. Columns 2 to 14 show the thirteen ministries of Table 6.8.  Each cell shows the number of departments 
within that ministry reporting the respective disclosure item. The percentage is not applied for this table because these departments do not represent the 
entire ministries 
Disclosure items  
Fin 
(n=9) 
Lab 
(n=2) 
Ind 
(n=2) 
Soc 
(n=2) 
Pm 
(n=3) 
Jus 
(n=2) 
Com 
(n=3) 
Hea 
(n=1) 
Int 
(n=1) 
Agri 
(n=4) 
Tra 
(n=1) 
Ene 
(n=1) 
Nat 
(n=2) 
Summary 
(n=33)   % 
1. Annual accounts or 
financial statement (Resource 
accounts)                                
1.1 Statement of Financial 
Position   8  1  1  2  2  1  2  -  1  1  1  -  2  22  66.7 
- Audited Statement of 
Financial Position  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
- Prior fiscal year  3  1  -  -  2  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  5  15.2 
- Future  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
- Analysis (e.g. common size)  5  -  -  1  1  1  -  -  -  1  1  -  -  10  30.3 
1.2 Statement of Financial 
Performance  8  1  1  2  2  1  2  -  1  1  1  -  2  22  66.7 
- Audited Statement of 
Financial Performance  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
- Prior fiscal year  3  -  -  -  2  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  5  15.2 
- Future  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
- Analysis (e.g. common size)  5  -  -  1  1  1  -  -  -  1  1  -  -  10  30.3 
1.3 Cash Flow Statement   -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  1  3  
 
249 
Table 6.9 Contents of the annual reports (2) 
Disclosure items  
Fin 
(n=9) 
Lab 
(n=2) 
Ind 
(n=2) 
Soc 
(n=2) 
Pm 
(n=3) 
Jus 
(n=2) 
Com 
(n=3) 
Hea 
(n=1) 
Int 
(n=1) 
Agri 
(n=4) 
Tra 
(n=1) 
Ene 
(n=1) 
Nat 
(n=2) 
Summary 
(n=33)   % 
- Audited Cash Flow 
Statement  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
- Prior fiscal year  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
- Future  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
- Analysis (e.g. common 
size)  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
1.4 Accounting policies and 
notes to the financial 
statements  6  1  -  1  2  1  2  -  1  1  1  -  1  18  54.5 
1.5 Cost analysis  3  -  -  1  1  1  2  -  -  -  1  -  -  9  27.3 
2. Mission, vision and 
strategy   9  2  2  2  3  2  3  1  1  4  1  1  2  33  100 
- Unique purpose  5  1  -  2  2  1  2  -  1  1  -  -  2  17  51.5 
- Scope of operations in 
terms of its product or 
services?  2  1  -  2  2  1  2  -  1  2  -  -  1  14  42.4 
3. Trends and future plan  3  1  -  -  1  1  1  -  -  1  -  -  -  8  24.2 
- Specific steps  1  1  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  1  -  -  -  3  9.1 
- Estimated time frames  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -   -   - 
4. Annual plan  -  -  -  -  -  1  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  1  3 
5. Accounting practices and 
information  9  1  1  2  2  1  2  -  1  2  1  -  2  24  72.7  
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Table 6.9 Contents of the annual reports (3) 
Disclosure items  
Fin 
(n=9) 
Lab 
(n=2) 
Ind 
(n=2) 
Soc 
(n=2) 
Pm 
(n=3) 
Jus 
(n=2) 
Com 
(n=3) 
Hea 
(n=1) 
Int 
(n=1) 
Agri 
(n=4) 
Tra 
(n=1) 
Ene 
(n=1) 
Nat 
(n=2) 
Summary 
(n=33)   % 
6. Resources and assets  8  1  1  2  2  1  2  -  1  1  1  -  2  22  66.7 
- Sources of resources  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
- Use of resources  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
- Resource plan  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
- Capital employed  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
7. Liabilities and 
commitments  8  1  1  2  2  -  2  -  1  1  1  -  2  22  66.7 
8. Laws and regulations  6  2  1  1  2  1  1  -  1  2  1  -  2  20  60.6 
9. Budget  6  2  1  2  3  2  2  1  1  4  -  -  2  26  78.8 
- Comparing between 
budget and actual  1  -  -  -  1  2  -  1  1  -  -  -  -  6  18.2 
- Forecast budget  -  -  -  -  1  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  1  3 
- Information from prior 
fiscal year  -  1  -  1  2  -  2  1  -  2  -  -  -  9  27.3 
- Full details  -  -  -  -  -  -  1  -  -  -  -  -  -  1  3 
- Using graphics  -  2  1  1  1  2  1  1  1  3  -  -  1  14  42.4 
10. Performance                                  
- Financial   9  1  2  2  3  1  2  -  1  3  1  1  2  28  84.8 
- Non-financial  9  2  2  2  3  2  3  1  1  4  1  1  2  33  100 
- Performance improvement  4  -  -  -  1  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  5  15.1 
11. Service  8  2  2  2  3  1  1  1  1  4  -  1  2  28  84.8  
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Table 6.9 Contents of the annual reports (4) 
Disclosure items  
Fin 
(n=9) 
Lab 
(n=2) 
Ind 
(n=2) 
Soc 
(n=2) 
Pm 
(n=3) 
Jus 
(n=2) 
Com 
(n=3) 
Hea 
(n=1) 
Int 
(n=1) 
Agri 
(n=4) 
Tra 
(n=1) 
Ene 
(n=1) 
Nat 
(n=2) 
Summary 
(n=33)   % 
12. A statement about how 
the board or committee are 
appointed  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
- The term of appointment  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
- Remuneration  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
- Message from the Minister 
or executives  5  1  1  2  1  -  2  -  1  3  1  1  2  20  60.6 
- List of executives  8  1  2  2  3  2  3  1  1  3  1  -  2  29  87.9 
- The number of staff  7  2  1  2  3  2  2  1  1  4  1  -  1  27  81.8 
13. Organisation structure  9  2  2  2  3  2  3  1  1  3  1  -  2  31  93.9 
- The purpose and functions 
of each section  3  2  2  -  1  -  1  -  -  -  -  -  -  9  27.3 
14. Contact information  4  -  2  1  2  -  3  -  1  2  1  1  1  18  54.5 
- Specific contact details 
(specific duties and 
responsibilities)  4  -  -  -  1  -  3  -  -  -  1  -  -  9  27.3 
- Graphics (e.g. maps)  1  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  1  3 
15. Language                               
- Only Thai   8  2  2  2  2  1  2  1  1  4  -  -  2  27  81.8 
- Both Thai and full detail in 
English  1  -  -  -  -  -  1  -  -  -  1  1  -  4  12.1 
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Table 6.9 Contents of the annual reports (5) 
Disclosure items  
Fin 
(n=9) 
Lab 
(n=2) 
Ind 
(n=2) 
Soc 
(n=2) 
Pm 
(n=3) 
Jus 
(n=2) 
Com 
(n=3) 
Hea 
(n=1) 
Int 
(n=1) 
Agri 
(n=4) 
Tra 
(n=1) 
Ene 
(n=1) 
Nat 
(n=2) 
Summary 
(n=33)   % 
- Both Thai and partial detail 
in English  -  -  -  -  1  1  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  2  6.1 
 
Abbreviations: 
Fin = Ministry of Finance        Lab = Ministry of Labour     Ind = Ministry of Industry     
Soc = Ministry of Social Development and Security  Pm = Office of the Prime Minister  Jus = Ministry of Justice 
Com = Ministry of Commerce       Hea = Ministry of Public Health  Int = Ministry of Interior  
Agri = Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives  Tra = Ministry of transportation   Ene = Ministry of Energy 
Nat = Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment 
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Table 6.10 Performance evaluation – annual reports  
Key to table. 
Column 1 shows the checklist of disclosure items. Columns 2 to 14 show the thirteen ministries of Table 6.8.  Each cell shows the number of departments 
within that ministry reporting the respective disclosure item. 
Disclosure items  
Fin 
(n=9) 
Lab 
(n=2) 
Ind 
(n=2) 
Soc 
(n=2) 
Pm 
(n=3) 
Jus 
(n=2) 
Com 
(n=3) 
Hea 
(n=1) 
Int 
(n=1) 
Agri 
(n=4) 
Tra 
(n=1) 
Ene 
(n=1) 
Nat 
(n=2) 
Summary 
(n=33)   % 
Financial Performance   9  1  2  2  3  1  2  -  1  3  1  1  2  28  84.8 
Non-financial 
Performance  9  2  2  2  3  2  3  1  1  4  1  1  2  33  100 
Performance improvement  4  -  -  -  1  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  5  15.1 
1. Evaluating the 
government's or unit's 
performance  8  2  1  2  3  2  1  -  1  3  1  -  1  25  75.8 
-  Key performance 
indicator using to evaluate 
its performance  7  1  -  2  2  2  2  -  1  1  -  -  1  19  57.6 
- Self assessment report  -  -  1  -  1  -  1  -  -  -  -  -  1  4  12.1 
2. The explanations why 
objectives are not met  7  1  -  1  2  2  1  -  1  1  1  -  1  18  54.5 
- The planned actions to 
improve  7  1  -  1  2  2  -  -  1  1  -  -  1  16  48.5 
3. Mission, strategic goals, 
and summary of 
accomplishments  -  -  -  1  -  -  -  1  -  -  -  -  -   2  6.1 
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Chapter 7 Discussion  
7.1 Introduction 
The aims of this chapter are to critically discuss the evidence on accountability in 
Thai  government  departments,  in  terms  of  the  six  main  components  (discussed  in 
Chapter  2),  and  to  examine  how  the  results  link  to  and  illuminate  the  theory  of 
accountability. This chapter brings together the results from the interviews (Chapter 5), 
and from the analysis of websites and annual reports (Chapter 6). Information from other 
sources  such  as  previous  research,  documents  from  international  organisations  and 
governmental papers are used to explain accountability in the Thai public sector. The 
chapter  focuses  on  three  types  of  accountability,  namely  public,  administrative  and 
organisational accountability, to discuss each of the six components. These three types 
link to each other.  
In this chapter, the relationship between accountors and accountees is examined 
through the lenses of cultural perspectives and other important factors, including the 
principal-agent  relationship.  Cultural  perspectives  can  explain  some  behaviour  of 
accountors  and  accountees,  and  can  affect  the  processes,  standards  and  effects  of 
accountability. Other factors are discussed to study how Thai civil servants behave.   
This  chapter  is  organised  by  following  the  six  main  components  of  the 
accountability relationship identified in Chapter 2. This chapter is organised as follows. 
Section 7.2 discusses the accountees and section 7.3 discusses the accountors. Section 
7.4  examines  what  the  accountors  are  accountable  for.  Section  7.5  discusses  the 
processes of accountability. As mentioned in section 2.5, the concepts of transparency, 
answerability and scrutiny are used to investigate and discuss features of the processes 
of accountability. Section 7.6 discusses standards of accountability and section 7.7 the 
effects. The conclusion is presented in section 7.8. 
7.2 Accountees  
The types of accountee will depend on the types of accountability (section 2.5.2). 
For  public  accountability,  the  accountees  are  the  public,  i.e.  tax  payers,  citizens  in 
general,  the  media,  NGOs,  or  private  sector  organisations.  For  administrative 
accountability,  the  main  accountees  are  the  auditors  or  controllers,  while  for 
organisational  accountability,  the  accountees  are  the  civil  servant’s  superiors.  These  
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accountees  have  different  duties  towards  accountors  (section  5.2).  The  type  of 
accountability affects both the identification of the accountor and what that accountor 
has a responsibility to be accountable for. 
In the case of Thailand after the economic crisis and the promulgation of the 
Constitution in 1997, a citizen-centred approach has been the main focus for operations 
(sections 3.4 and 5.3). Some projects were created using this idea as a guideline. The 
Good Governance Royal Decree aims to maximise citizens’ benefits (section 3.5). 
The  accountee  has  the  authority  to  ask  questions  or  to  request  other  desired 
information (Mulgan 2002; Pablos et al. 2002). On the other hand, the accountor has 
rights  which  allow  some  information  to  be  withheld  if  that  information  is  thought 
important or confidential (Ijiri 1983). There are differences between rights and powers. 
From the findings for Thailand, accountors respond to different accountees, who have 
different  rights  and  powers,  in  different  ways  (see  section  5.2).  Knowledge  of 
accountees regarding their rights and freedom, including educational background, is an 
important factor, given that some accountees cannot perform well in the accountability 
relationship because they do not have the knowledge or freedom to do so (sections 3.2 
and  5.4).  Attitudes  of  accountees  are  important  for  explaining  the  behaviour  of 
accountees (section 5.7).   
7.2.1 Public accountability  
People’s awareness of their rights and duties as accountees is one of the factors 
that enhance accountability (Suwanraks 1999). The World Bank aims to improve both 
civic  participation  and  service  delivery  (World  Bank  2000).  In  the  Constitution  of 
Thailand (1997
1
), Thai people and organisations were given rights which allowed them 
to  participate  in  governmental  decision  making  and  offer  ideas  on  service  delivery 
(World Bank 2000). Thus, the government and departments now pay more attention to 
citizens than in the past (section 5.2). The Good Governance Royal Decree is one of 
several projects developed based on the idea of a citizen-centred approach. It aims to 
maximise citizens’ benefits by improving efficiency and effectiveness of performance 
and service delivery (section 3.5). 
                                                 
1
 After the political turbulence in 2006, the Constitution (1997) was abrogated.   
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At the present time, most citizens know what their legal rights are (Suan Dusit 
Poll 2002c, in Thai). Citizens know that they can make a complaint about the behaviour 
of civil servants (section 5.4). From the results of interviews, Thai people know what 
they should receive from the government and its departments, e.g. citizens know that 
they should receive an appropriate level of service delivery from departments. If they do 
not get this, then they complain (section 5.4). In some cases, they are not interested in 
corruption. For example, in the national election, the deputy Prime Minister General 
Sonthi  Boonyaratglin  claimed  there  were  obvious  cases  of  vote  buying,  which 
constituents ignored and which were not reported to the authorities (Thairath 2007a, in 
Thai).   
There are several possible reasons why some Thais do not pay attention to public 
sector performance public sector performance. For instance, Thai people are tolerant of 
inequality in society (Hofstede 1991). Inequality is a broad concept, and can occur in 
many areas, for example, inequality in the work place or within families. As discussed in 
section  3.2,  both  social  values  and  religious  values  support  differences  among 
individuals. Therefore, it is easy for some Thais to accept inequality and differences 
among people. In addition, it is possible that they may think that this is a duty of their 
representatives to monitor and control departmental operations. 
Many Thais trust in karma, i.e. what goes around, comes around (section 3.2). 
They believe that if someone does something bad, then sooner or later something bad 
will happen to him or her. Thus, people may not have to do anything to ensure this is the 
case. Additionally, many wrongdoers are not punished for reasons such as a lack of 
evidence, or because they are receiving help from executives or politicians (section 5.4). 
Obtaining help from a superior is rooted in the value of grateful relationship orientation, 
i.e.  the  bunkhun  relationship,  and  the  patronage  system,  which  links  to  ideas  of 
clientelism  (discussed  in  section  3.2).  However,  the  fact  that  superiors  can  help 
subordinates relates directly to ineffective operational systems because if the system is 
effective, wrongdoers should not escape from punishment.    
Thai people realise a corruption exists in Thai government departments and they 
know that this problem needs to be solved (Suan Dusit Poll 2006, in Thai; section 3.2). 
However, many citizens neglect to do this, and may actually be involved in corrupt 
activities themselves (Phongpaichit et al. 2000; section 5.4). People will sometimes pay  
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bribes  or  petty  amounts  of  money  to  civil  servants  in  order  to  get  better  services 
(sections 3.2 and 5.4). However, neither thinks of this as corruption. It is just an amount 
of extra money paid when someone feels gratitude (section 3.2). Thus it is possible that 
people will receive different levels of service (section 5.4), depending on how well they 
are acquainted with particular civil servants, whether extra money has peen paid to these 
civil servant, or the personal morals of officials.    
Some of citizens are afraid to report corruption (Phongpaichit et al. 2000). They 
do  not  want  to  get  involved.  External  auditors  are  also  threatened  by  wrongdoers 
(section 5.4). In addition, some of them do not even know to where or to whom they 
should report such cases because departments do not give much information about this 
topic (sections 6.2 and 6.3). This situation shows how poor the communication system 
of  the  government  and  department  is.  This  is  one  of  the  obstacles  to  enhancing 
accountability.  
The media play an important role in the accountability relationship, by acting as 
a medium of communication between public sector organisations, the government or 
parliament, and the public (McMahon 1995; Mulgan 2000a; see also section 5.4). The 
media also scrutinise and examine governmental and departmental performance.     
7.2.1.1 Rights and power  
Prior  research  indicates  that  accountees  should  have  rights  and  the  power  to 
obtain  information  or  services  from  departments,  or  to  evaluate  departmental 
performance  (Mulgan  2000a).  However,  in  Thailand,  although  according  to  the 
Constitution each person should have similar rights, they will have different amount of 
power with which to force or put pressure on departments to give them information or 
services (section 5.2). For example, some PR officials pay more attention to the media 
than to the public (see section 5.2). Politicians and civil servants want to have a good 
relationship with the media because the media can present their good performance to the 
public (section 5.2). This links to the value of career advancement because the media 
can publish any information to the public.  
However, the departmental approach to citizens is different. Departments have 
conducted no surveys of citizens’ requirements and only some of them have information 
regarding how satisfied citizens are (section 5.4). Instead, civil servants do what they 
think  is  suitable  and  appropriate  for  citizens.  This  links  to  ideas  of  clientelism  and  
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grateful relationship orientation discussed in section 3.2. However, the government tries 
to reduce operational times and enhance efficiency and effectiveness in performance 
(section 3.5). This may reduce the occurrence of these kinds of relationships.  
It has been said that, in the past, civil servants thought that they were superior to 
citizens (Virushaniphawan 2004, in Thai). It is possible that some civil servants may still 
think like this but, after public sector reform, they realise that citizens are the main focus 
of governance (section 5.2). However, one problem that can obstruct the enhancement of 
accountability is that civil servants rank individual and organisational benefits above that 
of public benefits (Suwanraks 1999). This leads to some staff members accepting bribes 
from citizens, in order to make everything and every process smooth (Suwanraks 1999; 
section 5.4). This links to problems of attitudes of Thai people, social values, economic 
environment, and operational systems. 
One of the reasons why citizens do not have power over accountors is because 
they can only make complaints and they have no control over the level of penalties or 
promotion (see details section 5.2). In addition, Thai society is still based on a strong 
culture  of  collectivism  (Hofstede  1991)  even  though  that  society  now  is  more 
individualistic  than  in  the  past  (Klausner  1997;  as  discussed  in  section  3.2).  Civil 
servants concentrate on group thinking, but group may not mean the public. Therefore, 
although some civil servants realise the importance of citizens, they do not actually pay 
much attention to them (section 5.2). 
Even though citizens are the main focus of governance, and the individual has 
rights, they do not have the power to force departments to act. Only a group of people 
can do this. There have been some protests in Thailand, including at a national level. For 
example, in 1992, groups of Thais protested against the government, which had been 
formed  after  a  military  coup.  At  a  departmental  level,  some  Thais  in  Chumphon 
province protested against the police for abusing their power (MCOT 2009, in Thai). 
This situation shows accountability problems in Thailand. It represents the weakness of 
the use of laws by state power users and a lack of fairness in society. 
Although  the  power  of  the  media  is  not  a  legal  power,  it  is  quite  effective, 
because its power is backed up by citizens and the attitudes of civil servants, who in 
order to protect their careers will try to avoid criticism (section 5.4). However, there are 
still some drawbacks of the media. Some bias can occur because some types of media  
 
259 
such  as  newspapers  or  TV  channels  are  directly  or  indirectly  owned  by  politicians 
(Phongpaichit  and  Baker  1995).  These powerful  groups  of  people try  to  control  the 
media,  who  may  possibly  provide  misleading  information  to  the  public.  The 
accountability relationship between the public and the media may not be effective in this 
case.  
The  media  are responsible to news  recipients  and their professional peers by 
providing correct information to the public. This research does not study the media but, 
from  some  evidence  such  as  prior  literature,  there  are  some  problems  relating  to 
accountability of the media. There are some cases of media interference by politicians, 
who indirectly own the media (section 3.2). This can be construed as a lack of freedom 
of  the  media.  It  is  possible  that  some  sections  of  the  media  do  care  more  about 
themselves and their career opportunities instead of the news recipients. Thus, it can be 
inferred that they sometimes focus on individualistic objectives, although they also have 
to successively meet certain objectives, i.e. the objectives of organisations or owners. 
That means their collective objectives are only applicable within organisations, not to 
the public.    
7.2.1.2 Knowledge  
The knowledge of the public is another important factor in public accountability. 
For example, in the past, Thai citizens, particularly in rural areas, did not have a high 
degree  of  education.  Civil  servants  were  therefore,  able  to  take  advantage  of  them 
(Vandergreest 1993). Now, however, Thai people have a better level of education and 
know what they should get from departments. If dissatisfied, citizens can complain to 
the departments, the media or the Administrative Court of Thailand. Many of them do 
complain to the departments (section 5.4). While the process can take quite a long time, 
it does at least support the enhancement of accountability.  
7.2.1.3 Freedom  
 Another important factor is having the freedom to hold someone to account, and 
normally. During the period of political turbulence in 2006, this level of freedom was 
reduced, particularly with regard to the media (Naewna 2008, in Thai). Civil servants do 
not speak much about politics (section 5.4). Also, although citizens have the freedom to 
complain  (and  some  of  them  do  indeed  make  complaints  about  service  delivery  or 
departmental operations), they sometimes do so anonymously (section 5.4). Anonymous  
 
260 
complaints  are  rarely  followed  up  by  departments  or  auditors  (section  5.4).  Civil 
servants are, in such cases, reluctant to follow up accusations or become involved in any 
investigation (section 5.4). This situation enables civil servants to earn private benefits. 
These problems represent obstacles to the enhancement of accountability.  
7.2.1.4 Roles of accountees  
From the findings discussed earlier, the public pay more attention to what they 
themselves require from departments (section 5.4). From this, it can be seen that citizens 
are likely to exercise more control over activities in which they feel more interested. 
There are some areas that citizens do not focus on, and where they do not apply tight 
control. Here, citizens are content to let civil servants perform however they want. This 
lack of interest depends on whether citizens trust civil servants, or the type of activity 
departments perform. Such lack of interest can cause some frustration for citizens in the 
accountability  relationship, in turn leading to  an agency  problem.  From this  kind of 
environment,  politicians  and  civil  servants  can  easily  take  advantage  of  accountees. 
Thus, the behaviour of accountees can directly affect how accountors behave.     
7.2.2 Administrative accountability  
In  the  case  of  administrative  accountability,  accountees  are  auditors  and 
controllers  who  scrutinise,  evaluate,  and  assess  departmental  performance  (Bovens 
2005;  Brinkerhoff  2001).  For  Thailand,  this  type  links  to  public  accountability  and 
citizens. Auditors work indirectly on behalf of citizens. Auditors report audit results 
directly  to  parliament,  which  is  directly  accountable  to  citizens.  In  this  research, 
controllers and auditors are the Office of the Public Sector Development Commission 
(OPDC)  and  the  Office  of  the  Auditor  General  (OAG).  There  are  some  differences 
between these two organisations. The OPDC is not an independent organisation. It is a 
government  department  that  is  accountable  directly to  the  Prime  Minister,  while  the 
OAG is an independent organisation.  
7.2.2.1. Rights and power 
Both  the  OAG  and  the  OPDC  have  legal  rights  and  power  to  obtain  certain 
information, ask questions and request further information in support of their operations 
(section 5.2). However, rule enforcement is not strong (Suwanraks 1999; section 5.4). 
This leads to problems of cooperation between civil servants and auditors (section 5.3). 
Some civil servants delay some operational processes (section 5.8). The power which  
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auditors actually have used is sometimes not effective because it does not allow them to 
apply any penalties. They can only complain to higher-ranking officials. Some powerful 
people, such as politicians and higher-level officials, can threaten auditors (section 5.4). 
Also, auditors can find themselves faced with conflict of interest, whereby they may 
choose not to investigate incidents of fraud. This affects other types of accountability, 
particularly  public  accountability  and  professional  accountability.  If  some  auditors 
cannot work with their full capability, the representatives cannot perform their job well 
because  they  may  not  receive  the  correct  auditing  information.  For  performance 
evaluation, because both the OPDC and departments are at the same level within the 
bureaucratic  organisation,  the  relationship  between  accountees  and  accountors  is 
flexible, which sometimes depends on situation, and is likely to be cooperation.   
7.2.2.2 Knowledge 
Regarding improving the educational system and professional training, which the 
World Bank (1992) believes to be important for the enhancement of accountability, the 
OAG provides some training and seminars for its staff. Some auditors decide to study 
for a Masters degree in order to enhance their qualifications (section 5.4). Some auditors 
qualify as certified public accountants and secure part time work as auditors in auditing 
firms,  thus  becoming  familiar  with  accruals  accounting  helpful  when  departments 
implemented  that  type  of  accounting (section  5.4).  However,  it  is  also  possible  that 
conflict of interest can arise as a result of having extra jobs. Civil servants in the OPDC 
have to improve their knowledge quite often (section 5.4). Thus seminars and training 
are available in order for them to improve their skills. This is important for operations, 
because some departments try to create information on performance. Therefore, staff 
must catch up with other departments.   
7.2.2.3 Freedom  
  According to the State Audit Act B.E. 2542 (1999), the OAG has the freedom to 
hold  departments  to  account.  However,  there  are  some  factors  which  can  obstruct 
auditors from effectively performing their duties. For example, as mentioned earlier, 
auditors may feel threatened by wrongdoers and fail to obtain the necessary cooperation 
from civil servants. In addition, some values, such as grateful relationship orientation 
(i.e. bunkhun relationship) and ego orientation (i.e. kraeng jai, face saving and criticism 
avoidance), obstruct auditors from performing well.    
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For the OPDC, although both auditors and controllers
2
 should be independent 
from the influence of civil servants, this is sometimes difficult in the Thai public sector. 
Executives and civil servants of the OPDC and departments know each other. Criticism 
avoidance and Kraeng jai can occur. Therefore, operational processes are more flexible 
(section 5.4). There is no application of penalties for departments that fabricate data 
(section  5.4).  Controllers  do  not  want  to  create  conflict  among  departments  or  see 
departments lose face. They ask departments to amend the reports.  
7.2.2.4 Relationship between auditors or controllers and departments  
Regarding the relationship between accountors and accountees, there could be 
some  difficulties  with  cooperation  (section  5.3).  In  addition,  there  are  problems  of 
information asymmetry. Sometimes, the OAG and the OPDC cannot get the information 
they want, or departments provide incorrect information (section 5.4). Some departments 
try to manipulate performance information in order to get rewards from the government 
(section 5.4). Some auditors and controllers are aware of the problem of information 
asymmetry and incorrect information (section 5.4), and will apply rules and controls in 
their dealings with civil servants because their trust in officials is limited. If auditors and 
controllers  cannot  do  their  job  properly,  this  situation  can  cause  an  indirect  agency 
problem because they are indirectly accountable to the public. Agents might be able to 
take  advantage  of  the  situation.  The  relationship  between  superiors  and  their 
subordinates within departments can affect the relationship in the case of administrative 
accountability, since subordinates tend to follow the superiors’ aims.  
7.2.3 Organisational accountability 
7.2.3.1 Rights and power 
In the type of organisational accountability, for this research, the accountees are 
superiors who can order actions to be performed by subordinates and can give them both 
penalties and rewards (Brinkerhoff 2001; Bovens 2005). The relationship between these 
groups is a hierarchical and unequal (section 5.2). A hierarchical relationship is either a 
formal hierarchy or a clan-like hierarchy (section 3.2). 
Although at the present time, egalitarianism is a normal concept for Thai people, 
Thai society easily accepts inequality between people (section 3.2). Thai people accept 
                                                 
2
 Roles of auditors and controllers are mention in section 4.3.1.2.  
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inequality of ages and social status so they are used to paying respect to seniority, and 
sakdina or feudality (section 3.2). In addition, the Thai bureaucratic system has long 
been rooted in sakdina, and this system still affects public sector organisations to the 
present day, linking to the patronage system, bunkhun relationship, and phak phuak. The 
power and loyalty of groups are important factors in operations. In this case, it is no 
surprise  that  subordinates  follow  the  wishes  of  their  superiors.  Even  with  public 
accountability, where the main aim is to focus on the public, some civil servants focus 
more on their departments and the executives than on the public (section 5.2). This also 
represents their desire for career advancement (section 5.4).  
Nevertheless,  loyalty  to  superiors  is  not  necessarily  bad  for  accountability 
mechanisms.  Indeed,  some  researchers  claim  that  loyalty  to  superiors  can  help  to 
enhance  accountability  (Frink  and  Klimoski  2004).  Problems  of  corruption  do  not 
normally come about as a result of having a hierarchical system, but from other factors, 
such as the abuse of power, and individual behaviour, including motivations (section 
3.2).  The  accountability  relationship  in  the  case  of  relative  hierarchy  or  clan-like 
hierarchy can obstruct some operational processes and formal hierarchy. For example, 
some wrongdoers are helped by some executives (section 5.4). This may intervene with 
the system of checks and balances and the formal hierarchical system. 
The government gives power to the executives of departments to assess their 
officials’ performance (section 5.6). On the other hand, subordinates cannot evaluate 
their superiors’ performance (section 5.6). Excessive power given to superiors can lead 
to the abuse of power, corruption and mismanagement. Politicians and higher-ranking 
civil  servants  have  power,  which  enables  them  to  accrue  benefits  based  on  their 
positions (section 3.2). Higher-ranking civil servants or superiors can be biased when it 
comes to giving promotion to their phak phuak or their groups (section 5.6). This links 
to ideas of collectivism. They have the same targets and they want to reach their targets 
together. 
It is difficult for lower-ranking civil servants to stand up to their superiors and 
challenge unfair treatment (section 5.6). Therefore, some of them will just say nothing 
until they have a new superior (section 5.2). Civil servants do not want to participate in 
activities that may threaten their career or position or status, because superiors have the 
power to either enhance or hinder subordinates career chances (section 5.4). Due to the  
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power  of  superiors,  some  officials  who  know  about  corruption  cases  carried  out  by 
superiors are likely to turn a blind eye (section 5.4).  
Low salaries are one of the reasons why corruption occurs, since some less well-
paid civil servants will try to find ways to earn more money (Virushaniphawan 2004, in 
Thai; section 3.2). Some will take a ‘make hay while the sun shines’ approach, i.e. if 
they seen an opportunity to make money by corrupt means (either by themselves or by 
helping superiors to do something corrupt) then they take it (World Bank 2000). In some 
cases,  the  relationship  in  the  case  of  organisational  or  bureaucratic  accountability  is 
stronger than the relationship in the case of administrative and public accountability 
(section 5.4). 
The  accountability  problem  arises  through  a  combination  of  the  operational 
system  and  individuals.  With  the  operational  system,  although  the  government 
decentralises  some  jobs  to  provincial  offices  and  local  authorities,  the  director  of  a 
department still has a lot of power (section 5.2). He normally has the power to decide 
about departmental transactions (section 5.2). In addition, with certain processes, civil 
servants have the chance to use their positions to personally earn benefits, such as with 
service delivery (section 5.4). The motivation, including objectives, of individuals is an 
important factor. If they are motivated by materialism, they will try to do everything in 
order to gain benefits where possible. They will support their family, clan, or group, 
while taking advantage of their power or position. They act as patrons to assist their 
groups, as clients, in order to take benefits. Clients may come from within the same 
families,  geographical  areas,  background,  schools,  universities,  or  bunkhun  givers 
(section 3.2).  
7.2.3.2 Knowledge 
  Subordinates are responsible to their superiors. This means superiors should be 
responsible for the actions of their subordinates (Lucas 1993), and should be aware of 
what their subordinates have done. However, it is quite difficult for superiors keep on 
top of everything, as well as to perform their own work well (section 5.4). 
Some  superiors  do  not  pay  enough  attention  to  new  initiatives  such  as 
information technology and internal control (section 5.4). Therefore, some subordinates 
try to take advantage of the fact that they have greater knowledge about operations than 
their superiors (section 5.4). In some cases, relating to data in the database, superiors are  
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unaware of possible fraud because they do not understand the software or computer 
programmes being used. Some subordinates take advantage of this by using data for 
their own benefit. In addition, some superiors are normally interested in the high-profile 
projects, and not in general details or day-to-day operations (section 5.4). 
7.2.3.3 Freedom  
  With regard to  this  topic,  superiors  are free  to  hold  subordinates  to  account. 
There is nothing to stop them doing so, as they have the rights and powers to do so. 
7.2.3.4 Relationship between superiors and subordinates  
Superiors normally focus on the use of the budget (section 5.4). They do not pay 
much attention to officials whose jobs do not relate directly to money or budgets, and 
they do not apply many rules, regulations, to such staff (section 5.4). It may be that they 
trust their subordinates, or they may think this group of staff are not significant enough 
to  cause  any  serious  consequences,  even  if  they  were  to  do  something  wrong. 
Nevertheless,  subordinates  can  take  advantage  of  superiors’  lack  of  interest.  It  is 
possible that subordinates can find a way to benefit from corruption. For officials whose 
duties do relate to money, the relationship has more rules and control because of the 
importance of these duties (section 5.3). Problems can arise with information asymmetry 
and risk sharing. Some officials can find a way to seek benefits or practise corruption. 
Nevertheless,  the  relationship  also  depends  on  the  personal  relationship  between 
superiors and subordinates. If they have same objectives and interests, or if subordinates 
are  in  their  superiors  groups,  their  superiors  may  not  pay  much  attention  to  their 
subordinates, because either superiors trust them or because they already know what 
their subordinates want to do (section 5.4). However, if superiors and subordinates are in 
different  groups,  the  relationship  is  likely  to  be  tense,  with  rules  and  control  being 
applied  (section  5.4).  They  group  together  in  order  to  maximise  their  benefits  and 
achieve what they want.   
When  superiors  and  subordinates  are  in  the  same  groups,  they  sometimes 
collaborate  with  each  other  and  try  to  earn  benefits  from  their  power  (section  5.4). 
Hierarchy can cause corruption either top-down or bottom-up (Shah 2006). In Thailand, 
both  types  of  corruption  occur.  With  top-down  corruption,  superiors  may  ask 
subordinates  to  do  something  for  them  and  in  return  will  grant  subordinates  some  
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benefits.  With  bottom-up  corruption,  lower-ranking  civil  servants  share  any  benefits 
with their superiors. 
7.2.4 Reflection 
Public accountability  
There  are  various  types  of  accountees  in  public  accountability.  Although 
accountees,  i.e.  individual  citizens,  should  have  the  same  rights  according  to  the 
Constitution, they actually have different powers over accountors. Thus, the power of 
accountees  relates  to  their  power  to  control  accountors.  This  power  influences  what 
accountors intend to do, and may be linked to career achievement. The media, which are 
accountable  to  the  public  for  publicising  information,  have  more  power  than  other 
accountees.  The  power  of  accountees  affects  how  departments  deal  with  them.  In 
Thailand,  the  knowledge  held  by  accountees,  including  educational  background  and 
awareness  of  their  rights  to  hold  someone  to  account,  is  important  to  enhance 
accountability.  
Accountees  can  be  both  service  recipients  and  resource  owners.  As  service 
recipients, accountees have paid close attention to public accountability when directly 
related to their own benefits. However, they are not so concerned about the benefit to 
others. As resource owners, from the evidence (section 5.4), citizens do not concentrate 
closely on  governmental and departmental performance.  Instead, representatives may 
perform this task on behalf of citizens. However, it is possible that these representatives 
do  not  perform  properly,  which  can  cause  an  agency  problem.  This  does  not  help 
enhancing  accountability.  Although  the  media  and  NGOs  sometimes  focus  on 
departmental actions, this is generally only for longer, high-profile projects, not daily 
operations. Civil servants can, therefore, take advantage of this lack of interest.  
In summary, in the case of public accountability, there  are some factors that 
influence  the  accountability  relationship,  including  attitudes  and  motivations  of 
accountors and accountees, culture, social values, economic environment, use of laws, a 
lack of fairness, a lack of freedom of the public and media, media interference, and a 
lack of public participation. These factors can be classified as problems arising from 
individuals, society and systems.   
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Administrative accountability   
In the type of administrative accountability, the accountees are controllers and 
auditors.  The  OAG  has  both  legal  rights  and  power  to  obtain  cooperation  from 
departments, and it can monitor and investigate them. However, Thai values, such as 
grateful relationship orientation, i.e. the bunkhun relationship and ego orientation, i.e. 
phak phuak, kraeng jai and criticism-avoidance, and politics are important factors which 
hinder the OAG’s effective performance. Neither the executives of departments nor the 
officials want auditors to investigate their performance, so it is difficult for auditors to 
do their jobs. 
For the OPDC, there are few problems with cooperation. In addition, since the 
government pays attention to good governance, departments willingly respond to the 
OPDC and its job is not seen as invasive. As a consequence, civil servants feel more 
comfortable. In order to perform their job, accountees tend to apply strict control and 
monitor departments closely. Accountees do not want accountors to take advantage of a 
lack of interest. The different responses to auditors and controllers highlight the differing 
relationships and individual behaviour. In addition, accountors have a different attitude 
towards accountees. Accountors normally do what they think is best for them.    
Organisational accountability  
The relationship in the case of organisational accountability is between superiors 
and subordinates. Superiors have both rights and power over subordinates. However, 
superiors’ power occasionally does not help enhancing accountability, even though some 
researchers argue that loyalty to superiors and organisations can support accountability 
(Frink and Klimoski 2004). In the case of Thailand, some Thai culture and values, such 
as large power distance and grateful relationship orientation, do not help to enhance 
accountability  if  executives  wield  a  lot  of  power.  Poor  operational  systems  and 
motivations of individuals are among factors that can possibly hamper the enhancement 
of accountability.   
From the findings, the relationship between superiors and subordinates is likely 
to be strict for staff whose jobs relate to money, but less so for officials whose jobs are 
unrelated to money. In addition, personal relationships, group members and phak phuak 
are among the factors  which help explain the  relationship.  If superiors have a  close 
relationship with subordinates, the relationship is likely to be loose because the main  
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aim of both superiors and subordinates should be to maximise the group’s objectives. 
This links to ideas of clientelism as discussed in section 3.2.  
Accountees in three types of accountability link to one another. Accountees in 
one type can be accountors in another type. Executives are accountees in organisational 
accountability  but  they  are  accountors  in  administrative  and  public  accountability. 
Auditors are indirect accountors in public accountability. The media are accountees for 
public  accountability,  and  within  the  same  type,  the  media  are  accountors  and  are 
accountable to news recipients.  
7.3 Accountors 
  Accountors  have  obligations  to  provide  information  about  their  conduct  to 
accountees (UN 2004; Bovens 2005). For public sector accountability, accountors can be 
either civil servants or departments. However, accountors can play many roles in the 
accountability  relationship,  depending  on  the types  of  accountability  (Bovens  2005). 
Accountors can be organisations or individuals (Gelfand et al. 2004).   
In the Thai public sector, there are some projects in which the government and 
departments pay attention to accountors. For example, the Thai bureaucratic system has 
a long-term problem with corruption (section 3.2). There were some projects, such as the 
establishment of the ‘clean organisations’ project, brought about to improve the probity 
and integrity of civil servants (section 5.4). In this case, the accountability relationship 
starts with the accountors, who take an important part in the corruption problem, and 
then standards are created in order to improve the behaviour of accountors. As processes 
are improved, the performance of the accountors is analysed by the accountees, and the 
appropriate reward or penalty is applied.  
7.3.1 Public accountability 
For communicating with the public through websites and annual reports, the sole 
accountor is likely to be a department. The information to be made available via these 
two methods is approved and prepared by departments (section 5.4), thus departments 
should take responsibility for the content of these (i.e. websites and annual reports). 
Although corporate accountability should be applied, if mistakes occur then departments 
will usually find an individual to be held responsible. Therefore, civil servants have to 
be ready for complaints (section 5.3). This leads to the civil servants responsible for 
preparing this information  only  providing  to  the public  information  that  they  feel  is  
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accurate. Thus, some of them choose not to disclose a great deal of financial information 
(sections  6.2  and  6.3),  as  there  are  risks  involved  in  providing  inaccurate  financial 
information.  In  this  case,  accountors  tend  to  protect  their  career.  They  prevent 
themselves getting involved any trouble.  
  The  relationship  between  the  accountor  and  accountee  in  the  case  of  an 
individual is complicated. Civil servants who have direct contact with the public should 
be accountable to the public. However, some civil servants have not paid much attention 
to  citizens’  requests  (section  5.4).  They  normally  focus  on  maximising  their  own 
benefits  instead  of  other  people.  This  represents  individualism,  whereby  individual 
interests  prevail  over  collective  interests  (Hofstede  and  Hofstede  2005,  p.  109).  In 
addition, there are some factors affecting individual behaviour. Task achievement is one 
factor,  but  individual  performance  is  sometimes  not  related  to  reward  or  promotion 
(section 5.6). This relationship can possibly be explained by ideas of clientelism.  
Some factors, such as the patronage system, phak phuak, and bunkhun, can help 
civil servants escaping from penalty, and which can support misbehaviour towards the 
public (section 5.4). In addition, the process of investigation takes a long time. It is 
possible that some citizens may not want to waste time following up the cases. Some 
departments  do  not  provide  clear  information  about  procedures  and  results  so  some 
citizens may not know how to contact the departments (sections 6.2 and 6.3). 
Conflicts between responsibilities and a chain of command can happen. Some 
civil servants such as PR staff are accountable to the public, but are not directed by 
them. This situation allows accountors to prioritise which actions they want to perform 
first and most of them decide to follow the wishes of their superiors. Some researchers 
mention that civil servants are not directly accountable to the citizens at all (Axworthy 
2005). However, when citizens make contact with departments, they have to deal with 
someone, who has to be accountable for his/her behaviour.  The belief that civil servants 
do  not  have  to  be  accountable  to  the  public  may  not  help  to  enhance  public 
accountability.     
With  regard  to  the  relationship  between  accountor  and  accountees,  whether 
accountors  take  advantage  of  the  relationship  normally  depends  on  accountors’ 
motivation, attitudes and morality (sections 5.2 and 5.3). In addition, it also depends on 
accountees’  behaviour.  Some  of  civil  servants  follow  their  superiors’  requirements  
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(section 5.2). Therefore, if civil servants’ superiors focus on the public’s requirements, 
they will focus on the same issues. This shows that the relationship in organisational 
accountability affects public accountability directly.  
Some civil servants have sometimes used corrupt practices to support outside 
organisations, which they have links to (section 3.2). The allocation of resources usually 
goes to rich and powerful people (World Bank 2000). However, the government has 
implemented some new projects in order to reduce the amount of corruption, and has 
indicated  a  strong  desire  to  reduce  corruption  cases  (section  3.4).  However,  these 
projects can reduce only some levels of corruption, so higher-level cases of corruption 
will still occur. Some politicians and civil servants still find ways of behaving corruptly 
(section 5.4).  
7.3.2 Administrative accountability 
In  the  type  of  administrative  accountability,  the  accountor  is  likely  to  be  a 
department or corporate accountability because reports are launched in the name of the 
departments  (sections  6.2  and  6.3).  Executives  of  departments  are  responsible  for 
approving documents submitted to those organisations (section 5.4). However, if there 
are any problems with the information, subordinates are blamed and will be asked to 
correct and amend the reports (section 5.4). The relationship in this type can be linked to 
the superior and subordinate relationship or organisational accountability.  
For  the  relationship  between  accountors  and  accountees,  departments  assign 
certain  civil  servants  to  make  contact  with  controllers  or  auditors  (section  5.4).  On 
occasion, civil servants do not respond to the accountees’ requirements as soon as they 
would prefer (sections 5.4). Others do respond quickly. This depends on civil servants’ 
attitudes and motivations, whether they want to help auditors or not, or the level of 
moral responsibility felt, because some civil servants think that auditors are just out to 
investigate their mistakes (section 5.4). Some officials feel no obligation to ensure the 
work of the auditors goes smoothly. Individual motivations and incentives are important.  
  In cases where there is a lack of cooperation from civil servants, auditors usually 
turn to official’s superiors or higher-ranking officials in order to get the information 
(section 5.4). Superiors will then order their subordinates to provide the information and 
respond to the auditors (section 5.4). Moreover, civil servants will follow their superior’s 
requirements to avoid causing any frustration or confusion in the relationship between  
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them and their superiors (section 5.4). If they do not do, this will cause further problems. 
Auditors may once again appeal to executives. Executives will ‘lose face’ because it 
seems  that  they  cannot  manage  their  direct  subordinates.  In  addition,  there  will  be 
further problems if auditors complain to the executives of the ministries. However, civil 
servants and auditors have different points of view (section 5.8). Civil servants do not 
perceive  these  to  be  any  problems  of  conflict  or  cooperation  with  auditors,  while 
auditors think the opposite (section 5.8).  
  With regard to controllers, there are very few problems between accountors and 
accountees. The OPDC does not investigate for fraud and corruption like the OAG. They 
only evaluate performance. Therefore, civil servants do not feel threatened and have no 
concerns about this. The government emphasises performance assessment, particularly 
KPIs (section 3.4) so executives and civil servants focus on the same issue.  
In the case of the individual in the type of administrative accountability, there are 
some staff whose job can be classified as professional. In the Thai public sector, this 
aspect of the accountability relationship is not focused on closely by the government. 
These professional jobs, such as accountants and internal auditors, do not have direct 
organisations to control the quality and standards of the jobs they perform. Although the 
Comptroller General’s Department (CGD) and the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) 
launch laws and regulations for accountants and internal auditors to follow, these groups 
of officials are controlled and monitored directly by their executives, not professional 
peers. 
During the period of this thesis was undertaken, the CGD wanted to improve the 
quality of internal auditors and required them to pass certain exams (section 5.4). This 
shows that this type of accountability is important. Although the country did not have 
this system in the past, it decided to adopt this issue. However, some internal auditors do 
not  understand  the  concepts  or  the  CGD  may  not  communicate  well  enough  with 
internal auditors. Therefore, some internal auditors think this project wastes their time 
and they do not know what they would receive from this project (section 5.4). This 
situation highlights a communication problem within bureaucratic organisations. This 
problem is not happened only in Thailand. It can occur when the country decides to 
convert systems or to implement new ideas.      
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  The relationship between accountors and accountees can be either tight or loose, 
and  is  determined  by  the  executives  of  departments.  Focusing  on  either  their  own 
benefits,  departmental  benefits  or  public  benefits  can  affect  the  relationship.  For 
example, some departments fabricate information in order to get financial reward from 
the  government  (section  5.4).  This  shows  that  accountors  try  to  take  advantage  of 
accountees. Agency problems can occur. In addition, the relationship depends on the 
motivations and attitudes of civil servants. If accountors’ behaviour is in doubt, then 
controllers  and  auditors  have  to  work  harder  in  order  to  evaluate  and  scrutinise 
performance.  Departments  know  that  auditors  will  investigate  their  operations,  so 
departments will want everything to be ready so that auditors will find no mistakes.  
7.3.3 Organisational accountability 
In  organisational  accountability,  accountors  can  either  be  individuals  or 
divisions. They should be accountable to their direct superiors (section 2.5.2). In some 
cases,  particularly  in  business,  accountants  and  accounting  information  play  an 
important role. Accountants act as the medium between accountors and accountees (Ijiri 
1983), but in the Thai public sector, accountants do not have this kind of role. They just 
do their job and nothing else outside of this. In government departments, executives 
rarely use accounting information. They only use reports relating to use of the budget 
(section 5.4). This is one of the differences between the public and private sector, which 
can affect the processes of public sector accountability. This situation is possibly caused 
by problems with education, training and incorrect accounting information.  
With regard to the accountability relationship, motivations, positions, attitudes 
and morality are all important factors. Some accountors have many opportunities to take 
advantage of their position, but they do not do because they know it is wrong. However, 
there are some officials whose jobs are not even related to money yet who can still find 
ways to engage in fraudulent and corrupt activities (section 5.4). Thus, it depends on the 
individuals involved. The motivation of officials sometimes relates to career opportunity 
(Mulgan 2000b). Most focus on either divisional or departmental objectives, which are 
normally their executives’ objectives as well. For those other civil servants who are not 
members of executives’ groups, the relationship can be either tight or loose. It depends 
on the motivations, attitudes, morality, social values and organisational culture, on a 
case-by-case basis.   
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Normally, the relationship works well if both groups have similar objectives and 
both  earn  benefits  (section  3.2).  However,  within  organisations,  it  is  possible  that 
someone wants to take benefits from the other. If executives do ignore some operational 
processes,  civil  servants  may  take  advantage  of  this  situation  for  their  own  benefit 
(section 5.4). However, in some cases, civil servants have to be aware that executives 
can  take  benefits  from  them  (section  5.4).  Agency  problems  can  occur  in  this 
relationship  when  civil  servants  focus  more  on  their  own  benefits.  The  problem  of 
asymmetry information may occur. In addition, an agent normally focuses on his own 
benefits. If the principal does not control and monitor an agent effectively, it will be easy 
for an agent to turn this to his own advantage.  
7.3.4 Reflection   
Public accountability  
Accountors  in  this  research  are  departments  and  civil  servants,  each  of  who 
perform different roles. Departments and officials respond to the public by focusing on 
accountees’ rights and powers. Different rights and powers can affect how departments 
respond to the accountees. Some Thai values, such as the patronage system, phak phuak, 
bunkhun  and  personalism
3
,  (as  well  as  favouritism  and  bias),  can  affect  the 
accountability relationship. This is one form of corruption (World Bank 1992), common 
place  in  Thailand.  The  relationship  between  accountors  and  accountees  depends  on 
accountors’  motivations,  morality  and  attitudes.  However,  some  of  the  relationships 
between accountors and accountees in organisational accountability directly affect the 
relationship in public accountability.  
Administrative accountability  
Accountors  in  this  type  are  likely  to  be  departments  as  a  whole.  Although 
accountors should be accountable to accountees, there are some problems, particularly 
problems  of  cooperation,  which  can  occur.  Controllers  and  auditors  have  to  make 
contact with higher-ranking officials. This links to organisational accountability, which 
has an important role in administrative accountability.  
Some values, such as a lack of discipline and individualism, can indicate and 
explain the actions that accountors perform. The relationship between accountors and 
                                                 
3
 See details in section 3.2.  
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accountees may be either tight or loose, depending on how accountors behave and what 
accountees  think  of  accountors.  In  addition, communication  between accountors  and 
accountees influences the behaviour of both.   
Organisational accountability 
  Accountors in this type of accountability are either individuals or divisions. For 
this relationship, accountors are accountable to their direct superiors. In addition to rules 
and  regulations,  superiors  have  power  over  subordinates.  This  is  the  reason  why 
subordinates rank superiors’ requirements before other people. The relationship in this 
type can affect the relationship in both public and administrative accountability. This 
depends  on  positions,  organisational  culture,  motivations  and  the  attitudes  of  both 
accountors and accountees. Civil servants respond to different accountees in different 
ways. The main objective of accountors’ superiors may be different from that of the 
public. Therefore, it sometimes depends on accountors to decide what actions they want 
to follow.    
7.4 Accountability for what 
This accountability component indicates what the responsibilities or obligations 
of  accountors  are  (section  2.5.3).  The  relationship  depends  on  the  contract  between 
accountors  and  accountees  (Power  1991).  The  contract  can  possibly  be  formal  or 
informal, based on what accountors and accountees decide in any agreement with each 
other. Responsibilities can be both legal and moral, actions which can be supported 
either by rules and regulations or human reasons (Corlett 2004). The responsibilities 
relate directly to the processes of accountability and indicate what the processes should 
be. Some laws or regulations, i.e. one form of standards of accountability, can indicate 
what accountors should be accountable for. In order to facilitate interviews, the concept 
of responsibility has been used to represent this accountability component.  
7.4.1 Public accountability 
The  government  and  departments  use  public  money  and  resources  in  their 
operations so they are responsible to the public for their actions (Ball 2005). Operational 
process and general policy are the main obligations that departments are accountable for 
(Mulgan  2000b).  Accountors  should  be  responsible  for  congruence  between  public 
policy  and  actual  implementation,  and  the  efficient  allocation  and  use  of  public 
resources  (World  Bank  1992,  pp.  13-14).  Accounting  and  budgetary  information  is  
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important for the public evaluation of departmental performance (Pablos et al. 2002; 
Halachmi 2002; Premchand 1999). Departments also deliver services to the public so 
they  should  be  responsible  for  these  actions.  For  Thailand,  the  government  and 
departments responded to the World Bank’s demand to fight corruption and improve 
service delivery. These commitments led to the implementation of new projects. Some 
projects such as GFMIS and the new performance assessment system were applied to 
enhance accountability (section 3.4).   
Some  civil  servants  realise  that  they  use  public  resources  in  their  operations 
(sections 5.2 and 5.3). Departments have plans and policies which have to be approved 
by  parliament,  and  which  represent  a  contract  with  parliament,  which  is  the 
representative  of  citizens  and  directly  accountable  to  them.  Departments  provide 
information about their plans on websites in order to let the public know what they have 
done and what they will do (section 6.2). This is a form of commitment that they give to 
the public. For higher-ranking executives, the cabinet and ministers have to explain their 
plans to the parliament and representatives, who work on behalf of citizens.  
Directors and deputy directors of departments have to sign a commitment with 
the  permanent  secretary  to  confirm  and  accept  responsibilities  for  the  coming  year 
(section 5.3). This kind of contract is the legal responsibility stating that departments 
should reach targets. If they do not, departments have to explain why they cannot fulfil 
their  plans.  This  links  to  the  reward  system,  which  is  the  reason  why  departments 
sometimes try to create information to reach targets (section 5.4). This situation could 
imply that civil servants, particularly higher-ranking civil servants, should know what 
their legal responsibilities are. Thus, claiming to be unaware of one’s responsibilities 
should be an invalid excuse.  
  For  civil  servants’  responsibilities,  there  are  some  regulations  and  a  code  of 
conduct  that  mentions  what  departments  and  civil  servants  should  do  (section  5.5). 
However, accountors do not always follow these, because these  are only  guidelines. 
There is no penalty if they cannot perform, or if there are delays in the process, or if they 
do  not  perform  as  well  as  they  can.  For  example,  with  regard  to  service  delivery, 
although  departments  have  to  present  the  amount  of  time  that  they  spend  on  their 
operational process, in fact sometimes they cannot finish activities within the time limit. 
This  situation  can  cause  trouble  for  service  recipients.  However,  civil  servants’  
 
276 
behaviour is normally situation-oriented so they are flexible towards situations (section 
5.2). Therefore, it is possible that civil servants speed up certain processes in order to 
favour some accountees.     
In addition to legal responsibility, moral responsibility plays an important role in 
helping some accountees receive better services. Civil servants can process transactions 
for some accountees urgently if officials want this and accountees have an important 
reason (section 5.3). However, it is possible that moral responsibility can come with 
bias. If some accountees know civil servants personally, or are able to give them bribes, 
transactions can be faster. This causes inequality in receiving services from government 
departments.     
7.4.2 Administrative accountability 
The accountors should be responsible for what they have done during the year, 
and  for  how  they  have  performed  (section  2.5.3).  Efficiency  and  effectiveness  of 
operations are the main obligations of administrative accountability. Civil servants are 
accountable  to  auditors  and  controllers  because  of  legal  requirements,  moral 
responsibility, or both.  
For  Thai  departments,  there  are  some  laws  such  as  the  State  Audit  Act  that 
require civil servants to give reports, provide information and give support to auditors. 
However, not all civil servants adhere to these laws. Some people ignore them if the 
laws do not suit their needs (Klausner 1997). A sense of moral responsibility is crucial at 
this stage. Some auditors or controllers can use their personal connections to ask civil 
servants for favours, or to provide some information. Some civil servants think that they 
should give some confidential information, such as internal audit results or information 
related to corruption cases, to auditors (section 5.3).  
  Some accountors can make excuses to accountees. Laws and regulations set out 
exactly  when  reports  should  be  submitted  to  auditors  or  controllers  (section  5.2). 
However, departments can ask for permission to their submit reports late, and in some 
cases, auditors and controllers permit them to do so. This shows that the relationship is 
flexible and negotiable (section 5.4). Certain values, such as situation orientation, fun-
pleasure orientation, i.e. being easy going and smooth interpersonal relationship, i.e. mai 
pen rai, support this action. Officials will try to use a personal relationship to make  
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something easier than it should actually be (section 5.4). In addition, controllers and 
auditors will possibly reduce strictness in their operations.  
  Where accountors are uninterested in their responsibilities and accountees have 
to use personal connection to get data, this does not help to enhance accountability or to 
reduce corruption. Furthermore, this shows that officials do not understand their roles 
and responsibilities. Personal connection in this type should be considered a drawback 
rather than an advantage, as the OAG then has to rotate auditors regularly. The OAG 
does not want auditors to be familiar with working with particular officials, since this 
could lead to a devaluation of the auditing process. This is standard practice for the 
OAG to prevent auditors creating relationships with civil servants.   
7.4.3 Organisational accountability 
  Accountors  are  responsible  for  compliance,  i.e.  doing  what  accountees  want 
them  to  do  (section  2.5.3).  The  relationship  between  superiors  and  subordinates 
sometimes  depends  on  situation,  though  sometimes  organisations  have  more  formal 
agreements or contracts in place. In either case, it seems to be a feature of organisational 
culture that subordinates should be accountable to superiors (see details in sections 5.3 
and 5.4). Some departments do have a code of conduct and job descriptions to specify 
responsibilities. However, these codes are flexible and they can be changed to suit a 
particular situation.  
Details of officials’ responsibilities to executives are rarely provided on websites 
or in annual reports (sections 6.2 and 6.3). These sources usually only provide general 
responsibilities. Moreover, executive’s responsibilities and obligations are not normally 
quoted in laws or regulations either. It seems that these are considered to be an internal 
matter only. Similarly, other codes of good governance do not mention a great deal 
about the responsibilities of subordinates to superiors. They pay more attention to the 
relationship between departments and other stakeholders.  
  This relationship between superiors and subordinates is quite common for Thai 
people, because they are used to sakdina, which has been rooted for such a long time in 
Thailand  (section  3.2),  even  though  Thai  society  is  more  egalitarian  now,  and  Thai 
people have a higher level of education than in the past (Klausner 1997). Thais are 
familiar with the hierarchical system and they pay respect to higher positions, higher 
social status and higher power.   
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In order to formalise the commitments between accountors and accountees in the 
bureaucratic system, executives of the departments have to sign a commitment contract 
with ministers to confirm what they will do during the year (section 5.3). In addition, 
some  higher-ranking  civil  servants  also  have  to  sign  contracts  with  their  executives 
(section 5.3). However, lower-ranking officials have not yet had to sign this kind of 
contract, though in the future, they may have to do so (section 5.3).  
7.4.4 Reflection  
Public accountability 
The government and departments are responsible for their operations and actions, 
including  plans  and  policies,  because  they  use  public  resources  and  money  in  their 
operations.  They  are  also  responsible  for  service  delivery.  Departments  and  civil 
servants are accountable to the public either because of legal or moral accountability, or 
both.  While  moral  responsibility  can  play  an  important  role  in  the  accountability 
relationship, bias and favouritism can jeopardise it.  
Administrative accountability 
Accountors should be responsible for their performance. Both legal and moral 
responsibility is relevant in this type of accountability. Regarding legal responsibility, a 
lack of discipline can happen in the Thai public sector. Having a legal responsibility to 
do something is not enough to ensure that accountees will succeed with their objectives. 
Accountors’  attitudes  are  an  important  factor  in  any  consideration  of  moral 
responsibility. Whether accountors actually want to give support to the accountees is 
vital to improving accountability. If they do, then accountability in the public sector can 
be improved.   
Organisational accountability 
Subordinates are responsible for compliance with their superiors’ requirements 
or commands. They are obliged to follow what their superiors want. Responsibilities can 
be both legal  and  moral. The subordinate-superior relationship is loose  and flexible, 
dependent  upon  the  situation.  They  can,  for  instance,  negotiate  with  each  other. 
Communication between both groups is important. Thai values, particularly large power 
distance,  grateful  relationship  orientation,  and  smooth  interpersonal  relationship,  and 
organisational culture can affect how accountors perform and how accountees respond.    
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7.5 Processes of accountability 
The  processes  are  important  for  the  accountability  relationship  because  the 
processes  show  actions  between  accountors  and  accountees.  In  order  to  facilitate 
interviews and gather information in Thailand, the concepts of transparency, scrutiny 
and  answerability  are  applied,  derived  from  the  analysis  of  the  meanings  given  by 
previous research papers (section 2.6). The discussion in this section is, therefore, based 
on these three concepts.  
Some projects in Thailand were specifically implemented because of problems 
with the processes of accountability (see details in section 3.4). For example, the GFMIS 
was implemented in order to improve transparency, to make the information system 
more  systematic  and  to  make  information  available  for  use  by  executives  and  staff 
(section  3.4).  Both  executives  and  staff  have  had  to  study  this  system  and  then 
implement it. There are also laws and guidelines in place to support the system.  
7.5.1 Public accountability 
7.5.1.1 Transparency  
The availability of information to the public and clarity about government rules, 
regulations and decisions are defined as an explanation of transparency (Hood 2006; 
Kondo 2002). Transparency is also defined as reliable, relevant, and timely information 
about the activities of government (Kondo 2002). One of the main problems that the 
World Bank wanted Thailand to solve was public access to information (World Bank 
2000, p. 84). The  World Bank also wanted Thailand to improve fiscal transparency. 
Thailand  responded  by  introducing  a  number  of  projects  to  enhance  transparency  in 
order to reduce the number of corruption cases (section 3.4). However, these are still 
some  problems  with  the  information  provided  to  the  public,  such  as  availability, 
reliability and timeliness (sections 6.2 and 6.3).  
According to the World Bank (1992), information about governmental policies 
and actions should be available (p. 40). However, there are still some departments that 
do  not provide  this information  (sections  6.2  and  6.3).  In addition,  the World Bank 
wanted the Thai government to prevent and resolve corruption, so information about 
public expenditure is important. Unfortunately, information on departmental operations 
is not widely publicised.  
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Availability of information  
Access to information is the main obstacle to improving transparency in Thailand 
(sections  6.2  and  6.3).  Moreover,  Thai  culture  encourages  secrecy  instead  of 
transparency  (Gray  1988).  The  Thai  government  has  improved  access  to  public 
information by creating laws which enhance the rights of citizens, and using a variety of 
channels to communicate with the public (sections 3.4 and 3.5). The Thai government 
and its departments are developing their departmental communication media, websites 
and  annual  reports,  as  these  will  act  as  the  medium  between  them  and  the  public. 
Information  on  the  websites  mainly  responds  to  the  objectives  of  service  delivery 
(section  6.2),  though  some  present  departmental  performance  and  operational  results 
also.  
In the past, departments were not required to produce annual reports (section 
6.3). However, in 2006, the government made this a requirement (section 6.3). This 
shows how committed the government is to improving transparency. However, annual 
reports are limited in their availability to the public (section 6.3). It is difficult for Thais 
in rural areas to gain access to either websites or annual reports. Therefore, there is 
asymmetry of information between urban Thais and rural Thais.  
Citizens have the right to request departmental information but the process can 
take a long time. This is confirmed by the researcher’s own experience. Sometimes it is 
actually  not  that  easy  for  citizens  to  obtain  information  from  departments.  Personal 
acquaintances, phak phuak, and the patronage system can help to speed up processes. 
Where accountees hold more power (e.g. the media), then access to information should 
be easier (section 5.4). Departments sometimes prepare information for these accountees 
in advance (section 5.4). This shows that the power and rights of accountees can link 
directly to the processes of accountability.  
Rules and regulations  
Thai laws and regulations can be difficult for people to understand. Interpretation 
is needed in order to increase understanding, even for civil servants. For example, the 
OPDC had to launch explanations of the Good Governance Royal Decree in order to 
clarify the contents of the Decree (section 3.5). For laws relating to transparency, the 
Official Information Act (1997) lists some items that departments should present to the  
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public. Apart from this, neither the Act, nor the Decree identify anything specifically, 
and it is up to the departments how these are interpreted.   
  The laws do not mention a great deal about financial information, particularly 
financial statements. This is different from other codes of good corporate governance, 
such  as  the  OECD  principles  of  corporate  governance  and  the  ADB  code  of  good 
corporate governance, possibly due to variations in the nature of organisations. Within 
the Thai government departments, executives and civil servants do not focus much on 
accounting  information,  particularly  financial  statements  (section  5.4).  They  are  just 
concerned about how to use the budget allocated to them by the government. In addition, 
some civil servants pay more attention to their interests because they do not want to 
reduce  their  spending  (section  5.8).  As  one  interviewee  mentioned  if  a  department 
reduces its costs this year, it is possible that in the coming year the department will 
receive a lower budget (section 5.8). He does not want a tight budget (section 5.8). 
Although the results of this research may not be generalised to every Thai government 
department, it shows the attitude towards operations and how some civil servants think 
of public resources. They do not think about saving costs and believe that they may 
spend the whole of the budget they received from parliament.   
Reliability of information  
Financial information presented on websites and in annual reports is normally 
unaudited  (sections  6.2  and  6.3).  The  government  does  not  have  any  organisations 
tasked with checking or controlling the quality of this information. Therefore, it cannot 
guarantee  that  the  information  is  correct,  even  though  departments  approve  the 
information before it is released. However, since neither citizens nor civil servants, are 
interested in or use this financial information (section 5.4), there is no awareness of any 
problems  regarding  the  reliability  of  information.  This  situation  cannot  fulfil  the 
requirements for transparency. 
A lack of reliable information can cause an agency problem because this is one 
kind of information asymmetry. It is difficult for accountees to evaluate the actions of 
accountors (sections 6.2 and 6.3). Some departments do not provide certain types of 
financial information to the public, e.g. financial statements (sections 6.2 and 6.3). Many 
citizens would not want to waste their time requesting information. This cannot help to 
enhance accountability.   
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Relevant information  
Regarding  accountees  as  service  recipients,  departments  provide  a  lot  of 
information about service delivery (section 6.2). In citizens’ role as resource owners, 
some departments provide departmental performance and financial information but as 
mentioned earlier, there are typically reliability problems with this kind of information. 
However, the situation now is better than in the past when departments provided only 
limited information or withheld it altogether. This can be seen as a starting point to 
improve fiscal transparency, efficiency and effectiveness.   
With regard to the type of information provided, this is likely to be that which 
departments feel comfortable in providing (sections 6.2 and 6.3). As mentioned earlier in 
sections  7.2.3  and  7.3.3,  civil  servants  usually  adhere  to  the  requirements  of  their 
superiors.  If  the  government  does  not  pay  attention  to  information  disclosure,  then 
departments  and  civil  servants  will  not  be  interested  either.  For  example,  after  the 
change of government, one official did not know whether the department has to produce 
annual reports or not (section 5.4).  
Timely information  
  For some information, e.g. performance reports on websites, IT officials have to 
wait for other divisions to give the information to them (section 6.2). It takes some time 
to obtain this information and update it before it appears online. Information such as 
services and news is updated more frequently. Whether information is timely or not 
normally depends upon its type. Less sensitive and more easily-prepared information is 
publicised more quickly than other types. Departments have to check risky information 
thoroughly. 
  There is no exact and strict rule or regulation to control when departments have 
to publicise annual reports. Although the government requires producing the reports by 
February, departments can negotiate the due date (section 5.2). Due to the fact that it is 
difficult  for  the  public  to  get  these  reports,  which  they  rarely  use  anyway,  both 
accountors and accountees do not pay much attention to them. This shows a lack of 
awareness and participation by the public.       
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7.5.1.2 Scrutiny 
  In  addition to  accessing  information, increasing  both  public participation  and 
awareness among citizens and civil servants are important for accountability (Bertók et 
al. 2002). The World Bank wanted the Thai government to improve public participation 
(World Bank 2000). Public participation can overcome the problem of corruption, which 
is  one  of  the  biggest  problems  for  the  Thai  bureaucratic  system  (section  3.2). 
Nevertheless, this is a problem which still continues in Thailand today.  
Civil society should pay attention to monitoring departmental actions and official 
behaviour (Suwanraks 1999). However, in Thailand, this is not easily done. Thai people 
themselves pay very little attention to the scrutiny of departmental performance (section 
5.4).  Departments  provide  only  limited  information  about  their  controlling  and 
monitoring systems to the public (sections 6.2 and 6.3). Citizens do not request this 
information and are uninterested in the topic. Parliament and representatives have to 
monitor and control what the government and departments have done. However, there 
can be some conflict of interest between the cabinet and certain representatives if they 
come from the same party. Some of them may not perform their task properly causing an 
agency problem. If citizens show no interest in becoming involved, it will be difficult to 
enhance  accountability.  A  lack  of  public  participation  enhances  opportunities  for 
politicians and civil servants to misuse power and public resources. 
It  is  not  easy  for  the  public  to  participate  in  governmental  and  departmental 
matters.  From previous  research,  many Thais do not know how to report corruption 
cases  (Phongpaichit  et  al.  2000).  From  the  results  of  this  research,  there  are  some 
problems  about  issues  of  transparency,  particularly  availability  and  reliability  of 
information  (section  5.4).  During  the  period  of  the  research,  political  turbulence 
occurred.  Since  political  stability  is  one  of  the  components  of  good  governance 
(Kaufman  et  al.  2008),  this  does  not  help  the  country  to  improve  the  processes  of 
governance. Many Thais are wary of giving their opinions on political matters. Freedom 
of speech is claimed to be less than before (section 3.2). These are among the factors 
burdening public participation, which is an important factor of good governance. This 
could  imply  that  although  the  Thai  government  implemented  the  Good  Governance 
Royal  Decree  in  order  to  improve  the  process  of  governance,  there  are  still  some 
problems inhibiting this project.  
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Problems of scrutiny come from two major areas, from individuals and systems. 
The  motivation,  attitudes  and  opinions  of  individuals  are  important  to  enhance 
accountability.  With  the  systems,  there  are  problems  relating  to  the  audit  process, 
complaint process, methods of communication, and the political system. This situation 
inhibits the enhancement of accountability.  
7.5.1.3 Answerability  
  The  accountor  should  be  ready  to  give  answers  to  the  accountee,  including 
rebutting  any  accusations  (Armstrong  2005;  Brinkerhoff  2001;  Dubnick  2006).  In 
Thailand,  departments  have  channels  (e.g.  websites,  post,  or  phone)  through  which 
people  can  make  contact  or  give  opinions  or  complaints  on  governmental  and 
departmental operations.  
For  the  Thai  public  sector,  the  way  accountors  answer  general  questions, 
complaints and accusations differs. For general questions, departments have no problem 
in providing answers and they answer questions from all kinds of accountees (section 
5.4). These questions normally relate to service delivery and the majority of complaints 
usually come from those unhappy with departmental services. 
On the other hand, when answering accusations, departments respond to different 
accountees  in  different  ways  (section  5.4).  The  process  depends  on  the  relationship 
between accountors and accountees. The accountees who have power over departments 
can get what they want more easily. This is different from the aims of the Constitution 
which states that all people have the same rights. 
7.5.2 Administrative accountability 
7.5.2.1 Transparency 
The accountors in this case are sometimes unaware of their own individual roles, 
which is typical behaviour for some Thai civil servants (Suwanraks 1999). Although 
there are some problems with cooperation, civil servants have to provide the information 
and reports that the accountees want (section 5.4). While it is possible that there are 
some  information  asymmetries,  departments  will  ultimately  have  to  provide  the 
information  accountees  require.  However,  this  information  may  be  either  correct  or 
incorrect. Accountees have to use their own skill to scrutinise this information.   
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7.5.2.2 Scrutiny  
  There are various kinds of corruption and fraud, including graft, bribery, theft, 
conflict of interest, nepotism, bias or favouritism (World Bank 1992; section 3.2). These 
activities have occurred in Thailand and can obstruct the scrutinising process and are 
common in Thailand (section 5.4).   
Although auditors have the power to scrutinise, in fact it is not easy to investigate 
corruption. There are some factors that can affect operations, such as the politics and 
attitudes  of  civil  servants  (section  5.3).  Auditors  are  sometimes  threatened  by 
wrongdoers and their groups (section 5.4). Even though the OAG is an independent 
organisation and reports auditing results directly to the parliament, there are some links 
between the parliament and the cabinet. The chairman of the National Assembly and the 
majority of representatives are normally members of the Prime Minister’s party, which 
can cause conflict of interest. This situation can burden the enhancement of public sector 
accountability.  
It is difficult for auditors to find support or witnesses from among staff within 
the organisations. This depends on the integrity and morality of the individuals. There 
are a number of laws and regulations but, due to some Thai values such as the patronage 
system, personalism and bunkhun and a number of operational stages, some cases take 
longer to sort out and can end up being unresolved.  
For performance evaluation, the main problem that controllers face is that of 
incorrect information (section 5.4). They have no problems with access to information or 
participation, just with the quality of information. Although it seems like auditors and 
controllers work indirectly on behalf of the  citizens in order to  monitor and control 
departmental activities, their results are rarely provided to the public. On the other hand, 
performance  assessment  reports  are  provided  to  the  public,  but  only  by  some 
departments (sections 6.2 and 6.3).  
7.5.2.3 Answerability  
  Civil servants have to answer questions from auditors and controllers (section 
5.4). Because this is a legal requirement, they cannot ignore these even though they may 
not want to answer. Moral responsibility can help accountees to obtain more information 
for their work, but this is not easy to realise. Even an external auditor believes the level 
of cooperation depends on an official’s attitudes and morality (section 5.4). With regard  
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to the length of time taken for response and answers, this can vary among organisations. 
Officials  may  postpone  giving  information  to  auditors  or controllers.  However, they 
cannot be too late because auditors complain whereby the officials may be reprimanded 
by their superiors.   
7.5.3 Organisational accountability 
7.5.3.1 Transparency  
  Executives  of  departments  have  no  problems  getting  information  promptly 
because they are entitled to this. For them accessing this information is simple (section 
5.4).  This  relationship  does  not  have  any  legal  requirements  for  control,  but  civil 
servants know what they have to do. Although accountors have rights to protect their 
privacy,  if  it  does  not  relate  to  personal  information,  subordinates  should  provide 
information  to  superiors.  However,  information  used  by  organisations  is  handled 
differently to information provided to the public. Information used within organisations 
is more confidential in terms of detail.  
7.5.3.2 Scrutiny 
  There are some projects that departments have implemented in order to improve 
and  control  departmental  operations  (section  3.4).  Regarding  the  Good  Governance 
Royal Decree, monitoring and scrutinising the performance of both the department and 
the individual is mentioned in the Decree (section 3.5). This shows that the government 
pays attention to this process. However, how this works will depend on the actions of 
officials. In addition, what the government and ministers think about monitoring and 
evaluating is important because a lack of political will to back up concrete and continual 
change is one of the main obstacles to the introduction of good governance (Suwanraks 
1999). If the government remains continuously interested in monitoring and evaluating, 
departments will also follow this idea.  
Hierarchical control is claimed to be an ineffective method of control (World 
Bank 1992), but in Thai departments this sometimes depends on the attitudes of the 
executives. Problems do not normally come from having a hierarchical system but from 
the failure of hierarchical control. There are both top-down and bottom-up corruption 
cases in Thailand. This is one sign that higher-ranking executives may not have the 
qualifications to implement effective control. In addition, there are problems with the  
 
287 
education, training and a lack of interest of executives. This situation does not support 
the hierarchical control either. 
Departments are controlled by higher-level executives, who are also ministers. In 
the  Thai  bureaucratic  system,  politicians  are  much  more  influential  in  operations 
(section  5.3),  and  executives  and  staff  have to  follow  politicians’  requirements.  The 
cabinet and ministers are controlled by the parliament that is accountable to the public. 
However,  conflict  of  interest  does  sometimes  happen.  The  Prime  Minister  can 
sometimes intervene in parliamentary and independent organisations’ matters (section 
3.3).   
Regarding participation by accountees, there are some obstacles to the promotion 
of good governance and accountability (Suwanraks 1999). For example, executives of 
departments  do  not  always  pay  close  attention  to  internal  control  and  accounting 
information  (section  5.4),  which  a  lack  of  interest  and  will,  coupled  with  a  lack  of 
knowledge and understanding of the concept, can explain.  
It is not only executives of departments who do not pay full attention to the 
matter of control, but civil servants also. Some staff may discover instances of fraud or 
corruption, but choose not to take any action, because they think it is none of their 
business (section 5.4). A lack of vision and awareness of the appropriate roles may help 
to  explain  this  situation.  However,  some  officials  use  this  reluctance  for  their  own 
benefit. Corruption or fraud may happen due to the ignorance of control by executives.  
With regard to performance evaluation, this is a unidirectional assessment. Civil 
servants are unable to evaluate their superiors’ actions (section 5.6), yet executives can 
use bias or prejudice in their assessment. Thai people may not perceive favouritism or 
bias to be a major problem, and many civil servants accept favouritism (section 5.6).  
  Executives  of departments  are  normally  more  interested  in  risky  divisions  or 
projects  than  others.  However,  if  executives  are  themselves  involved  in  corrupt 
activities, some  officials  may  turn the  blind  eye,  and  only  in  a  few  cases  will  civil 
servants complain. This makes it difficult for internal auditors to perform their duties 
effectively.   
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7.5.3.3 Answerability  
  Civil servants have to be ready to answer questions and accusations as soon as 
executives  require  them  to  (section  5.4).  There  are  very  few  problems  with  this 
component. However, executives have to use their own judgement as to whether they 
can trust their subordinates.  
7.5.4 Reflection  
Public accountability  
For transparency, the government responded to the World Bank’s requirements 
by implementing specific projects. The government encouraged departments to provide 
more information to the public, such as publishing their own departmental websites and 
producing annual reports. However, there are some limitations with this, such as the 
availability  of  information,  particularly  with  annual  reports,  and  the  reliability  of 
information, especially of the financial variety. In addition, favouritism also takes an 
important  part  in  the  availability  of  information.  With  regard  to  timely  information, 
news  about  services  is  often  updated,  but  for  performance  reports  and  financial 
statements, the public often have to wait some time to obtain information. Rules and 
regulations  relating  to  information  disclosure  are  not  precise.  They  are  open  for 
departments to decide which information they should present.    
Regarding scrutiny, the main issue for this concept is public participation and 
awareness. However, from reviewing the evidence, it is clear that this rarely occurs. The 
public pay little attention to daily departmental operations, while other groups such as 
the media and NGOs focus mainly on large or high-profile projects. Citizens, as service 
recipients,  focus  only  on  service  delivery.  In  addition,  one  of  the  problems  is  the 
willingness to report corruption cases.  
For answerability, departments have channels through which the public can make 
comments  or  complaints  and  ask  questions.  However,  there  are  differences  in  how 
departments  respond  to  general  questions  and  accusations.  For  general  questions, 
departments respond to the public quite quickly. However, for accusations, they often 
take  time  to  respond.  The power of  accountees  is  an important  factor  in  explaining 
accountors’ behaviour towards answering accusations.  
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Administrative accountability  
  Regarding  transparency,  although  there  are  some  difficulties  in  cooperation 
between accountors and accountees, this is only in terms of a few problems of access to 
information, since accountors are required by law to give information to accountees.  
  For scrutiny, there are some problems in cooperation between accountors and 
accountees. Some factors, such as the political and patronage system, can obstruct the 
monitoring and evaluation processes. Compared to in the past, the auditing process is 
currently better because the OAG is now independent. 
  For answerability, auditors and controllers have no problem obtaining an answer 
from departments because they have the rights and powers to do so. However, whether 
or not they get further details or useful information for investigation depends on the 
attitudes and morality of departments and civil servants.  
Organisational accountability 
  For transparency, superiors have no problem obtaining information from their 
subordinates. The government improved transparency by implementing the GFMIS, to 
ensure  that  superiors  have  access  to  departmental  information  systems,  according  to 
their legal rights. 
  With regard to  scrutiny,  executives  pay  more attention  to  budget  so  officials 
whose jobs relate to money are closely monitored by them. For other jobs such as PR or 
IT staff, executives do not pay as much attention. Both executives and officials seem to 
avoid paying close attention to internal control (section 5.4). This can cause a degree of 
corruption or fraud in organisations. With regard to hierarchical control, executives can 
use favouritism or bias to assess official performance, which naturally does not enhance 
accountability.  Moreover,  the  executives  and  civil  servants  do  not  understand  the 
concept very well, which is a problem to do with education and training (section 5.8).  
  For  answerability,  subordinates  have  to  respond  by  answering  questions  and 
accusations  from  superiors.  Therefore,  there  is  no  problem  for  the  criterion  of 
answerability.   
7.6 Standards of accountability 
Clarity of standards and having a number of rules and regulations have a strong 
influence  on  the  accountability  relationship  (Gelfand  et  al.  2004).  The  relationship  
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between accountors and accountees will be strong if standards are clear and there are a 
number of rules (Gelfand et al. 2004). In an attempt to enhance accountability, one of 
the most important projects implemented by the government was the introduction of the 
concept of good governance (section 3.5). The Good Governance Royal Decree was 
promulgated to be a standard and guideline for departments to follow.  
The Good Governance Royal Decree is a standard of appraisal for accountability. 
Some projects have originated through ideas taken from the Decree. However, other 
activities  or  projects  that  do  not  originate  from  the  Decree  usually  have  their  own 
standards. For example, for human resources, departments have to follow regulations 
and codes produced by the Office of the Civil Service Commission (OCSC). Auditing 
processes are controlled by the State Audit Act (1999).  
For  Thailand,  previous  research  suggests  that  a  lack  of  law  is  not  the  main 
problem  but  rather  ineffective  law  enforcement  (Suwanraks  1999).  As  discussed  in 
section 3.5, the Good Governance Royal Decree links to the aspects of accountability. 
Although the ideas of the Decree cannot fulfil all the requirements for good governance, 
e.g. lack of political stability, the Decree gives useful ideas and is a starting point for 
some new projects. There are other factors, such as politics and individual motivations, 
influencing  the  implementation  of  projects  in  relevance  to  accountability.  Factors 
affecting  the  accountability  relationship  are  discussed  in  Chapter  8  (section  8.3).  In 
addition,  with  regard  to  the  problems  in  Thailand,  laws  are  normally  open  for 
departments to use their own judgement. Therefore, it is possible that civil servants can 
find the way for gaining their benefits if what they have done is still under the laws.  
7.6.1 Public accountability  
With  regard  to  performance,  departments  present  their  plans  and  policies, 
including their objectives, through departmental websites and annual reports (sections 
6.2 and 6.3). This represents a promise between departments and the public as to what 
departments  have  done  or  will  do.  The  public  can  use  the  plans  and  policies  that 
departments present as a standard with which to analyse what departments might do, or 
what they may achieve in the future.  However, some departments do not provide such 
information about their plans and operational results. If the public are unaware of these, 
public participation does not occur.   
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For quality of service delivery, some activities do not have any standards and 
citizens do not use any standards to evaluate civil servants’ behaviour (section 5.5). 
Indeed, they use their own feelings towards those behaviours. The standards in this case 
are supposed to be informal. Some departments that do not provide their policies or 
plans may think that the public may not be interested in this information, that they may 
not pay attention to public matters, or the information is not ready for release. Even 
though codes of conduct, codes of ethics or principles are essential for accountability, 
the public are not involved in the setting of such standards. Departmental codes are 
rarely provided to the public (sections 6.2 and 6.3).  
One of the problems which obstructs good governance is the fact that laws, rules 
and regulations (as the standards of accountability) are not clear (section 5.5). Rewards 
or punishments are also not always clearly defined (section 5.6). Both citizens and civil 
servants can use gaps in the law to their own benefit. Civil servants can negotiate about 
some rules or regulations (section 5.2). Accountees in this type of accountability do not 
have any chance to influence the standards.  
Although the Good Governance Royal Decree mentions some rights of citizens 
(section 3.5), it does not focus much on this topic. This information is rarely presented 
either on websites or in annual reports (sections 6.2 and 6.3). The Decree concentrates 
more  on  operational  processes.  In  addition,  for  the  Decree,  the  responsibilities  of 
departments  and  civil  servants  towards  the  public  are  not  extensively  referred  to. 
However, there are a few sections in the Decree which indicate the legal responsibilities 
of departments towards the public.  
Information about the responsibilities of departments is normally provided on 
websites and annual reports, in order to inform the public about what they intend to do 
or have done during the year (sections 6.2 and 6.3). Some departments also provide 
details on divisional responsibilities. This is helpful to clarify to the public what they can 
expect from departments.  
7.6.2 Administrative accountability  
The Good Governance Royal Decree mentions some responsibilities and duties 
of the  OPDC  and  specifies  what  this  department should  do.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
Decree  does  not  provide  much  guidance  about  the  OAG.  Auditors  have  their  own 
standards, such as the State Audit Act (1999) and codes of conduct, which departments  
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should follow (section 5.3). Some of these standards are not derived from the Good 
Governance Royal Decree. However, these laws can still help to enhance accountability.  
For controllers, the relationship between accountors and accountees is different 
from  that  involving  auditors,  given  that  for  controllers  the  standards  are  not  laws. 
Standards  in  this  relationship  normally  originate  from  the  Good  Governance  Royal 
Decree and are benchmarks or targets for projects. The OPDC sets standards and gives 
guidelines  for  departments  to  set  their  own  standards.  The  OPDC  approves  these 
standards and then evaluates departmental performance. These standards are normally 
clear in order for departments to understand them. 
For government departments, the Good Governance Royal Decree mentions that 
departments  should  submit  their  performance  reports  and  financial  statements  for 
evaluation  and  scrutiny  (section  3.5).  It  mentions  the  responsibilities  to  departments 
towards operational processes within the bureaucratic system. This situation can confirm 
that departments should know their responsibilities. However, whether they carry out 
these responsibilities or not depends upon their attitudes. 
7.6.3 Organisational accountability  
Each department may have different plans, policies, and objectives, which will 
affect their operational styles. Therefore, it is possible that some differences in practice 
will occur. For example, regarding information disclosure, each department will have 
differing amounts of information (section 6.2).  
Divisions within each organisation should each have a plan and policy for each 
year. At an individual level, civil servants usually do not have to make plans. For some 
departments, standards regarding this type are normally not clear, and are not legal in 
nature. Code of conduct and code of ethics are important for accountability (Brinkerhoff 
2001; Osborne 2004). Some departments create new codes, while others do not and 
follow the codes produced by the Office of Civil Service Commission (section 5.5). In 
addition, some civil servants do not know about the codes of conduct. This is an obstacle 
to  the  enhancement  of  accountability  and  shows  that  some  civil  servants  are  not 
interested in any other issue, except that of their own duties (as assigned to them by their 
superiors). From previous research, most did not even know  about the public sector 
reform (Suan Dusit Poll 2002b, in Thai).   
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7.6.4 Reflection  
Public accountability 
  The public can use both laws and departmental plans and policies as standards of 
appraisal. These standards can be both formal and informal. However, one of the main 
drawbacks  is  that  standards,  including  rewards  and  punishments,  are  not  clear.  In 
addition, law enforcement is weak. In tandem with individuals, and a lack of discipline 
seen in Thai people and culture, this does not enhance accountability. 
Administrative accountability 
  For  auditors,  the  standards  are  normally  laws  and  regulations  but  for  the 
controllers in this research, they are not. Instead they are normally the benchmarks or 
targets of the projects. However, standards are normally clear enough for departments 
and officials to follow. 
Organisational accountability 
  Standards  in  this  case  can  be  both  formal  and  informal.  Executives  of 
departments  have  to  make  commitments  to  the  Permanent  Secretary  of  the  ministry 
which they then have to follow. These kinds of standards are formal and legal. However, 
within organisations, standards tend to be informal and not clear, and are sometimes 
dependent  on  an  organisational  culture.  Some confusion  may  occur  if  there is some 
conflict  between  laws  and  organisational  culture.  In  some  cases,  it  is  possible  that 
objectives or policies raised by executives are standards. Therefore, attitudes of power 
wielders  are  important  for  the  enhancement  of  accountability.  For  informal,  the 
enforcement of those standards sometimes depends on who uses those standards and 
who would receive an effect. In Thailand, the term ‘double standards’ is common place. 
Two  people  may  undertake  the  same  activities,  yet  receive  different  effects.  It  is 
sometimes not easy to predict what the effects will be. This situation creates bias and 
favouritism. This will affect the enhancement of accountability.    
7.7 Effects 
  Effects in this research mean the sanctions, feedbacks, punishments or rewards 
that  accountors  may  receive  after  accountees  evaluate  and  assess  on  accountors’ 
performance  and  actions.  However,  this  research  does  not  focus  heavily  on  this 
component  because  the  research  is  more  concerned  with  other  accountability 
components, in order to better understand the Thai public sector.   
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For the accountability relationship, accountees can give sanctions or feedback to 
accountors after they evaluate performance by using standards of appraisal (see section 
2.4). There is a variety of sanctions and feedback, which can affect the behaviour of both 
the  accountors  and  the  accountees.  If  sanctions  and  feedback  are  strict  and  clear, 
accountors tend to focus more on following standards or on what they are supposed to 
do. Sanctions can be both formal and informal (Bovens 2005). For Thailand, in the case 
of  administrative  accountability,  sanctions  tend  to  be  formal.  For  public  and 
organisational accountability, sanctions may be both formal and informal.  
  In  the  past,  the  Thai  government  did  not  have  a  reward  system  (Suwanraks 
1999). Therefore, during the introduction of good governance, the government decided 
to implement a reward system for the public sector. The government now gives rewards, 
which are normally in forms of money, to departments whose performance reaches the 
benchmark. Within departments, the director of departments distributes rewards to their 
staff.    The  reward  system  is  as  an  incentive  for  departments  and  civil  servants  to 
perform. This can affect what accountors are accountable for, accountors’ attitudes and 
processes of accountability.  
  For  the  Thai  public  sector,  the  implementation  of  a  reward  system  has  both 
advantages  and  disadvantages  (sections  5.4  and  5.6).  In  terms  of  advantages, 
departments  have  more  incentives  to  work,  and  focus  more  on  departmental 
performance.  However,  bad  behaviour  can  sometimes  occur.  For  example,  some 
departments create information, bias and favouritism are common, and some executives 
give promotion or more proportion of rewards to their phak phuak or their group.  
7.7.1 Public accountability  
From Transparency in Government by one Sub-Saharan African country, it is 
important that ‘the administration must know how to punish and reward’ (World Bank 
1992, p. 43). The best way of knowing how to reward or punish officials who work with 
the public is to know what the public think about their performance (World Bank 1992). 
However, in Thailand, although the public can complain about an official’s behaviour, if 
that official is a powerful individual within the organisation, or belongs to the same 
group as the executives assigned to deal with the complaint, then it is unlikely that they 
will  be  penalised  (section  5.6).  Having  regulations  is  one  thing,  but  the  practical  
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application of these is different, and depends on how executives deal with the case. Thai 
values have an important influence in this part.  
Although there are some laws and regulations relating to control, sometimes the 
actual effect is not stipulated by law. It will follow the law where a precise statement 
exists. Nevertheless, the effects from some actions, such as complaints from citizens, are 
not  quoted  anywhere  (sections  6.2  and  6.3).  Even  civil  servants  do  not  know  what 
executives will do if departments receive complaints (sections 5.6).  
With  regard  to  feedback,  comments  or  complaints  from  citizens,  some 
departments  use  these  to  improve  their  operations.  Although  departments  have 
procedures  to  deal  with  these,  they  deal  with  different  cases  in  different  ways.  For 
general  cases,  executives  of  departments  will  let  practitioners  deal  with  feedback. 
Officials  do  what  they  think  is  appropriate.  However,  different  practitioners  have 
different perspectives. This is one of the reasons why effects are not clear at this point.   
7.7.2 Administrative accountability  
  In the Thai public sector, while auditors have quite clear laws and regulations, 
the effects are unclear (section 5.6). They report to parliament and give feedback to 
audited organisations. The outcome then depends on evidence and decisions made by 
executives.  For  controllers,  the  process  is  virtually  the  same.  They  just  report  their 
actions to higher-ranking executives. These two organisations have the right to scrutinise 
and assess performance, but regarding punishments, these are decided by others, and 
will depend on who did what and how severe the case is.   
7.7.3 Organisational accountability  
  Effects in organisational accountability are also the same as the previous two 
types because departments and civil servants only have guidelines to follow, not precise 
rules  or  regulations  (section  5.6).  Some  departments  award  promotion  annually  to 
officials by rotation, unrelated to performance  (section 5.6).  It is possible that some 
executives believe that all their staff should be given opportunities, i.e. that they are 
being fair. However, this situation is not fair if some civil servants are working harder 
than others. Indeed, these civil servants may wonder why they should bother working so 
hard, and put in less effort as a result.   
Executives  of  departments  have  the  power  to  give  rewards  to  subordinates 
(section  5.6).  Executives  do not  always  pay  close attention  to  feedback,  either  from  
 
296 
internal auditing reports or complaints by the public (section 5.4). Some of them use 
their own judgement. In addition, some executives will promote officials from their own 
group (section 5.6). Personalism, bunkhun and phak phuak are all important factors, how 
much so will depend on the executives’ attitudes and the organisational culture. Some 
staff cannot stand prejudice and will complain, but such cases are not easy to investigate, 
and if the case is not serious, it will be ignored (sections 5.4 and 5.6). This does not 
provide much of an incentive for officials to perform well, as they may ask themselves:  
if they cannot get promotion, why should they have to work hard? This would be a 
problem for the enhancement of accountability.   
It is not easy for executives to penalise civil servants because they have to set up 
a committee, with the process sometimes taking about a year to complete (section 5.6). 
Sometimes it is easier for executives to withhold a promotion. Some actions such as 
bribery, bias, conflict of interest and favouritism can happen without the wrongdoers 
receiving any penalty (section 5.4). If there is no one following the case, the case will be 
closed and nobody will notice. Control and changing attitudes should be the best option 
to solve these problems. 
  To enhance accountability, clear standards, laws and regulations are important. 
Ideally, rewards and penalties should be clearly understood and defined. However, in 
Thailand, this ideal requirement rarely happens. Although for some actions there are 
clear statements about the effects, sanctions or feedback, in practice the statements are 
not always followed. This is quite vague and difficult for the public, departments and 
civil servants to understand and follow.    
7.7.4 Reflection  
Public accountability 
  Although the public can complain to departments, the sanctions or penalties to be 
applied are only applicable to departments. Effects that officials will receive are not 
clear, and neither civil servants nor the public know what will happen in such cases.   
Administrative accountability 
  The effects in this type are also unclear because auditors and controllers are not 
the ones giving the rewards or sanctions to departments. They can only report results to 
higher-ranking  executives  and  audited  organisations.  It  is  then  up  to  higher-ranking  
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executives, who might be the cabinet, ministers, or permanent secretary, to decide about 
the effects. Effects will often depend on individual cases. 
Organisational accountability 
  As with the other two types of accountability, effects in this type are also unclear 
and sometimes depend on decision making made by executives of departments. Some 
values, such as bunkhun, the patronage system and phak phuak, including favouritism 
and bias, are all influential factors for defining and giving of effects. Obviously, this 
does not help in enhancing accountability.   
7.8 Conclusion 
This  chapter  draws  together  the  findings  and  aspects  of  accountability,  with 
regard to prior literature. In Thailand, the three types of accountability are interrelated. 
Departments and civil servants can be either directly or indirectly accountable to the 
public. For some activities, the public have to make direct contact with departments. 
Therefore, departments and civil servants who have direct contact with the public are 
accountable to them. They are accountable for what they have done with the public. For 
indirect accountability, departments are accountable to their higher executives, which 
are the permanent secretary and ministers respectively. Ministers and the cabinet are 
accountable  to  the  parliament,  which  is  directly  accountable  to  the  public.  For  both 
chains of accountability, the media play an important role in communicating important 
information to the public. The media are accountable to news recipients for what they 
publicise. Ideally, this information should be accurate but sometimes they do provide 
incorrect information that can mislead the belief of news recipients.  
Administrative accountability links to public accountability because auditors are 
indirectly accountable to the public through parliament, to whom auditors submit their 
audit  reports.  Organisational  accountability  links  to  both  public  and  administrative 
accountability because departmental performance, plans, policies and the attitudes of 
superiors and subordinates can affect how organisations perform and how they behave 
with the public, auditors and controllers. Accountees in one type of accountability can be 
accountors in another type. For example, executives of departments are accountees in 
the case of organisational accountability but they are accountors in administrative and 
public accountability.  
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1) Accountees and accountors (see details in sections 7.2 and 7.3) 
Power, rights, motivations, positions, attitudes of accountors or accountees and 
Thai values and culture affect the accountability relationship directly. At the same time, 
the behaviour of accountors depends on who the accountees are. Accountors respond to 
different  accountees  in  different  ways.  The  relationship  in  the  three  types  of 
accountability can be linked together. As Thai society focuses more on relationships 
with  each  other  such  as  bunkhun  relationships,  people  pay  more  attention  to  group 
thinking. Values, including ego orientation, grateful relationship orientation and smooth 
interpersonal relationship, are all normal for the Thai public sector. These values and 
characteristics affect how accountors and accountees have behaved. In addition, Thais 
pay respect to a person who has higher status, power, and position. Thais also think 
highly of someone who gives them the help they need. These characteristics are the main 
reasons  why  civil  servants  pay  more  attention  to their superiors,  instead  of  to  other 
accountees.  However,  if  civil  servants  are  personally  acquainted  with  someone,  it  is 
possible that they pay more attention to those people.    
The government grants power to the executives of departments. This is another 
factor to force subordinates to follow the requirements of their superiors. Civil servants 
focus on what executives require. This can also be inferred at the ministerial level where 
executives follow ministers’ requirements. However, not all subordinates do this. There 
are  some  subordinates  that  are  not  in  the  same  group  as  the  superiors  or  whose 
objectives differ from those of their superiors’. In such cases, the relationship between 
the  accountors  and  the  accountees  is  not  closed  and  sometimes  is  tight.  Executives 
sometimes  apply  strict  control  to  staff  who  are  not  in  their  groups.  However,  the 
relationship between accountors and accountees will depend on the circumstances of 
each individual case.  
The  relationship  in  organisational  accountability  relates  to  relationships  in 
administrative and public accountability. Accountors may have one way of behaving 
with  superiors  and  another  with  auditors  and  the  public.  In  some  cases,  accountors 
follow  the  groups’  desire  but  the  group  sometimes  means  only  the  department,  and 
excludes the public or other organisations, given that the public, auditors and controllers 
do not have any power over accountors. Civil servants may not pay much attention to 
them.   
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If  accountees  know  accountors  personally,  the  process  between  them  can  be 
smoother and faster. This situation causes some bias and prejudice in operations, and 
does not help to enhance accountability. Accountors respond to different accountees in 
different  ways.  Some  types  of  accountees  cannot  give  accountors  direct  rewards  or 
punishment. Accountees can complain but the processes of investigation take a long 
time to complete.  
In  the  case  of  accountees,  auditors  and  controllers  investigate  and  evaluate 
departmental performance, and this also includes applying some control. However, the 
relationship is different in public accountability. Due to the influence of Buddhism on 
society, many Thai people believe in karma. Believing in karma can support or inhibit 
accountability. Some people may be aware of karma and they may not want to do bad 
things.  However,  this  belief  can  cause  some  lack  of  interest  among  accountors  and 
accountees. In addition, due to sakdina, rooted in Thai society, Thai people can accept 
inequality  easily.  Though  they  know  something  wrong  has  happened,  they  do  not 
necessarily do anything about it.  
To enhance accountability, the World Bank and the Thai government wanted to 
increase public participation. However, there is still a lack of interest from the public 
towards departmental performance. People appear to be familiar with corruption and 
mismanagement. In addition, it is not easy for lay people to know how to participate in 
the  process  of  public  hearings.  Only  selective  groups  of  people,  such  as  scholars, 
researchers and elite persons, participate in the process.   
Consequently,  if  the  public  are  uninterested  in  departmental  activities,  civil 
servants can easily take advantage of the situation. This can deter the enhancement of 
accountability.  However,  the  media  play  an  important  role  in  the  accountability 
relationship. They communicate news, especially bad news, about departments and the 
government to the public. People pay close attention to this kind of news even if it does 
not relate to their own business. As citizens of the country the public can force the 
government and departments to solve the problems.  
One good example of the power of the media is the political turbulence which 
happened  in  Thailand  during  the  period  of  this  research.  The  media  publicised 
information about governmental and departmental performance that led some groups of 
people to think and believe that the government had done something wrong. Another  
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group  in  the  media  communicated  the  opposite.  Therefore,  in  Thailand,  during  the 
period  of  this  research,  there  were  various  opinions  on  the  government,  politicians, 
political system and even high-ranking civil servants.   
The fact that accountees have the freedom to hold accountors to account is an 
important factor that can enhance accountability in the Thai public sector. Any Thai 
person is free to do so but some do not use this right. For example, some accountees 
know they can be threatened if they make complaints. During the last two years, there 
have been claims about the limit of the freedom of the media. Since some political 
groups actually own parts of the media, it is possible that there is some bias in the 
information  which  is  being  published.  The  media  are  accountable  to  the  public  by 
providing them with accurate information, but some are unable to do this. This research 
does not focus on the roles of the media. However, from the findings, the media are an 
important factor in the way accountability operates in Thailand. Future research should 
concentrate on an in-depth study of the roles of the media in public accountability.  
2) Accountability for what (see details in section 7.4) 
Regarding accountability for what, there are two main types of responsibility, 
namely legal and moral. Accountors have to follow their legal accountability but the 
moral aspects of accountability depend on accountors’ attitudes and morality. A sense of 
moral responsibility can involve bias and favouritism. For example, someone may be 
personally acquainted with an accountee, or receiving bribes, and generally thinking and 
acting only for their own benefits. Where accountors do not know accountees well, legal 
responsibility  is  likely  to  apply  because  accountors  are  unlikely  to  be  affected  by 
applying  the  laws  and  regulations.  Also,  they  will  want  to  protect  themselves  from 
complaint. Moral responsibility can in some cases help enhancing accountability. For 
example, civil servants may provide some information about fraud to auditors. However, 
when civil servants decide to carry out some activities as a result of bribery or a personal 
relationship, this situation can inhibit the enhancement of accountability. Nevertheless, it 
is proving difficult to remove this entirely from the Thai bureaucratic system because 
Thais  are  familiar  with  the  patronage  system  and  they  tend  to  establish  relative 
hierarchies and bunkhun relationships. These kinds of values support the use of personal 
relationships.  
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3) Processes (see details in section 7.5) 
Regarding transparency as part of the processes of accountability, there are very 
few problems for controllers, auditors and executives. These groups of accountees are 
able  to  obtain  the  information  that  departments  have.  However,  for  the  public, 
information has the problems of reliability, availability, and to some extent timeliness. 
The reliability of information is the main characteristic of transparency. The problem of 
reliability is still an issue, particularly with regard to the financial information provided 
on websites and annual reports. However, this information is rarely used by the public, 
thus the public are not greatly affected by unreliable information. Therefore, neither civil 
servants nor the public realise and focus closely on this problem. This problem happens 
continuously in the Thai public sector.  
Public participation and awareness are important for public scrutiny. However, 
this rarely happens concerning departmental performance. The public do not normally 
focus on performance. However, during the period of political turbulence in Thailand, 
Thai people, especially the media, paid more attention to governmental and departmental 
performance.  However, there are some drawbacks with the information provided by the 
media.  The  public  can  be  misled  because  some  parts  of  the  media  are  owned  by 
politicians or powerful groups. During this time, there are several groups of thinking 
about this subject in Thailand. However, during the period of research for this thesis, 
when several political incidents occurred, it appeared to be difficult for the public to 
participate in governmental and departmental operations  
For administrative accountability, auditors work indirectly on behalf of citizens 
because they report audit results directly to the parliament. Citizens should be able to 
trust them. However, if the executives of departments receive orders from ministers to 
carry out some fraudulent or corrupt action, conflict of interest can occur because the 
majority of representatives and the chairman of the parliament are members of the same 
party as the prime minister. Thus, audit results will not be a priority for them.  
In addition, the representatives and the senators have a responsibility to propose 
and appoint the Auditor General of Thailand. In 2005, there was conflict among the 
representatives  and  the  senators  about  the  recruitment  process,  and  who  to  choose 
because they wanted to appoint someone with whom they were personally acquainted 
(Komchadluek  2005,  in  Thai).  There  were  two  groups  each  supporting  different  
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candidates. Finally, Khunying Jaruwan Maintaka regained her position as the auditor 
general, after being forced to leave her position for a few months (section 3.3). This 
situation shows that conflict of interest can occur at all levels of accountability types and 
this leads to a lack of accountability in the bureaucratic system.  
For organisational accountability, both executives and civil servants do not pay 
much attention to internal control. Some officials can take advantage of such reluctance. 
Some values such as favouritism and bias occur in the monitoring and assessment stage. 
Some executives and staff do not want to study new techniques or new ideas. They just 
strictly adhere to what they are required to do at the present time. This situation can be 
explained by culture and values, individual motivation, attitude, understanding and a 
lack of education and training. They focus on their own benefits instead of their duty to 
the public and other accountees. Some executives and staff would not even think of 
behaving corruptly, they just want to get on with their duties (section 5.3). 
For  answerability,  there  are  few  problems  with  auditors,  controllers  and 
executives obtaining answers from officials, or  with the public obtaining answers to 
general questions, particularly about services. However, how accusations are dealt with 
depends on the power of the accountees. Powerful accountees can obtain answers faster 
than other groups of accountees. Accountors’ motivations and poor operational systems 
lead to this situation. In addition, the idea of clientelism can be used to explain these 
processes of accountability. Some politicians and civil servants give opportunities and 
provide better services to someone, with whom they are personally acquainted.   
4) Standards (see details in section 7.6) 
Regarding standards of accountability, for the Thai public sector, there are quite 
a number of laws and regulations. The main law for good governance and accountability 
is the Good Governance Royal Decree. This Decree is mainly about the processes of 
accountability instead of other components. This can be inferred that the government 
thought that its accountability problems came from the processes of accountability as 
opposed  to  any  of  the  other  components.  However,  from  the  findings,  there  are 
accountability problems associated with several other factors, such as Thai culture and 
values,  including  the  behaviour  and  attitudes  of  accountors  and  accountees. 
Nevertheless, the behaviour and values of accountors and accountees are too abstract,  
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and it is not easy to change or improves behaviour. This is one possible reason why a 
lack of accountability in the bureaucratic system is difficult to solve.  
In the Decree, some sections are not specific, e.g. information disclosure. They 
are open for departments to use their judgement to decide which actions they should 
take.  Standards  can  be  either  formal  or  informal.  For  public  accountability  and 
organisational accountability, standards are both formal and informal and they are both 
clear and not clear. Unclear standards can burden the enhancement of accountability, 
because it is difficult for both accountees and accountors to perform their roles well. 
Some  of  them  can  take  advantage  from  unclear  standards.  For  administrative 
accountability, standards are both formal and informal but they are quite clear. 
5) Effects (see details in section 7.7) 
This  research  does  not  focus  much  on  the  effects.  From  the  findings  of  this 
research, the government decided to implement a reward system in order to provide 
incentives for departments and officials to perform well. However, the reward system 
can  cause  both  advantages  and  disadvantages.  Some  departments  may  try  to  make 
information up in order to ensure they get a reward. Although the reward system takes 
into account opinions from the public, this is only a part of the evaluation process and 
not the main part. For complaints and penalty, the process of giving effects is not clear. 
Both accountees and accountors do not know what will happen. This does not support 
accountability.  The  characteristics  of  effects  of  accountability,  particularly  the 
introduction of the reward system, should be studied in-depth in future research even 
though effects are normally dependent on individual cases. It is interesting to know how 
departments  and  civil  servants  deal  with  cases,  how  this  links  to  efficiency  and 
effectiveness of operations, and what factors influence the processes of granting effects.    
In summary, from the findings, the government and departments have attempted 
to improve themselves in order to enhance accountability. Not only have they developed 
systems, but they are also trying to change the attitudes of some civil servants. However, 
this  is  not  easy  to  do  and  there  are  still  some  obstacles  which  are  deferring  the 
enhancement of accountability. However, it is better now than in the past, when the 
public sector was poor in allowing citizens to establish contact. The next chapter is the 
conclusion of this thesis.    
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Chapter 8 Conclusions 
8.1 Introduction  
The  purpose  of  this  chapter  is  to  summarise  the  results  from  the  study, 
discuss theory, make recommendations and offer suggestions about future research. 
Six main components of accountability have been applied as a framework of this 
research.  In  order  to  facilitate  interviews,  four  concepts,  namely  responsibility, 
transparency, scrutiny and answerability, were used to represent ‘accountability for 
what’ and ‘the processes of accountability’. This research has focused mainly on the 
accountability  relationship  in  three  main  types  of  accountability,  i.e.  public, 
administrative and organisational accountability.  
  There are three general research questions:  
GQ1:  How  is  accountability  as  defined  in  a  western context  reflected  by  public 
sector organisations in a developing country? 
GQ2:  How  do  government  departments  in  a  developing  country  implement 
accountability?  
GQ3:  How does the experience of implementation in a developing country help us 
think about theories of accountability?  
To answer these general research questions, the empirical research questions 
are studied:  
SQ1:  How is accountability evidenced following public sector reform and the Good 
Governance Royal Decree, in the particular case of government departments? 
SQ1.1: How do departmental communications, including reports, show evidence 
of accountability? 
SQ2:  What are the constraints on departments from the implementation of public 
sector reform and the Good Governance Royal Decree? 
These  empirical  research  questions  relate  specifically  to  Thailand.  These 
questions have been answered by interviews (Chapter 5), website and annual report 
analysis (Chapter 6), information from previous research and the literature (Chapter 
3). The research methods used have been discussed in Chapter 4. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 8.2 summarises the reflection of 
the implementation of the accountability aspects in the public sector. Section 8.3 
discusses  the  contribution  to  theory.  Section  8.4  contains  recommendations  and 
section 8.5 contains limitations. Section 8.6 makes suggestions for future research. 
Section 8.7 is the conclusion.  
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8.2 Reflection on the implementation of accountability 
This section reflects in particular on GQ1.  It considers the ideas expressed in 
the  literature,  defined  in  a  western  context,  and  compares  these  ideas  to  those 
opinions  of  the  government  and  civil  servants  about  their  understanding  of 
accountability and their actions in carrying out accountability as observed through 
the evidence, including documents and previous research papers. The opinions and 
understanding of the government and civil servants are shown in many forms e.g. 
laws, regulations, and projects implemented.  In this section the results taken from 
the empirical chapters are cross referenced to the respective sections where more 
detail may be found. 
8.2.1 Accountees and accountors  
Accountors  can  be  either  individuals  or  groups  of  people  (Gelfand  et  al. 
2004).  Civil servants can play many roles, and they can be involved in more than 
one type of accountability relationship (Bovens 2005). Prior literature has shown that 
in some cases, accountors rely on corporate accountability, in which a department as 
a whole is the accountor (Bovens 2005). In addition, officials are accountable for 
what  they  themselves  have  done,  or  individual  accountability  (Bovens  2005).  In 
addition  to  being  accountable  to  their  superiors,  some  professional  jobs  such  as 
internal auditors and accountants should be accountable to their professional peers 
(Bovens 2005). However, professional accountability in the Thai public sector is not 
so  strong  because  the  relationships  of  hierarchical  accountability  are  stronger 
(sections  7.2  and  7.3).  The  literature  review  indicates  that  the  accountability 
relationship  is  about  power  (Ebrahim  2005).  Asymmetry  is  normal  in  the 
accountability relationship. Accountors will follow the requirements of accountees 
who have power over them (sections 7.2 and 7.3).  
  Accountees can either be inside or outside an organisation (Ijiri 1983). Those 
accountees  inside  organisations  are  normally  superiors,  through  hierarchical 
accountability. Thai civil servants usually rely  on this accountability relationship, 
even though this can lead to problems of accountability mismatch (discussed later in 
section 8.3). For accountees from outside organisations, the relationship is different 
and will depend on power, knowledge, and the freedom to hold someone to account 
(section 7.2). The pressure placed on accountors is also an important factor (section 
7.2).   
  In Thailand, after the implementation of projects to enhance accountability, 
officials  were  clearly  uneasy  about  the  projects  arising  from  the  aspects  of  
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accountability. However, there are differences between two levels of officials. In the 
case of higher-level civil servants, a prior research paper indicates that accountability 
is what CEOs ‘uphold and fear’, and about what CEOs feel ‘anguish and attachment 
as a moral practice’ (Sinclair 1995, p. 232). In this research, although Thai higher-
level  officials  are  not  CEOs,  the  findings  suggest  that  they  feel  under  pressure 
because their responsibilities relate to plans and policies of departments, which relate 
to the public in general (section 5.3). Therefore, they feel this way because of a sense 
of moral obligation and because they are more aware of what the government is 
trying to achieve.  
Another reason why officials feel under pressure is that they are fearful of 
making  mistakes  or  of  being  involved  in  mismanagement  (section  5.3).  These 
officials have to follow the requirements of ministers and directors of departments 
(section 5.3). Thus, they  are not thinking  much about public accountability, only 
about following out the wishes of their superiors (sections 5.2 and 5.3). Also, they 
may  not  experience  pressure  from  the  general  public  directly.  Axworthy  (2005) 
argues that civil servants do not have to be responsible to the public. In many cases, 
this claim is consistent with the observations in Thailand. However, there are some 
cases where the public make direct contact with departments and put pressure on 
departments directly, and in this situation, departments are considered to be subject 
to public accountability. Thus, the claim by Axworthy (2005) may not always be 
correct, but will depend on the positions of civil servants or their circumstances. 
Some civil servants, because of their position, have to be accountable directly to the 
public (section 5.3). 
The responsibilities of lower–ranking officials are sometimes not related to 
the public (sections 5.2 and 5.3). However, they still experience pressure with regard 
to accountability because they must be wary of making mistakes in their day-to-day 
operations  (section  5.2).  Officials  who  have  direct  contact  with  the  public  may 
recognise they have moral responsibility to the public but they do not feel obliged to 
apply this because the public cannot affect them directly i.e. the public can complain 
but  the  complaint  process  is  dependent  on  executives  (section  5.3).  Although 
officials rely on the relationship between accountors and accountees in the case of 
organisational accountability, they are also aware of the relationship with auditors or 
controllers in administrative accountability because the relationship in this case is 
based on investigation (sections 5.2 and 5.3).   
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Prior research indicates that, in the western context, certain types of staff such 
as accountants play important roles in the accountability relationship (Ijiri 1983). 
However, in other societies including Thailand, this is not the case (see details in 
section 5.2) because, within the bureaucratic system, a hierarchical structure exists. 
Accountants, therefore, do what their superiors want them to do (section 5.2). In 
addition,  executives  and  other  civil  servants  rarely  understand  accounting 
information (section 5.4). Therefore, in Thailand, the role played by accountants may 
not be considered to be as important as it is in western society or private sector 
organisations.  
8.2.2 Accountability for what   
In order to facilitate interviews in Thailand, the concept of responsibility has 
been used for this research (section 2.6). For this component, there are not many 
differences between the implementation of this in Thailand and the ideal concept 
from developed countries. For the public sector, the government and departments are 
responsible for the use of public money, including performance and administration 
(Ball 2005; UN 2004). Within the bureaucratic system, subordinates are responsible 
for complying with the wishes of their superiors (Mashaw 2006). The majority of 
accountors and accountees know what they should be responsible for and how they 
should perform (section 5.3). However, it is possible that certain pressures can affect 
accountability mechanisms. This situation will be discussed in section 8.3.3. 
 Codes of conduct and codes of ethics are also important for accountability 
(Osborne 2004). Unclear codes can affect what civil servants have done (section 7.4). 
The relationship between superiors and subordinates will be strong if the codes or 
rules are clear (Gelfand et al. 2004). So, in Thailand, though some civil servants may 
want to take advantage of accountees, if there are clear laws or codes of conduct, 
they may not be able to do so. However, from the results, it appears that such codes 
are not particularly clear in Thailand (section 5.5). Therefore, the judgements and 
decisions being made by civil servants in Thailand are important.   
8.2.3 Processes of accountability  
  In  order  to  gather  information  in  Thailand,  three  concepts,  namely 
transparency, scrutiny and answerability, have been used as features of the processes 
of accountability (see details in sections 2.6 and 2.7). This accountability component 
can show what and how the government and departments have done, and what they 
should do in order to solve any problems.   
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1) Transparency  
  With  regard  to  transparency,  the  availability  of  information,  including 
reliability,  timeliness  and  relevance,  is  an  important  factor  for  enhancing 
accountability (Barrett 2001; Kondo 2002; Bertók et al. 2002). For Thailand, the 
main problems of transparency at this time are availability, reliability and timely 
information (section 5.4). Some information is not easily accessible by the public. 
For  example,  audited  financial  statements  are  normally  the  main  tools  for 
accountability in developed countries (Pablos et al. 2002). However, in Thailand, this 
information is not easy to access (sections 5.4, 6.2 and 6.3). It is not easy for the 
public  to  evaluate  departmental  performance.  A  lack  of  transparency  can  cause 
difficulties for external groups or organisations to exercise control (Heald 2006b). 
Thailand’s main focus during the period of the research has possibly been to try to 
increase  the  amount  of  information  disclosed  instead  of  other  features  of 
transparency, particularly reliability of information (sections 6.2 and 6.3). This has 
resulted in some unreliable information appearing on websites or in annual reports.    
2) Scrutiny   
  Scrutiny,  with  sanctions,  is  important  for  the  accountability  mechanism 
(Brinkerhoff 2001). Certainly, the international lenders wanted the Thai government 
to improve the bureaucratic operational system (World Bank 2000). Some systems of 
scrutiny, such as auditing, have existed in Thailand for many years prior to the 1997 
crisis.  However,  the  ideas  proposed  by  international  organisations  helped  these 
systems to be more concise and systematic, without the need to create entirely new 
systems. However, there have been some problems, particularly about the education 
and training of staff, which have obstructed their implementation (section 5.8). Some 
employees  do  not  yet  understand  the  concepts  well  (section  5.8).  This  topic  is 
discussed later (section 8.3). 
3) Answerability  
  There  are  two  types  of  question  that  should  be  asked.  The  first  type  of 
question asks about facts and figures or reporting on what they have done and the 
second  type  about  reporting  facts,  figures,  explanations  and  reasons  about 
performance (Brinkerhoff 2001). General questions, e.g. regarding service delivery, 
are straightforward to answer but it can take some time to deal with complaints or 
accusations (section 5.4). In addition, if questioners do not chase accountors for a 
response, it is possible that they will get a late reply (section 5.4).  In the case of  
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public accountability, it is even more difficult and time consuming for the accountees 
to receive answers to complaints or accusations. If the public do not put pressure on 
civil  servants,  it  is  quite  easy  for  officials  to  be  uninterested  in  complaints  and 
accusations or to delay the process of answering (section 5.4). Citizens do not have 
much  power  over  civil  servants.  Within  the  bureaucratic  system,  the  process  of 
getting  answers  is  sometimes  not  easy.  Moreover,  some  wrongdoers  are  actually 
helped by superiors (section 5.4). This situation relates to the obstacles of cultural 
perspectives discussed later in this chapter.   
8.2.4 Standards of accountability  
  From  prior  literature,  for  the  accountability  relationship,  standards  of 
accountability are guidelines for evaluating the performance of the accountors. There 
are  various  standards  due  to  the  types  of  accountability  (Mashaw  2006).  The 
relationship between officials and affected organisations or people is based on legal 
rules (Mashaw 2006). For the relationship between superiors and subordinates, the 
standards are based on instrumental rationality (Mashaw 2006). The standards in the 
case of the relationship between superiors and subordinates are more flexible than 
other relationships (section 5.5). This flexibility is helpful for ensuring operations run 
smoothly.  Having  a  number  of  rules,  including  clear  statements,  can  make  the 
relationship  between  superiors  and  subordinates  strong  (Gelfand  et  al.  2004). 
However, for this relationship, it is often difficult to have clear and specific standards 
or  principles.  The  relationship  sometimes  depends  on  organisational  culture  or 
obligation  instead,  thus  without  clear  standards  there  can  be  an  opportunity  for 
superiors to use their power to force subordinates to do what they want (section 5.6). 
This can lead to problems of accountability mismatch.  
  Regarding  the  concept  of  good  governance  in  the  Thai  public  sector, 
important projects and policies, including activities in organisations, are dependent 
on  centralised  decision  making  made  by  ministers  or  departmental  executives 
(sections 5.5, 5.6 and 7.7). In this case, it is likely that good governance is interpreted 
as centralist. For example, the Good Governance Royal Decree (2003) mentions that 
departments should provide information to the public, except information relating to 
national and economic stability (section 6.2). Thus, executives of departments are 
able  to  exercise  a  certain  amount  of  judgement,  regarding  which  information  to 
release.  The  researcher  was  unable  to  obtain  some  financial  statements,  as  this 
information  was  deemed  to  be  confidential.  While  it  is  reasonable  that  the  laws 
should not be too specific, some civil servants use this to their own advantage.  
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   In addition, as discussed in section 3.5.4, one of the main projects arising 
from the Decree, which supports reducing corruption, is decentralisation. However, 
during this time, centralised decision making still occurs in the Thai public sector. 
This does not support the enhancement of governance. That means the Decree can 
partially  support  reducing  corruption.  Problems  caused  by  centralised  decision 
making are difficult to resolve.  
  In order to improve governance, there are some principles arising from ideas 
of the Decree. For example, a project of ‘clean organisations’ is established (section 
3.5). Civil servants in the departments will follow. However, there is no enforcement. 
In  addition, there  are  code of conduct and code of ethics that  civil servants will 
follow. These kinds of principles are intended to act as guidelines for staff. While 
some departments create their own guidelines or principles, others do not (section 
5.5).  In  addition,  regarding  policies,  plans  and  targets  that  citizens  can  use  as 
standards  of  accountability,  there  are  some  departments  that  provide  little 
information  (sections  6.2  and  6.3).  This  situation  links  to  the  processes  of 
accountability. Since citizens are not being kept informed of these, they cannot use 
them to evaluate performance.    
The  clarity  of  standards  may  not  be  only  problem  for  standards  of 
accountability. Rule enforcement is another problem (section 7.2). Some countries, 
including  Thailand,  are  situation-oriented  rather  than  law-oriented  (Komin  1990). 
Therefore,  their  behaviour  will  be  flexible  depending  on  the  situation.  Rules, 
standards or guidelines are flexible towards individuals. Civil servants who perform 
similarly may be treated in different ways and receive different results (section 5.6). 
This  situation  is  known  as  ‘double  standards’  in  Thailand.  Its  occurrence  will 
normally depend on the institution or people using the standards to be enforced. This 
links to culture, values and institutional factors discussed in section 8.3.     
8.2.5 Effects 
  An  effect  is  an  important  component  of  accountability  (Mashaw  2006). 
Accountability  mechanisms  without  any  effects  are  possibly  not  effective 
(Brinkerhoff 2001). The World Bank required Thailand to implement a new reward 
system additional to the system that Thailand already had (World Bank 2000). A 
reward  system  has  both  advantages  and  drawbacks,  as  discussed  in  Chapter  7, 
because of the importance which Thai values play in the accountability relationship. 
Bias  and  favouritism,  which  are  two  of  the  general  characteristics  of  corruption 
mentioned by the World Bank (1992), continue to occur in Thailand (section 5.3).  
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The effects are not clear (section 5.6). Civil servants do not actually know what will 
happen to them when they do something wrong (section 5.6).  
8.2.6 The reflection of accountability from developed countries and 
Thailand 
After the economic crisis in 1997, Thailand received and implemented the 
ideas  of  accountability  from  developed  countries  and  international  organisations 
(section 3.4). With regard to the public sector, from governmental documents and 
previous  research  papers,  accountability  aspects  from  developed  countries  were 
translated and implemented in the Thai public sector. The ideas led to many new 
projects being implemented by the Thai government (section 3.4). Both civil servants 
and citizens think that operational processes are better now than in the past (section 
5.4). Civil servants now consider citizens to be more important (section 5.2). The 
processes  of  accountability,  particularly  transparency,  scrutiny  and  answerability, 
have been improved (section 5.4). For example, the operational processes are more 
controlled and systematic. Citizens can access governmental information easier and 
there  are  more  channels  through  which  citizens  can  send  in  comments  and 
complaints (sections 6.2 and 6.3).  
However,  although  accountability  aspects  taken  from  developed  countries 
and international organisations can improve the operational processes in the Thai 
public  sector,  they  cannot  solve  all  its  problems.  The  main  problem  of  the  Thai 
bureaucratic system is that of corruption (section 3.2). This problem still occurs even 
after  the  implementation  of  the  accountability  aspects  (section  5.4).  Within  the 
bureaucratic system, certain types of behaviour, such as bias, favouritism and the use 
of personal relationships, frequently occur in operations (section 5.4). In addition, the 
root of the political turbulence which occurred during the period of this research was 
believed to have arisen from corruption within Thai bureaucracy, particularly at the 
ministerial level (section 3.2).  
The projects arising from the public sector reform and the introduction of 
good governance are both successful and unsuccessful. Different countries respond 
to the same ideas of accountability in different ways. For some projects, Thai values, 
such as the patronage system, personalism, and accepting inequality in either power, 
social  or  economic  status,  are  barriers  for  the  enhancement  of  accountability 
(sections  7.2  and  7.3).  However,  too  much  accountability  may  slow  down  some 
operational processes because of the increased number of processes (section 5.4).  
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Nevertheless,  in  general,  the  Thai  public  sector  has  improved  its  operational 
processes significantly after the economic crisis (sections 5.4 and 7.5).    
8.3 Contribution to theory 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the contributions of this research are to discuss 
the literature on accountability issues in the public sector in a developing country and 
to link the findings with accountability theory in the public sector in a developing 
country. This section discusses the contributions in this research to develop thinking 
about theories of accountability, responding to GQ3. 
This section discusses the results relating to the accountability relationship. 
Sections 8.3.1 and 8.3.2 discuss accountability theory specifically. This section starts 
with  the  meaning  of  accountability  in  8.3.1.  Section  8.3.2  discusses  the 
accountability  relationship.  In  this  part,  factors  affecting  the  accountability 
relationship are discussed. While this section starts with culture and values, these are 
not the only factors affecting accountability. The findings of this research link to 
institutional  theory,  which  is  one  possible  theory  to  apply  in  discussing 
accountability.  Therefore,  institutional  factors  are  discussed.  Cultural  factors  and 
institutional factors are related. Cultural factors can explain individual or institutional 
behaviour.  In addition,  section 8.3.2 discusses the competency of  accountors and 
accountees, and politics.  Section 8.3.3 discusses the accountability mismatch which 
has become apparent from the research findings.    
8.3.1 The meaning of accountability   
The  idea  of  accountability  is  said  to  be  complicated  and  elusive  (Sinclair 
1995; Mulgan 2000b). Adding to this complexity, it is not easy for a non-English-
speaking country to understand accountability as the problem of incommensurability 
is  also  an  issue.  This  is  a  general  problem  for  non-English  speaking  countries 
(Dubnick  2002),  Thailand  included.  From  the  literature  review,  the  meaning  of 
accountability is:  
…obligation,  or  responsibility  of  a  person  or  organisations  or  entities  to 
explain, answer, justify, and defend their actions or what they have done to another 
party who will observe, evaluate, and scrutinise that performance and they can give 
feedback, including reward and punishment (see details in Chapter 2) 
  From a Thai public sector context, accountability is a ‘responsibility’ to admit 
and accept punishment arising from one’s own actions or ‘readiness to be responsible 
for one’s actions and to receive effects arising’ (or in Thai Rabob kham phrom rub  
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pid or Kham phrom rub pid) (see details in Chapter 3). Some organisations translate 
‘accountability’ as responsibility for their own duties and actions (or in Thai Kham 
rub pid chob or Kham rub pid chob tor nhaa ti).  
  Accountability  can  be  said  to  consist  of  six  main  components,  namely 
accountors,  accountees,  accountability  for  what,  processes,  standards  and  effects 
(Mashaw 2006). Although, from the meanings synthesised from previous research 
papers,  standards  of  accountability  are  not  mentioned,  in  order  to  scrutinise  and 
evaluate performance, accountees have to use standards. From a Thai perspective, 
this is different because the Thai public sector focuses more on ‘responsibility or 
accountability for what’, ‘processes’ and ‘effects’. One of the possible reasons that 
the  meaning  of  accountability,  particularly  in  the  public  sector,  focuses  on 
‘responsibility’ is because civil servants lacked any sense of responsibility for their 
mission,  e.g.  these  were  perceived  to  be  departmental  missions  not  their  own 
(Virushaniphawan 2004, in Thai).  
In  addition,  the  Thai  public  sector  focuses  on  the  operational  system  or 
processes  (sections  3.4  and  3.5).  Therefore,  it  is  not  surprising  that  projects  to 
enhance accountability concentrate on the processes of accountability, for example 
the Good Governance Royal Decree (section 3.5). The meaning of accountability can 
be linked to another important idea arising from this study, that of accountability 
mismatch, which is discussed later in section 8.3.3.  
All  six  accountability  components  are  important  for  the  accountability 
relationship. The interpretation of the aspects of accountability sometimes does not 
enhance  accountability.  Accountability  in  practice  sometimes  deviates  from  what 
accountability should ideally be. For example, in the case of public accountability, 
the process of scrutiny and giving effects rarely occur in Thailand. For observing and 
examining  performance,  citizens  normally  focus  on  service  delivery  instead  of 
departmental performance (section 5.4). This does not help to enhance accountability 
because  according  to  the  literature  external  scrutiny  is  the  main  part  of  public 
accountability (Bertók et al. 2002). This situation can link to other factors such as 
incentives for citizens to make contact with departments. Citizens do not want to 
spend time on other issues, unrelated to their own businesses. The process of giving 
sanctions or feedback relates to scrutiny. The public cannot give a significant amount 
of feedback on departmental performance because they do not scrutinise it closely 
enough or they sometimes fear to do (section 5.4).  
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The interpretation of accountability shows how much the country understands 
this concept. This is important to be well informed and know what the country wants 
to achieve by implementing the aspects of accountability.     
8.3.2 The Accountability relationship 
From  the  results  of  the  thesis,  there  are  some  factors  that  affect  the 
accountability relationship. As discussed in the previous section, interpretation of the 
aspects of accountability is an important factor. Countries understand and translate 
accountability differently (Dubnick 2002). Moreover, the interpretation can change 
the focus of accountability or cause civil servants to focus on the wrong objectives. 
Many accountability problems in the bureaucratic system are caused by accountors 
and accountees. For example, relationships such as clientelism or patron-client can 
cause  some  accountability  problems.  They  may  involve  or  support  corruption  or 
fraud.  This  then  leads  to  an  agency  problem,  which  in  fact  is  still  a  problem  in 
Thailand. The implementation of the aspects of accountability may not be able to 
solve every problem in the Thai bureaucratic system.    
Accountors and accountees are affected by both internal and external factors. 
Internal factors, i.e. relating directly to individuals, can include their way of thinking 
and  sense  of  morality  (sections  7.2  and  7.3).  Another  influencing  internal  factor 
could be competency and knowledge of both accountors and accountees (sections 7.2 
and  7.3).  These  factors  drive  accountors  and  accountees  to  perform  actions.  In 
addition, there are some external factors, such as organisational culture and values, 
influencing the accountability relationship (sections 7.2 and 7.3). It is possible that 
external factors are sometimes more influential than an individual’s own incentives. 
For example, when accountees put pressure on accountors, accountors sometimes 
have to follow what accountees want them to do (sections 7.2 and 7.3). 
For  developing  countries  (such  as  Thailand),  the  implementation  of 
accountability  derived  from  western  society  does  not  lead  to  the  creation  of  an 
entirely new system. Instead it helps people in that society to realise the systems they 
have already implemented in the past and clarifies the aspects of accountability that 
they  should  be  implementing.  There  are  certain  factors,  such  as  incentives, 
motivations,  competency,  problems  of  the  country  and  culture  that  influence  the 
implementation of the aspects of accountability. There are some differences between 
developed  and  developing  countries  so  accountability  relationships  will  not  be 
similar. In order to implement the new concepts, the implementers should focus on 
the factors that can influence the concepts.   
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In this part, factors  affecting the accountability  relationship are described. 
These are culture and values, institutional factors, competency of individuals and the 
political system.  
8.3.2.1 Culture and values 
Culture  and  values  are  one  of  the  most  important  factors  influencing  the 
aspects of accountability. Cultural perspectives in Asian countries are different from 
those western countries. Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) argued that some developed 
countries such as the UK and Australia are classified as having small power distance, 
weak  uncertainty  avoidance  and  individualism  while  some  developing  Asian 
countries (such as Thailand) are classified as having large power distance, strong 
uncertainty avoidance, and collectivism. These kinds of Asian cultural perspectives 
are  factors  that  can  deter  accountability  (Velayutham  and  Perera  2004).  To 
implement accountability without any changes in culture and values may not enhance 
accountability. With regard to Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, as discussed earlier in 
Chapter 3, there are some conflicts between these and Thailand’s situation. However, 
this research still used Hofstede’s dimensions because his ideas are respectable ideas 
and the researcher wants to keep an open mind about cultural dimensions and then 
use  findings  of  this  research  to  discuss  the  ideas  of  Hofstede.  Indeed,  from  the 
findings, some ideas emerge, which can be used to confirm similarities or differences 
between Hofstede’s and Thailand’s.   
Individualism and collectivism 
There are some differences between more recent Thai values and the ideas 
proposed by Hofstede about Thai culture, particularly individualism and collectivism 
(section 3.2). After the period of Americanisation and westernisation, Thai people 
are more individualistic now than in the past (Klausner 1997). Thai people tend to do 
what they want and to focus on themselves (section 3.2). It is quite difficult for them 
to work as a team (Virushaniphawan 2004, in Thai), and there are some problems 
relating to the cooperation of two organisations or two divisions within the same 
organisations (section 5.3). However, both collectivism and individualism now play 
an important part in the implementation of accountability in Thailand.  
One characteristic of collectivist society is that employees are members of in-
groups who will pursue their in-group’s interest (Hofstede and Hofstede 2005, p. 
104) while the characteristic of individualism is that employees are economic men 
who will pursue the employer’s interest if it coincides with their self-interest (p. 104).  
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In Thailand, both collectivism and individualism occur, but they occur at different 
levels. In some relationships or behaviour, civil servants perform actions because 
they are focusing on themselves but the phrase ‘for themselves’ sometimes means 
‘for their group’ because they are members of organisations and they want to please 
their superiors in order to receive promotion. This links to institutional factors, which 
are discussed later in section 8.3.2.2. 
Civil servants pay attention to their own objectives and want to maximise 
their benefits (sections 7.2 and 7.3). However, in order to earn benefits and succeed 
with their objectives, they have to follow departmental objectives (sections 7.2 and 
7.3). If they do not agree with their superiors, they will normally keep quiet (section 
5.2). This situation links to institutional theory discussed later in section 8.3.2.2. In 
addition, there is a certain degree of collectivism. Focusing on collective objectives 
does not mean that civil servants focus on public benefits. They rather follow the 
requirements  of  their  executives.  It  is  possible  that  some  of  their  activities  or 
behaviour will not enhance public benefits. In such cases, individual motivation and 
incentives are more important.   
In some situations, civil servants find some mismanagement or fraud but they 
keep quiet (section 5.4). It is possible that they focus on themselves and do not want 
to be involved. Another possible reason is that they know the wrongdoers well. They 
do not want to cause problems for the wrongdoers. For some situations, they may not 
want  the  wrongdoers  to  ‘lose  face’.  This  situation  shows  both  individualism  and 
collectivism in the behaviour of civil servants.      
Regarding  standards  of  accountability,  for  collectivist  society  and  loose 
structure, standards are normally informal, likely to be implicit in the social context, 
and less  clearly  defined (Gelfand  et al. 2004).  This situation occurs in Thailand, 
where officials can use unclear standards to their own advantage. In addition, for 
situation-oriented society, the behaviour of civil servants can be flexible depending 
on the situation.  
Power distance 
 Another  conflict  between  Hofstede’s  cultural  dimensions  and  the  case  of 
Thailand  is  power  distance.  From  previous  literature,  although  Hofstede  (1991) 
argues  that  Thai  society  is  classified  as  large  power  distance,  Klausner  (1997) 
suggests that Thai people are more egalitarian. Education can increase social status 
(Phongpaichit  and  Baker  1995).  The  bureaucratic  system  relies  on  hierarchical  
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accountability. In the public sector, civil servants do realise that the system is now 
more egalitarian than in the past and know that if they feel a situation is unfair, they 
can  make  a  complaint  (section  5.4).  However,  they  still  sometimes  complain 
anonymously. What they usually do is just keep quiet, because it is possible that their 
complaints may not be upheld, thereby risking their own positions (sections 5.2 and 
5.5). Some relationships within organisations are unequal in nature, such as that of 
superiors towards subordinates. Therefore, it is not surprising that there are still some 
inequalities in society, since rewards and promotion depend on the executives.  
Although it is appropriate for subordinates to be loyal to superiors (Frink and 
Klimoski 2004), for large power distance society, this factor may actually hinder 
attempts to enhance accountability in some cases because subordinates will not stand 
up against their superiors (section 5.2). They have to accept what they are given 
(section  5.6),  and  avoid  criticising  their  superiors,  who  may  not  be  receptive 
complaints. In addition, this factor can cause a lack of interest in the performance of 
the  government  and  public  sector.  Although  this  research  does  not  focus  on  the 
public, some results show that some Thai people will no longer accept inequality or 
differences when it comes to the level of service they receive from departments. 
Indeed,  there  have  been  some  complaints,  as  well  as  accusations,  from  citizens 
(section  5.4).  However,  some  complaints  are  sometimes  made  anonymously 
(sections 5.4 and 5.6). Although some Thai people will no longer accept inequality, 
they do not want to become involved directly in the process of complaining.  
If a society has a strong hierarchical relationship, is based on a system of 
patronage, or makes use of personal connections, then some executives can use bias 
and favouritism to promote someone of their choosing (sections 5.2 and 5.3). Such 
behaviour  is  classified  as  corruption  (World  Bank  1992).  However,  it  is  normal 
behaviour  for  some  countries,  including  Thailand.  Thus,  they  do  accept  and  are 
familiar with it (section 3.2), and although there are many projects implemented to 
solve this problem, civil servants can still find ways to carry out fraudulent practices 
or  incidences  of  corruption  (section  5.4).  Not  only  do  civil  servants  themselves 
participate in fraud or corruption, but at a higher-level, politicians actually use their 
influence to gain benefits (section 5.7). It is difficult to solve such problems and, in 
fact, only accountability may not be the correct solution.    
One characteristic of large power distance is that managers rely on superiors 
and on formal rules (Hofstede and Hofstede 2005, p. 59) while, for small power 
distance, managers rely on their own experience and on subordinates (p. 59). In  
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some cases, superiors in Thailand do not follow formal rules (sections 5.5 and 5.6), 
instead focusing on subordinates. Within organisations, there are many groups. These 
groups normally pay more attention to someone who is a member of a group, as 
opposed to an individual.  
In addition, for large power distance, power is based on tradition or family, 
charisma, and the ability to use force, while, for small power distance, power is 
based  on  formal  position,  expertise,  and  ability  to  give  rewards  (Hofstede  and 
Hofstede 2005, p. 67). There two characteristics are present in Thailand. Superiors 
usually have power over subordinates because they can give subordinates promotion 
or reward (sections 7.2 and 7.3). This is another example where Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions and Thai values conflict.  
Generally, large power distance is still valid in Thailand. However, in some 
situations, there are certain Thai characteristics that conflict with Hofstede’s ideas on 
cultural dimensions.    
Strong uncertainty avoidance  
  This cultural dimension relates to how people in society feel about unknown 
situations (Hofstede and Hofstede 2005). The need for rules is a characteristic of 
strong uncertainty avoidance. This is the case in Thailand, where there are plenty of 
laws and rules (section 5.5). However, the problem is that enforcement of these laws 
and rules is not so strong (section 7.2). In addition, the laws and rules, which do 
exist, are sometimes unclear.  
  As  discussed  earlier  in  Chapter  3,  there  are  some  conflicts  between 
Hofstede’s  cultural  dimensions  and  Thailand’s  (see  section  3.2).  Hofstede  and 
Hofstede (2005) argue that people in strong uncertainty avoidance society like to 
work hard. From the previous research, this claim is partially true within the Thai 
private sector but not the public. Civil servants are normally blamed for red-tape 
(Virushaniphawan 2004, in Thai). According to this research, there is some evidence 
to  suggest  that  some  civil  servants  will  postpone  tasks  and  put  little  effort  into 
working (section 5.8). However, it cannot be summarised from this research that, in 
general, civil servants and other employees do not like to work hard. This would 
entail future research, focusing on the work effort of civil servants.  
In addition, effort may not be the only factor, as these are a number of other 
processes in operations, which need to be considered (section 5.4). These processes 
have to pass between many other divisions. Thus, operational processes can be quite  
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slow. Even though the government is trying to reduce the number of steps, there are 
still  many  processes,  which  must  be  carried  out.  These  can  burden  operational 
processes and support the claim that civil servants do not work hard because they are 
unable to do. In future research, the working styles of civil servants should be studied 
in-depth in order to establish the reasons for this situation. In addition, some civil 
servants have very little motivation for working, because their promotion will not 
depend  on  performance  but  on  other  issues,  such  as  rotation  or  acquaintance 
(sections 5.5 and 5.6). 
  As  discussed  earlier  in  Chapter  3,  the  political  system  is  involved 
significantly  in  the  bureaucratic  system.  One  characteristic  of  strong  uncertainty 
avoidance is that civil servants are negative towards political processes (Hofstede 
and Hofstede 2005). From the results, they do not actually say much about politics. 
They only mention that politicians involved directly in the public sector (section 5.3). 
Politicians are their direct superiors so they try to avoid criticising their executives. 
They  show  neither  negative  nor  positive  sides  towards  politicians  and  political 
processes.   
Femininity  
  People in feminine society are likely to be modest, tender, and concerned 
with the quality of life (Hofstede and Hofstede 2005, p. 120). They avoid criticism 
and will not want to make someone lose face (section 7.3). This dimension does help 
operational processes to be smooth and fast. Civil servants can skip some processes 
in  order  to  make  processes  faster  (section  5.4).  However,  for  accountability,  this 
dimension  possibly  burdens  the  mechanism.  When  civil  servants  uncover  some 
fraud, they may not do anything because they do not want to criticise (sections 7.2 
and 7.3).  
Long-term orientation  
  For  long-term  orientation,  society  normally  focuses  on  long-term  results 
(Hofstede and Hofstede 2005). This research cannot generalise about people’s ideas 
regarding  long-term  orientation.  However,  with  regard  to  the  Thai  bureaucratic 
system,  after  the  economic  crisis,  they  began  strategic  and  long-term  projects 
(section 3.2) but civil servants, particularly lower-ranking staff, pay little attention to 
tasks that are not directly related to their own responsibilities (sections 5.3 and 5.4). 
They  focus  only  on  the  jobs  that  they  are  assigned  to.  It  may  imply,  thus,  that  
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whether or not they focus on long-term plans depends on the executives of their 
departments or ministries.   
In summary – Hofstede  
  With  regard  to  the  ideas  of  Hofstede,  from  the  literature,  there  are  some 
similarities and conflicts between Hofstede and Thailand’s. This research confirms 
these.  However,  the  majority  of  his  ideas  are  still  compatible  with  Thai  society, 
particularly  femininity  and  large  power  distance.  Both  individualism  and 
collectivism feature in Thailand, as well as, strong uncertainty avoidance. However, 
there are some characteristics and practices, which conflict with Thai culture and 
values. For long-term orientation, the positions and responsibilities of individuals are 
important to explain this issue.  
  These  cultural  perspectives  can  either  support  or  inhibit  accountability 
mechanisms, depending on individual  motivations, incentives  and behaviour. The 
rest of this section discusses some values, which can motivate individual behaviour 
and performance.   
Power  
Power, knowledge, freedom, incentives and motivations of accountors and 
accountees play important parts in the accountability relationship (see sections 7.2 
and  7.3).  With  regard  to  power,  the  enhancement  of  social  status,  prestige,  and 
control  over  people  and  resources  will  motivate  individuals  (Schwartz  and  Sagiv 
1995).  The  accountability  relationship  is  normally  an  unequal  relationship, 
particularly  between  superiors  and  subordinates  (section  2.4).  Accountees  usually 
have more power and a higher status than that of accountors. However, different 
accountees have different powers depending on their social status and power over 
people or resources (sections 7.2 and 7.3). The power of accountees is related to the 
career  advancement  of  accountors.  Accountors  are  likely  to  focus  more  on 
accountees  who  can  enhance  their  career  opportunities.  Therefore,  some 
accountability relationships are stronger than others.  
In  some  societies  like  the  Thai  bureaucratic  system,  some  accountors  are 
motivated by career advancement so the relationship in the case of organisational 
accountability  is  stronger  than  for  administrative  and  public  accountability.  This 
situation causes accountability mismatch, which is discussed later in section 8.3.3. 
This  is  supported  by  Hofstede’s  cultural  dimensions  of  large  power  distance. 
Subordinates can accept inequality relatively easily, particularly differences in status  
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within  an  organisation  (Virushaniphawan  2004,  in  Thai).  If  they  do  not  want  to 
follow their superiors, they just keep quiet (section 5.2.2). This situation may affect 
the system of checks and balances or, in other words, the process of scrutiny.  
A lack of transparency can represent the acceptance of inequality in society, 
particularly  promotion,  rewards  or  punishment,  i.e.  effects  of  accountability.  For 
example, the reward system sometimes causes problems in operations but a lack of 
transparency regarding the details of rewards can prevent jealousy (Heald 2006b). 
Thus,  in  some  cases,  confidentiality  can  avoid  problems  associated  with  unequal 
rewards. If the society applies confidentiality, it can be inferred that people trust the 
accountability mechanisms so a lack of transparency causes no problem. However, in 
some societies, a lack of transparency, or confidentiality may come from inequality 
in access to information or from having someone with private issues that does not 
want to inform other people.  
In  the  case  of  Thailand,  a  lack  of  transparency  was  the  cause  of  some 
problems, such as the economic crisis in 1997 and corruption (Fischer 1998). With 
regard to the reward system in Thailand, even though the rewards may be unequal, 
the government or departments do sometimes disclose this information (section 5.6). 
They are unconcerned about this issue because, in Thai society, officials are unlikely 
to complain about unequal rewards, and will accept inequality (sections 5.2 and 5.3). 
This situation does not enhance accountability, particularly the process of scrutiny. 
Some operational processes may not be monitored because officials accept what has 
been done by superiors. Civil servants accept the results without any complaints.          
Task achievement, security, benevolence  
Another value influencing the accountability relationship is task achievement. 
Career  advancement  influences  accountors’  decision  making.  In  some  societies, 
working hard may not guarantee better career opportunities (Komin 1990; section 
5.6). This may then lead to some unwanted behaviour. It is possible that some civil 
servants will not work to the best of their ability, leading to a lack of concern and a 
feeling that their jobs are not important (section 5.3). In addition, they feel unable to 
say anything to their superiors because, in the Thai bureaucratic system, it is not 
made easy for them to complain. They may instead resort to just waiting for new 
executives, by which time it may possibly be their turn for promotion. 
  The above situation shows both individualism and collectivism in operation 
at the same time. This links to ideas of institutions that they want to maximise their  
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utility  by  following  institutions.  This  situation  may  not  support  the  processes  of 
scrutiny. Although a reward system may be in place, if situations are unclear, this 
may not motivate civil servant much (section 5.6). In some cases, it may motivate but 
in  the  wrong  way.  For  example,  some  civil  servants  may  fabricate  information 
instead of actually improving operational performance (section 5.4). 
There  are  some  values  influencing  the  accountability  relationship.  For 
example, some accountors may be motivated by social values of security. They want 
to  feel  safe  and  secure  by  being  a  member  of  a  group,  society,  or  relationship 
(Schwartz  and  Sagiv  1995).  They  will  make  decisions  based  on  what  the  group 
wants.  However,  what  the  group  wants  should  not  distract  them  from  their  own 
benefits  (section  7.2).  This  links  to  Hofstede’s  ideas  of  collectivism  and 
individualism. In addition, both accountors and accountees are sometimes motivated 
by feelings of benevolence or gratefulness within a relationship. They do not want 
someone to lose face (sections 7.2 and 7.3). This is a normal situation for feminine 
society. Therefore, it is possible that accountors would accommodate the needs of 
accountees or vice versa.  
Religious value 
Religious  values  are  important.  They  can  either  support  or  detract 
accountability mechanisms. Some Buddhist values, such as a belief in karma, can 
either support or detract the accountability relationship (section 5.7). Some citizens 
and civil servants will take no action because they think that wrongdoers will get 
retribution some time in the future (section 5.7). However, believing in karma is not 
the only reason for not taking action. Some officials will be afraid to report any 
wrongdoing because the perpetrators are powerful or are supported by a powerful 
group (section 5.4). Therefore, some civil servants do not want to be involved. 
Situation orientation     
In some countries, people are quite flexible and are situation-oriented. Thai 
people are classified in this type (Komin 1990). Consequently, it is not surprising 
that two similar situations may have different results due to differences in the people 
involved  (section  5.6).  This  affects  the  accountability  relationship  directly.  The 
processes  of  accountability,  particularly  scrutiny,  are  detracted.  Some  bias  and 
favouritism may occur in relation to the effects of accountability. An example is that 
the effects of accountability are normally unclear (section 5.6). This does not help 
enhancing accountability even if the government implements the reward system. This  
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may  cause  problems  relating  to  standards  of  accountability.  Even  though  both 
accountors and accountees set standards or rules, it is possible either of them may 
choose not to follow those standards if they have other choices. Not only can unclear 
standards and effects deter accountability (Gelfand et al. 2004), but unclear standards 
also  support  the  use  of  values  and  culture  in  interpreting  the  accountability 
relationship. It is possible that some perspectives, such as personal connections and 
the  patronage  system,  can  also  play  a  part  in  the  accountability  relationship. 
However, culture and values are not the only factor influencing the accountability 
relationship. 
Effects from culture and values  
Taking into account the above cultural factors, it is clear that there are some 
factors,  which  can  persuade  accountors  to  pay  more  attention  to  organisational 
accountability  than  to  administrative  accountability.  In  the  case  of  administrative 
accountability,  the  relationship  is  horizontal  (section  5.2).  External  auditors  or 
controllers cannot give civil servants the effects directly.  
With  regard  to  administrative  accountability,  including  professional 
accountability in the case of being accountable to professional peer, the relationship 
is  normally  one  of  cooperation  instead  of  hierarchy  (section  5.2).  Therefore, 
accountees in this relationship do not have power over accountors. The relationship 
is likely to be a bidirectional relationship while the relationship between superiors 
and subordinates is likely to be unidirectional. Unless the accountees put pressure on 
the accountors, it is possible that some processes will be delayed or that problems 
relating to cooperation may occur (section 5.4). It is possible that civil servants do 
not pay much attention to auditors’ requirements. For this situation, civil servants are 
not only motivated by career achievement, but also motivated by security. They may 
sometimes feel insecure when they are inspected. They may not want auditors or 
controllers  to  investigate  their  performance.  The  main  duty  of  controllers  and 
auditors is to monitor and verify performance and administration (Brinkerhoff 2001). 
Asymmetry  of  information  can  occur  if  the  accountors  focus  more  on  their  own 
benefits. Asymmetry means not only unequal access to information but in some cases 
it means receiving incorrect information (section 5.4). It is difficult for the process of 
checks and balances to occur. This can affect the operational processes of auditors 
and controllers.   
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There  are  some  problems  about  transparency,  access  to  information  and 
communication. Access to information is important for accountability (Birkinshaw 
2006). In order to implement the concept of good governance, the World Bank’s idea 
was  used  to  create  the  Good  Governance  Royal  Decree.  This  is  an  example  of 
pressure from outside organisations. However, some officials, whose responsibilities 
relate to the Decree, do not know how the Decree was created, or what the World 
Bank’s  concept  was  used  as  a  guideline  (section  3.5).  Although  the  undisclosed 
information did not produce bad results as was the case with NASA and Challenger 
(Romzek and Dubnick 1987), it does not support accountability. This situation shows 
a lack of transparency in the public sector. However, it is not only the public that has 
difficulty in gaining access to governmental information. This is also a problem for 
any  developing  country  where  the  operational  processes  are  not  transparent. 
Although this situation is not related to accounting information, it can link to Gray’s 
ideas, i.e. many Asian countries, which are classified as having large power distance, 
collectivism and strong uncertainty avoidance, normally keep financial information 
secret (Gray 1988). In the past, financial information was not provided much in the 
Thai  bureaucratic  system.  Even  now  financial  information  is  rarely  provided 
(sections  6.2  and  6.3).  This  confirms  Gray’s  (1988)  ideas  that  Asian  countries 
normally keep information secret. Although that research was studied twenty years 
ago, it is still valid for the Thai public sector. Even though the Thai government 
wants to improve and enhance level of transparency, there are still some government 
departments that do not follow the ideas (sections 6.2 and 6.3).  
With regard to public accountability, although the relationship is likely to be 
vertical, the general public, except some powerful groups and the media, do not have 
much power and cannot control departments (sections 7.2 and 7.3). Therefore, the 
relationship is less strong than organisational accountability. In addition, pressure 
from and the knowledge of the public are important elements in forcing officials to 
pay attention to the public (sections 7.2 and 7.3). Different types of accountees exert 
different types of pressure on civil servants. For example, the media are likely to 
have more influence than the general public (sections 7.2 and 7.3). The media are, 
therefore, an important factor in the accountability relationship. However, it does not 
mean that all types of media do this job. It depends on the motivations of the media. 
The motivations and incentives of both citizens and officials can sometimes cause 
accountability  mismatch  discussed  later  in  section  8.3.3.  In  addition,  individual 
motivations  can  cause  conflict  of  interest  between  accountors  and  accountees  
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(sections 7.2 and 7.3). This situation can lead to problems, such as risk sharing and 
asymmetry of information, which in turn leads to the agency problem (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). In some societies, accepting inequality, particularly inequality in 
social  status,  positions,  power,  and  economical  status,  and  a  lack  of  interest  of 
citizens  are  common,  making  it  is  easier  for  officials  to  take  advantage  possibly 
because there is no outside control.  
Due to the importance of organisational accountability, it is possible that the 
relationship in this type can influence the relationships in other types. This situation 
sometimes does not support public and administrative accountability. Accountability 
mismatch can possibly occur at this point, when the accountors change focus from 
what they were expected to focus on. 
In summary, culture and values affect the accountability relationship directly. 
They can either inhibit or support enhancing accountability. However, culture and 
values are not the only factors affecting accountability. The next section discusses 
institutional factors.      
8.3.2.2 Institutional factors  
From  the  results  of  this  research,  culture  and  values  are  the  main  factors 
influencing the accountability relationship directly. In addition to culture and values, 
institutional theory is one possible framework to explain accountability. This will be 
useful  for  future  research  focusing  on  institutional  factors  in  relation  to 
accountability.  
Basis of compliance   
The basis of compliance of institutions links to the concept of ‘accountability 
for what’ and ‘standards of accountability’. For regulative institutionism, the basis of 
compliance is expedience (Scott 1995). Accountors and accountees, in the case of 
administrative accountability and public accountability, are related to this category. 
For these two types of accountability, accountors normally follow a legal framework 
(section  5.3).  In  addition,  they  sometimes  comply  with  social  obligation  (section 
5.3). National culture and values may influence the social obligation. This situation 
occurs  in  countries  whose  people  are  situation-oriented,  i.e.  they  are  flexible, 
depending on a particular situation or circumstance.   
The accountability relationship in the case of organisational accountability is 
a little bit different from the other two types. The relationship between accountors 
and accountees is more flexible (sections 7.2 and 7.3). Subordinates normally follow  
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rules or standards set by institutions. In addition, organisational norms and values are 
important  to  indicate  individual  behaviour,  which  may  influence  institutions  as  a 
whole.  
Mechanisms  
The  structure  of  the  relationship  between  accountors  and  accountees 
influence the mechanisms, which exist within institutions. Regardless of whether the 
relationship  is  formal  or  informal,  equal  or  unequal,  or  unidirectional  or 
bidirectional, it influences individual behaviour. This relates to ‘accountability for 
what’ and ‘processes of accountability’ directly. The interaction between accountors 
and accountees is also important. As discussed in the earlier section, power between 
accountors and accountees can affect what both groups have done. Different types of 
relationships  can  cause  different  types  of  interaction.  In  addition,  knowledge  of 
accountees’ desires is important in reflecting what accountors intend to do (Ebrahim 
2003). If accountors know these, they will respond to the accountees’ wills (sections 
7.2 and 7.3).     
In the case of public and administrative accountability, where the relationship 
follows a legal framework, the mechanisms of an institution are likely to be coercive 
(Scott 1995). However, these mechanisms may not be so effective in societies, where 
the structures are loose and situation-oriented. This can lead to an agency problem. If 
an agent’s decision is motivated by the personal benefits to be gained, then it is more 
likely that they will take advantage, because it is difficult for a principal either to 
apply control over an agent or to coerce him to do the right thing. In such cases, it is 
easy for an agent to withhold certain information from a principal. This burdens the 
enhancement of accountability. 
Following a legal framework is sometimes complicated because an accountor 
may have to follow the guidelines for more than one institution (sections 5.2 and 
5.3). It is possible that they sometimes have to use their own judgement in order to 
decide which guidelines to follow (Peters 2000). This situation causes accountability 
mismatch, since some values, such as power, task achievement, and benevolence, 
can influence decision making. Also, it is possible that, where an individual has some 
overlapping duties, conflict of interest may occur.  
In the case of organisational accountability, the mechanisms of an institution 
are likely to be normative. Individuals usually follow rules and norms that have been 
established by institutions (Scott 1995), and which represent the appropriate level of  
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behaviour  that  individuals  within  these  organisations  are  expected  to  follow. 
Accountors and accountees, in the case of organisational accountability, also have to 
follow laws or have any legal sanctions. They have to keep this in their mind when 
they make decisions (section 5.3).  
Organisational  values  and  norms  can  structure  the  choices  made  by 
individuals. In addition, moral principles are also of relevance. Civil servants are 
guided  by  their  incentives  when  deciding  on  the  best  course  of  actions  in  their 
operations, but this may result in their choices conflicting with the benefits to the 
public. In addition, a certain element of corruption, such as favouritism and bias, may 
occur.  
Choices 
Regarding the idea of rational choice, the primary motivation of individuals is 
to maximise utility, i.e. to maximise benefits to themselves (Peters 2000). While such 
goals may be achieved through institution action, their behaviour may have to be 
constrained,  i.e.  they  will  normally  adhere  to  the  institutional  guidelines  (Peters 
2000). For example, civil servants tend to focus on what their departments, i.e. their 
superiors want them to do, not what the public want (section 5.3). In addition, civil 
servants have, by law, to provide certain information to external auditors. If they do 
not do, then they may be penalised (section 5.4). This situation shows how relevant 
the choices are made by an individual. Incentives can be either inducements or rules 
(Peters  2000),  depending  on  the  institution.  This  situation  shows  that  accountors 
comply with accountees, but in various ways, as they have to make decisions which 
maximise the benefits to themselves.  
With regard to the choices made by individuals, there are many factors that 
may take into consideration before a decision is reached, e.g. the legal system, utility, 
cost-benefit logic, career advancement, morality, culture and values, social rules and 
guidance (sections 7.2 and 7.3). The learning process also influences the decisions of 
individuals.  If  individuals  know  the  wishes  of  their  superiors,  principals  or 
accountees,  then  they  will  know  what  they  need  to  do.  Thus,  this  affects  their 
decision making.  
In addition to the above factors, the  mechanisms of institutions can  force 
individuals to comply with the aims of institutions, which should be collective and 
not individual. However, it is possible that some individuals will try to alter the 
collective aims by changing them to individual aims. In some cases, the two aims  
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will  be  indistinguishable.  It  is,  therefore,  possible  that  individuals  can  shape 
institutions and force them to operate in whichever way they want (Peters 2000). 
Sometimes,  individual  incentives  can  change  an  institution,  depending  on  the 
leadership  structure.  The  public  sector  is  a  mainly  hierarchical  structure,  which 
enables the choices and incentives of higher-ranking civil servants to influence the 
institutions themselves (section 5.3). Higher-ranking officials choosing to focus more 
on themselves or their own personal benefits do nothing to enhance accountability.  
Lower-ranking civil servants will work on routine tasks and will normally 
follow organisational routines (sections 5.2 and 5.3). Dependent on the organisations, 
these routines may take the form of rules, standards or agreement (Peters 2000), and 
will also be affected by organisational culture. In some cases, where institutions are 
based on hierarchy and personalism, it will be the executives of those institutions 
who decide what the standards should be.  For  organisational accountability, civil 
servants  will  normally  comply  with  what  the  executives  of  the  departments  or 
ministries want.  
There are other factors that can affect institutions. For example, changing on 
operational styles and legal framework influence what institutions decide to do. A 
good example of this from this research is that when the Thai government shifted its 
attention to increasing the level of transparency, the  government agencies had to 
refocus too (section 6.2). Thus, their operational styles and their way of thinking 
have been changed. The next section discusses the competency and qualifications of 
accountors and accountees.   
8.3.2.3 Competency and qualifications of accountors and accountees 
The  problems  arising  from  the  implementation  of  accountability  aspects, 
including  policy  transfer,  are  related  to  the  competency  of  civil  servants.  For 
example, regarding the implementation of accruals accounting, developed countries, 
such as Australia and the United Kingdom, took almost ten years to change from a 
cash accounting system to accruals accounting (see Barton 2004; Heald 2005). On 
the other hand, Thailand took less than three years to implement this, though it may 
be said that officials were not ready to apply the new system (Selaratana 2003, in 
Thai; section 5.8). When the government decided to change from a manual system to 
a computer based system, the situation was even worse (section 5.8).  
With regard to the accounting system, civil servants in Thailand did not have 
much knowledge about this. In addition, the majority of them did not even possess an  
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accounting degree so implementing accruals accounting was not going to be an easy 
task for them (Selaratana 2003, in Thai). Obviously, it would take time for them to 
understand the new system. This shows how both the competency of civil servants 
and the time constraint they must work under can cause problems (section 5.8). In 
addition,  another  main  issue  showing  a  lack  of  qualification  of  civil  servants  is 
internal  control.  Civil  servants  do  not  pay  much  attention  to  projects  relating  to 
internal control (section 5.4). They do not understand the concepts of internal control 
and some of them do not want to waste their time studying (section 5.4). They prefer 
to spend more time on other matters.  
The  topic  of  how  competency,  education  and  training  influence 
accountability  is  not  focused  on  much  in  the  literature  on  western  society. 
Researchers  may  expect  that  people  in  developed  countries  should  understand 
accountability. However, for a developing country like Thailand, it is actually not 
easy for people to understand accountability. The international organisations did not 
pay much attention to this topic.  
Another  main  problem  regarding  the  competency  of  civil  servants  is  an 
annual  report,  which  is  one  of  the  main  tools  for  representing  public  sector 
accountability.  There  are  many  research  papers  about  information  disclosure  in 
annual reports in the western and developed countries. However, in the case of the 
public sector in Thailand, before the introduction of the concept of good governance, 
only  some  departments  produced  annual  reports  and  the  patterns  varied  across 
departments.  In  2006,  after  public  sector  reform  and  the  introduction  of  good 
governance, departments were required to produce an annual report (section 6.3). 
However, the main issue now is with the consistency of the annual reports being 
produced (section 5.4).  
An annual report is mostly ignored by both the public and some civil servants 
(section 5.4). Some departments produce an annual report because the government 
has  exerted  pressure  on  them  to  do  so.  However,  it  is  possible  that  when  the 
government ceases to focus on this as an issue, departments will do nothing because 
certain officials do not realise the importance of an annual report. This shows how 
both the competency and understanding of civil servants regarding accountability can 
create problems. From this consideration of annual reports, it can be inferred that 
some civil servants either do not know the importance of annual reports, or do not 
actually understand the concepts of accountability.   
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Although an annual report is a tool for presenting public accountability, the 
public do not put pressure on departments to produce an annual report. Therefore, 
departments may not feel reliant on this type of accountability. Departments are more 
interested  in  departmental  websites  (section  6.2).  The  literature  indicates  that 
websites are important tools for communicating with the public. The direct cost of 
disclosure on websites should be less than that of an annual report (Prat 2006). In 
Thailand,  the  government  realises  the  importance  of  websites  (section  6.2). 
Therefore, departments are persuaded to create their own websites and deliver online 
services. Departments are encouraged to provide information to the public through 
their websites in order to improve transparency (section 6.2). 
8.3.2.4 Politics 
         The political system, including political stability, is a factor influencing the 
accountability relationship (World Bank 1992). Politicians are involved in all three 
of the types of accountability focused on in this research, i.e. public, administrative 
and organisational accountability. They take part in the bureaucratic system directly, 
particularly the process of appointing and transferring civil servants (section 3.3).  
  During  the  time  that  this  thesis  was  being  prepared,  Thailand  was  still 
experiencing political turbulence. This political instability leads to many problems 
inhibiting  the  enhancement  of  accountability.  This  affects  the  processes  of 
accountability, particularly scrutiny, since the system of checks and balances may not 
then be effective. Due to the political unrest, certain projects were postponed (section 
5.8.3). The new government normally comes with new projects, and civil servants 
are not sure which projects they should continue (section 5.4). They just wait for 
guideline from their superiors.   
  This  kind  of  situations  leads  to  difficulties  in  the  enhancement  of 
accountability. It is possible that when people are unable or unwilling to express their 
opinions, the government will do what it wants and that fraud or corruption may 
occur.  
  The  next  part  discusses  an  important  accountability  problem,  which  is 
accountability mismatch.   
8.3.3 Accountability mismatch  
Corruption  
  In  addition  to  the  problem  of  understanding  accountability,  there  is  the 
problem  of  the  interpretation  of  the  cause  of  a  lack  of  accountability.  A  lack  of  
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accountability was the main cause of the South-East Asian economic crisis (Fischer 
1998;  section  3.2).  At  that  time,  the  World  Bank  wanted  Thailand  to  improve 
accountability in both the public and private sectors (World Bank 2000). Corruption 
was  the  main  problem,  occurring  in  almost  every  level,  i.e.  from  low-ranking 
officials to politicians (section 3.2). Therefore, applying accountability based only on 
good practice was not going to be enough to solve Thai problems.  
  A system of monitoring and controlling is the main tool in the prevention and 
investigation of corruption. The cause of the audit explosion in the United Kingdom 
in  late  1980s  was  mainly  due  to  three  aspects:  the  rise  of  the  new  public 
management; increased demands for accountability and transparency; and the rise of 
quality assurance models of organisational control (Power 2000, p. 111).  
In the case of Thailand, after the economic crisis, the pressure for a system of 
monitoring  and  controlling  came  from  the  existence  of  corruption  and  a  lack  of 
accountability (sections 3.4 and 3.5). The Thai government focused on such a system 
in order to provide a means of both investigating operations and establishing value 
for money. Certainly, the situation seems to have improved and to be better than in 
the past (section 7.5). However, it is possible that the Thai government implemented 
the projects too quickly. Many officials, including departmental executives, did not 
understand the concept well enough (sections 5.4 and 5.8). This is due to a lack of 
proper education and training for staff, resulting in some misunderstanding of the 
concepts and some errors in its implementation (see details in section 5.8). 
  Controlling  and  monitoring  systems,  in  developed  countries  like  the  UK, 
normally came about as a result of pressure from their own citizens (Power 2000). 
However,  in  the  case  of  Thailand,  it  was  a  requirement  of  the  international 
organisations  (World  Bank  2000).  Although,  in  the  past,  the  Thai  bureaucratic 
system already had systems for controlling and monitoring, this was not being paid 
much  attention.  Civil  servants  did  not  understand  much  about  internal  control 
(section 5.4). Some institutions, such as the Office of the Auditor General, became an 
independent  organisation  in  1999,  i.e.  after  the  economic  crisis.  Although  some 
officials understand the concept of auditing (including controlling and monitoring), 
officials may still think that these topics are unimportant (section 5.4). Only some 
officials pay attention to this issue.  
  Power (2000) comments that to be accountable, to hold accountable and the 
account to be audited are different from making information more transparent or  
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publicly accessible (pp. 116-7). The main focus is to ensure auditing takes place, not 
what is done and to whom the report is made. This situation also applies not only in 
the UK, but in a developing country like Thailand, where the situation is possibly 
even worse. Not only do departments not provide audited information to the public, 
but external auditors  cannot audit all organisations in a  year (section 5.4). Thus, 
citizens cannot obtain information from auditors or controllers (sections 6.2 and 6.3). 
Citizens are reliant on the information provided from the departmental side only. 
This is a problem with the access to the information. Although the auditing system is 
implemented, it does not mean that the auditing system can enhance transparency or 
public accessibility. Access to information is still not easy for the Thai people. This 
situation affects public accountability directly (see details in Chapter 5).  
Pressure from international organisations   
  As discussed earlier in Chapter 3, the Thai government had already made 
plans for public sector reform a long time ago. These were set out in the policies of 
the  governments  (Sopchokechai  2002).  However,  these  projects  were  not 
implemented till after the economic crisis. There were several reasons for this. First 
of all, there were frequent changes of government. This caused a lack of true political 
commitment to public sector reform (Sopchokechai 2002). In addition, within the 
bureaucratic system, there was strong resistance against reform (Sopchokechai 2002; 
Soralump 2004). For the private sector organisations, the public and the media, there 
were only limited opportunities to participate in the reform (Sopchokechai 2002). 
Moreover, many tests and pilot studies were not suitably focused and implemented 
(Sopchokechai 2002). Following the political turbulence, i.e. Black May in 1992, 
there was a period of political reform between 1996 and 1997. In addition, it was the 
economic  crisis  of  1997,  combined  with  citizens’  demands  for  good  governance, 
which led to successful public sector reform. In addition, another important factor 
behind  the  need  for  successful  public  sector  reform  was  pressure  from  those 
international  organisations,  which  had  supported  the  Thai  government  during  the 
economic turbulence.  
   The  continuation  of  projects  depends  on  certain  factors.  Pressure  from 
international organisations is among those factors. In addition, political stability is 
also a factor. Some projects may be postponed if a new government decides not to 
continue (section 5.8), i.e. a new government means new projects. The attention of 
executives at either a ministerial or departmental level will be important, because 
whatever issues they focus, civil servants will focus on too (section 5.2). The wishes  
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of civil servants, particularly executives of departments, are important because it is 
impossible for ministers to keep track of every project. Some projects are controlled 
by the executives of departments. Therefore, if they want projects to continue, they 
will allow them to.  
As a result of pressure from international lenders, the Thai government had to 
accommodate them by cutting operational costs (Thailand Letter of Intent 1997-99). 
The main operational cost of the Thai public sector is the salary of civil servants. 
Therefore,  to  solve  the  problem,  the  number  of  officials  had  to  be  reduced.  The 
Office of the Civil Service Commission (OCSC) came under pressure and relied on 
bureaucratic  accountability.  This  caused  some  problems  related  to  professional 
accountability  in  other  departments.  The  number  of  internal  auditors  in  some 
departments was not enough to perform well (section 5.8).   
  This possibly implies that the government focused on the short-term instead 
of the long-term. This situation is similar in the case of non profit organisations that 
rely on donors, or the relationship between NGOs and donors emphasising upward 
accountability (Ebrahim 2005). If organisations know what the donors want, they 
aim to please their donors rather than focusing on broader objectives. It is the same 
as developing countries having to implement support programmes from international 
organisations.  It  is  possible  that  the  politicians  and  departmental  executives  paid 
more attention to the lenders than to other people. The cabinet did what it thought 
should be appropriate.  
  The  international  organisations  such  as  the  International  Monetary  Fund 
(IMF) wanted to solve the economic problems in order to help the country recover 
from  the  economic  crisis  and  repay  money  to  creditors  or  financial  institutions 
(Bullard et al. 1998; Kapur 1998; Khor 1998). It has been suggested that sometimes 
the  IMF  does  not  focus  on  the  real  problems  of  the  country  and  may  not  be  so 
concerned  with  long-term  issues  (Kapur  1998;  Khor  1998).  When  the  Thai 
government implemented projects, the economy recovered and the government was 
able to repay its loans to the lender organisations, particularly the IMF.  
When  the  objectives  of  the  international  organisations  should  have  been 
considered  successful,  there  were  some  problems  which  remained  afterward.  For 
example, human resource reform and the reduction of the number of civil servants 
caused  some  problems  to  the  public  sector  (section  5.8).  However,  after  the 
international  organisations  left  Thailand,  certain  programmes  came  to  a  halt,  
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particularly the anti-corruption programmes, which was a loss for Thailand (Mutebi 
2008). Whether other projects continue or not depends on the current government, 
and the political climate. The majority of projects did continue, though some were 
delayed  because  the  new  government  shifted  their  focus  elsewhere  (section  5.8). 
From the results of this research, the opinions and attitudes of ministers or directors 
of  departments  are  important  in  determining  whether  or  not  existing  projects 
continue.   
The problem arising from accountability mismatch  
  The problem of accountability mismatch is the main problem that can deter 
the  enhancement  of  accountability.  This  kind  of  case  also  happens  in  developed 
countries. One notorious example is the case of the Challenger disaster and NASA, 
when  NASA  changed  the  focus  from  professional  accountability  to  political  and 
bureaucratic accountability, resulting in tragedy (Romzek and Dubnick 1987).  
There are two ideas about the concept of ‘to whom’. The first idea is that 
officials are accountable to both superiors and the public.  A second idea is that 
officials do not have to be accountable to the public (Brinkerhoff 2001; Axworthy 
2005).  The  main  aim  of  many  public  sector  organisations  is  to  satisfy  public 
requirements.  For  individual  accountability  (for  Thailand),  officials  should  be 
accountable to their superiors (section 5.2). However, some Thai officials, whose 
responsibility  relates  to  the  public,  should  also  be  accountable  to  the  public. 
However, many officials rely more on organisational accountability instead of public 
accountability  (sections  5.2  and  5.3).  They  perform  by  focusing  on  the  group 
objectives instead of the public in general. Even within organisations, officials who 
come  from  different  sections  sometimes  focus  on  sectional  objectives  instead  of 
departmental objectives. Internal auditors should focus on professional accountability 
but in fact they focus more on organisational or bureaucratic accountability. This 
links to the discussion earlier about culture, values and institutional factors.   
In the case of corporate accountability, departments and civil servants are 
accountable for public policy and the use of public money (Mulgan 2000b). They 
also  have  to  follow  what  their  superiors  require  so  they  should  rely  on  both 
bureaucratic  accountability  and  public  accountability.  However,  in  Thailand, 
departments and officials are likely to rely on bureaucratic accountability instead of 
public  accountability  so  officials  apply  projects  according  to  politicians’ 
requirements (sections 5.2 and 5.3). They are under pressure from these politicians  
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because if they do not follow out requirements, their own jobs may be at risk. The 
public  do  not  place  much  pressure  on  departments  (section  5.4).  Though  some 
individual citizens may exert pressure, the public are mainly interested in service 
delivery. There are sometimes complaints made about corruption but in most cases 
these are not communicated to the public. Therefore, it is only the complainer who 
has a problem. However, in some cases, citizens inform the media who respond by 
focusing on the case themselves. Departments will then pay attention to these cases.  
In a democratic society, the media should provide information to the public 
(UN 2004). They should investigate governmental performance and provide the truth 
to  the  public.  However,  sometimes  a  conflict  of  interest  occurs,  the  truth  is  not 
reported to the public, and the media does not do what it is supposed to do. In such 
cases, the media are not taking account of their professional accountability, show a 
disregard for their professional peers and are more concerned about the owners and 
what the owners want them to do. In other words, the media does not understand its 
responsibilities. It also raises the problem of ‘accountability for what’. Nevertheless, 
some people argue that Thailand cannot be classified as an open democracy due to its 
several periods of political turbulence (including during the period of this research). 
However, the statement of the Constitution of Thailand declares Thailand to be a 
democratic country, with the King as the head of the state. Therefore, this research 
classifies  Thailand  as  a  democratic  country.  The  freedom  of  the  media  and  the 
political system are possible areas of study for future research.  
  The  main  type  of  accountability  for  members  of  parliament  is  public 
accountability,  or  as  some  researchers  refer  to  it,  political  accountability,  which 
represents the relationship between politicians and their constituents (Day and Klein 
1987;  Bovens  2005).  The  relationship  between  the  parliament  and  cabinet  is 
normally one of upward accountability. However, in Thailand, even at this level, an 
accountability mismatch may happen. Some members of parliament are accountable 
to the cabinet instead (section 3.3). The relationship is the opposite of that described 
in the literature, i.e. the relationship is one of downward accountability not upward. 
Some  politicians  come  under  pressure  from  their  parties,  or  focus  on  their  own 
business.  
Some  politicians  decide  to  be  accountable  to  the  prime  minister,  who  is 
normally the head of a political party (section 3.3). This accountability mismatch 
possibly  arises  from  money  politics  and  corruption  cases  and  also  represents  the 
problem of a conflict of interest for both the politicians and prime minister. This  
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links  to  the  ideas  of  clientelism.  Many  constituents  do  not  put  pressure  on  their 
representatives. Therefore, this group of representatives can continue acting in this 
way without encountering any problems. The level of responsibility felt towards the 
public  is  lower  than  that  felt  towards  the  cabinet  in  some  cases.  This  is  totally 
different  from  literature  which  states  that  politicians  should  be  responsive  to 
constituents  (Romzek  and  Dubnick  1987).  Unless  citizens  pay  attention  and 
complain about the behaviour of their representatives, the court or legislative power 
cannot involve in such matters. This issue is a possible area for future research.  
Regarding responsibility, Lucas (1993) argues that if I am responsible to you, 
you are responsible for what I do’ (p. 184). This sentence is not completely true in 
any given circumstance and some societies. In Thailand, there are many cases where  
subordinates  are  responsible  for  superiors’  actions  or  departmental  actions.  Some 
superiors pass on their responsibilities to subordinates. In addition, in some cases, 
civil servants are responsible for politicians’ actions. It is possible that Thai people 
are more individualistic than in the past. They focus more on their own activities and 
executives  are  more  likely  to  escape  punishment  (section  5.2).  However,  it  is 
possible  that  executives  are  unable  to  examine  the  actions  of  their  subordinates 
(Lucas 1993), and subordinates can take advantage of this situation. 
The reason why some officials do not pay much attention to accountability 
aspects, or do not try to understand accountability, can be related to pressure from 
outside  the  bureaucratic  system,  i.e.  from  international  organisations.  When  the 
government  implemented  the  ideas  of  good  governance,  there  were  many  issues 
surrounding the actual implementation of this. For example, the government forced 
departments to implement the Government Fiscal Management Information System 
(GFMIS), but it was too rushed for officials to understand, and there have been many 
problems since the implementation (section 5.8). Executives and officials have not 
yet  received  the  full  benefits  of  this  implementation.  Mistakes  often  occur  and 
remain unresolved for some departments. This can be connected to the system of 
education and training (section 5.8).  
Another example which illustrates the problems involved in implementing 
good governance is that of annual reports. An annual report is seen in the literature as 
an important tool for accountability, particularly public accountability (IFAC 2001; 
Steccolini 2004; McTigue et al. 2005). As discussed earlier in section 8.3.2.3, some 
officials do not have much awareness of annual reports. Civil servants do not really 
understand the importance of annual reports or the importance of accountability.   
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Accountability  mismatch  is  an  important  accountability  problem.  This 
problem affects the implementation of accountability directly. 
8.4 Practical recommendations  
This  section  extends  the  detailed  discussion  of  GQ2  already  provided  in 
previous chapters.  It does so by considering practical recommendations arising from 
the findings.  There are two main types of recommendations arising from this thesis. 
The  origin  of  the  first  type  comes  from  values  and  culture,  which  relate  to  the 
behaviour of accountors and accountees. The other type of recommendation comes 
from the problems caused by the other  factors, such as the characteristics of the 
bureaucratic system, laws and regulations.  
8.4.1 Values and culture (relating directly to accountors and 
accountees)  
  Individual attitudes, incentives and motivations influence the implementation 
of  the  aspects  of  accountability  directly  (sections  5.2,  5.3  and  5.4).  Culture  and 
values, including social and organisational values, influence individual behaviour. As 
mentioned in previous chapters, some Thai values and cultural aspects can deter and 
obstruct  the  enhancement  of  accountability  (see  details  in  Chapter  7).  Therefore, 
changing and adapting some Thai values is a possible way to enhance accountability. 
However, it is not easy to change these.  It takes time to change the attitudes of 
people.  As  well  as  their  way  of  thinking,  some  systems  such  as  the  educational 
system and societal system may have to change too.  
From  the  results  of  this  thesis,  values  and  individual  attitudes  are  among 
factors affecting the implementation of accountability. The government and people in 
society  should  focus  more  on  morality  and  change  some  values.  Although  the 
government implemented a project called ‘clean organisation’ in order to improve 
the  morality  and  integrity  of  civil  servants  (section  5.4),  this  project  may  not 
necessarily help with enhancing accountability, because there are some social values 
and environments that the  government is not able to manage.  For example, Thai 
society is focused on materialism. Its people do not care by what means money is 
earned (section 3.2). Therefore, changing only the bureaucratic system may not be 
enough. Society needs to address this issue as well.  
  This solution is not the only way to solve the accountability problem. Other 
solutions include having severe penalties, strict monitoring or tight control in order to 
prevent  fraud  or  mismanagement.  These  methods  have  both  advantages  and 
disadvantages. The drawbacks are that the more honest civil servants may not be  
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happy with these control methods. In addition, these do nothing to solve the origin of 
the problem, and it is possible that the problem will recur. 
8.4.2 Other factors  
  From  the  results,  some  accountability  problems  occur  because  of  factors 
relating  to  the  bureaucratic  system.  Although  the  Thai  government  and  its 
departments  have  improved  their  operational  systems  in  order  to  be  more 
accountable than in the past, there are still problems which remain.  
8.4.2.1 Transparency  
  The main source of the transparency problem may either be misunderstanding 
of or a lack of interest in the concept of transparency (sections 6.2 and 6.3). It is also 
possible  that  with  some  processes  departments  are  not  able  to  provide  the 
information in time. If the problems happen because of a lack of understanding, then 
the  government  should  revise  its  projects  and  systems  so  that  the  features  of 
transparency are brought into focus more. In addition, the government should pay 
more  attention  to  education  and  training.  The  government  should  assign  some 
organisation  to  be  responsible  for  the  reliability  of  the  information  provided  on 
websites or in annual reports. Moreover, as discussed earlier, civil servants do not 
realise the importance of annual reports so the government needs to communicate to 
civil servants the importance of the reports towards accountability mechanisms.   
Problems of understanding accountability may arise if a country is a non-
English  speaking  country  because  then  the  ideas  of  accountability  have  to  be 
translated.  Different  countries  have  different  definitions  and  understanding  of  the 
aspects  of  accountability.  It  is  not  easy  to  make  people  in  societies  understand 
accountability. Even in Thailand, during the first stage of the introduction of the 
implementation  of  the  ideas  of  good  governance  and  accountability,  there  were 
various words and phrases used to represent these two ideas (see Chapter 3). Some 
scholars used the word  ‘accountability’ directly and did not try to translate from 
English to Thai. There are, therefore, some differences in ideas and understanding, 
and the government should not rush through the implementation of these concepts.  
If the problem comes from the processes, there are many problems that lie 
behind the scenes. The government then needs to solve the problems on a case-by-
case basis because it is then too late to address the origins of such problems. For new 
projects and new systems, the government and departments should study the costs 
and  benefits,  including  effects,  before  implementing  them.  However,  this  is 
sometimes difficult to do, especially in Thailand with its unstable political system.   
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If the government wants to implement something, it will normally try to do 
this  within  its  operational  term.  However,  after  the  crisis,  the  government 
implemented those systems recommended by the IMF or the World Bank urgently, 
without  studying  costs  and  benefits  of  these  e.g.  the  implementation  of  accruals 
accounting (section 5.8). Moreover, there were still some existing problems, such as 
the incorrect amount of assets (section 5.8). A new government does not always want 
to  continue  with  the  projects  raised  by  the  previous  government.  In  2008,  this 
problem was even worse because there were four governments within a year. This 
situation  can  cause  a  problem  for  operations,  including  the  enhancement  of 
accountability. 
8.4.2.2 Scrutiny, particularly public participation and attention to 
internal control  
8.4.2.2.1 Public participation  
  In the past and until now, the government and departments have carried out 
projects to improve and increase the level of participation by the public (section 3.4). 
Although the level of participation has been enhanced, it is only some groups of 
people who are interested in governmental and departmental activities (section 5.4). 
The government needs to continuously focus on the educational system in order to 
improve the competency of Thai people. The government should communicate to its 
citizens the importance of accountability for the country. If Thais are better educated, 
they will possibly focus more on governmental and departmental performance and 
have a better understanding of what it is they need to know. It does not mean that 
they  have  to  focus  on  only  financial  information  or  financial  statements.  Any 
governmental and departmental matters are important. Some citizens know of cases 
of corruption, yet they keep quiet or complain anonymously (sections 3.2 and 5.4). In 
addition, it is possible that communication between the government and the public is 
poor.  Some  departments  do  not  provide  some  useful  information  such  as 
departmental performance and financial statements to the public (sections 6.2 and 
6.3). It is difficult for the public to gain access to governmental and departmental 
information (sections 6.2 and 6.3). Citizens’ lack of interest is not a problem only in 
Thailand. This problem can happen to other countries but when it does happen, it can 
obstruct the enhancement of accountability.     
  Another issue that relates to public participation is the media. As mentioned 
earlier  there  are  some  conflicts  in  the  information  being  provided  by  the  media 
because some sections of the media are biased towards the group that the media  
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prefer or support. This can possibly increase a degree of some conflict in society, and 
will affect public participation (section 3.2). People may not know which news or 
information they should trust. If there is any uncertainty in people’s mind about the 
impartiality  of  the  media,  then  they  will  be  unsure  whether  the  governmental 
information being reported is truthful or not. Moreover, if the government tried to 
address this, either by direct intervention, or by introducing laws and regulations, it 
would cause a storm of protest from both the media and the public. If, however, 
citizens knew who owns the media, then it would be easier for them to ascertain 
which political groups the various sections of the media might support. Thus, they 
would be better able to decide if the information being reported was unbiased or not.  
8.4.2.2.2 Internal control  
  There are some problems relating to understanding internal control (section 
5.4). Some civil servants think that internal control is the responsibility of internal 
auditors and, thus they do not pay much attention to it themselves (section 5.4). In 
addition, some of them do not really understand the concept. This is difficult to solve 
at the present time. It is difficult to persuade executives of departments to attend 
seminars  (section  5.4).  Departments  offer  cooperation  but  executives  do  not 
themselves  attend  even  though  those  seminars  were  set  up  particularly  for 
executives. They normally just send their representatives, and continue to overlook 
the internal control aspects of their jobs. In fact, executives may pay more attention 
to other topics. Some civil servants do not want to learn about a new system and they 
consider  this  to  be  unimportant.  They  have  no  enthusiasm  for  new  projects 
(Virushaniphawan 2004, in Thai). This does not help to enhance accountability. Even 
though internal control does not mean accountability, it affects some accountability 
features, such as transparency, scrutiny and answerability. 
The  government  should  pay  attention  to  internal  control  and  issue  clear 
policies  for  departments  to  follow.  If  the  government  and  its  ministers  force 
departments to follow set guidelines, it will mean that executives will have to take 
more interest in internal control than at the present time. Since subordinates normally 
follow the wishes of their superiors, if superiors pay attention to internal control, it is 
possible that subordinates will do the same.   
8.4.2.3 Answerability 
  There  are  a  number  of  processes  involved  in  answering  complaints  or 
accusations, which cannot be changed because they depend on many organisations or  
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divisions (section 5.4). If citizens think that the process is taking too long, they can 
complain  about  departmental  operations.  However,  it  is  possible  that  some  civil 
servants want to delay the process. This situation relates directly to the Thai values 
and culture discussed earlier.  
8.4.2.4 Standards and effects  
  These issues relate to institutional factors directly because each institution 
operates  according  to  a  basic  level  of  compliance  that  individuals  within  these 
institutions have to follow. Standards, rules, principles, obligations, or norms should 
be appropriate and clear enough for individuals to understand.    
The  main  problem  regarding  standards  and  effects  is  their  lack  of  clarity 
(sections 5.5 and 5.6). Another major problem is that the laws and regulations are 
difficult to understand the contents or objectives of laws and regulations (section 
3.5). Some of those laws relate directly to citizens but citizens do not receive any 
guidance on how to decipher this. They have to use their own knowledge in order to 
understand these laws and regulations. In order to address this problem, departments 
should distribute manuals to the public, and to save costs, departments should post 
these  manuals  on  their  websites  but,  during  this  time,  they  do  not  do  this.  The 
government and departments could also hold seminars for relevant citizens to help 
them understand the laws and regulations better. However, this would be costly and 
time consuming, so some departments do not want to do this. The government should 
pay attention to this issue in order to make laws and regulations more understandable 
to the public.   
  The reward system links directly to values and culture. Whether the standards 
for the reward and promotion system are clear or not sometimes does not affect the 
end results because some civil servants can always find a way to excuse their actions 
and behaviour. This situation is usual in a country where citizens do not participate in 
governmental activities. As for penalties, the results will vary depending on each 
individual case, (e.g. available evidence and witnesses). However, values and culture 
can also play a part in this system. Therefore, this topic directly relates to values and 
culture, which are discussed earlier in this section. 
8.5 Limitations 
  There are some limitations in this study. 
8.5.1 The first limitation is that, in this research, citizens were not interviewed. The 
researcher realised the importance of citizens towards public sector accountability.  
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However, for this thesis, the researcher wanted to focus on the bureaucratic system in 
order to obtain increased knowledge for research in this area. Further research on 
accountability focusing on citizens would then be conducted. Another reason for the 
exclusion of citizens is that this research used the Good Governance Royal Decree as 
a guideline so the main focus relied on the contents of the Decree. Citizens are not 
mentioned much in the Decree. Therefore, the researcher decided not to interview 
citizens. However, information from other sources, such as previous research, was 
used to obtain some ideas and perspectives from the public.  
8.5.2 The second limitation is that politicians were not interviewed. This group of 
people are important for the accountability relationship, particularly public sector 
accountability.  The  political  system  can  provide  broader  ideas  on  accountability 
issues.  However,  in  Thailand,  it  is  not  easy  to  interview  politicians.  In  addition, 
during the period of this research, Thailand experienced some political turbulence, 
making it even more difficult to set up interviews with this group. The researcher 
decided to use other sources of information instead and to follow the contents of the 
Good  Governance  Royal  Decree  focusing  on  the  bureaucratic  system,  and 
government departments in particular.  
8.5.3  International  organisations  such  as  the  World  Bank  wanted  to  solve  the 
problem of good corporate governance and accountability for both public and private 
sector organisations (see details in Chapter 3). Public sector accountability involves 
and has a relationship with private sector accountability. For example, some laws and 
regulations  (e.g.  business  laws)  affect  the  process  of  what  private  sector 
organisations  should  perform,  and  some  processes  (e.g.  a  procurement  system  of 
government departments) relate to private sector organisations directly. However, 
this  research  does  focus  on  the  bureaucratic  system  instead  of  the  relationship 
between  the  public  and  private  sector.  Therefore,  interpretation  in  this  research 
mainly concerns public sector organisations.   
8.5.4 With regard to the information on the websites and annual reports, this research 
studied a specified period of time only. For the websites, the study looked at the 
information on departmental websites between November 2006 and January 2007. 
Therefore,  it  is  possible  that  after  the  study,  government  departments  may  have 
changed  and improved the quality and information on such sites. Information on 
these sites may not be the same as when the researcher conducted the research. For 
annual reports, the reports of the year 2005 were used. It is similarly possible that 
after 2005, the information in annual reports may not be the same.    
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8.6 Future research  
8.6.1 From the findings, it is clear that the political system and politicians are the 
main factors for the enhancement of accountability in the public sector. A political 
system is one of the main factors affecting governance and accountability (World 
Bank 1992). The relationship among civil servants, politicians and businesses links 
to the accountability relationship. In addition, during the period of the thesis, there 
has  been  the  kind  of  political  turbulence  in  Thailand  that  affects  public  sector 
accountability directly. Some projects have been cancelled or stopped. This research 
does  not  focus  much  on  the  political  system.  This  should  be  a  matter  for  future 
research to study how political turbulence can affect accountability in the Thai public 
sector.  
  In addition to the political system, the legislative system is also important for 
accountability.  However,  this  research  focuses  more  on  accountability  within  the 
bureaucratic system. Therefore, the legislative system is not studied in this research. 
For future research, it would be interesting to study accountability in the legislative 
system. 
8.6.2 This research does not interview citizens due to the limitations mentioned in 
Chapter 4 and in section 8.5. However, for future research, it would be interesting to 
study the perspectives of citizens towards public sector accountability. It is possible 
that there would be some differences between civil servants’ and citizens’ points of 
view.  
8.6.3 Due to the contents of the Good Governance Royal Decree, the main topic in 
the Decree relates to operational processes. This study does not focus much on the 
effects of accountability. For future research, it would be interesting to study the 
effects of accountability even though these may not be clear. The factors motivating 
decision making and how this affects accountability would be an interesting area of 
study.  
8.6.4 According to the results of this research, institutional theory is one possible 
theory to explain accountability. Therefore, for future research, researchers would get 
better ideas about accountability by using institutional theory in their studies.  
Future research may also focus on this theory in order to further understand 
the  accountability  relationship  and  accountability  mechanisms.  In  addition,  this 
theory  can  help  a  researcher  to  understand  the  factors  affecting  accountability 
mechanisms and how these mechanisms process.   
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8.6.5  This  thesis  focuses  on  only  the  public  sector.  However,  private  sector 
accountability is also important for the accountability mechanisms of the country. 
Both public and private sectors have a relationship with each other. In addition, in 
this research, accounting information is considered to be the results of transactions in 
a particular period, but the meaning of its narrative is not focused. Therefore, it is 
interesting  to  establish  how  both  the  public  and  private  sector  in  Thailand  use 
accounting information by studying the narrative of this information. One interesting 
area of study is looking at accounting information and the messages those sectors 
seek to communicate through this information. However, in countries like Thailand, 
accounting information in the public sector may not be of much interest. In addition, 
some accounting information may be incorrect (section 5.8). Future research should 
be  interesting,  when  applied  to  the  private  sector,  looking  at  how  accounting 
information in the private sector represents ideas of accountability to the public.   
8.7 Conclusion 
  This  research  studies  accountability  in  Thai  public  sector  organisations, 
particularly government departments. The research focuses on accountability after 
the implementation of the public sector reform and the introduction of the concept of 
good governance into Thai departments. Due to the economic crisis in 1997, the Thai 
government received and implemented ideas from international organisations, such 
as the World Bank, the IMF and the ADB. The main objectives of this research are to 
contribute  to  the  literature  on  the  issue  of  accountability  in  public  sector 
organisations  in  a  developing  country,  and  to  explore  the  relationship  between 
accountability  theory  and  accountability  aspects  implemented  and  reflected  in  a 
developing country. The aspects of accountability that have been implemented come 
from western society. Some differences in the systems, values, culture and historical 
background make the aspects of accountability different from the western context. 
The  main  contribution  is  to  discuss  the  literature  on  accountability  issues  in  the 
public sector in a developing country and to link the findings with accountability 
theory.  
An understanding of the aspects of accountability is important because in any 
circumstances this issue is the starting point for the implementation of accountability. 
However,  it  is  not  easy  for  some  societies,  particularly  a  non-English  speaking 
country  because  it  has  to  translate  the  ideas  from  English  to  its  own  language. 
Consequently,  some  ideas  can  be  missed.  It  is  sometimes  difficult  for  people  to 
understand  the  aspects  of  accountability  thoroughly,  and  misunderstanding  can  
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occur. This can affect what accountors and accountees have done and may affect the 
interpretation of other accountability components. For the government that creates 
the aspects on its own initiative, some aspects may not enhance accountability in 
public sector.  
The  Thai  government  and  departments  implemented  many  projects  in  an 
attempt  to  enhance  accountability,  projects  proposed  directly  from  international 
organisations and developed countries, and ideas created by the Thai government. If 
the government is aware of the problems it needs to overcome and understands the 
concepts  of  good  governance  and  accountability,  it  is  better  that  the  government 
creates its own ideas because it should know its own country’s situation better than 
anyone  else.  From  the  results  of  this  research,  one  problem  that  burdens  the 
implementation of public sector reform and the enhancement of accountability is the 
understanding of civil servants. Some of them do not understand the importance of 
some processes that they have done (section 5.4). 
Although  the  aspects  of  accountability  as  defined  by  western  society  are 
widely used and are workable in developed countries, it does not mean that these will 
be suitable for every country. The systems, values and culture are among several 
factors  affecting  the  implementation  of  accountability,  thus  some  changes  and 
adaptation will need to be applied. However, due to some misunderstanding, some 
projects or aspects created by a developing country may not be useful. In addition, 
accountability  problems, such as  corruption in  developing countries,  are different 
from western society. Therefore, the implementation of the aspects of accountability 
may give different results if these were applied in both developed and developing 
countries.   
Compared with western society, the accountability relationship implemented 
by a developing country is different. For a developing country, the implementation of 
accountability is not easy. In addition to problems with translation, there are some 
culture and values that are unable to accommodate accountability. It is not easy to 
change or adapt values and culture of a society in a short period of time. The political 
system and legislative system are also important for the accountability relationship. 
However, in this research, these two systems are not the main focus. Future research 
may provide more ideas about these topics.   
Due to societal differences, the same  kind of behaviour in developed and 
developing countries may not have the same outcomes. A country should be careful  
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if it wants to implement a concept from developed countries. Some positions that are 
considered important for accountability in developed countries may not have much 
significance in accountability relationships in a developing country. A good example 
in this case is an accountant, an unimportant role in not-for-profit organisations in 
some  developing  countries.  However,  this  position  is  important  in  developed 
countries, where organisations have to report financial statements to the public.   
Regarding the accountability relationship, the relationship can start from any 
of the accountability components but the relationship should be balanced in order to 
enhance accountability. Any imbalance in the focus of accountability components 
can  cause  drawbacks.  This  situation  may  arise  because  of  misunderstandings 
regarding the aspects of accountability or the problems of accountability. Once the 
government  has  implemented  the  ideas,  it  is  difficult  to  solve  any  accountability 
problems, except on a case-by-case basis. For new projects, the government should 
study the projects as much as it can before the implementation in order to study cost 
and benefits, and understand the projects thoroughly. 
  The aspects of accountability are normally addressed by both developed and 
developing countries, even though accountability in these two types of countries is in 
different  forms.  This  can  imply  that  the  aspects  of  accountability  are  considered 
important  and  should  be  implemented  in  order  to  improve  the  efficiency  and 
effectiveness of operational processes. However, in enhancing accountability, there 
are various factors which play important roles in the accountability relationship. This 
should be the focus of future research to study the effects of accountability arising 
from such factors.  
This research gives some perspectives of the accountability relationship that 
may be used as a guideline for accountability research in the future. However, there 
are some topics that this research does not focus on such as the political system, the 
legislative system, effects of accountability, and citizens’ perspectives. In order to 
study  these  topics,  the  results  of  this  research  can  partially  help  to  improve  the 
research design for the future research.   
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Appendix 1: The meanings of accountability 
 
Responsibility and relating words        Transparency and relating words   
Answerability and relating words         Scrutiny and relating words  
Transparency and Answerability        Transparency and Scrutiny 
Responsibility and Answerability         Other words  
 
Public sector  
Author  Definition  Context  Concepts 
1. Bovens (2005)  - a social relationship in which an actor feels an obligation to explain and to 
justify his or her conduct to some significant other (p. 184) 
 
- Public sector 
- in general - not 
specify countries 
- obligation  
- explain  
- justify  
2. Pollitt (2003) 
quoted in Bovens 
(2006) 
‘the obligation to explain or justify conduct’ which implies ‘a relationship 
between an actor and a forum’ (p. 9) 
  - obligation  
- explain  
- justify 
3. Jackson (1982, 
p. 220) quoted in 
Hyndman and 
Anderson (1995) 
 
 ‘…accountability involves explaining or justifying what has been done, what 
being done and what has been planned … Thus, one party is accountable to 
another in the sense that one of the parties has a right to call upon the other to 
give an account of his activities.’ (p. 1) 
- Bureaucracy   - explain  
- justify  
- give an account 
- accountable 
- right  
4. Barberis 
(1998)  
- to give explanation 
- to provide information 
- to review and, if necessary, to revise 
- to grant redress, to impose sanctions (p. 467) 
- Public 
administration 
- NPM 
- United 
Kingdom 
- explanation 
- provide 
information  
- review 
- revise  
- grant redress 
- impose 
sanctions   
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Public sector  
Author  Definition  Context  Concepts 
5. Behn (2001)  - ‘the responsibility to answer, to explain, and to justify specific actions (or 
inactions), in part by keeping records of important activities’ (p. 4) 
- Democratic 
accountability  
- responsibility 
- answer 
- explain 
- justify 
6. Aucoin and 
Heintzman 
(2000) 
- ‘… citizens hold their governors to account for their behaviour and 
performance directly through elections; the representatives of citizens in 
legislative assemblies hold political executives and public servants 
accountable through mechanisms of public scrutiny and audit; political 
executives hold their subordinate officials accountable through hierarchical 
structures of authority and responsibility; and, among other things, court and 
various administrative tribunals and commissions hold legislatures, executives 
or administrative officers accountable to the law.’ (p. 45) 
- ‘Accountability … constitutes the principle that informs the processes 
whereby those who hold and exercise public authority are held to account’ (p. 
45) 
- The three purposes or functions of accountability are control, assurance, and 
continuous improvement 
- Public 
governance and 
management 
- NPM 
- hold to account 
- control 
- public scrutiny 
and audit  
- inform the 
process 
- control 
- assurance 
- continuous 
improvement 
- authority and 
responsibility  
7. Day and Klein 
(1987) 
 
- ‘…actions are open to inspection and can challenge scrutiny’ 
- ‘…actions can be set against a certain set of rules or expectations about the 
right of conduct’ 
- ‘to answer for the discharge of a duty or for conduct’; ‘to give a satisfactory 
reason for or to explain’; and ‘to acknowledge responsibility for one’s actions’ 
- To account is to answer for the discharge of a duty or for conduct 
 
- Accountability 
in public 
services  
- Focusing on the 
public services 
in the United 
Kingdom 
- open to 
inspection 
- scrutiny 
- answer 
- discharge of a 
duty 
- give reason 
- explain 
- responsibility 
for one’s actions 
- answer  
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Public sector 
Author  Definition  Context  Concepts 
7. Day and Klein 
(1987) con.  
 
- an accountability relationship is defined as  
‘…the relationship between individuals, presupposes agreement both about 
what constitutes an acceptable performance and about the language of 
justification to be used by actors in defending their conduct. Furthermore, it 
implies a definition of the relationship between actors. To talk about 
accountability is to define who can call for an account, and who owes a duty 
of explanation’ (p. 5).   
  - discharge of a 
duty or for 
conduct 
- justification 
- defending their 
conduct 
- call for an 
account 
- duty  
- explanation  
8. Nelson et al. 
(2003) 
- ‘The term of accountability is usually used to describe the responsibility that 
those who manage or control resources have to other’ (p. 78) 
- accountability 
disclosures  
- Canadian 
Universities 
- responsibility 
 
9. Kluvers (2003)  - For traditionally, accountability has been defined in terms of rendering an 
account of actions and decisions (p. 57) 
- Under the New Public Management, accountability also includes the 
effective use of resources and the effectiveness of policy decisions (p. 58) 
- Accountability is an obligation to present an account of and answer for the 
execution of responsibilities to those who entrusted those responsibilities. 
(Gray and Jenkins 1986 referred in Kluvers 2003, p. 58)  
- Accountability 
in local 
government, 
Victoria, 
Australia  
- NPM 
- Westminster 
system 
- rendering an 
account 
- obligation 
- present 
- answer 
- responsibility 
10. Haque (2000)  - basic mechanisms of public accountability such as legislative committee, 
parliamentary debate, public hearing, ministerial control, ombudsman, and 
media scrutiny 
- one of the important issues of public accountability is contents or standards, 
which is the criteria for which public officials are held accountable to citizens 
- Public 
governance 
- control 
- scrutiny   
- ombudsman 
- debate 
- public hearing 
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Public sector 
Author  Definition  Context  Concepts 
11. Osborne 
(2004) 
- ‘Accountability requires accounts to be given, actions to be reported’ (p. 
294) 
- Both public and 
private sector 
- give account 
- report actions 
12. Stewart 
(1984) 
- ‘The full concept of accountability involves both rendering and judging as a 
basis for action’ (p. 15) 
- Public 
accountability  
- render 
- judge 
13. Normanton 
quoted in Stewart 
(1984, pp. 13-14) 
- Public accountability is defined as ‘consisting in a statutory obligation to 
provide for independent and impartial observers holding the right of reporting 
their findings at the highest level in the state any available information about 
financial administration which they request’ (1966) 
- ‘There is no clear master-servant relationship; public accountability means 
reporting to persons other than to one’s own superiors who have the power to 
make open criticism’ (1971, p. 313)    
- Public sector   - obligation 
- provide 
- right of 
reporting  
- available 
information  
- reporting 
- power to make 
open criticism 
14. Dunsire 
(1978) quoted in 
Stewart (1984, p. 
14) 
- ‘Being accountable may mean as is now said about ministerial 
responsibility, no more than having to answer questions about what has 
happened or is happening within one’s jurisdiction … But most usages require 
an additional implication: the answer when given, or the account, when 
rendered, is to be evaluated by the superior or superior body, measured 
against some standard or some expectation, and the difference noted; and then 
praise or blame are to be meted out or sanctions applied. It is the coupling of 
information with its evaluation and application of sanctions that gives 
‘accountability’ or ‘answerability’ or ‘responsibility’ their full sense in 
ordinary organisation usage’  
- Bureaucracy   - responsibility 
- give answer 
- render account  
- evaluate 
- measure 
- praise or blame 
- sanctions  
- answerability 
- responsibility  
- render account  
- evaluate 
- measure 
- praise or blame 
- sanctions  
- answerability 
- responsibility  
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Public sector  
Author  Definition  Context  Concepts 
15. Jones (1977) 
quoted in Stewart 
(1984, p. 14-15)  
- ‘Accountability is the liability to give an account to another of what one has 
done or not done. It is the antithesis of autonomy, where accountability is to 
oneself alone. Responsibility as accountability implies a liability to explain to 
someone else, who has authority to assess the account, and allocate praise or 
censure’ 
- Government  - liability  
- give an account 
- responsibility 
- explain 
- assess account 
- praise or 
censure 
16. Parker and 
Gould (1999) 
- ‘Accountability has been variously defined as implying simply a literal 
accounting/reporting function or implying explanation or justification of 
actions’ (p. 116) 
- ‘Roberts (1991) describes accountability as a social relation that has both 
moral and strategic dimensions and could be understood as something a 
person feels or even an artefact of scrutiny’ (p. 116) 
- Two key elements of accountability - the account and the holding to account 
and, and two parties.  
- Public sector 
accountability 
- NPM 
- Westminster 
system   
- explanation 
- justification 
- scrutiny 
17. Mulgan 
(200b) 
- One sense of accountability is the process of ‘being called to account’ to 
some authority for one’s actions. (Mulgan 2000b, p. 555) 
- external – ‘the account is given to some other person or body outside the 
person or body being held accountable’ (Mulgan 2000b, p. 555) 
- social interaction and exchange – one side, that calling for account, seeks 
answers and rectification while the other side, that being held accountable, 
responds and accepts sanctions (Mulgan 2000b, p. 555) 
- right of authority – those calling for an account are asserting rights of 
superior authority over those who are accountable, including the rights to 
demand answers and to impose sanctions (Mulgan 2000b, p. 555) 
 
 - Public 
administration  
- account is 
given 
- calling for 
account 
- answers and 
rectification  
- respond and 
accept sanction  
- rights 
- answer 
- impose 
sanctions 
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Public sector  
Author  Definition  Context  Concepts 
18. Mulgan 
(2000a)  
- ‘…certain obligations that arise within a relationship of responsibility, where 
one person or body is responsible to another for the performance of particular 
services. The obligations in questions are, first to account for the performance 
of their duties and, second, to accept sanctions or redirection.’ (p. 87) 
- Accountability is not the only means of making suppliers of goods and 
services responsive to their clients. In public choice terms, accountability is a 
‘voice’ rather than an ‘exit’ option. It assumes that the client or customer 
needs to engage in argument with a particular agency rather than simply 
transfer his or her custom to an alternative agency. (p. 88) 
 - Paper about 
public 
administration 
but general 
theme of 
accountability – 
both public and 
private 
accountability 
- Australian 
organisations 
- obligation 
- responsibility 
- duties  
- accept 
sanctions or 
redirection  
19. Sinclair 
(1995) 
 - For the simplest sense, ‘accountability entails a relationship in which people 
are required to explain and take responsibility for their actions’ (pp. 220-221) 
- ‘In theoretical research, accountability has discipline-specific meanings, for 
example, auditors discuss accountability as if it is a financial or numerical 
matter, political scientists view accountability as a political imperative and 
legal scholars as a constitutional arrangement while philosophers treat 
accountability as a subset of ethics’ (p. 221) 
- Australian 
public sector 
organisations 
- CEO views on 
administration, 
leadership and 
management 
- explain 
- take 
responsibility for 
their actions  
20. Steccolini 
(2004) 
-‘Accountability involves being obliged to explain one’s actions, to justify 
what one does and my be viewed in terms of a setting, where one party (the 
accountor) is accountable to another party (the accountee) for an action, 
process, output, or outcome’ (p. 330) 
- ‘Accountability involves both the giving of information (to account) and the 
evaluation of the information obtained in order to judge (to hold to account)’ 
(p. 330) 
- local 
governments 
- Italy 
- being obliged  
- explain one’s 
actions  
- justify 
- giving of 
information 
- evaluation of 
information 
- judge 
- hold to 
accountee  
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Private sector 
Author  Definition  Context  Concepts 
1. Cadbury report 
(1992) 
- ‘The formal relationship between the shareholders and the board of directors 
is that the shareholders elect the directors, the directors report on their 
stewardship to the shareholders and the shareholders appoint the auditors to 
provide an external check on the directors’ financial statements. Thus the 
shareholders as owners of the company elect the directors to run the business 
on their behalf and hold them accountable for its progress. The issue for 
corporate governance is how to strengthen the accountability of boards of 
directors to shareholders’ (p. 48) 
- ‘Shareholders have delegated many of their responsibilities as owners to the 
directors who act as their stewards. It is for the shareholders to call the 
directors to book if they appear to be failing in their stewardship and they 
should use their power. While they cannot be involved in the direction and 
management of their company, they can insist on a high standard of corporate 
governance and good governance is an essential test of directors’ stewardship. 
The accountability of boards to shareholders will, therefore, be strengthened if 
shareholders require their companies to comply with the Code’ (p. 49)  
- Report on 
corporate 
governance 
- Code of 
conduct for the 
UK business 
firms 
 
- report 
- provide an 
external check 
- run the 
business on their 
behalf  
- hold 
accountable 
- responsibilities 
2. Conrad (2005)  - ‘… the operation system of accountability in specific contexts of interaction 
can be analysed in terms of individuals drawing upon and reproducing 
structures of signification, domination, and legitimation. The language of the 
particular system of accountability provides a structure of meanings for 
interaction, the significant structure. Systems of accountability also embody a 
moral order, the legitimation structure, since they define rights and 
obligations, including the rights of some to hold others to account.’ (p. 5)   
- gas industry 
- management 
control and 
organisation 
change 
- rights and 
obligations 
- hold others to 
account 
3. Bird (1973)   - ‘Accountability places two obligations upon a steward; he must render an 
‘account’ of his dealings with the stewardship resources, and then he must 
submit to an examination (usually known as an ‘audit’) of that account by or 
on behalf of the person or body to whom he is accountable’ (p. 2) 
- Private sector  
- Financial 
reporting  
- obligations 
- render an 
account 
- submit to an 
examination 
- audit   
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Private sector  
Author  Definition  Context  Concepts 
4. Hüpkes et al. 
(2005) 
The functions of accountability are to provide public oversight, maintain and 
enhance legitimacy, enhance agency governance, and improve agency 
performance.  
- Financial sector 
supervisors or 
Regulatory and 
Supervisory 
Agencies 
- provide public 
oversight 
- legitimacy 
- enhance agency 
governance 
- improve 
agency 
performance 
5. Ahrens (1996)  - ‘… accounting information can convey newly relevant images if 
organisational performance to which operational management must answer. In 
this scenario, accounting becomes implicated in the creation of a particular 
style of accountability.’ (p. 140) 
- Private sector  - answer 
6. Kaler (2002)  - ‘… accountability has to be understood as the providing of answer, as 
reporting or, more obviously, ‘giving an account. In terms of business context 
…this is a way of understanding accountability that connects it to financial 
auditing and reporting as well as to accountancy in general’ (p. 328) 
- Private sector  - providing of 
answer 
- reporting 
- giving an 
account 
- financial 
auditing and 
reporting 
7. Gray et al. 
(1987) 
‘the onus, requirement, or responsibility to provide an account or reckoning of 
the actions for which one is held responsible’ (p. 2) 
- Corporate 
social reporting 
- Social 
accountability 
- Social 
responsibilities  
- onus 
- requirement 
- responsibility 
- provide an 
account 
- held 
responsible 
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Private sector  
Author  Definition  Context  Concepts 
8. Ijiri (1983)  - ‘In an accountability-based framework, the objective of accounting is to 
provide a fair system of information flow between the accountor and the 
accountee’ (p. 75) 
- The framework 
of accounting 
- Private sector 
- provide a fair 
system of 
information flow  
9. Roberts and 
Scapens (1985) 
 - ‘Accountability in its broadest sense simply refers to the giving and 
demanding of reasons for conduct’ (p. 447) 
- Three important elements of systems of accountability are structures of 
Signification (meaning), Legitimation (morality) and Domination (power).  
- For meaning, terms of what has happened, anticipate the future, and plan and 
assess action is important for systems of accountability. 
- For morality, ‘Systems of accountability also embody a moral order: a 
complex system of reciprocal rights and obligations. The practice of 
accounting institutionalises the notion of accountability; it institutionalises the 
rights of some people to hold others to account for their actions.’ (p. 448)   
- For power, there are two senses, which are a broad and a narrow sense. For a 
broad sense, the power is as ‘the power of human action to transform the 
social and material world’. ‘Organisation constitutes a conscious attempt to 
enhance the productive power of human action through coordination’ (p. 449) 
- For a narrow sense, power is as ‘the domination of some individuals by 
others’ (p. 449)   
- Organisation 
context 
- giving reasons 
for conducts 
- demanding of 
reasons for 
conducts 
- terms of what 
has happened, 
anticipate future, 
and plan  
- assess action  
- rights and 
obligations  
- rights of some 
people to hold 
others to account 
for their actions  
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Social system and human resource management  
Author  Definition  Context  Concepts 
1. Frink and 
Klimoski (1998) 
 
- ... perceived need to justify or defend or action to some audience(s) which 
has potential reward and sanction power, and where such rewards and 
sanctions are perceived as contingent on accountability condition 
- ‘One theme concerns the context, that is, who and what is involved in a 
given situation, and the second theme involves the notion of an evaluation and 
feedback activity in some forms’ (p.5) 
- Human 
resource 
management 
- justify 
- defend  
- reward and 
sanction 
- evaluation and 
feedback 
2. Frink and 
Klimoski (2004) 
 
…the activities that are seen as elements of the accountability phenomenon. 
…associated with the observation and evaluation of agents, the determination 
of the behaviours that the agent may be compelled to defend, justify, or 
otherwise answer for, and the creation of expectations for such as obligation. 
… there needs to  be an associated reward or punishment system which makes 
the evaluations meaningful to the agent. (p. 3)    
- Social systems 
- Accountability 
in organisations  
- observation and 
evaluation 
- defend 
- justify 
- answer 
- obligation  
- reward and 
punishment 
- evaluation  
3. Erdogan et al. 
(2004) 
- Accountability is defined as ‘the feeling of responsibility, obligation, and the 
need to justify one’s actions to others or to one’s self’ (p. 19)  
- interpersonal 
exchanges 
- organisation 
- responsibility 
- obligation 
- justify 
4. Ammeter et al. 
(2004) 
- ‘accountability is a perception based on shared expectations about a potential 
need to explain one’s actions or beliefs regarding an organisational issue to a 
constituency for reasons such as social desirability considerations’ (p. 48) 
- the integration 
of trust and 
accountability 
- accountability 
in organisations 
- explain one’s 
actions or beliefs  
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NGOs and not-for-profit organisations 
Author  Definition  Context  Concepts 
1. Ebrahim 
(2003) 
- ‘accountability has both an external dimension in terms of ‘an obligation to 
meet prescribed standards of behaviour’ (Chisolm 1995, p. 141) and an 
internal one motivated by ‘felt responsibility’ as expressed through individual 
action and organisational mission (Fry 1995)’ (Ebrahim 2003, p. 814) 
- ‘It may be defined not only as a means through which individuals and 
organisations are held responsible for their actions …, but also as a means by 
which organisations and individuals take internal responsibility for shaping 
their organisational mission and values, for opening themselves to public or 
external scrutiny, and for assessing performance in relation to goals’ (p. 815) 
- Important elements of accountability mechanisms consist of disclosure 
statements and reports, performance assessment and evaluation, participation, 
self-regulation, and social auditing (p. 815) 
- NGOs 
accountability 
- obligation 
- responsibility 
- held 
responsible 
- external 
scrutiny 
- assessing 
performance 
- performance 
assessment 
- disclosure 
statements and 
reports 
- evaluation  
- participation  
- self-regulation 
- social auditing  
2. Edwards and 
Hulme (1996, p. 
967) quoted in 
Ebrahim (2003, 
pp. 813-814) 
- ‘…the means by which individuals and organisations report to a recognised 
authority (or authorities) and are held responsible for their actions’ 
- NGOs  - report  
- held 
responsible 
3. Fox and Brown 
(1998, p. 12) 
quoted in 
Ebrahim (2003, p. 
814) 
- ‘the process of holding actors responsible for actions’   - NGOs  - responsible for 
actions 
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NGOs and not-for-profit organisations 
Author  Definition  Context  Concepts 
4. Cornwall, 
Lucas, and 
Pasteur (2000, p. 
3) quoted in 
Ebrahim (2003, p. 
814) 
- ‘accountability is both about being ‘held responsible’ by others and about 
‘taking responsibility’ for oneself’ 
- Health sector  - held 
responsible 
- take 
responsibility 
5. Malena et al. 
(2004) 
- ‘Accountability can be defined as the obligation of power-holders to account 
for or take responsibility for their actions’ (p. 2) 
- ‘Government officials and bureaucrats are accountable for their conduct and 
performance. In other words, they can and should be held accountable to obey 
the law and not abuse their powers, and serve the public interest in an 
efficient, effective and fair manner’ (p. 2)  
- ‘Social accountability can be defined as an approach towards building 
accountability that relies on civic engagement, i.e., in which it is ordinary 
citizens and/or civil society organisations who participate directly or indirectly 
in exacting accountability’  
- Social 
accountability, 
focusing on the 
accountability of 
government 
actors toward 
citizens and poor 
people 
- obligation 
- take 
responsibility 
 
6. AccountAbility 
(2005) the AA 
1000 series 
 
… accountability as being made up of: 
- Transparency: accounting to stakeholder 
- Responsiveness: responding to stakeholder concerns 
- Compliance: complying with legal requirements, standards, codes, 
principles, policies and other voluntarily commitments (p. 15) 
- social and 
ethical 
accounting  
- transparency 
- responsiveness 
- compliance 
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NGOs and not-for-profit organisations 
Author  Definition  Context  Concepts 
7. Unerman and 
O’Dwyer (2006) 
- ‘… the main purpose of accountability is to provide mechanisms through 
which all those affected by an organisation’s (or person’s) actions can demand 
an account from the managers of that organisation (or from that person) 
regarding how and why the organisation (or person) has acted in the manner it 
has’ (p. 351) 
- Relational issue – ‘being answerable to and held responsible by others, or as 
an identity issue – being answerable to ideals or missions and one’s own sense 
of responsibility’(p. 353) 
- For relational accountability, ‘people are required to explain and take 
responsibility for their actions through the giving and demanding of reasons 
for conduct’ (p. 353) 
- ‘Accountability is conceived of as a vital mechanism of control’ (p. 353) 
- ‘Identity accountability represents a means by which managers (or activist) 
running organisations take responsibility for shaping their organisational 
mission and values, for whether (and, if so, how) to open themselves to public 
or external scrutiny, and for assessing their performance in relation to their 
goals’ (p. 356) 
- NGOs 
accountability 
- Some 
information 
about 
commercial 
organisations  
- answerable 
- held 
responsible  
- explain 
- take 
responsibility  
- control 
- open 
themselves to the 
public  
- external 
scrutiny 
- assessing 
performance 
- giving and 
demanding of 
reasons 
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International organisations and world politics  
Author  Definition  Context  Concepts 
1. Bank for 
International 
Settlements 
(1998) 
- ‘Accountability refers to the need to justify and accept responsibility for 
decisions taken’ (p. v) 
- ‘Accountability imposes discipline on management; firms that have to 
justify their actions publicly are less likely to take actions of which their 
shareholders and creditors might disapprove’ (p. 5) 
- ‘Accountability imposes discipline on national authorities by ensuring that 
the authorities are answerable to the general public and market participants for 
their decisions’ (p. 13) 
- this research 
arising from the 
international 
financial crisis  
- private sector 
- national 
authorities 
- international 
financial 
institutions 
- justify  
- accept 
responsibility 
- answerable 
2. Grant and 
Keohane (2005) 
- ‘some actors have the right to hold other actors to a set of standards, to judge 
whether they have fulfilled their responsibilities in light of these standards, 
and to impose sanctions if they determine that these responsibilities have not 
been met’ (p. 29) 
- the accountability relationship is defined as ‘the actors being held 
accountable have obligations to act in ways that are consistent with accepted 
standards of behaviour and that they will be sanctioned for failures to do so’ 
(pp. 29-30) 
- Two basic concepts are delegation and participation. 
- World politics 
- National 
accountability 
- International 
organisation 
- right 
- judge 
- responsibility 
- impose 
sanctions 
- obligations 
3. IFAC (2001)  Accountability is the process whereby public sector entities, and the 
individuals within them, are responsible for their decisions and actions, 
including their stewardship of public funds and all aspect of performance, and 
submit themselves to appropriate external scrutiny. (p. 12) 
- Government 
accountability 
- responsible for 
their decisions 
and actions  
- external 
scrutiny 
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International organisations and world politics   
Author  Definition  Context  Concepts 
4. IMF quoted in 
UN (2004) 
 
 ‘clarity on the structure and functions of government, responsibilities within 
government and relations between government and the rest of the economy’; 
‘public availability of comprehensive information on public sector financial 
stocks and flows, published at specified times’; ‘public availability of 
information on how budgets are prepared and executed, and minimum content 
to budgets and financial reports’; and ‘financial data meeting accepted quality 
standards and subjected to independent audit scrutiny’ (pp. 9-10) 
  - responsibility 
- public 
availability of 
information 
- audit scrutiny 
 
Psychology and ethics 
Author  Definition  Context  Concepts 
1. Lerner and 
Tetlock (1999) 
 
Accountability refers to the implicit and explicit expectation that one may be 
called on to justify one’s beliefs, feelings, and actions to others. 
Accountability also usually implies that people who do not provide a 
satisfactory justification for their actions will suffer negative consequences 
ranging from disdainful looks to loss of one’s livelihood. (p. 255)   
- Psychology  - justify 
- justification 
 
2. Dubnick 
(2003) 
- In this paper, there are the four major forms of accountability that demand 
account-giving responses. They are answerability, blameworthiness, liability 
and attributability 
- ‘Institutional perspectives approach accountability as formalised means of 
feedback and control established with governance structures of states and 
corporate entities’ (p. 408) 
- ‘Sociological perspectives focus attention on accountability as a type of 
social act that is part of a larger class of social processes or mechanisms 
dealing with the need to repair or overcome damaged relationships resulting 
from unanticipated or untoward behaviour’ (p. 408)  
- Ethics   - answerability 
- 
blameworthiness  
- liability  
- attributability 
- feedback and 
control 
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Appendix 2 Questions - interview based case study 
Key:  
Research questions: 
SQ1: How is accountability evidenced following public sector reform and the Good 
Governance Royal Decree, in the particular case of government departments? 
SQ1.1:  How  do  departmental  communications,  including  reports,  show 
accountability? 
SQ2: What are the constraints on departments from the implementation of the public 
sector reform and Good Governance Royal Decree? 
For concepts of accountability in practice: 
T = Transparency      R = Responsibility 
S = Scrutiny        A = Answerability 
O = Other information 
For interviewees: 
E = executives       Ac = accounting practitioners 
IA = internal auditors     PR = staff from a division of public relations 
IT = staff from a division of information technology  
 
Organisation structure 
Interviewees   Questions  RQ  Acc 
concepts  E  Ac  IA  P
R 
IT 
1. Could you explain the structure of 
your operational process? 
1  R  /  /  /  /  / 
2. Does the department produce or have 
clear roles and responsibilities for the 
staff? 
1  R   /  /  /  /  / 
3. Which standards, code of conduct or 
best practice do staff have to follow? 
1  R, S  /  /  /  /  / 
4. Are there any problems if the staff 
change their position? 
1, 2  R   /  /  /  /  / 
5. How does the department solve this 
problem? 
1, 2  R   /  /  /  /  / 
6. How much training do you get per 
year?  
1  R  /  /  /  /  / 
7. Which kinds of training do you get?  1, 2  R  /  /  /  /  / 
8. What is your recommendation to 
improve the organisation’s operational 
process? 
1, 2  R   /  /  /  /  / 
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Plans and policies 
Interviewees   Questions  RQ  Acc 
concepts  E  Ac  IA  PR  IT 
1. How are plans and policies 
formulated? 
1  R, S  /  /  /  /  / 
2. Which kinds of information are used 
in this process? 
1  R  /  /  /  /  / 
3. Who is involved in this process?  1  R, S  /  /  /  /  / 
4. How does the department evaluate its 
performance and the accomplishment of 
its plans and policies? 
1  S   /  /  /  /  / 
5. What internal and external factors 
influence departmental performance? 
1, 2  S  /  /  /  /  / 
6. What is the process of strategy and 
plan amendment? And what are the 
main reasons for the amendment? 
1, 2  S  /  /  /  /  / 
7. What are the plans and policies for 
providing information to the public? 
1, 
1.1, 
2 
T, A  /  /  /  /  / 
8. What is the process for providing 
information to the public or answering 
the public’s questions? 
1, 
1.1, 
2 
R, T, S, A  /  /  /  /  / 
9. Which kinds of information do the 
department usually provide to the 
public? 
1, 
1.1 
T  /  /  /  /  / 
10. What is your recommendation to 
improve the process of plan or policy 
making? 
1, 2  R  /  /  /  /  / 
 
Budgetary system 
Interviewees   Questions  RQ  Acc 
concepts  E  Ac  IA  PR  IT 
1. What is the process of annual 
budgetary report producing? 
1, 2  R, T, S   /  /  /     
2. What standards are used in the 
preparation? 
1  R, S  /  /  /     
3. What information is disclosed in the 
report? 
1, 
1.1 
T  /  /  /     
4. How do you evaluate performance 
and the use of the budget? 
1, 2  S  /  /  /     
5. What kinds of budgetary information 
are required by executives? 
1  T, A  /  /  /     
6. Apart from internal users, who else 
uses budgetary reports? 
1, 
1.1 
T, A  /  /  /  /  / 
7. What is the process of budgetary 
monitoring and controlling? 
1, 2  S  /  /  /     
8. Is the annual budgetary report audited 
by the Office of the Auditor General? 
And how soon does the department 
receive the comments? 
1, 2  S  /  /  /     
9. What is your recommendation to 
improve budgetary system? 
1, 2  S  /  /  /      
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Reports  
Interviewees   Questions  RQ  Acc 
concepts  E  Ac  IA  PR  IT 
1. Which information or reports do 
executives usually require? 
1, 
1.1 
T, A  /  /  /  /  / 
2. For executives, how long does it take 
to gain access to the reports? 
1, 
1.1 
T, A  /  /  /  /  / 
3. Are there any problems when the 
executives want to gain access to 
departmental information? What 
solutions does a department apply?  
1, 
1.1, 
2 
T, A  /  /  /  /  / 
4. Apart from internal users, who is 
allowed to gain access to financial 
records? And why they are allowed? 
1, 
1,1 
T  /  /  /  /  / 
5. What is the process of monitoring and 
controlling record keeping? 
1, 
1.1, 
2 
S  /  /  /     
 
 
Websites  
Interviewees   Questions  RQ  Acc 
concepts  E  Ac  IA  PR  IT 
1. Who is responsible for website 
designing, updating and information 
provided on the websites? 
1, 
1.1 
R        /  / 
2. What is the process of website 
monitoring and controlling? 
1,1.1
, 2 
S      /    / 
3. How do staff deal with comments or 
questions received from the citizens? 
1, 
1.1 
S, A        /  / 
4. What is the process for evaluating and 
assessing the quality of the websites? 
1, 
1.1, 
2 
S      /    / 
5. What is your recommendation to 
improve a departmental website? 
1, 
1.1, 
2 
S  /  /  /  /  / 
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Internal control 
Interviewees   Questions  RQ  Acc 
concepts  E  Ac  IA  PR  IT 
1. What is the process of internal 
auditing and monitoring during the 
year? 
1, 2  S  /  /  /     
2. Does the department have standards 
or a framework for internal control? And 
which standards does the department use 
as a guideline? 
1  S  /  /  /     
3. What controls are applied for 
financial information? 
1  S  /  /  /     
4. What controls are applied for 
documents and reports? 
1  S  /  /  /     
5. How do you use the results from the 
internal auditing to improve 
departmental performance and 
operations? 
1, 2  S  /  /  /     
6. Does the department provide the 
results to the public? 
1, 
1.1, 
2 
T, S  /  /  /     
7. What is your recommendation to 
improve internal control of the 
department? 
1, 2  S  /  /  /     
 
Accruals accounting 
Interviewees   Questions  RQ  Acc 
concepts  E  Ac  IA  PR  IT 
1. What is the process of financial 
statement produced? 
1, 2  R  /  /       
2. Does the department have its own 
framework for producing financial 
statements? 
1  R, S  /  /       
3. What is the process for information 
provided to the executives? 
1, 2  T, A  /  /       
4. How do you feel about the new public 
sector accounting? 
1, 2  R  /  /       
5. In addition to internal users, are there 
any other users using financial 
statements? 
1, 
1.1 
A  /  /  /  /  / 
6. Do citizens have any questions about 
financial statements? 
1, 
1.1 
A  /  /    /  / 
7. What is your recommendation to 
improve the accounting system? 
1, 2  R  /  /  /     
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Questions  for  the  staff  from  the  Office  of  the  Public  Sector  Development 
Commission 
Questions  RQ  Acc 
framework 
1. Apart from the Asian economic crisis, are there any 
reasons why the government started the public sector 
reform? 
1  O 
2. What was the process of the public sector reform?  1, 2  O 
3. Who was involved in this process?  1  R 
4. What are the main projects arising from the reform?  1, 2  R 
5. Why did the government decided to issue the Good 
Governance Royal Decree? 
1  R 
6. What was the process for producing the Good 
Governance Royal Decree? 
1  R 
7. Which standards, code of best practices, code of good 
governance and framework were used as a guideline for 
the Good Governance Royal Decree? 
1  R 
8. Why were these standards chosen?  1  R 
9. Regarding performance assessment, which standards 
or framework were used as a guideline for assessment 
criteria and key performance indicators? 
1  S 
10. Why did you choose these standards?  1  S 
11. Are there any problems when the departments apply 
this guidance? 
1, 2  S 
12. How do you solve the problems?  1, 2  S 
13. Are there any questions from any other departments? 
And what are they about? 
1, 2  R, A 
14. What is your recommendation to improve the process 
of the public sector reform and projects arising from the 
reform? 
1, 2  S 
 
Questions for the staff from the Office of the Auditor General 
Questions  RQ  Acc 
framework 
1. What is the procedure for financial statement auditing?  1, 2  S 
2. Which information and documents are used in that 
process? 
1, 2  S 
3. Which problems do auditors usually encounter during 
the auditing process? 
1, 2  S 
4. How do the auditors solve those problems?  1, 2  S 
5. Which standards are used in auditing?  1, 2  S 
6. What improvements would you recommend for the 
auditing process? 
1, 2  S 
7. What are your comments on departmental financial 
statements? And what are your recommendations to 
improve performance? 
1, 2  S 
8. What is your recommendation to improve the control 
system? 
1, 2  S 
9. What controls would you recommend for the GFMIS?  1  S 
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Appendix 3 
The examples of coloured coding 
Responsibility – Yellow 
Transparency – Pink 
Answerability – Gray 
Scrutiny – Green 
Responsibility means duties – Purple  
Responsibility for plans and policies – Orange  
Responsibility for petition and complaints – Red  
Responsibility for assessment – Turquoise  
Responsibility to superiors – use red as font 
Responsibility to other public sector organisations – use blue as font  
Responsibility to the public – use green as font   
Transparency and Scrutiny – Tan 
Transparency – citizens – Light green 
Transparency – other public sector organisations – Rose  
Transparency – superiors – use orange as font  
Answerability – public – use bright green as font  
Answerability – other public sector organisations – use pink as font  
Answerability – superiors – use violet as font  
Scrutiny – performance assessment – Dark yellow 
Scrutiny – internal control – Dark red 
Scrutiny – internal auditing – Dark blue 
Scrutiny – external auditing – Teal  
Scrutiny – code of ethics – Light yellow 
Attitudes and constraints – Light blue 
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The example of coding 
Interviewee: Head of Public Relations Section (B6) 
Q: Question        A: Answer 
Q. What is the organisational structure of the division? 
A. This section is part of  the Office of the Central Management. The Office consists 
of  PR,  Treasury,  Personnel,  Human  Resource  Management,  Training,  and 
Administrative sections. This division supports departmental operations.  
Q. What are the main responsibilities of the PR section? 
A. We provide information to the public so that they have all the information and 
understanding on laws and regulations that are important for them. We also impart 
information on our services. In addition, we aim to improve departmental reputation 
from the citizen’s perspective.   
For  the  PR  section,  we  have  two  main  groups,  which  are  News  and 
Information,  and  PR.  The  News  and  Information  group  has  four  main 
responsibilities. These are producing news to publicise to the public, analysing news 
in order to inform the executives to use when the correspondent ask the executives, 
making VDO and other audiovisual aids, and maintaining contact with the media in 
order  to  invite  correspondents  to  attend  departmental  activities  and  ensure  good 
relationships exist between executives and the media. 
In my job, I have to be responsible to both executives and citizens but I rank 
citizen’s requirements before the executive’s because the main aim of the PR staff is 
to provide departmental services and information, and communicate with the public. 
I think now departments should approach citizens rather than the reverse.   
Q. Do you have to do daily news analysis? 
A. Yes, we have to start working at 6 am in order to read the newspapers and collect 
all items of, which we then have to analyse. There may be some topics, which we are 
less  knowledgeable  about,  or  we  may  need  more  information,  so  we  contact  the 
relevant division to ask for more information. We then send all this information to 
the  executives.  I  think  this  task  should  not  belong  solely  to  the  PR  section.  All 
divisions should brainstorm and do this job together. However, at present, the role is 
carried out only by the PR section.   
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Q. As discussed earlier, they are responsibilities of the News and Information 
group. Another main group is PR. What are the main responsibilities? 
A. For PR, we get feedback from the public which allow us to see which problems 
we have and we then try to overcome these by using the media to increase public 
awareness. We also support our executives when they go to press conferences. In 
addition, we use the media to improve departmental reputation.  
Q. Do both groups have contact with the public?  
A. Yes. Now, the Thai government pays more attention to citizens. We also pay 
attention to them. There are some projects produced specifically to satisfy citizens’ 
requirements. It is quite important that I should follow this idea. However, it is not 
only the public that I focus on. In my relationship with executives, I have to prepare 
information and news reports to them every day. In addition, for press conferences, I 
also have to produce the information to be used at these. If I cannot do so by myself, 
I have to ask staff from other divisions to help me in this process. In the course of my 
duties, I focus on the requirements of citizens and the executives equally.  
Q. Are there any surveys carried out to ascertain for citizen requirements? 
A.  There  are  no  surveys  for  citizen  requirements.  I  wish  citizens  can  get  the 
information that we want to present. All the information, we make available, covers 
everything, I think, and is useful for the public.  
Q.  Which  kinds  of  information  does  the  department  usually  provide  to  the 
public? 
A. I normally provide information about our services and news.  
Q. How do you provide information to the public? 
A. We have information on the website. In addition, we also produce brochures that 
citizens can get from our offices. For other information, they can make a phone call. 
We have a call centre to answer any questions.  
Q. Does your work relate to the departmental website? 
A. Yes, we produce news to be posted on the website. We try to update information 
daily.   
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Q. How do you deal with comments or questions from citizens? 
A. If we can answer the questions, then we do so. However, if we cannot, we will 
pass these on to the relevant division. When we receive the answers, we will then 
contact the citizens, or in some cases, we will post the answers on our websites.  
I  think  staff  from  all  divisions  in  the  department  should  cooperate  and 
brainstorm in order to discuss which information or answers we want to transfer to 
the public. This should be a job for all staff in the department. It should not only be 
the responsibility of PR staff. 
Q. What is your recommendation to improve a departmental website? 
A. The website should be more up-to-date and should give useful information to 
users.  
Q. How many civil servants in this section? 
A. Sixteen. However, in some cases, the number of officials is not enough because 
we have many responsibilities such as being correspondent, photographer, and host 
at press conferences. However, this is not a great problem. We are able to manage 
the situation.  
Q. Do you have official job descriptions? 
A. We have flexible ones. I accept that we do not give specific responsibilities to 
staff. We do for the core responsibilities of the division, but for each official we do 
not, because of the nature of our responsibilities, which something we cannot fix. 
Staff need to be able to replace each other.  
Q. What are your Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)? 
A. Our KPI relates to the budgetary plan. We focus on the capabilities of our staff. At 
present, these are insufficient to reach our aims, but we do everything in our power to 
ensure everything is done. By the end of each month, we have to write a performance 
report and we analyse this information. 
Q. Do you have an annual plan? 
A. Yes, we do. We have an annual plan detailing service delivery to citizens. In 
addition, at this time, the government wants departments to produce time limits for 
each activity and we have to follow this plan. This plan is as a standard that we have 
to follow. The results relate directly to departmental performance and KPIs. The plan 
is  usually  measured  in  terms  of  quantity  rather  than  quality,  because  to  measure  
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understanding and attitude is difficult. At the moment, we evaluate certain criteria, 
such as the use of the budget, the number of press releases, and the amount of news 
broadcast. However, we never do qualitative analysis. 
  With regard to service delivery, it is possible that sometimes we cannot give 
citizens what they want. We try our best but it is not easy to please every person. In 
addition, some steps cannot be skipped. Therefore, some processes take a long time. 
However, if citizens are in urgent need or have particular reasons, we can prioritise 
their cases and process things as fast as possible.  
Q. During the year, do you ever make changes to the plan? 
A. It is difficult to change because of the budget. We have to use the budget we get. 
The budget is not flexible. For example, the budget that the News section was given 
was for travelling. However, sometimes we have to pay the press to promote our 
news, but this is difficult because we do not get money for this objective. According 
to the bureaucratic system, we are required to ask to ask for the money before the 
budgetary year starts. So, we have to make a plan in advance. We cannot make direct 
contact with citizens because we do not have a large enough budget. 
Q. I know it is unlikely to occur but if you had to amend a plan, what would the 
process  for  amending  this  be,  and  what  would  be  the  reason  for  the 
amendment? 
A. We would have to write a report explaining the scenario which we send to the 
executives. The reasons for doing this might be due to us having an urgent job to do.  
Q. What is the process for producing a budgetary plan? 
A.  When  we  make  a  plan,  we  use  brainstorming  to  discuss  the  strengths  and 
weaknesses of the section. In addition, we also think about what activities we should 
do during the year. The budget usually increases by 10% from the previous years. 
After we finish our plan, we submit it to the executives.  
Q. Do many citizens contact this section? 
A. Not many, because we have the PR counter downstairs. The staff from more than 
one  divisions  help  to  answer  questions  from  citizens.  If  they  cannot  answer  the 
questions, they will forward these questions to related divisions. At this time, we 
broadcast our news via radio because it is cheaper when compared with TV. We 
would also like to publicise news via TV but it is difficult to do because it would cost  
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a lot of money. However, we do ask the press for cooperation, but whether they do or 
not depends on them not us.  
Q. To use TV, you do not get any money for this, do you? 
A. For this, we do not get a budget. We usually try to give information to the public 
by sending out information or brochures via the provincial offices, which would then 
transmit our news to the public.  
Q. What are your main responsibilities to the executives? 
A. We have to be responsible to executives ranging from departmental executives to 
ministers. We have to follow all the news relating to the department, perform news 
analysis and provide a means of responding to such news. We have to work seven 
days a week. During the weekends, we have to create a schedule to determine who 
will come in to the department to prepare and collect the news. We have to report 
any information to the executives as soon as possible.   
Q. Are there any problems when the executives want to gain access to some 
information? 
A. No, because  for my division, we  can  get the information to them  as soon  as 
possible. However, with some information, where I may want some time to prepare, I 
just tell the executives that I will provide information as soon as it is ready.  
Q. Apart from internal users, who else is allowed access to financial records? 
A.  I  have  no  idea  about  other  financial  information  but  as  far  as  our  budget  is 
concerned, it is used only within our own organisation.  
Q. Do citizens ever have any questions about financial statements? 
A.  No,  I  do  not  receive  any  questions  about  this.  Perhaps  the  accounting  and 
financial division will know about this.  
Q. In order to pass news from the PR to the IT division, do you need to get 
permission from the executives? 
A. No, we have a lot of freedom. This is the strength of our division. Only very new 
items would the executives want to check first. So at the moment, we can reduce the 
amount of time spent. 
Q. Did the public sector reform affect your work? 
A. Not much, we still have the same responsibilities and have the same freedom. 
However, after reform, citizens are mow more important. I am more aware of this  
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concept.  Now,  we  focus  very  much  on  citizens.  We  pay  attention  to  their 
requirements.  One  of  the  main  objectives  of  our  division  is  to  satisfy  citizens’ 
requirements. 
Q. That means you now pay more attention to citizens. 
A. Yes. In addition, I also have responsibility to the executives. There is equality 
between the attention paid to executives and citizens. I rank them equally. 
Q. What about the Good Governance Royal Decree? Does it affect your work? 
A. My responsibilities changed very little, because I already have more freedom in 
my work so this Decree does not affect me at all. I have the same responsibilities as 
before the implementation of the Decree. 
Q. When the executives give out information at a press conference, do you need 
to prepare information for them? 
A. Yes, we have to prepare the answers for the executives. We have to ask relating 
organisations for answers, then summarise these and give them to the executives. 
One  of  the  main  aims  of  PR  is  to  look  after  departmental  reputation  from  the 
citizen’s perspective. A quick response to problems can make people feel impressed 
with our performance.  
Q. What are the main factors that affect operational performance? 
A. There are two main factors, executives and ourselves. The executives do not pay 
attention to this job. They do not think it is important.  
Q. Do you measure the level of executive’s satisfaction in your performance? 
A. No, we do not have, PR in the public sector also has to follow the executives’ 
needs. PR is classified as supporting staff to support the executives. We can produce 
scripts to the executives for use at a press conference, but we cannot force them to 
use these. It depends on them.  
Q.  At  this  time,  the  organisation  structure  seems  to  support  the  executives 
rather than the citizens. 
A. No, I do not think so. I think we focus on the citizens. We hope citizens are 
getting  the  information  we  are  able  to  provide.  The  executives  are  the  medium 
between the PR division and citizens. We do not contact citizens directly due to the 
limitations of the budget. If we wanted to contact them directly, we would have to 
spend a lot of money on mass media.   
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Q. What is the main future project of the department? 
A. Presently, we have a project for sending news via SMS to executives. For this 
project, we have to cooperate with the IT Division. However, at this time, I do not 
know much about this project.  
Q. Do you ever have any organisational overlap? 
A. Yes, but we can solve this problem using our personal contact. Sometimes, though 
we want to succeed at our task, it is impossible because we need help from the other 
divisions. For example, we sometimes want to immediately post important news onto 
the internet during the weekends, but it is impossible because we have to wait for the 
IT division.   
Q. Could you explain how reform and the Good Governance Royal Decree have 
affected your operation? 
A.  After  the  reform,  there  have  been  some  changes.  Some  of  them  affect  our 
division. For example, I think you know about how the government changed the 
system of human resource management. 
Q. You mean the new type of public officials? 
A. Yes. It is quite difficult for them to work effectively, because, for example, when 
they have to go to other provinces to work, they cannot authorise to use of a car by 
themselves.  I  have  to  sign  the  document  for  them.  This  wastes  the  time  and  is 
awkward. They should have the right to ask permission by themselves. 
Q. Are there any other ideas about the reform and the Decree? 
A. I know that after public sector reform, citizens are now considered important for 
governance and the bureaucratic system. Departments have to pay attention to them. 
We have to give them information and answer any questions. Additional to citizens, 
there  are  some  groups  of  people  or  organisations  that  are  also  important  for  our 
operations. For example, for NGOs and the media, I have to pay a lot of attention to 
these groups because they can provide information to the public, and our executives 
do not want them to have a bad impression of the department. We want to make a 
good impression, because if the media reports bad things about departments, this will 
cause problems for me. Executives would not be satisfied with such a situation. 
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Q. How do you plan to improve your organisation? 
A.  It should begin with us. We should improve ourselves so that we  have more 
knowledge and ability. We should also be more creative because, in the bureaucratic 
system, there are a lot of regulations that mean it is difficult for us to improve our 
creative skills.   
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